FOOTNOTES:

"In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,"But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be employed."Thus have they explained the meaning of Páṇini's sútras, since"He himself uses such phrases asjanikartuḥandtatprayojakaḥ."[314]

"In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,

"But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be employed.

"Thus have they explained the meaning of Páṇini's sútras, since

"He himself uses such phrases asjanikartuḥandtatprayojakaḥ."[314]

Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question (of theMahábháshya) is that "it is to be understood that the rules of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition concerning words' are now commenced."

"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,' as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless excess of letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since the employment of such a word asśabdánuśásanam, the sense of which can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a subordinate study (aṅga) to the Veda.[315]Otherwise, if there were no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the readers to the study of grammar. Nor may you say that this application will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any (special) end,"[316]because, even though there be such an injunction, it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end is mentioned which will establish that it is anaṅgaof the Veda. Thus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in haste to say—

"Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by common life,"And therefore grammar is useless?"

"Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by common life,

"And therefore grammar is useless?"

Therefore it was only when they understood it to be anaṅgaof the Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establishthat grammar is anaṅgaof the Veda. If, when the end is explained, they should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would consequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Saraswatí." Now it is to declare this end which establishes that it is anaṅgaof the Veda that he uses the wordsatha śabdánuśásanamand notatha vyákaraṇam. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction concerning words,i.e., propriety of speech. "But," an objector may say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the true means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by word is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the understanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided into proper and improper words.[317]Thus there is a tradition that Bṛihaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by word,[318]and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was Bṛihaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,—how much less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is rendered efficient by four appropriate means,—reading, understanding, practising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life would only suffice for the bare time of reading; therefore the reading word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and consequently,as we said at first, the desired end is not established." We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word. And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called roots, &c. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus, for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1),karmaṇi, the affixaṇis enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with it; and by this rule we learn many words, askumbhakára, "a potter,"káṇḍaláva, "a cutter of stems," &c. But the supplementary special rule (iii. 2, 3),áto 'nupasarge kaḥ, directing that the affixkais to be used after a root that ends in longáwhen there is noupasarga, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be [since it would never teach us how to distinguish anupasarga]. "But since there are otheraṅgas, why do you single out grammar as the one object of honour?" We reply, that among the sixaṅgasthe principal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal is sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said—

"Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious austerities,"The wise have called grammar the firstaṅgaof the Veda."

"Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious austerities,

"The wise have called grammar the firstaṅgaof the Veda."

Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &c., of the Veda. Hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the great Commentary [quoting a Várttika], "the end (or motive) is preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance."[319]Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus Kátyáyana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word according to theśástra; it is equal to the words of the Veda itself." Others also have saidthat "a single word thoroughly understood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow." Thus (they say)—

"They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;"But those who use such false forms asachíkramatamust trudge thither on foot."[320]

"They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;

"But those who use such false forms asachíkramatamust trudge thither on foot."[320]

Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word possess such power?" since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god. For the Śruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its heads, and seven its hands,—roars loudly the threefold-bound bull, the great god enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great commentator thus explains it:—The "four horns" are the four kinds of words—nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet" mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the tense-affixes,laṭ, &c.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary (or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the "manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the three organs—the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull" (vṛishabha) is applied from its pouring forth (varshaṇa),i.e., from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars,"i.e., utters sound, for the rootrumeans "sound;" here by the word "sound" developed speech (or language)[321]is implied; "the great god enters mortals,"—the "great god,"i.e., speech,—enters mortals,i.e., men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is declared the likeness [of speech][322]to the supreme Brahman.

The eternal word, calledsphoṭa, without parts, and the cause of the world, is verily Brahman; thus it has beendeclared by Bhartṛihari in the part of his book called the Brahmakáṇḍa—

"Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible essence of speech,"Which is developed in the form of things, and whence springs the creation of the world."

"Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible essence of speech,

"Which is developed in the form of things, and whence springs the creation of the world."

"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this, too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prakírṇaka—

"Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a fivefold,"Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the like."

"Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a fivefold,

"Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the like."

Helárája interprets the fivefold division as includingkarmapravachaníyas.[323]But the fourfold division, mentioned by the great commentator, is proper, sincekarmapravachaníyasdistinguish a connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions (upasargas).[324]

"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound calledsphoṭa? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the word is a false perception.

