FOOTNOTES:

"Wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified,[270]it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects; thus it may appear in the power of seeing the very distant or the very minute, but not in the ear's becoming cognisant of form."

Hence (b.) we also maintain that your position cannot be established by any supposed supernatural testimony [as that quoted above from the Rig-Veda, "from him sprang the Ṛich and Sáman verses"]. For the rule of Páṇini (iv. 3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the grammatical affixes with which such names as Káṭhaka, Kálápa, and Taittiríya are formed, impart to those derivatives the sense of "uttered by" Kaṭha, Kalápin, &c., though we maintain that these names have reference [not to those parts of the Veda as first composed by these sages, but] to the fact that these sages instituted certain schools of traditional study. And in the same way we hold [in reference to this verse from the Rig-Veda] that it only refers to the institution of certain schools of traditional study of these Vedas.

Nor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternityof sound, because [as we said before] it is opposed to the evidence of our consciousness, [since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as the one heard before]. Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although the letters are not the same, they seem to be so on account of their identity of species. For here we ask our opponents a question—Is this idea that "the apparent sameness arises from identity of species" put forward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being the same, or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experience shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous [as in the cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above]? (a.) If it arises from the latter reason, we Mímáṃsakas, who hold that the Veda is its own evidence, have said in reference to this timid imagination—

"He who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion, will go to utter ruin in every transaction of life, his mind a mass of doubts."

(b.) "But [the Naiyáyikas will ask] does not this recognition ofgand other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the species which exists the same in each, and not to the several individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make such distinctions as we do when we say 'Somaśarman is reading'?" This objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for as there is no proof of any distinction between the individualg's, there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a speciesg; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand [the Naiyáyika doctrine of] the speciesg, the one species [in the Naiyáyika view] will by the influence of distinction of place, magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as short; so to the man who does not understand our [Mímáṃsaka doctrine of] one individualg, the oneg(in our view) will by the diversity of "manifesters,"[271]appear to him associated with their respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way ascribed [to the letterg], there is a fallacious appearance of distinction [between differentg's]. But does this ascription of contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference [between theg's], result (1.) from the nature of the thing, or (2.) from our imagination? There is no proof of the former alternative; for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be admitted between differentg's, we should have to say, "Chaitra has uttered teng's," and not "Chaitra has uttered the samegten times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent distinction betweeng's, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a difference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, &c., that there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [i.e., "different" as applied to theg's] is really caused by thenoise, which in each case is different. This has been said by the great teacher—

"The object which the Naiyáyikas seek by supposing a species is, in fact, gained from the letter itself; and the object which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters, is attained from audible noises;[272]so that the assumption of species is useless."

And again—

"Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's non-eternity."

This at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiyáyika]treatise by Vágíśwara, entitledMána-manohara, "sound is non-eternal from the fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of sense[273](sc.the ear), just as colour is to the eye."

We can also refute it in the following ways: (a.) If we follow the [Sáṅkhya and Vedánta] view that sound is a substance, it is evidently overthrown[274][as in that case sound cannot be a quality]; (b.) if we take it as referring to thenoise, not thesound, we have no dispute, as it only establishes what we ourselves allow; and (c.) the inference is overthrown by the "limiting condition" [upádhi] ofaśrávaṇatva, or "the not causing audition."[275]So Udayana tries at great length to establish that, although ether, the site of sound, is imperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is perceptible; and he then brings forward as an evidence for the non-eternity of sound, that sense perception which causes the use of such common expressions as "The tumult is stopped," "The sound has arisen."[276]But he is sufficiently answered[277]by our old reply [in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance ofdistinction arises from contrary characters being erroneously ascribed, just as, in the story, the demon Tála went away [as well as Betála] when the offering of blood was given to the latter.[278]And as for the objection raised by the author of theNyáyabhúshaṇa,[279]that, if sound were eternal, the conclusion must follow that it would be either always perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated by our allowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our articulate noise.[280]And as for the (Naiyáyika) argument against the existence[281]of such a constant relation as this which is supposed between the manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since they both come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing, this is invalid, as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of the soul.[282]

Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not originated from any personal author, and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is thus absolutely destroyed, we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated that it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to duty.

