Attack in the Riga Sector.
Attack in the Riga Sector.
On September 9, 10, and 11, 1916, the Russians launched a series of very fierce attacks, carried out by strong forces against Bavarian troops, holding part of the Stokhod line near Stara Czerwiszcze. Again and again they came on in wave after wave. But neither great numbers nor the most extensive artillery fire had any effect, as far as gaining ground was concerned. The losses on both sides, however, were appalling. By the middle of September, 1916, the fighting in the Kovel sector lost noticeably in violence. On September 16, 1916, however, the Russians again attacked west of Lutsk over a front of about twelve miles. Though they suffered severe losses, they could not overcome the Austro-German resistance, and for the balance of the month ofSeptember, 1916, comparative quiet reigned along the Kovel sector of the eastern front.
Simultaneously with their renewed efforts against Lemberg the Russians began once more to drive against Kovel, with the beginning of October, 1916. On October 1 and 2, 1916, the most stubborn fighting developed west of Lutsk in the neighborhood of Zaturze, Zola Savovskaia, and Shelvov. In some places Russian troops stormed twelve times against one and the same position, and at one point they made seventeen attacks. These attacks were kept up for a number of days, but met with little success, and by October 5, 1916, comparative calmness prevailed on the Volhynian sector.
However, on October 8, 1916, the battle west of Lutsk, in the direction of Vladimir Volynski, broke out once more in full fury. On that day the Russians gained some slight successes at a few points, which they lost, however, again on the following day. During the next few days a number of smaller engagements occurred at many places west of Lutsk, near Kiselin and along the Stokhod. These were only forerunners of a new drive against Kovel which was begun on October 14, 1916.
On that day the Russians captured some trenches near Korytniza, forty miles south of Kovel. These were held against many violent Austro-German counterattacks, although the latter were kept up for a number of days. By October 18, 1916, a new battle had developed in the neighborhood of Kiselin, and fighting also was renewed more vigorously on the Stokhod. In the latter region the Austro-Germans regained some ground which they held against strong counterattacks. By October 20, 1916, activities on the Volhynian front had slowed down to an exchange of artillery fire of varying intensity and to minor engagements of local extent and little importance. This condition continued throughout the balance of October, 1916, except that during the last few days the Russian artillery fire along the entire Stokhod line, especially just west of Lutsk, increased greatly in violence.
Throughout November, 1916, only a few actions of real importance took place in the Kovel sector. Most of these occurredon the Stokhod, where the Austro-Germans succeeded in improving their positions at various points. The Russians seemed to be satisfied everywhere to maintain their positions and to repulse as violently as possible all Austro-German attempts to press them back. The most important engagement in this sector most likely occurred on November 9, 1916, in the region of Skrobova, near Baranovitchy, where the Central Powers attacked along a front of about two and one-half miles and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians.
Throughout the entire period of the Russian offensive against Kovel and Lemberg comparative quiet reigned in the northern half of the eastern front. Of course there, as well as everywhere else, continuous engagements occurred. But they were almost all of a minor character, and in most instances amounted to little more than clashes between outposts or patrol detachments. On September 2, 1916, the Germans made a somewhat more pretentious attack against some Lettish battalions of the Russian army near Riga. The latter retorted promptly by a strong counterattack which inflicted severe losses. On September 3, 1916, the Russians repulsed a strong German gas attack.
During the balance of September, 1916, comparatively little of importance occurred along the northern half of the eastern front between Riga and the Styr. On September 6, 1916, the Russians crossed to the western bank of the Dvina, north of Dvinsk, drove the Germans out of their trenches along a short stretch and captured these positions. On the next day the Germans promptly attacked these positions, first with artillery and then with infantry, but were unable to dislodge the Russians. On September 12, 1916, the Russians made a number of attacks north of Dvetnemouth and near Garbunovka, but were repulsed. A similar fate was suffered by a series of massed attacks, preceded by a gas attack, which were undertaken by the Germans on September 22, 1916, southwest of Lake Narotch.
The month of October, 1916, brought little of moment on the northern half of the eastern front. Of course, local engagements occurred at various places almost continuously, but most of them were little less than fights between outposts of patrols. OnOctober 12, 1916, the Germans suddenly attacked Russian trenches near the village of Goldovitchy, on the western bank of the Shara, north of the Pripet Marshes. A few isolated gas attacks were attempted by the Russians in the same vicinity on October 24 and 25, 1916. The latter was reciprocated by an infantry attack, carried out by a small German force on October 26, 1916, which had no result. A similar attack made against the Russian positions just south of Riga was equally unsuccessful.