Hence you must concede that there is such a thing assphoṭa, as otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the following dilemma:—Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning [which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows (say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the cognition of the meaning, there must be asphoṭaby means of which arises the knowledge of the meaning; and thissphoṭais an eternal sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (sphuṭyate) or revealed by the letters," hence it is calledsphoṭa, as revealed by the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is calledsphoṭaas causing the knowledge of the meaning,—these are the two etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been said by the worshipful Patañjali in the great Commentary, "Now what is the word 'cow'gauḥ? It is that word by which, when pronounced, there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiyaṭa in the passage commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we wished]," and ending, "TheVákyapadíyahas established at length that it is thesphoṭawhich, distinct from the letters and revealed by the sound, expresses the meaning."[325]

Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say that thesphoṭahas no power to convey the meaning, as it fails under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of conveying the meaning always produced, since, assphoṭais supposed to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other alternative, viz., thatsphoṭaconveys the meaning when it is itself manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your hypothesis that they have this power to manifestsphoṭa." This has been said by Bhaṭṭa in his Mímáṃsá-śloka-várttika—

"The grammarian who holds thatsphoṭais manifested by the letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single difficulty."

The truth is, that, as Páṇini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (Sút. ii. 123) both lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they help.[326]If you object that as there are the same letters inrasaas insara, innavaas invana, indínáas innadí, inmáraas inráma, inrájaas injára, &c., these several pairs of words would not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been said by Tautátita—

"As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will be the meaning which they convey."

Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate thing calledsphoṭais unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our view having been shown to be irrelevant].

All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at a straw;[327]for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,[328]could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done with, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term "aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united together in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant, a man, a horse, &c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and pass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting" power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to conveyone meaning had been established; and, on the other hand, their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis ofsphoṭa. "But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain thing calledsphoṭawhich expresses the meaning, the same untenable alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler with the revenue-officer's house close by.'"[329]This, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power, reveals the invisiblesphoṭa, and each successive letter makes thissphoṭamore and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading, is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely manifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition, the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered letter." Therefore, since Bhartṛihari has shown in his first book that thelettersof a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain such and such a meaning from such and such aword," we are forced to assume the existence[330]of an indivisiblesphoṭaas a distinct category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this has been established in the discussion (in the Mahábháshya) on "genus" (játi), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is ultimately thatsummum genus,i.e., thatexistence whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality[331](Brahman).

"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no purpose at the same time!" Thus it has been said—

"The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn and not by combination.""Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the trouble of refuting."

"The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn and not by combination."

"Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the trouble of refuting."

All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as blue, red, yellow, &c., so, since thesummum genus, Brahman, is variously cognised through its connection with different things, as severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the various conventional words which arise from the different species,[332]as cow, &c., these being "existence" (thesummum genus) as found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we have the following authoritative testimony—

"Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as possessing that colour."

And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being divided, when found in cows, &c., by reason of its connection with different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root. This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the affixedtva,tal, &c., express" (Páṇini v. 1, 119).

"Existence" is that greatsummum genuswhich is found in cows, horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse," &c., are not really different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (gotvaandaśvatva) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that onesummum genusexistence, which is differentiated by the various subjects, cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence "existence" is the meaning of the stem-word (prátipadika). A "root" is sometimes defined as that which expressesbháva;[333]now, asbhávais "existence," the meaning of a root is really existence.[334]Others say that a root should be defined as that which expresses "action" (kriyá); but here again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this "action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the line—

"Others say that action (kriyá) is a genus, residing in many individuals."

So, too, if we accept Páṇini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the affixestvaandtalcome after a word [denoting anything], when we speak of the nature (bháva) thereof," it is clear from the very fact that abstract terms ending intvaortá[asaśvatvaandaśvatá] are used in the sense ofbháva, that they do express "existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in space, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul." Such is the meaning of Hari's twokárikásquoted above. So, too, it is laid down in the discussion onsambandha[in Hari's verses] that the ultimate meaning of allwords is that something whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word Substance.

"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of discrimination,[335]but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea [without owners] is expressed."[336]

So, too, the author of the Mahábháshya, when explaining the Várttika,[337]"a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed," in the passage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and determined by various unreal[338]conditions [as "the nature of horse," &c.]

According to the opinion of Vájapyáyana, who maintains that all words mean a genus, words like "cow," &c.,[339]denote a genus which resides by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," &c., denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &c.," we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,[340]&c. [as directly denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is denoted; this is the root-meaning, as inpaṭhati, "he reads," &c., since we find here a meaning common to all who read.