"Well"[283][say our opponents], "let this question rest;but how about another well-known controversy? It is said—

"'The Sáṅkhyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness are self-proved; the followers of the Nyáya hold that both are proved by something else [as inference, &c.]; the Buddhists hold that the latter is self-proved and the former proved by something else; the teachers of the Veda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and non-authoritativeness proved by something else.' Now we ask, amidst all this discussion, how do the Mímáṃsakas accept as established their tenet that the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved? And what is the meaning of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness? Is it (a.) that authoritativeness springs from itself? or (b.) that it springs from the right knowledge in which it resides? or (c.) that it springs from the instrumental causes [as the eye, &c.] which produced the right knowledge in which it resides? or (d.) that it resides in a particular knowledge produced by the instrumental causes which produced the right knowledge?[284]or (e.) that it resides in a particular knowledge produced by the instrumental causesonlywhich produced the right knowledge?

"(a.) It cannot be thefirst, because wherever the relation of cause and effect is found there must be a difference, and therefore these two cannot reside in the same subject [i.e., authoritativeness cannot cause itself]. (b.) It cannot be thesecond, because if knowledge, which is a quality, were the cause of authoritativeness, it would have to be a substance, as being an intimate cause.[285](c.) It cannot be thethird, because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly be'produced' at all,[286]whether we call it a general characteristic (upádhi) or a species (játi);[287]for if we call it anupádhi, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any contradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does not possess the nature of recollection;[288]and this cannot be produced, for we all allow that absolute non-existence is eternal; and still less can we speak of its being produced, if we regard it as a species. (d.) Nor can it be thefourth, for wrong knowledge [as well as right knowledge] is a particular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental causes which produce the general are included in those which produce the particular,[289]just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied to 'tree,' is included in the particular seed of any special tree, as,e.g., the Dalbergia Sisu; otherwise we might suppose that the particular had no instrumental cause at all. Your definition would therefore extend too far [and include erroneous as well as true knowledge]; for non-authoritativeness, which Vedantists and most Mímáṃsakas allow to be produced by something external, must also be considered as residing in a particular knowledge [i.e., a wrong knowledge] produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which produced the right knowledge. (e.) As for yourfifthview, we ask whether by being produced by the instrumental causesonlywhich produced right knowledge, you mean to include or exclude the absence of a 'defect'? It cannot be the former alternative; because the followers of the Nyáya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by something external [as inference, &c.], would at once grant that authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge combined with the absence of a 'defect.'Neither can it be the latter alternative; for, inasmuch as it is certain that the absence of a 'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes, this absence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of right knowledge, since right knowledge will always accompany its presence, and be absent if it is absent,[290]and it will at the same time be not an unimportant condition.[291]If you object that non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its "emergent non-existence" or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you at both ends. This has also been said by Udayana [in his Kusumáñjali, i. 10]—

"'As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause as well as an effect.'

"The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows:—Right knowledge depends on some cause[292]other than the common causes of knowledge, from the very fact that, while it is an effect, it is also knowledge, just as wrong knowledge does.[293]Authoritativeness is known through something external to itself [e.g., inference], because doubt arises in regard to it in an unfamiliar case, as we also see in non-authoritativeness.

"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced and recognised by means of something external, the Mímáṃsá tenet that 'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and rotten."

This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to strike the sky with his fist; for (a.) we mean by our phrase "self-proved" that while right knowledge is produced by the instrumental causes ofknowledge, it is not produced by any other cause (as "defect," &c.) The following is our argument as drawn out in full:—Right knowledge is not produced by any other instrumental causes than those of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is produced by these, because it is not the site of wrongness of knowledge,—just like a jar.[294]Nor can Udayana's[295]argument be brought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on something external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the equally potent contradictory argument. "Right knowledge is not produced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and is also other than 'defect,'[296]from the very fact of its being knowledge—like wrong knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can arise from the causes of knowledgeper se, it would be a needless complexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether you call it aguṇaor the absence of a "defect" (dosha).[297]

"But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of right knowledge?" We meet this, however, by maintaining that the absence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause, as it only acts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said—

"Therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence ofguṇasthe absence of 'defects,'[298]from their absence the non-existence of the two kinds of non-authoritativeness,[299]and from this the general conclusion."[300]

(b.) We maintain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced by the same causes only which make us perceive the first knowledge[301][sc.the eye, mind, &c.] Nor can you object that this view is precluded, because it would imply that there could be no such thing as doubt; for we answer that doubt arises in cases where, although all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there is also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, as a "defect," &c.