During November, 1916, practically nothing of importance happened anywhere along that part of the eastern front which stretches from Riga to the Styr. Occasional attacks by small infantry groups were made by both sides, but resulted in no actual change in the relative positions. At other times artillery duels would take place, varying in duration and intensity, and having likewise no result of real importance.[Back to Contents]
FIGHTING IN THE CARPATHIANS
Accompanying the renewed Russian efforts against Lemberg and Kovel in the beginning of September, 1916, fighting broke out again with greater vigor in the Carpathians. Numerous local engagements took place on September 1, 1916, none of which, however, brought any successes to the attacking Russians. They were more successful on the following day, September 2, 1916. South of Rafailov, in the region of Kapul Mountain and also near Dorna Vatra, the Austro-Germans lost some strongly fortified positions and the Russians thereby captured some heights. Considerable fighting also occurred on both banks of the Bystritza near the Rumanian border. These successes were somewhat extended by the Russians on September 3, 1916. On the following day small engagements developed southwest of Zabie and in the region of Shypoth. Strong Russian attackswere repulsed with heavy losses southwest of Fundul Moldowi. Finally, on September 5, 1916, these continuous Russian attacks lasting day and night somewhat undermined the Austro-German resistance and resulted in a slight Russian advance along the entire line of attack.
On September 6, 1916, the Russians attacked southeast of Zielona, about thirty-five miles southwest of Stanislau, and on the Bagaludova west of the Kirlibaba Valley, on the border between the Bukowina and Hungary. Both of these attacks were repulsed. The Austro-Germans promptly replied with counterattacks near Zielona and west of Shypoth on September 7, 1916. The Russians registered some successes on the following day, September 8, 1916, west and southwest of Shypoth as well as near Dorna Vatra. On the same day the Austro-Germans were also forced to retreat northwest of Mount Kapul, a neighborhood in which more or less fighting had been in progress ever since July, 1916. This mountain peak is about 5,000 feet high. Again on September 9, 1916, the Russians gained some ground west of Shypoth after attacking at many points in the southern Carpathians. The heights east of the Cibo Valley, about three miles west of Mount Kapul and just within the Hungarian line, were also occupied by Russian forces.
Attacks again occurred in the Mount Kapul sector on September 10 and 11, 1916. On the latter day the Russians finally succeeded in capturing Mount Kapul, after first having occupied a ridge to the north of it. Almost 1,000 prisoners as well as some machine guns and mortars fell into their hands. This success apparently encouraged the Russians to other efforts in this territory.
On September 12, 1916, they attacked in the Carpathians along the entire line from Smotrych, southwest of Zabie, to the Golden Bystritza, without, however, making any headway.
Part of the position on Mount Kapul lost by the Austro-Germans on September 11, 1916, was recovered on the fourteenth. To the west, in the Cibo Valley, the fighting continued, but here too, as along the balance of the eastern front, fighting gradually slowed down during the rest of September, 1916.
During the first half of October, 1916, fighting in the Carpathians was of a rather desultory nature. Neither side, though frequently undertaking local engagements, registered any noticeable successes. Suddenly on October 14, 1916, simultaneously with the increased vigor shown by the Russians in Volhynia and Galicia, the Central Powers launched a violent offensive movement along the entire Carpathian front, from the Jablonica Pass down to the Rumanian border, on a front of some seventy-five miles.
Especially heavy fighting occurred near Kirlibaba, in the Ludova sector, and south of Dorna Vatra. In the latter region the Russians were thrown back over the Negra Valley. These early successes, however, led to nothing of importance. After October 15, 1916, up to the end of the month only local engagements took place. By that time weather conditions in the Carpathians had become too severe to permit of any extensive operations.
Just as on the other parts of the eastern front the Carpathian sector showed comparatively little activity during the month of November, 1916. Only at one point, in the region south of Dorna Vatra, did there occur an action of somewhat greater importance. The Russians there had gradually gained some ground by a series of small engagements. About the middle of the month the Austro-Germans launched a strong counterattack and regained all the ground, inflicting at the same time heavy losses on the Russians. At other points occasional artillery duels took place, and at many places small local engagements between outposts and patrol detachments occurred almost daily.[Back to Contents]
WINTER AT THE EASTERN FRONT
With the beginning of December, 1916, the severity of the cold weather became so pronounced that activities at the eastern front had to be reduced to a minimum by both sides. During the first week of December, 1916, considerable fighting, however, continued in that part of the Carpathians just north of the Rumanian border, especially in the vicinity of Dorna Vatra and Kirlibaba. This, too, gradually decreased in violence, and during the second week of the month only minor engagements between outposts and the usual trench activities occurred.