In the doctrine of Vyáḍi, who maintained that words meant individual things [and not classes or genera], the individual thing is put forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied [as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of "indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."[341]

Both views are allowed by the great teacher Páṇini; since in i. 2, 58, he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that "when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be optionally used" [as in the sentence, "A Bráhman is to be honoured," which may equally run, "Bráhmans are to be honoured"]; while in i. 2, 64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing, where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of things similar in form" [i.e., the dual means Ráma and Ráma, and the plural means Ráma, and Ráma and Ráma; but we retain only one, adding a dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all assemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised. Therefore both theories are in a sense true;[342]but the real fact is that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.

As it has been said—

"Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one true universal meaning, identical with the one existent, shines out in many forms as the thing denoted."

Hari also, in his chapter discussingsambandha, thus describes the nature of this true meaning—

"That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the perception [which unites them] are insusceptible of doubt,[343]thatonly is called the truth by those who know the end of the three Vedas."

So too in his description of substance, he says—

"Thatwhich remains as the Real during the presence of modification, as the gold remains under the form of the earring,—thatwherein change comes and goes,thatthey call the Supreme Nature."

The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.

"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is identical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two souls."[344]

The meaning of this Káriká is that Brahman is the one object denoted by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon it according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the power of "concealment"[345][exercised by illusion] at the time of the conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is the case during sleep. Thus those skilled in Vedánta lore tell us—

"As all the extended world of dreams is only the development of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a development of illusion likewise."

When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval ignorance is abolished,final bliss is accomplished, which is best defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the Supreme Brahman."[346]And thus we establish the fact that the "exposition of words" is the means to final bliss.

Thus it has been said—

"They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the science of sciences."[347]

And so again—

"This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the travellers to emancipation."

Therefore our final conclusion is that the Śástra of grammar should be studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man.

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:[307]Mádhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians adopted and fully developed the idea of the Púrva-Mímáṃsá school that sound is eternal. He therefore treats ofsphoṭahere, and not in his Jaimini chapter.[308]Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.[309]Śabdánuśásana, if judged by the apparent sense of Páṇini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so, because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66, whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were an agent expressedas well asan object,i.e., if such a word asácháryeṇafollowed. In the example given, we cannot sayáścharyo godoho śikshitena gopálena(as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither can we sayáścharyo gaváṃ doho' śikshitasya gopálasya(as it would violate ii. 3, 66).[310]That is, theubhayapráptiof ii. 3, 66, is abahuvríhiagreeing withkṛitiin ii. 3, 65. These points are all discussed at some length in the Commentaries on Páṇini.[311]These actually occur in the Commentaries to Páṇini, ii. 2, 8; iii. 3, 117, &c.[312]This takes in all cases of relation,sambandha(i.e.,shashṭhí-sambandha).[313]As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.[314]These compounds occur in Páṇini's own sútras (i. 4, 30, and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were to interpret the latter without some such saving modification asshashṭhí śeshe.[315]The very wordśabdainśabdánuśásanamimplies the Veda, since this is pre-eminentlyśabda.[316]Compare Max Müller,Sansk. Liter., p. 113. It is quoted as from the Veda in the Mahábháshya.[317]In the Calcutta text, p. 138, deledaṇḍain line 3 afterbhavet, and insert it in line 4 afterśabdánám.[318]As in the so-calledpadatext.[319]See Ballantyne'sMahábháshya, pp. 12, 64.[320]Achíkramataseems put here as a purposely false form of the frequentative ofkramforachaṅkramyata.[321]Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the lines of Bhartṛihari which immediately follow.[322]One would naturally supplyśabdasyaaftersámyam, but the Mahábháshya hasnaḥ sámyam(see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).[323]I.e., prepositions used separately as governing cases of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.[324]Thekarmapravachaníyasimply a verb other than the one expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced by this understood verb. Thus in the example,Śákalyasaṃhitám anu právarshat, "he rained after the Śákalya hymns,"anuimplies an understood verbniśamya, "having heard," and this verb shows that there is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. Thisanuis said to determine this relation.[325]See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.[326]This is not very clear, theanuinanugrahamight meankrameṇa, and so imply the successive order of the letters.[327]In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I readkalpamforkalpanam.[328]In p. 142, line 3, I addvináafternimittam.[329]The ghaṭṭa is the place where dues and taxes are collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day dawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb meansuddeśyásiddhi.[330]In p. 143, line 13, I readsphoṭakabhávamforsphoṭábhávam.[331]Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mahábháshya, pp. 9, 32.[332]The Mímáṃsâ holds that a word means the genus (játi) and not the individual (vyakti); the Nyáya holds that a word means an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).[333]Cf. Rig-Veda Prátiś. xii. 5.[334]He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.[335]Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.[336]So by the words "horse," "cow," &c., Brahman is really meant, the one abiding existence.[337]Cf. Ballantyne's Mahábháshya, pp. 44, 50.[338]In p. 145, line 8, readasatyaforaśvattha.[339]We have here the well-known four grammatical categories,játi,guna,dravyaorsaṅjná, andkriyá.[340]But cf. Siddh. Muktáv., p. 6, line 12.[341]Thus we read in the Siddhánta Muktávali, p. 82, that the Mímáṃsá holds that a word means the genus and not the individual, since otherwise there would bevyabhicháraandánantya(cf. also Maheśachandra Nyáyaratna's note, Kávya-prakáśa, p. 10). If a word is held to mean onlyoneindividual, there will be the first fault, as it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not include; if it is held to meanmanyindividuals, it will have an endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."[342]This seems the meaning of the text as printedtasmát dvayaṃ satyam, but I should prefer to read conjecturallytasmád advayaṃ satyam, "therefore non-duality is the truth."[343]Scil.they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone exists.[344]Scil.the individual soul (jíva) and Brahman.[345]TheSaṃvṛitiof the text seems to correspond to theávaraṇaso frequent in Vedánta books.[346]This passage is quoted in the Maitrí Upanishad, vi. 22.[347]Adhividyamoccurs in Taitt. Upanishad, i. 3, 1, where it is explained by [']Saṃkara asvidyásv adhi yad dar[']sanaṃ tad adhividyam.