As for your argument [O Naiyáyika! givensupra, in p. 198, lines 17-24], I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself or not? If it is, it proves too much [for it would properly apply to itself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof, whereas you hold it to be independent of such]; and if it is not, we should have a case ofregressus in infinitum, for it will want some other proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its turn will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.

As for the argument urged by Udayana[302]in the Kusumáñjali, when he tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend on the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech which sets him acting: "Action depends on wish, its vehemence on thatof the wish,[303]wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is only ascertained by an inference based on some 'sign' which proves that the thing is closely connected with the wished-for end, and this inference depends on the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses; but throughout the whole series of antecedent steps the Mímáṃsá idea of the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of action." All this appears to us simple bluster, like that of the thief who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had actually found the gold under his armpit. It is only the knowledge that the thing is a means to attain the desired end, and this knowledge recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which causes the definite volition to arise at all; and in this we can distinctly trace the influence of that very perception of authoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently pretended to deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt, then, as it might always arise so in every given case, all ascertainment of authoritativeness would be useless; and as the very existence of what is unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness would have to be considered as dead and buried! But enough of this prolix controversy; since it has been said—

"Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which (authoritativeness) presented itself as representing a real fact, may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect,' which perception is produced by some sign that proves the discrepancy between the cognition and the fact."[304]

Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved and authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the following divergency between the two great Mímáṃsáschools]:—The Veda is composed of three portions, respectively called "hymns" (mantra), "explanatory passages" (arthaváda), and "injunctions" (vidhi); and by "injunction" we mean such sentences as "Let him who desires heaven sacrifice with the jyotishṭoma." Hereta, the affix of the third person singular, denotes an enjoining power, which is "coloured" [or rendered definite] by the meaning of the root, according to the opinion of the followers of Bhaṭṭa Kumárila, who maintain that words signify[305]something definite by themselves [apart from the sentence]. The followers of Guru Prabhákara, on the contrary, hold that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be done.[306]Thus all has been made plain.