On December 17, 1916, the Germans, after considerable artillery preparation, started a more extensive offensive movement in the vicinity of Great and Little Porsk, about twenty-one miles southeast of Kovel. After considerable fighting, lasting all afternoon, nightfall put a temporary stop to this undertaking. It was, however, renewed during the early morning hours of the following day, and as a result the Germans occupied small portions of the Russian positions. These were held against a number of Russian counterattacks made during the following days. Minor engagements also occurred on December 16, 17, and 18, 1916, near Kabarowce, northwest of Tarnopol; in the Jezupol region of the river Bystrzyca between Stanislau and the Dniester; southwest of Vale Putna in the extreme south of the Bukowina; on the Narajowka River near Herbutow, about ten miles north of Halicz; and near Augustowka south of Zboroff.
During the balance of December, 1916, nothing of importance happened at any part of the eastern front, except that on December 25, 1916, the Germans violently bombarded the Russian positions in the region between Brody and Tarnopol in Galicia and farther south on the Narajowka south of Brzezany.
The first few days in January, 1917, brought little change on the eastern front. Engagements between small detachmentsoccurred daily at a number of places. None of these was of any importance.
On January 23, 1917, the Germans after extensive artillery preparation launched an attack with considerable forces against the positions which the Russians had recently gained along the river Aa. Though meeting with stubborn resistance they were successful, and captured not only considerable ground, but also some 1,500 prisoners. The Russians were forced to retire about a mile and a half toward the north. During the next two days, January 24 and 25, 1917, they were forced back still farther. These gains the Germans were able to hold in the face of strong Russian counterattacks made on January 26 and 27, 1917, though they were unable to extend them.
During the last four days of January, 1917, engagements along the entire front increased occasionally in number and violence. On January 28, 1917, Russian troops attacked positions held by Turkish troops near the Galician village of Potutory, some seven miles south of Brzezany. At the point of the bayonet the Turks were forced to yield, and in spite of a number of counterattacks the Russians maintained their success. Fighting on January 29, 1917, was restricted chiefly to the vicinity of the river Aa, where the Germans again made some slight gains. This was also the case on January 30, 1917, when the Germans with the assistance of extensive artillery bombardments and a series of gas attacks captured some more Russian positions as well as about 900 prisoners and fifteen machine guns.
On the last day of January, 1917, practically nothing of any importance occurred at any point of the eastern front, the whole length of which was that day in the grip of ever-increasing cold.[Back to Contents]
RUMANIA'S MILITARY STRENGTH
Finally the military power of Rumania was of enough consequence to warrant the greatest exertions on the part of diplomats to obtain its active support. With a population of close to 7,000,000, the little state could throw a respectable army into the field. In 1914 her infantry numbered well over a quarter of a million, her cavalry close up to 20,000, while her equipment included 600 modern cannon and 300 machine guns. Aside from this there was a considerable reserve to draw from. By the middle of 1916, just before she entered the war, it was estimated by good authorities that the Rumanian army numbered at least 600,000 men under arms and that about an equal number could still be counted on in the reserves. In theory at least, it was a well-trained army. The artillery of all classes numbered about 1,500 guns, but there was a marked shortage of really powerful cannon. The horse and field artillery were armed with Krupp quick-firers of 3-inch caliber, and the heavy and the mountain guns were from the Creusot works in France. The infantry was armed with the Austrian Mannlicher rifle, but of these arms Rumania possessed barely enough to arm her 600,000 men.
Shortly before she definitely made her decision, this stock of arms was considerably augmented by shipments from France and England, and even from Russia, but on account of the fact that they must be shipped by a dangerous sea route and then across Russia, the time of transit covering six weeks, she was probably not very well supplied with ammunition.[Back to Contents]
HOSTILITIES BEGIN
The first news of the actual fighting was given to the world through an official Austrian communiqué, dated August 28, 1916, announcing that, during the preceding night, the Rumanians had begun a determined attack on the Austrian forces in the Red Tower Pass and the passes leading to Brasso. On the following day another report added that the attempted invasion had become general and that the Imperial troops were resisting attacks in all the passes along the whole frontier. But, added the report, everywhere the Rumanians had been successfully repulsed, especially near Orsova, in the Red Tower Pass, and in the passes south of Brasso. In spite of these successes, however, the Austrians were compelled to retire their advanced detachments to a position prepared in the rear, as planned long before, because overwhelming forces of Rumanians were attempting a far-reaching flanking movement. As a matter of fact, the Austrians, never very determined fighters, and now especially demoralized by the recent success of the Russian offensive under Brussilov, were giving way all along the line before the Rumanians under General Averescu. On the same day a Rumanian official report gave a long list of villages and towns which the Rumanians had taken beyond the frontier, their Fourth Army Corps also having taken 740 prisoners. Within two days Averescu had advanced so rapidly that he was in possession of Petroseny, north of the Vulkan Pass, and of Brasso, beyond Predeal Pass. His troops were pouring through the Tolgyes and Bekas Passes up in the north in steady streams, and were advancing on Maros Vasarhely, a military base and one of the principal towns of central Transylvania. The Rumanians advancing by way of Gyimes, after a sharp encounter with the Austrians, had driven the latter back to the heights east of Csikszereda, a point over twenty miles inside the Austrian frontier. Finally, spirited fighting was taking place in theVarciorova Pass on the Danube, and here too the Austrians made a very poor showing.
