Bibliographical Note.

¹ SeeThe New South,by Holland Thompson (inThe Chronicles of America).

¹ SeeThe New South,by Holland Thompson (inThe Chronicles of America).

Reconstruction could hardly be a genuine issue in the presidential campaign of 1876, because all except these three reconstructed States had escaped from radical control, and there was no hope andlittle real desire of regaining them. It was even expected that in this year the radicals would lose Louisiana and Florida to the "white man's party." The leaders of the best element of the Republicans, both North and South, looked upon the reconstruction as one of the prime causes of the moral breakdown of their party; they wanted no more of the Southern issue but planned a forward-looking, constructive reform.

To some of the Republican leaders, however, among whom was James G. Blaine, it was clear that the Republican party, with its unsavory record under Grant's Administration, could hardly go before the people with a reform program. The only possible thing to do was to revive some Civil War issue—"wave the bloody shirt" and fan the smoldering embers of sectional feeling. Blaine met with complete success in raising the desired issue. In January 1876, when an amnesty measure was brought before the House, he moved that Jefferson Davis be excepted on the ground that he was responsible for the mistreatment of Union prisoners during the war. Southern hot-bloods replied, and Blaine skillfully led them on until they had foolishly furnished him with ample material for campaign purposes. The feeling thusaroused was so strong that it even galvanized into seeming life the dying interest in the wrongs of the negro. The rallying cry "Vote as you shot!" gave the Republicans something to fight for; the party referred to its war record, claimed credit for preserving the Union, emancipating the negro, and reconstructing the South, and demanded that the country be not "surrendered to rebel rule."

Hayes and Tilden, the rival candidates for the presidency, were both men of high character and of moderate views. Their nominations had been forced by the better element of each party. Hayes, the Republican candidate, had been a good soldier, was moderate in his views on Southern questions, and had a clean political reputation. Tilden, his opponent, had a good record as a party man and as a reformer, and his party needed only to attack the past record of the Republicans. The principal Democratic weakness lay in the fact that the party drew so much of its strength from the white South and was therefore subjected to criticism on Civil War issues.

The campaign was hotly contested and was conducted on a low plane. Even Hayes soon saw that the "bloody shirt" issue was the main vote winner. The whites of the three "unredeemed" SouthernStates nerved themselves for the final struggle. In South Carolina and in some parishes of Louisiana there was a considerable amount of violence, in which the whites had the advantage, and much fraud, which the Republicans, who controlled the election machinery, turned to best account. It has been said that out of the confusion which the Republicans created they won the presidency.

The first election returns seemed to give Tilden the victory with 184 undisputed electoral votes and popular majorities of ninety and over six thousand respectively in Florida and Louisiana; only 185 votes were needed for a choice. Hayes had 166 votes, not counting Oregon, in which one vote was in dispute, and South Carolina, which for a time was claimed by both parties. Had Louisiana and Florida been Northern States, there would have been no controversy, but the Republican general headquarters knew that the Democratic majorities in these States had to go through Republican returning boards, which had never yet failed to throw them out.

The interest of the nation now centered around the action of the two returning boards. At the suggestion of President Grant, prominent Republicans went South to witness the count. Laterprominent Democrats went also. These "visiting statesmen" were to support the frail returning boards in their duty. It was generally understood that these boards, certainly the one in Louisiana, were for sale, and there is little doubt that the Democrats inquired the price. But they were afraid to bid on such uncertain quantities as Governor Wells and T. C. Anderson of Louisiana, both notorious spoilsmen. The members of the boards in both States soon showed the stiffening effect of the moral support of the Federal Administration and of the "visiting statesmen." Reassured as to their political future, they proceeded to do their duty: in Florida they threw out votes until the ninety majority for Tilden was changed to 925 for Hayes, and in Louisiana, by throwing out about fifteen thousand carefully selected ballots, they changed Tilden's lowest majority of six thousand to a Hayes majority of nearly four thousand. Naturally the Democrats sent in contesting returns, but the presidency was really won when the Republicans secured in Louisiana and Florida returns which were regular in form. But hoping to force Congress to go behind the returns, the Democrats carried up contests also from Oregon and South Carolina, whose votes properly belonged to Hayes.