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:[247]Mádhava here calls it thepráchí Mímáṃsá.[248]Cf.J. Nyáyamálávist, pp. 5-9.[249]Thus it is said that he who desires to be a family priest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured one to Soma, and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case fortantraor not? Bytantraone offering to Agni would do for both; but as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and thus it must be a case ofávápa,i.e., offering the two separately (J. Nyáyamálá, xi. 1, 13).[250]In p. 123, line 4, I readvilakshaṇa-dṛishṭaphala.[251]In the former case it would be avidhi, in the latter aniyama. Cf. the linesvidhir atyantam aprápto niyamaḥ pákshike sati, tatra chányatra cha práptau parisaṃkhyá vidhíyate.[252]The Mímáṃsá holds that the potential and similar affixes, which constitute avidhi, have a twofold power; by the one they express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the root-meaning (artha-bhávaná); by the other an enforcing power in the word (śabda-bhávaná). Thus insvargakámo yajeta, theetaimplies "let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make up a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence;" next it implies an enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the self-existent Veda and not of God) which sets the hearer upon this course of action.[253]These four "fruits of action" are obscure, and I do not remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India that they were a thing's coming into being, growing, declining, and perishing. If so, they are the second, third, fifth, and sixth of the sixvikárasmentioned in Śaṅkara's Vajrasúchi, 2,i.e.,asti,jáyate,vardhate,vipariṇamate,apakshíyate,naśyati. I do not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds ofapúrva, sc.phala,samudáya,utpatti, andaṅga, described in Nyáya M. V. ii. 1, 2.[254]Thenigamasare the Vedic quotations in Yáska'snirukta.[255]See Nyáya-málá-vistara, i. 4, 19.[256]The exact number is 915.[257]This is to explain the last of the five members, thesaṃgati.[258]Cf. Aśvaláyana's Gṛihya Sútras, i. 19, 1.[259]Theanuváda, of course, implies a previousvidhi, which it thus repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal authority. Theanuvádain the present case is the passage which mentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the previousvidhias to teaching.[260]I read in p. 127, line 12,anava-gamyamánasya, and so the recension given in the Nyáya M. V. p. 14,na budhyamánasya.[261]In the next two or three pages I have frequently borrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in hisSanskrit Texts, vol. iii. p. 88.[262]The soul may be traced back through successive transmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.[263]Mádhava means that the author of this stanza, though unknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his contemporaries, no doubt, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the origin, but which, nevertheless, had a human author. The stanza in question is quoted in full in Böhtlingk's Indische Sprüche, No. 5598, from the MS. anthology called theSubháshitárṇava. Formuktaka, seeSáh. Darp., § 558.[264]The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the Mímáṃsá that sound is eternal.[265]Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water, and air, minds, time, space, ether, and soul) haveviśesha, notsámányaor genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses. Genera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they reside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these arguments belong rather to the Nyáya-vaiśeshika school than to the Nyáya.[266]The Mímáṃsaka allows that theuchcháraṇaor utterance is non-eternal.[267]The inference will be as follows: "The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, &c."[268]The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the composition of Manu, &c."[269]In assuming a material body, he would be subject to material limitations.[270]The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman developments (atiśayáḥ) in their saints.[271]Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air "manifest" the always existing sound.[272]"What is meant by 'noise' (náda) is these 'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the air."—Ballantyne,Mímáṃsá Aphorisms, i. 17.[273]The Nyáya holds that colour and sound are respectively special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of course, have its corresponding special quality.[274]In p. 131, line 7, I readpratyakshásiddheḥ.[275]Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Chárváka-darśana) for theupádhi. Theupádhior "condition" limits a too general middle term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle." Thus if the condition "produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire," the argument "the mountain has smoke because it has fire" is no longer a false one. Here, in answer to the Nyáya argument in the text, our author objects that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide,i.e., it is sometimes found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as,e.g., insounditself, according to the Mímáṃsá doctrine. To obviate this he proposes to add the "condition," "not causing audition," as he will readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which,while not causing audition, are special qualities belonging to an organ of sense, as,e.g., colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the Púrva Mímáṃsá and the Nyáya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of sound, as their points of view are so totally different.[276]In the former case we have thedhwaṃsaof sound, in the latter itsprágabháva.[277]In p. 131, line 12, I readsamapauhiforsamápohi,i.e., the passive aorist ofsam+apa+úh.[278]I do not know this legend. Tála and Betála are the two demons who carry Vikramáditya on their shoulders in the Siṃhásan-battísí. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating how one answer can suffice for two opponents.[279]This is probably a work by Bhásarvajña (see Dr. Hall'sBibl. Index, p. 26).[280]Dhvani, or our "articulate noise," produces the vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into a definite speech by our various articulations. I takesaṃskṛitahere as equivalent toabhivyakta.[281]I read in p. 131, line 15,saṃskárakasaṃskáryabhávábhávánumánam.[282]It would be a case ofvyabhichára. The Naiyáyika argument would seem to be something as follows:—Sound is not thus manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its species; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not manifested by the species. But the Mímáṃsá rejoins that this would equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense perceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not sure that I rightly understand the argument.[283]Here begins a longpúrva-paksha, from p. 131, line 18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198infra.[284]This is Prabhákara's view (see Siddh. Muktáv., p. 118). The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar;" the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive the jar;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (prámáṇya), which resides in it as its characteristic.[285]Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities, and only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a quality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause and therefore a substance.[286]The eye, &c., would be its instrumental causes.[287]The first three categories "substance," "quality," and "action," are calledjátisor species; the last four, "genus," "viśesha," "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are calledupádhisor "general characteristics."[288]The Púrva Mímáṃsá denies that recollection is right knowledge.[289]Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental causes (as the eye, &c.) which produced right knowledge, but by thesetogether with a "defect,"as biliousness, distance &c.[290]Scil.if there bedoshábhávathere ispramá; if not, not. In p. 132, line 20, I readdoshábhávatvenafordoshábhávasahakṛitatvena.[291]Anyathásiddhatvammeansniyatapúrvavartitve sati anávaśyakatvam.[292]Scil.or the absence of "defect,"doshábháva.[293]Wrong knowledge hasdoshábhávaor the presence of a "defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.[294]Wrongness of knowledge (apramátva) can only reside in knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in a jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes than those of knowledge (as,e.g., the potter's stick, &c.), but it is not produced by these other causesin combinationwith being also produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has nothing directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in Sanskrit than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass muster. The jar is not produced-by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while-at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.[295]I suppose this is the argument given at the close of the previous long púrva-paksha.[296]These words "and is other than defect" (dosha-vyatirikta) are, of course, meaningless as far as right knowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to bring in "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by the causes of knowledgeplus"defect;" right knowledge by the former alone.[297]The Nyáya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a "defect," as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and right knowledge by aguṇaor "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a true object), or by the absence of a "defect."[298]Theguṇa(or βελτἱστη ἕξις of an organ is not properly a cause ofpramábut ratherdoshábháva-bodhaka.[299]Scil."doubtful" (sandigdha) and "ascertained non-authoritativeness" (niśchitáprámáṇya).[300]Utsargais a general conclusion which is not necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common causes of knowledge, the eye," &c.[301]The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth of the perception,i.e., its authoritativeness orprámáṇya.[302]This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words, and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the Kusumáñjali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).[303]I readtat-práchuryamfortatpráchuryein p. 134, line 7.[304]This stanza affirms that according to the Mímáṃsá school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness is proved from something else (as inference, &c.)[305]I takevyutpattihere as used forśakti;siddhemeansghaṭádau.[306]These are the two great Mímáṃsá schools. The former, calledabhihitánvaya-vádinaḥ, hold (like the Naiyáyika school) that words by themselves can express their separate meaning by the functionabhidháor "denotation;" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea. The latter, calledanvitábhidhána-vádinaḥ, hold that words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected with an action. Ingám ánaya,gámdoes not properly meangotva, butánayanánvita-gotva,i.e., the bovine genus as connected with "bringing." We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb, andvice versâ. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (Comparative Philology, page 136): "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words. But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding thought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."