Then on the last day of the month came the announcement from Bucharest that Russian forces had arrived on Rumanian soil and were already crossing the Danube over into Dobrudja, their left wing on the Black Sea coast being protected by ships of the Russian fleet. The commander of this force was General Zaionchovsky, who, together with his staff, had been welcomed in Bucharest by a throng of the enthusiastic inhabitants, women and children hurling bouquets of flowers on the Russians as they passed through the streets. Another peculiar feature of this event was the organization of a brigade of Serbians, interned soldiers who had escaped into Rumanian territory during the invasion of their country the year previously. These now became a part of the Russian contingent. Meanwhile in the north the Rumanians and the Russians had also joined forces, and on August 29, 1916, Berlin officially announced that the German-Austrian forces in that section had been attacked by the Russo-Rumanians in the Carpathians.
On the Danube the Austrian river fleet showed some activity. A monitor shelled Varciorova, Turnu Severin, and Giurgevo, situated on the Rumanian bank, and some small craft were captured at Zimnita. On the other hand, the Rumanians were reported to have begun a general bombardment of Rustchuk, an important Bulgarian port on the river. And on the night of the 28th the fact that the nation was at war was brought home to the citizens of the capital by an aeroplane and a Zeppelin, which sailed over the city dropping bombs, but doing very little harm. During the following month such raids were to be almost daily occurrences, and many were the women and children killed by the bombs hurled down from above.
On the 1st of September, 1916, came the announcement of a really striking victory for the Rumanians: Orsova, where heavy fighting had been raging since the first hour of the war and in which the Austrians were daily claiming success, was finally taken. Here the Austrians held a strong position, against which the Rumanians had hurled one assault after another, until theysucceeded in taking two heights overlooking the town, each over a thousand feet high and thus forced the defeated enemy over the Cserna River, a northern branch of the Danube. This success caused some sensation, for now it appeared that the way was opening for an offensive across the southern portion of Hungary which should sever the Teutons and the Magyars from their Bulgarian and Turkish allies.
Badly beaten as they had been by Brussilov, the Hungarians and the Austrians were now considerably shaken. Again, Germany was called on to come to the rescue, as she had done before on the eastern front and in Serbia. Nor could the Germans afford to overlook the call, for there had been much agitation in Hungary for a separate peace. Indeed, Germany had for some time been preparing to relieve the situation as subsequent events conclusively proved. On the following day, September 2, 1916, her first blow was struck.[Back to Contents]
BULGARIA ATTACKS
Up to this time the Rumanians had hoped, perhaps, even believed, that Bulgaria would refrain from attacking in Dobrudja. Not a word had come from Sofia indicating that Bulgaria intended to begin hostilities. But on this day, September 2, 1916, a strong force composed of Bulgarians, Turks, and Germans, which had been quietly mobilizing behind the Bulgarian frontier, hurled itself over into Dobrudja and threw back the weak Rumanian guards. The force with which this blow was delivered was understood a few days later, when it was learned that Germany had sent her best field commander, General Mackensen, to direct operations in this zone.
This territory is of a nature entirely different from the scene of the fighting along the eastern and northern borders of Rumania. Dobrudja forms a square tract of level country, abouta hundred miles long and sixty broad, lying just south of the delta of the Danube and along the Black Sea coast. The larger part of it is marshy or low, sandy plain. Here the Danube splits into three branches, only one of which, the Sulina, is navigable. Two railroads traverse this country; the one running from Bucharest to Constanza, an important seaport; another branching off from this line below Medgidia, running down to Dobric, thence over the frontier into Bulgaria. The former was of special importance to the Rumanians, as it was the only line of communication between Rumania and any Rumanian force that might be operating in Dobrudja. It crossed the Danube over a bridge and viaduct eleven miles in length, forming the only permanent crossing over the river below the bridge at Belgrade. This structure ranks as one of the big engineering works in the world, its cost being close to $3,000,000. It consists, first of a bridge of three spans, 500 yards in length, then follows a viaduct eight miles in length, resting on piers built on islands, and finally comes a bridge 850 yards in length, of five spans, crossing the main channel of the river, which here is a hundred feet deep in places. Such is the famous Cernavoda Bridge. Toward this important point Mackensen's first move was obviously directed.