The final contest came in Congress over the counting of the electoral votes. The Constitution provides that "the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted." But there was no agreement as to where authority lay for deciding disputed votes. Never before had the presidency turned on a disputed count. From 1864 to 1874 the "twenty-second joint rule" had been in force under which either House might reject a certificate. The votes of Georgia in 1868 and of Louisiana in 1872 had thus been thrown out. But the rule had not been readopted by the present Congress, and the Republicans very naturally would not listen to a proposal to readopt it now.

With the country apparently on the verge of civil war, Congress finally created by law an Electoral Commission to which were to be referred all disputes about the counting of votes and the decision of which was to be final unless both Houses concurred in rejecting it. The act provided that the commission should consist of five senators, five representatives, four designated associate justices of the Supreme Court, and a fifth associate justice to be chosen by these four. While nothing wassaid in the act about the political affiliations of the members of the commission, every one understood that the House would select three Democrats and two Republicans, and that the Senate would name two Democrats and three Republicans. It was also well known that of the four justices designated two were Republicans and two Democrats, and it was tacitly agreed that the fifth would be Justice David Davis, an "independent." But at the last moment Davis was elected Senator by the Illinois Legislature and declined to serve on the Commission. Justice Bradley, a Republican, was then named as the fifth justice, and in this way the Republicans obtained a majority on the Commission.

The Democrats deserve the credit for the Electoral Commission. The Republicans did not favor it, even after they were sure of a party majority on it. They were conscious that they had a weak case, and they were afraid to trust it to judges of the Supreme Court. Their fears were groundless, however, since all important questions were decided by an 8 to 7 vote, Bradley voting with his fellow Republicans. Every contested vote was given to Hayes, and with 185 electoral votes he was declared elected on March 2, 1877.

Ten years before, Senator Morton of Indiana hadsaid: "I would have been in favor of having the colored people of the South wait a few years until they were prepared for the suffrage, until they were to some extent educated, but the necessities of the times forbade that; the conditions of things required that they should be brought to the polls at once." Now the condition of things required that some arrangement be made with the Southern whites which would involve a complete reversal of the situation of 1867. In order to secure the unopposed succession of Hayes, to defeat filibustering which might endanger the decision of the Electoral Commission, politicians who could speak with authority for Hayes assured influential Southern politicians, who wanted no more civil war but who did want home rule, that an arrangement might be made which would be satisfactory to both sides.

So the contest was ended. Hayes was to be President; the South, with the negro, was to be left to the whites; there would be no further military aid to carpetbag governments. In so far as the South was concerned, it was a fortunate settlement—better, indeed, than if Tilden had been inducted into office. The remnants of the reconstruction policy were surrendered by a Republican President,the troops were soon withdrawn, and the three radical States fell at once under the control of the whites. Hayes could not see in his election any encouragement to adopt a vigorous radical position, and Congress was deadlocked on party issues for fifteen years. As a result the radical Republicans had to develop other interests, and the North gradually accepted the Southern situation.

Although the radical policy of reconstruction came to an end in 1877, some of its results were more lasting. The Southern States were burdened heavily with debt, much of which had been fraudulently incurred. There now followed a period of adjustment, of refunding, scaling, and repudiation, which not only injured the credit of the States but left them with enormous debts. The Democratic party under the leadership of former Confederates began its régime of strict economy, race fairness, and inelastic Jeffersonianism. There was a political rest which almost amounted to stagnation and which the leaders were unwilling to disturb by progressive measures lest a developing democracy make trouble with the settlement of 1877.

The undoing of reconstruction was not entirely completed with the understanding of 1877. Thereremained a large but somewhat shattered Republican party in the South, with control over county and local government in many negro districts. Little by little the Democrats rooted out these last vestiges of negro control, using all the old radical methods and some improvements,¹ such as tissue ballots, the shuffling of ballot boxes, bribery, force, and redistricting, while some regions were placed entirely under executive control and were ruled by appointed commissions. With the good government which followed these changes a deadlocked Congress showed no great desire to interfere. The Supreme Court came to the aid of the Democrats with decisions in 1875, 1882, and 1883 which drew the teeth from the Enforcement Laws, and Congress in 1894 repealed what was left of these regulations.

¹ SeeThe New South,by Holland Thompson (inThe Chronicles of America).

¹ SeeThe New South,by Holland Thompson (inThe Chronicles of America).