[247]Mádhava here calls it thepráchí Mímáṃsá.

[248]Cf.J. Nyáyamálávist, pp. 5-9.

[249]Thus it is said that he who desires to be a family priest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured one to Soma, and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case fortantraor not? Bytantraone offering to Agni would do for both; but as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and thus it must be a case ofávápa,i.e., offering the two separately (J. Nyáyamálá, xi. 1, 13).

[250]In p. 123, line 4, I readvilakshaṇa-dṛishṭaphala.

[251]In the former case it would be avidhi, in the latter aniyama. Cf. the linesvidhir atyantam aprápto niyamaḥ pákshike sati, tatra chányatra cha práptau parisaṃkhyá vidhíyate.

[252]The Mímáṃsá holds that the potential and similar affixes, which constitute avidhi, have a twofold power; by the one they express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the root-meaning (artha-bhávaná); by the other an enforcing power in the word (śabda-bhávaná). Thus insvargakámo yajeta, theetaimplies "let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make up a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence;" next it implies an enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the self-existent Veda and not of God) which sets the hearer upon this course of action.

[253]These four "fruits of action" are obscure, and I do not remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India that they were a thing's coming into being, growing, declining, and perishing. If so, they are the second, third, fifth, and sixth of the sixvikárasmentioned in Śaṅkara's Vajrasúchi, 2,i.e.,asti,jáyate,vardhate,vipariṇamate,apakshíyate,naśyati. I do not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds ofapúrva, sc.phala,samudáya,utpatti, andaṅga, described in Nyáya M. V. ii. 1, 2.

[254]Thenigamasare the Vedic quotations in Yáska'snirukta.

[255]See Nyáya-málá-vistara, i. 4, 19.

[256]The exact number is 915.

[257]This is to explain the last of the five members, thesaṃgati.

[258]Cf. Aśvaláyana's Gṛihya Sútras, i. 19, 1.

[259]Theanuváda, of course, implies a previousvidhi, which it thus repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal authority. Theanuvádain the present case is the passage which mentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the previousvidhias to teaching.

[260]I read in p. 127, line 12,anava-gamyamánasya, and so the recension given in the Nyáya M. V. p. 14,na budhyamánasya.