[307]Mádhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians adopted and fully developed the idea of the Púrva-Mímáṃsá school that sound is eternal. He therefore treats ofsphoṭahere, and not in his Jaimini chapter.

[308]Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.

[309]Śabdánuśásana, if judged by the apparent sense of Páṇini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so, because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66, whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were an agent expressedas well asan object,i.e., if such a word asácháryeṇafollowed. In the example given, we cannot sayáścharyo godoho śikshitena gopálena(as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither can we sayáścharyo gaváṃ doho' śikshitasya gopálasya(as it would violate ii. 3, 66).

[310]That is, theubhayapráptiof ii. 3, 66, is abahuvríhiagreeing withkṛitiin ii. 3, 65. These points are all discussed at some length in the Commentaries on Páṇini.

[311]These actually occur in the Commentaries to Páṇini, ii. 2, 8; iii. 3, 117, &c.

[312]This takes in all cases of relation,sambandha(i.e.,shashṭhí-sambandha).

[313]As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.

[314]These compounds occur in Páṇini's own sútras (i. 4, 30, and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were to interpret the latter without some such saving modification asshashṭhí śeshe.

[315]The very wordśabdainśabdánuśásanamimplies the Veda, since this is pre-eminentlyśabda.

[316]Compare Max Müller,Sansk. Liter., p. 113. It is quoted as from the Veda in the Mahábháshya.

[317]In the Calcutta text, p. 138, deledaṇḍain line 3 afterbhavet, and insert it in line 4 afterśabdánám.

[318]As in the so-calledpadatext.

[319]See Ballantyne'sMahábháshya, pp. 12, 64.

[320]Achíkramataseems put here as a purposely false form of the frequentative ofkramforachaṅkramyata.

[321]Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the lines of Bhartṛihari which immediately follow.

[322]One would naturally supplyśabdasyaaftersámyam, but the Mahábháshya hasnaḥ sámyam(see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).

[323]I.e., prepositions used separately as governing cases of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.

[324]Thekarmapravachaníyasimply a verb other than the one expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced by this understood verb. Thus in the example,Śákalyasaṃhitám anu právarshat, "he rained after the Śákalya hymns,"anuimplies an understood verbniśamya, "having heard," and this verb shows that there is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. Thisanuis said to determine this relation.

[325]See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.

[326]This is not very clear, theanuinanugrahamight meankrameṇa, and so imply the successive order of the letters.

[327]In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I readkalpamforkalpanam.

[328]In p. 142, line 3, I addvináafternimittam.

[329]The ghaṭṭa is the place where dues and taxes are collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day dawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb meansuddeśyásiddhi.

[330]In p. 143, line 13, I readsphoṭakabhávamforsphoṭábhávam.

[331]Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mahábháshya, pp. 9, 32.

[332]The Mímáṃsâ holds that a word means the genus (játi) and not the individual (vyakti); the Nyáya holds that a word means an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).

[333]Cf. Rig-Veda Prátiś. xii. 5.

[334]He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.

[335]Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.

[336]So by the words "horse," "cow," &c., Brahman is really meant, the one abiding existence.

[337]Cf. Ballantyne's Mahábháshya, pp. 44, 50.