Under such discouraging conditions the voting strength of the Republicans rapidly melted away. The party organization existed for the Federal offices only and was interested in keeping down the number of those who desired to be rewarded. As a consequence, the leaders could work in harmony with those Democratic chiefs who were content with a "solid South" and local home rule. The negroesof the Black Belt, with less enthusiasm and hope, but with quite the same docility as in 1868, began to vote as the Democratic leaders directed. This practice brought up in another form the question of "negro government" and resulted in a demand from the people of the white counties that the negro be put entirely out of politics. The answer came between 1890 to 1902 in the form of new and complicated election laws or new constitutions which in various ways shut out the negro from the polls and left the government to the whites. Three times have the Black Belt regions dominated the Southern States: under slavery, when the master class controlled; under reconstruction, when the leaders of the negroes had their own way; and after reconstruction until negro disfranchisement, when the Democratic dictators of the negro vote ruled fairly but not always acceptably to the white counties which are now the source of their political power.

Thebest general accounts of the reconstruction period are found in James Ford Rhodes'sHistory of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877,volumes V, VI, VII (1906); in William A. Dunning'sReconstruction, Political and Economic, 1865-1877, in theAmerican NationSeries, volume XXII (1907); and in Peter Joseph Hamilton'sThe Reconstruction Period(1905), which is volume XVI ofThe History of North America,edited by F. N. Thorpe. The work of Rhodes is spacious and fair-minded but there are serious gaps in his narrative; Dunning's briefer account covers the entire field with masterly handling; Hamilton's history throws new light on all subjects and is particularly useful for an understanding of the Southern point of view. A valuable discussion of constitutional problems is contained in William A. Dunning'sEssay on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics(1904); and a criticism of the reconstruction policies from the point of view of political science and constitutional law is to be found in J. W. Burgess'sReconstruction and the Constitution, 1866-1876(1902). E. B. Andrews'sThe United States in our own Time(1903) gives a popular treatment of the later period. A collection of brief monographs entitledWhy the Solid South?by Hilary A. Herbert and others (1890) was written as acampaign document to offset the drive made by the Republicans in 1889 for new enforcement laws.

There are many scholarly monographs on reconstruction in the several States. The best of these are: J. W. Garner'sReconstruction in Mississippi(1901), W. L. Fleming'sCivil War and Reconstruction in Alabama(1905), J. G. deR. Hamilton'sReconstruction in North Carolina(1914), W. W. Davis'sThe Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida(1913), J. S. Reynolds'sReconstruction in South Carolina, 1865-1877(1905); C. W. Ramsdell'sReconstruction in Texas(1910), and C. M. Thompson'sReconstruction in Georgia(1915).

Books of interest on special phases of reconstruction are not numerous, but among those deserving mention are Paul S. Pierce'sThe Freedmen's Bureau(1904), D. M. DeWitt'sThe Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson(1903), and Paul L. Haworth'sThe Hayes-Tilden Disputed Presidential Election of 1876(1906), each of which is a thorough study of its field. J. C. Lester and D. L. Wilson'sKu Klux Klan(1905) and M. L. Avary'sDixie After the War(1906) contribute much to a fair understanding of the feeling of the whites after the Civil War; and Gideon Welles,Diary,3 vols. (1911), is a mine of information from a conservative cabinet officer's point of view.

For the politician's point of view one may go to James G. Blaine'sTwenty Years of Congress,2 vols. (1884, 1886) and Samuel S. Cox'sThree Decades of Federal Legislation(1885). Good biographies are James A. Woodburn'sThe Life of Thaddeus Stevens(1913), Moorfield Storey'sCharles Sumner(1900), C. F. Adams'sCharles Francis Adams(1900). Less satisfactory because more partisan is Edward Stanwood'sJamesGillespie Blaine(1906). There are no adequate biographies of the Democratic and Southern leaders.

The official documents are found conveniently arranged in William McDonald'sSelect Statutes, 1861-1898(1903), and also with other material in Walter L. Fleming'sDocumentary History of Reconstruction,2 vols. (1906, 1907). The general reader is usually repelled by the collections known asPublic Documents.The valuableKu Klux Trials(1872) is, however, separately printed and to be found in most good libraries. By a judicious use of the indispensableTables and Index to Public Documents,one can find much vividly interesting material in connection with contested election cases and reports of congressional investigations into conditions in the South.

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