[261]In the next two or three pages I have frequently borrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in hisSanskrit Texts, vol. iii. p. 88.

[262]The soul may be traced back through successive transmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.

[263]Mádhava means that the author of this stanza, though unknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his contemporaries, no doubt, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the origin, but which, nevertheless, had a human author. The stanza in question is quoted in full in Böhtlingk's Indische Sprüche, No. 5598, from the MS. anthology called theSubháshitárṇava. Formuktaka, seeSáh. Darp., § 558.

[264]The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the Mímáṃsá that sound is eternal.

[265]Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water, and air, minds, time, space, ether, and soul) haveviśesha, notsámányaor genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses. Genera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they reside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these arguments belong rather to the Nyáya-vaiśeshika school than to the Nyáya.

[266]The Mímáṃsaka allows that theuchcháraṇaor utterance is non-eternal.

[267]The inference will be as follows: "The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, &c."

[268]The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the composition of Manu, &c."

[269]In assuming a material body, he would be subject to material limitations.

[270]The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman developments (atiśayáḥ) in their saints.

[271]Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air "manifest" the always existing sound.

[272]"What is meant by 'noise' (náda) is these 'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the air."—Ballantyne,Mímáṃsá Aphorisms, i. 17.

[273]The Nyáya holds that colour and sound are respectively special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of course, have its corresponding special quality.

[274]In p. 131, line 7, I readpratyakshásiddheḥ.

[275]Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Chárváka-darśana) for theupádhi. Theupádhior "condition" limits a too general middle term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle." Thus if the condition "produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire," the argument "the mountain has smoke because it has fire" is no longer a false one. Here, in answer to the Nyáya argument in the text, our author objects that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide,i.e., it is sometimes found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as,e.g., insounditself, according to the Mímáṃsá doctrine. To obviate this he proposes to add the "condition," "not causing audition," as he will readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which,while not causing audition, are special qualities belonging to an organ of sense, as,e.g., colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the Púrva Mímáṃsá and the Nyáya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of sound, as their points of view are so totally different.

[276]In the former case we have thedhwaṃsaof sound, in the latter itsprágabháva.

[277]In p. 131, line 12, I readsamapauhiforsamápohi,i.e., the passive aorist ofsam+apa+úh.

[278]I do not know this legend. Tála and Betála are the two demons who carry Vikramáditya on their shoulders in the Siṃhásan-battísí. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating how one answer can suffice for two opponents.

[279]This is probably a work by Bhásarvajña (see Dr. Hall'sBibl. Index, p. 26).

[280]Dhvani, or our "articulate noise," produces the vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into a definite speech by our various articulations. I takesaṃskṛitahere as equivalent toabhivyakta.

[281]I read in p. 131, line 15,saṃskárakasaṃskáryabhávábhávánumánam.

[282]It would be a case ofvyabhichára. The Naiyáyika argument would seem to be something as follows:—Sound is not thus manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its species; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not manifested by the species. But the Mímáṃsá rejoins that this would equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense perceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not sure that I rightly understand the argument.

[283]Here begins a longpúrva-paksha, from p. 131, line 18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198infra.

[284]This is Prabhákara's view (see Siddh. Muktáv., p. 118). The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar;" the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive the jar;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (prámáṇya), which resides in it as its characteristic.

[285]Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities, and only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a quality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause and therefore a substance.

[286]The eye, &c., would be its instrumental causes.

[287]The first three categories "substance," "quality," and "action," are calledjátisor species; the last four, "genus," "viśesha," "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are calledupádhisor "general characteristics."

[288]The Púrva Mímáṃsá denies that recollection is right knowledge.

[289]Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental causes (as the eye, &c.) which produced right knowledge, but by thesetogether with a "defect,"as biliousness, distance &c.

[290]Scil.if there bedoshábhávathere ispramá; if not, not. In p. 132, line 20, I readdoshábhávatvenafordoshábhávasahakṛitatvena.

[291]Anyathásiddhatvammeansniyatapúrvavartitve sati anávaśyakatvam.

[292]Scil.or the absence of "defect,"doshábháva.

[293]Wrong knowledge hasdoshábhávaor the presence of a "defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.