On September 3, 1916, a Rumanian dispatch announced that Mackensen was attacking in full force along his front below Dobric and that he had been repulsed. But as developed within twenty-four hours Mackensen was not repulsed. On the contrary, he was advancing, as was shown the next day when he had extended his lines to a point eight miles northwest of Dobric, while the full length of the frontier was well within his front. On the following day, the 4th, Dobric was attacked and easily taken, and the combined forces of Bulgarians, Turks, and Germans hurled themselves against the outer fortifications protecting the south end of the bridge at Tutrakan. Fortunately for the Rumanians they were now reenforced by a considerable body of Russians, and the Bulgarians were temporarily checked, the heaviest fighting taking place in the neighborhood of Dobric. But the Rumanians and the Russians were plainly outnumbered, at Dobric they were gradually pressed back, while at the bridgeheadthey were severely defeated. At this latter point the enemy showed his vast superiority in artillery, which he had concentrated here for the purpose of demolishing the fortifications. After nearly a dozen assaults, each following a furious artillery preparation, the Bulgarians finally, on September 6, 1916, drove the Rumanians back and took the fort. It was at this point that the German and Bulgarian dispatches claimed that 20,000 Rumanians were taken prisoner, but dispatches from Bucharest stoutly denied this. However, as was admitted later, the total losses of the Rumanians could not have been much less.
After the fall of Tutrakan the Russo-Rumanian forces, under the command of General Aslan, retired northward, and a lull came in the fighting on this front which lasted almost a week. On the 8th Silistra too was evacuated by the Rumanians after a spirited defense by the small garrison. When the news of these reverses became known to the people of Bucharest little depression was shown, for the operations against the Austro-Hungarians were continuing successfully for the Rumanians.
In spite of the fact that the Austro-Hungarians had had two years' experience of warfare, and that the Rumanians were new to actual fighting, the former made very poor resistance. With comparative ease the Rumanians advanced beyond Brasso and took Sepsiszentgyorgy and forced the Austro-Hungarians to retreat west of Csikszereda. On the 8th the Rumanians announced themselves in possession of Toplicza, San Milai, Delne, and Gyergyoszentmiklos, while in the sector between Hatszeg and Petroseny they were pressing the enemy severely. Nowhere did the Austrians make any serious resistance: they retreated, as slowly as possible, under the protection of rear-guard actions, yielding over 4,000 prisoners to the advancing Rumanians, as well as a great deal of railroad rolling stock, cattle, and many convoys of provisions. That they were expecting the assistance which was presently to come to them from the Germans seems obvious from the fact that they did not destroy the railroad or its tunnels or bridges as they retired; they apparently felt certain of returning. The peasantry, on the other hand, burned their houses and crops in those sections where the population isMagyar, then fled toward Budapest, which was beginning to fill with refugees. In those sections where the Rumanians were numerous the people, according to the Rumanian dispatches, welcomed the invaders with frantic enthusiasm.
The victorious Rumanians continued toward Hermannstadt, taking Schellenberg on the way. Here a Hungarian army had been defeated in 1599 by Rumanians under Michael the Brave. Hermannstadt, however, marked the high tide of Rumanian victory. At this point the resistance of the enemy began suddenly to stiffen. And then came the report that the Rumanians were observing German uniforms among the opposing forces. Again Germany had come to the rescue. On September 13, 1916, the first German troops to arrive on the scene came in contact with the Rumanians southeast of Hatszeg near Hermannstadt. Within two days the Rumanians were no longer able to gain ground, though for some time longer they sorely pressed their enemies.
Meanwhile, Mackensen in Dobrudja was showing extreme activity. The lull which followed the retirement of the Rumanians from Tutrakan was suddenly terminated on the 12th, when the Bulgarians and their allies attacked Lipnitza, fifteen miles east of Silistria. Here the Rumanians resisted furiously, and after an all-night fight they severely repulsed Mackensen's troops, taking eight German guns. However, this was only a temporary advantage. Some days later the German kaiser, in a telegram to his wife, announced that Mackensen had gained a decisive victory in Dobrudja. While this phraseology is perhaps a little too strong as a description of the situation at that date, the fact was that the Rumanians and the Russians were again forced to retire northward. According to the German reports the retreat was a disorderly flight, but the absence of any reports indicating a large capture of prisoners or material would indicate that the Germans exaggerated their success. At this moment a new loan was being launched in Germany, and it was natural that the military situation should be somewhat warmly colored.