[338]In p. 145, line 8, readasatyaforaśvattha.

[339]We have here the well-known four grammatical categories,játi,guna,dravyaorsaṅjná, andkriyá.

[340]But cf. Siddh. Muktáv., p. 6, line 12.

[341]Thus we read in the Siddhánta Muktávali, p. 82, that the Mímáṃsá holds that a word means the genus and not the individual, since otherwise there would bevyabhicháraandánantya(cf. also Maheśachandra Nyáyaratna's note, Kávya-prakáśa, p. 10). If a word is held to mean onlyoneindividual, there will be the first fault, as it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not include; if it is held to meanmanyindividuals, it will have an endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."

[342]This seems the meaning of the text as printedtasmát dvayaṃ satyam, but I should prefer to read conjecturallytasmád advayaṃ satyam, "therefore non-duality is the truth."

[343]Scil.they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone exists.

[344]Scil.the individual soul (jíva) and Brahman.

[345]TheSaṃvṛitiof the text seems to correspond to theávaraṇaso frequent in Vedánta books.

[346]This passage is quoted in the Maitrí Upanishad, vi. 22.

[347]Adhividyamoccurs in Taitt. Upanishad, i. 3, 1, where it is explained by [']Saṃkara asvidyásv adhi yad dar[']sanaṃ tad adhividyam.

"But how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation [thus held by the grammarians, following the guidance of thepúrvaanduttaraMímáṃsá schools], when the system of development propounded by the Sáṅkhyas is still alive to oppose it?" Such is their loud vaunt. Now the Śástra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent[348]only, that which is evolute only, that which is both evolute and evolvent, and that which is neither. (a.) Of these the first is that which is only evolvent, called the root-evolvent or the primary; it is not itself the evolute of anything else. It evolves, hence it is called the evolvent (prakṛiti) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium of the three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness. This is expressed [in the Sáṅkhya Káriká], "the root-evolvent is no evolute." It is called the root-evolvent, as being both root and evolvent; it is the root of all the various effects, as the so-called "great one," &c., but of it, as the primary, there is no root, as otherwise we should have aregressus ad infinitum. Nor can you reply that such aregressus ad infinitumis no objection, if, like the continued series of seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evidence of our senses,[349]—because here there is no evidence to establish the hypothesis. (b.) The "evolutes and evolvents" are the great one, egoism, and the subtile elements,—thus theSáṅkhya Káriká (§ 3), "the seven, the great one, &c., are evolute-evolvents." The seven are the seven principles, called the great one, &c. Among these the great principle, called also the intellect,[350]&c., is itself the evolute of nature and the evolvent of egoism; in the same manner the principle egoism, called also "self-consciousness" (abhimána), is the evolute of the great one, intellect; but this same principle, as affected by the quality of darkness, is the evolvent of the five rudiments called subtile elements; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it is the evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs of perception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the five organs of action, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and generative organ; and the mind, partaking of the character of both; nor can you object that in our arrangement the third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a cause by producing action in the others. This has been thus declared by Íśvara Kṛishṇa in his Kárikás[351](§ 24-27), "Self-consciousness is egoism. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, the elevenfold set and the five elemental rudiments. From modified[352]egoism originates the class of eleven imbued with goodness; from egoism as the source of the elements originate the rudimentary elements, and these are affected by darkness; but it is only from egoism as affected by activity that the one and the other rise. The intellectual organs are the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; those of action are the voice, feet, hands, anus, and organ of generation. In this set is mind, which has the character of each; it determines, and it is an organ (like the other ten) from having a commonproperty with them."[353]All this has been explained at length by the teacher Váchaspati Miśra in the Sáṅkhya-tattva-kaumudí.

(c.) The "evolute only" means the five gross elements, ether, &c., and the eleven organs, as said in the Káriká, "The evolute consists of sixteen;" that is, the set of sixteen is evolute only, and not evolvent. Although it may be said that earth, &c., are the evolvents of such productions as cows, jars, &c., yet these are not a different "principle" (tattva) from earth, &c., and therefore earth, &c., are not what we term "evolvents;" as the accepted idea of an evolvent is that which is the material cause of a separate principle; and in cows, jars, &c., there is the absence of being any such first principle, in consequence of their being all alike gross [i.e., possessed of dimensions] and perceptible to the senses. The five gross elements, ether, &c., are respectively produced from sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, each subtile element being accompanied by all those which precede it, and thus the gross elements will have respectively one, two, three, four, and five qualities.[354]The creation of the organs has been previously described. This is thus propounded in the Sáṅkhya Káriká (§ 22)—

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