5. BATTLE FOR MOTOBU
It was General Shepherd’s plan to have the Twenty Second and Fourth continue the drive up the mainland of Okinawa until Hedo Misaki was seized. To destroy the enemy known to be on Motobu, the General committed the Twenty Ninth Marines, which had been in Corps reserve during the first four days of the operation. For the time being, the Fourth Marines was held as a reserve near the base of the peninsula. Patrolling continued.
Many captured enemy soldiers and civilians had stated that the main Japanese defensive force was in southern Okinawa but that a force of about 3000 men, commanded by a Colonel Udo, was somewhere up north, probably on Motobu. Aerial observation and photo terrain studies confirmed indications that there was a sizeable enemy force on the peninsula. On 8 April the Twenty Ninth Marines moved out in three columns, one along the south coast, one along the north coast and one up the center toward the town of Itomi. At first progress was rapid and there were few contacts made; it was noted, however, that all inland trails were mined or blocked. The coast roads had numerous roadblocks and tank traps. By 10 April the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, was at Toguchi and had been hit by enemy artillery fire near Awa. Near Toguchi, on the Manna road, it had contacted Udo’s force. West of Itomi the First Battalion was also in contact with what was apparently the same force. Meanwhile the Second Battalion had captured the enemy midget submarine base at Unten Ko but had encountered no appreciable resistance.
During the next three days the battalions were in almost constant contact with Udo’s forces. Ambushes were frequent but the enemy could not be engaged in any decisive action. It was clear that he was engaged in guerrilla-type warfare and wanted to harass our troops but was trying to avoid a meeting engagement. By 13 April the enemy position was definitely fixed as being in theMt.Yaetake area; it was known that he had considerable artillery, mortars, and a few naval guns emplaced in hidden positions in the wild and rugged mountain mass.
Mt.Yaetake provided Colonel Udo with ideal ground for defensive positions. Here he had unlimited observation in every direction; it was impossible to attack him without warning. The rugged character of the terrain prohibited the use of mechanized support in the reduction of his positions.
While the Twenty Ninth Marines were fixing the enemy position and determining its character and strength, General Shepherd saw that he would need additional troops to destroy Udo’s force. His tactical decision was to move the Fourth Marines, less the Third Battalion, to Sakimotobu on the western side of the peninsula and attach to it the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth Marines which was near by. Then he ordered a coordinated attack for 14 April with the Fourth Marines driving into Yaetake in an easterly direction while the Twenty Ninth Marines, with two battalions, near Itomi, attacked to the west and southwest. Udo would be hit from front and rear.
Map 3. 4th Marines Battle for Mt. Yaetake.Map 3. 4th Marines Battle for Mt. Yaetake.
Map 3. 4th Marines Battle for Mt. Yaetake.
Map 3. 4th Marines Battle for Mt. Yaetake.
On 14 April the Fourth Marines, commanded by Colonel Alan Shapley with the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, attached, moved rapidly inland to seize the first high ground from which to launch the attack onMt.Yaetake. The Twenty Ninth Marines found enemy dispositions to its front in such strength and on such unfavorable ground,that it was virtually impossible to attack in a southwesterly direction.
Resuming the attack on 15 April the Fourth Marines drove up the approaches to Mt. Yaetake; fighting was bitter with one battalion commander killed and several company commanders casualties. The First Battalion, Fourth Marines, seized a key hill mass southwest of the Yaetake peak against heavy resistance. Over rugged terrain the Twenty Ninth Marines continued to advance into the rear of Udo’s position against intermittent resistance.
Map 4. Battle for Mt. Yaetake.Map 4. Battle for Mt. Yaetake.
Map 4. Battle for Mt. Yaetake.
Map 4. Battle for Mt. Yaetake.
Next day, 16 April, the Sixth Marine Division prepared to attack the enemy from three sides. The First Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, which had been in immediate reserve near Awa, was ordered to advance to the north to close the gap between the two attacking regiments. After a day of extremely hard fighting the Fourth Marines seizedMt.Yaetake and held it despite an all-out Banzai charge. Meanwhile, the Twenty Ninth Marines, now under Colonel WilliamJ.Whaling,USMC, had swung its front to the west and north, destroying fixed emplacements and enemy groups as it moved.
With Udo’s force caught in the jaws of a giant nutcracker, and driven from the commanding ground in its position, the Fourth Marines changed its tactics. Colonel Shapley ordered his two left battalions, facing east, to initiate a holding attack on 17 April, while the two right battalions drove down fromMt.Yaetake to the north with the mission of seizing the Manna Road. The situation on this day then, was for the two battalions to sweep down a corridor formed by the First and Second Battalions, Twenty Ninth, on the east and the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, and Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, on the west. Down from Yaetake and through the corridor swept the First and Third Battalions, Fourth Marines, mopping up enemy remnants as they went. Nightfall saw both regiments on the first hills south of the Toguchi-Itomi road, the road that ran through Manna.
On 19 April the Sixth Marine Division began a coordinated drive to secure the high ground remaining between the Toguchi-Itomi road and the north coast of the peninsula. On the left was the Fourth Marines; next to it, the First and Second Battalions, Twenty Ninth Marines. From Toguchi, the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth moved by truck to Itomi and struck out through the hills toward the highest hill mass in the northern part of Motobu, which was seized next morning. On 20 April, the drive continued and both regiments reached the north coast without difficulty. Little opposition had been found in this last sweep, but it was known that several hundred enemy troops had escaped from Motobu and were somewhere in northern Okinawa.
The battle for Motobu had challenged the Sixth Division with mountain warfare of the most rugged sort. It was costly: the Sixth Marine Division lost 207 men killed, 757 wounded and 6 missing in action. In contrast, the enemy lost 2,014 men killed. Captured enemy material included 11 field pieces of 75 and 150-mm. calibre, two six-inch naval cannon and large numbers of mortars, machine guns and 20-mm. dual purpose guns.
While the other two regiments were fighting on Motobu, the Twenty Second Marines, commanded by Colonel MerlinF.Schneider,USMC, continued its march up the northern part of the mainland. On 13 April the Second Battalion moved by forced march to seize Hedo Misaki, the northern tip of the island. Scattered resistance was encountered during the march. Upon occupying Hedo Misaki, the regiment sent patrols down the east coast and on 19 April, patrols from the north and south met on the east coast at Aha. By 20 April all of Okinawa north of the original landing beaches had been secured by the Sixth Marine Division; it was known, however, that several small enemy groups still remained at large.
The first of these isolated enemy groups to be located was one consisting of about 200 men. It was contacted by the First Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, near Taniyo-take, a hill mass southeast of Motobu Peninsula. After two days of heavy fighting most of the enemy band was destroyed although a few escaped to join another remnant of the Motobu action. By 27 April this group had been located and from Hentona two battalions of the Twenty Second Marines advanced toward the suspected area in a forced night march. Meanwhile from Kawada the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines hurried inland and made contact by noon. After considerable maneuvering, the battalion outflanked the enemy and forced him to fight on unfavorable ground. Most of the group was destroyed; a handful escaped.