On September 17, 1916, the Rumanian dispatches indicated that the Russo-Rumanian forces in Dobrudja had fallen back toa line reaching from Rasova, south of Cernavoda some ten miles to Tuzla, twelve miles south of Constanza. Thus the situation was quite grave enough. Meanwhile, some days before, General Averescu, who seemed to have been doing so well on the Hungarian front, was sent to Dobrudja, in the hope apparently that his superior abilities would save the situation. He arrived on the 16th, together with considerable reenforcements which had been drawn from the northwest, where the Russians were supporting the Rumanians. Further Russian contingents had also arrived, and on the following day, the 17th, Averescu turned suddenly on Mackensen and gave him determined battle. This was the heaviest fighting which had so far taken place in this section. Again and again Mackensen hurled his Bulgarians and Turks against the Russo-Rumanian lines, first battering them with his huge cannon. At Rasova, on the Danube, his attacks were especially heavy. Had he taken this point he would have been able to flank the Rumanians at Cernavoda, capture the bridgehead there and so cut all communication between the Rumanians in Dobrudja with Rumania itself. The battle raged until the 19th all along the line, with no definite advantage to either side. But on that day reenforcements came to Averescu. That night he began to advance. The mightiest efforts of Mackensen's forces were unable to check him. At dawn the Bulgarians began to retreat, setting fire to the villages through which they retired. In this battle the Rumanians were plainly victorious. No doubt they were in superior numbers, for Sarrail's offensive in Macedonia had grown extremely formidable and the Bulgarians had been compelled to rush down reenforcements from the Dobrudja front. At any rate, Mackensen was forced to retreat until he established his re-formed lines from Oltina, on the Danube, to a point southwest of Toprosari, thence to the Black Sea coast, south of Tuzla. For the time being the Rumanians were much elated by their success. But, as time was to show, it was merely temporary.[Back to Contents]
THE GERMANS ARRIVE
The center of interest in the campaign now became the Hungarian front. As has already been stated, by the middle of the month the arrival of German reenforcements had checked the advance of the Rumanians, and now the situation along this front assumed an aspect not quite so encouraging to the Rumanians. Some little progress was still made in this direction in the third week of the month; after a few slight engagements the Rumanians occupied Homorod Almas and Fogaras, the latter a town of some importance halfway between Brasso and Hermannstadt. During these operations nearly a thousand prisoners were taken. Finally, on the 16th, they reached Barot, dominating the railroad between Brasso and Foeldvar, some thirty miles beyond the frontier.
Meanwhile German troops had reenforced the Austrians at Hatszeg, in the valley of the Streiu. Here on the 14th a pitched battle was begun in a mountain defile, which lasted two days and resulted in the defeat of a force of Magyars. On the 18th General von Staabs, commanding a large force of German troops, attacked the Rumanians in the Hatszeg sector, and after a very hot fight thrust them back. And at about the same time German forces began attacking the Rumanians in the Gyergyoi Havosok and Kalemen Hegyseg ranges of the Carpathians.
On the 21st a Berlin dispatch announced that the Teutonic forces had carried the Vulkan Pass and cleared it of the enemy. On the following day, however, the Rumanians were still fighting at this point and three days later forced the Teutons back and reconquered the lost territory, as well as the neighboring Szurduk Pass. By the 28th they had recovered ten miles of lost ground within the Hungarian frontier, driving the Austrians and the Germans before them.
Teutonic Invasion of Rumania.
Teutonic Invasion of Rumania.
A month had now passed since the outbreak of hostilities and the Rumanians were still holding a large conquered territory,nearly a third of Transylvania, or about 7,000 square miles of country. They were in complete occupation of four out of fifteen administrative departments and a portion of five others. Up to this time 7,000 prisoners had been captured. Meanwhile large forces of Germans continued arriving and reenforcing the enemy's lines, and now the determination of the Germans to devote their best energies to the punishment of Rumania was indicated by the fact that this northern army was under the command of General von Falkenhayn, formerly chief of the German General Staff.