[294]Wrongness of knowledge (apramátva) can only reside in knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in a jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes than those of knowledge (as,e.g., the potter's stick, &c.), but it is not produced by these other causesin combinationwith being also produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has nothing directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in Sanskrit than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass muster. The jar is not produced-by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while-at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.

[295]I suppose this is the argument given at the close of the previous long púrva-paksha.

[296]These words "and is other than defect" (dosha-vyatirikta) are, of course, meaningless as far as right knowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to bring in "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by the causes of knowledgeplus"defect;" right knowledge by the former alone.

[297]The Nyáya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a "defect," as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and right knowledge by aguṇaor "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a true object), or by the absence of a "defect."

[298]Theguṇa(or βελτἱστη ἕξις of an organ is not properly a cause ofpramábut ratherdoshábháva-bodhaka.

[299]Scil."doubtful" (sandigdha) and "ascertained non-authoritativeness" (niśchitáprámáṇya).

[300]Utsargais a general conclusion which is not necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common causes of knowledge, the eye," &c.

[301]The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth of the perception,i.e., its authoritativeness orprámáṇya.

[302]This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words, and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the Kusumáñjali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).

[303]I readtat-práchuryamfortatpráchuryein p. 134, line 7.

[304]This stanza affirms that according to the Mímáṃsá school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness is proved from something else (as inference, &c.)

[305]I takevyutpattihere as used forśakti;siddhemeansghaṭádau.

[306]These are the two great Mímáṃsá schools. The former, calledabhihitánvaya-vádinaḥ, hold (like the Naiyáyika school) that words by themselves can express their separate meaning by the functionabhidháor "denotation;" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea. The latter, calledanvitábhidhána-vádinaḥ, hold that words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected with an action. Ingám ánaya,gámdoes not properly meangotva, butánayanánvita-gotva,i.e., the bovine genus as connected with "bringing." We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb, andvice versâ. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (Comparative Philology, page 136): "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words. But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding thought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."

If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and this is an affix,'" may we not reply that to those who have drunk the waters of Patañjali this question produces no confusion, since it is notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point of the separation of the original roots and affixes? Thus the very first sentence of the venerable Patañjali, the author of the "Great Commentary," is "atha śabdánuśásanam," "Now comes the exposition of words." The particleatha("now") is used here as implying a new topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is meant the system of grammar put forth by Páṇini. Now a doubt might here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such doubt that he employed the particleatha, since this particle implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the exclusion of everything else.

The word "exposition" (anuśásana), as here used, implies that thereby Vaidic words, such as those in the lineśaṃ no devír abhishṭaye,[308]&c., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for "cow," "horse," "man,""elephant," "bird," &c., are made the subject of the exposition,i.e., are deduced from their original roots and properly formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix. We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of the object [śabdánuśásanamstanding forśabdasyánuśásanam], and as there is a rule of Páṇini (karmaṇi cha, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the phraseśabdánuśásanamdoes not come before us as a duly authorised compound.

Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the alleged rule of Páṇini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in connection with a word ending with akṛitaffix, there the object alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;[309]this limitation arising from our takingubhayapráptiin the sútra as abahuvríhicompound.[310]Thus we must say, "Wonderful is the milking of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put in the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in the Káśiká Commentary: "Some authors maintain that there should be an option in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of wordsofthe teacher' or 'bythe teacher.'" Inasmuch, however, as the words of the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended relates towordsand not tothings, and since this can be at once understood without any mention of theagent,i.e., the teacher, any such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object and the agent arenotboth expressed in one and the same sentence, this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in connection with a word ending with a kṛit affix, is to be put in the genitive [which in this instance is expressed by thetatpurushacompound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to such recognised forms asidhma-pravraśchana,paláśa-śátana, &c.[311]Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in thisshashṭhítatpurushais one of the class called "residual," in accordance with Páṇini's rule (ii. 3, 50), "Let the genitive be used in the residuum," [i.e., in the other constructions not provided for by special rules];[312]and in this way we might defend the phrase against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and hence Bhartṛihari in hisVákyapadíyahas shown that these rules are mainly useful where the question relates to theaccent.[313]To this effect are the words of the great doctor Vardhamána—

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