On September 26, 1916, the Germans began their first really serious advance, the point of attack falling on the Rumanians near Hermannstadt, about fifty miles northeast of Vulkan Pass. For three days the Rumanians made a heroic resistance against a great superiority in men and heavy cannon on the part of the enemy. On the third day the Rumanians found themselves entirely surrounded, their retreat through the Red Tower Pass being cut off by a column of Bavarian Alpine troops who had scaled the mountain heights and occupied the pass in the rear. Rendered desperate by this situation, the Rumanians now fought fiercely to escape through the ring that encircled them, but only a comparatively few succeeded in reaching Fogaras, from which town another Rumanian force had been trying to make a diversion in their favor. In this action, according to German accounts, the Rumanians lost 3,000 men, thirteen guns, ten locomotives, and a quantity of other material. This battle, called by the Germans the Battle of Hermannstadt, enabled them to occupy again the Red Tower Pass. On October 1, 1916, they had continued beyond this pass and were attacking a Rumanian force south of it, near Caineni, on Rumanian territory. Thus, with the first of the new month the Rumanians were on the defensive in this region.[Back to Contents]
THE RUMANIAN RAID ACROSS THE DANUBE
On the following day general attention was again attracted toward the Dobrudja by a feat on the part of the Rumanians which for the moment gave the impression that she was about to strike the enemy an unexpected and decisive blow. A day or two before a Turkish and a Bulgarian division had been severely repulsed near Toprosari, south of Tuzla. Immediately there succeeded a general assault along the entire line to which Mackensen had retreated on the 20th, but though thirteen guns were captured, he did not again give ground.
Suddenly, on the morning of October 2, 1916, the Rumanians threw a pontoon bridge across the Danube at Rahova, about halfway between Rustchuk and Tutrakan, and well in the rear of Mackensen's line. Before the small Bulgarian forces stationed at this point were aware of what had happened they were completely overwhelmed by the Rumanians, who were streaming across the bridge. All the villages in the neighborhood were seized and for twenty-four hours it was expected that Mackensen was about to suffer a sensational repulse. But apparently the Rumanians lacked the forces necessary for the successful carrying out of what would have been a brilliant stroke, or possibly the Bulgarian forces which appeared here against them were larger than had been expected, for the next day they announced that the force which had been thrown across the river had again retired, unharmed, the object of its demonstration having been accomplished. According to the Bulgarian accounts their retreat was forced because of the appearance of an Austrian monitor, which began shelling and destroying the pontoon bridge, and that before the retreat had been completed the bridge had been destroyed and a large remnant of the Rumanian force had been captured or killed. In general, however, the fighting during these first few days of the month gave neither side anyadvantage, and again the situation calmed down to comparative inactivity.
That the retirement of the Rumanians was well ordered is shown by the fact that even the Berlin dispatches claimed very few prisoners, in addition to a thousand taken at Brasso, while the Austro-Germans had lost considerably over a thousand. On the 6th Fogaras had been relinquished. North and east of Brasso the Rumanians had also retreated. On the 8th Berlin announced that "the entire eastern front of the enemy was in retreat." This was, in general, quite true, except that for a few days longer they still held their positions in the valley of the Maros.
Aside from the advantage in his superiority of numbers, Falkenhayn also had at his disposal the better railroad accommodations. A line running parallel with almost the entire front enabled him to shift his forces back and forth, wherever the contingencies of the situation made them needed most. By the 12th he was facing the Rumanians in the passes. Heavy fighting then began developing at Torzburg, Predeal, and Buzau Passes. Finally the Rumanians were forced back toward Crasna on the frontier. A critical moment seemed imminent. Averescu, who had defeated Mackensen, was now recalled from the Dobrudja and sent to take command of the Rumanian forces defending the passes behind Brasso.
By the middle of the second week of October, 1916, the Rumanians had lost all the territory they had taken, except a little in the northeast. The German-Austrian pressure was now heaviest in two areas: about the passes behind Brasso and before the Gyimes Pass in the northeast.
In the latter region, on the 11th, the Rumanians had retired from Csikszereda and from positions higher up on the circular strategic railroad in the valley of the Maros. Before Oitoz Pass they resisted fiercely, and for a time were able to hold their ground. But it was in the passes behind Brasso that Falkenhayn's weight was being felt most severely. On the 12th the following description of the general situation was issued from Bucharest:
"From Mount Buksoi as far as Bran the enemy has attacked, but is being repulsed."
On the following day came better news than the Rumanians had heard for some weeks. The Germans had not only been checked in the Buzau and the Predeal Passes, but they had suffered a genuine setback there, being forced to retire. This victory was important in that Predeal Pass had been saved, for not only was this pass close to Bucharest, but through it ran a railroad and a good highway, crossing the mountains almost due south of Brasso at a height of a little over 3,000 feet. On the next day, however, the Rumanians were driven out of the Torzburg Pass and forced to retire to Rucaru, a small town seven miles within Rumanian territory. Falkenhayn's forces were now flowing through the gap in the mountain chain and deploying among the foothills on the Rumanian side of the chain. Here the situation was growing dangerous to an extreme degree. Only ten miles farther south, over high, rolling ground, was Campulung, the terminus of a railroad running directly into Bucharest, only ninety miles distant.
But Falkenhayn made no further progress that day. In the neighboring passes he was held back successfully while his left flank in the Oitoz Pass and his right flank in the Vulkan Pass were each thrown back. All during the 15th and the 16th the fighting in the passes continued desperately, the battle being especially obstinate before the railroad terminus at Campulung, up in the foothills. At about this same time the Russians in the Dorna Vatra district, where they joined with the Rumanians, began a strong offensive, in the hope of relieving the pressure on the Rumanians farther down. This attempt was hardly successful, as the German opposition in this sector developed to unexpected strength. On the 17th Falkenhayn succeeded in squeezing himself through Gyimes Pass and reaching Agas, seven miles inside the frontier. At about the same time strong fighting began in the Red Tower Pass. The battle was, indeed, raging at a tense heat up and down the whole front. It was now becoming obvious that the Central Powers had determined to make an example of Rumania and punish her "treachery," as they calledit, even though they must suspend activity in every other theater of the war to do so. Not a little anxiety was caused in the Allied countries. The matter was brought up and caused a hot discussion in the British Parliament. In the third week France sent a military mission to Bucharest under General Berthelot, while England, France, and Russia were all making every effort to keep the Rumanians supplied with ammunition, in which, however, they could not have been entirely successful.
The Rumanians, on their part, continued defending every step forward made by the enemy. On the 18th they won a victory in the Gyimes Pass which cost the enemy nearly a thousand prisoners and twelve guns. At Agas, in the Oitoz region, the Austro-Germans also suffered a local defeat. Nor had they so far made very marked progress in the passes behind Brasso. There seems to be no doubt that had the Rumanians been able to devote all their forces and resources to the defense of the Hungarian frontier, they would probably have been able to hold back Falkenhayn's forces. But Mackensen had forced them to split their strength.
On October 19, 1916, the situation in Dobrudja again began assuming an unpleasant aspect. On that date Mackensen began a new offensive. Since his retirement a month previous he had remained remarkably quiet, possibly with the purpose of making the Rumanians believe that he had been more seriously beaten than was really the case, so that they might withdraw forces from this front for the Transylvania operations. This, in fact, they had been doing, and when, on the 19th, he suddenly began renewing his operations, the Russo-Rumanian forces were not in a position to hold him back.
After a vigorous artillery preparation, which destroyed the Russo-Rumanian trenches in several places, Mackensen began a series of assaults which presently compelled the Russo-Rumanian forces to retire in the center and on the right wing. On the 21st the Germans reported that they had captured Tuzla and the heights northwest of Toprosari, as well as the heights near Mulciova, and that they had taken prisoner some three thousand Russians. This success now began to threaten the railroad linefrom Cernavoda to Constanza. This line had been Mackensen's objective from the beginning. On the 23d a dispatch from Bucharest announced that the Rumanian lines had retired again and were barely south of this railroad. Having captured Toprosari and Cobadin, the Bulgarians advanced on Constanza, and on the 22d they succeeded in entering this important seaport, though the Rumanians were able to remove the stores there under the fire of the Russian warships.
General von Mackensen and his staff in Rumania. Already victorious in campaigns in Galicia and Serbia, Mackensen won new laurels in the Dobrudja. His troops pushed on to Bucharest, which fell December 6, 1916.
On the same date Mackensen began an attack on Medgidia, up the railroad about twenty-five miles from Constanza, and succeeded in taking it. He also took Rasova, in spite of the fierce resistance which the Rumanians made at this point. In these operations Mackensen reported that he had taken seven thousand prisoners and twelve guns. Next he attacked Cernavoda, where the great bridge crossed the Danube, and on the morning of the 25th the defenders were compelled to retire across the structure, afterward blowing it up. Thus the railroad was now in the hands of Mackensen. The Russians and the Rumanians had been driven across the river or up along its bank. But it would be no small matter for the enemy to follow them. With the aid of so effective a barrier as this broad river it now seemed possible that the Rumanians might decrease their forces very considerably on this front, still succeed in holding Mackensen back, and turn their full attention to Falkenhayn in the north. Of course, there still remained the northern section of Dobrudja, passing up east of southern Rumania to the head of the Black Sea and the Russian frontier, along which Mackensen might advance and get in behind the rear of the main Russian lines. But this country in large part constitutes the Danube delta and is swampy, and is certainly not fitted for operations involving heavy artillery. Moreover, Mackensen was now at the narrowest part of Dobrudja, whose shape somewhat resembles an hourglass, and a farther advance would mean an extension of his lines. Aside from this, by advancing farther north, he laid his rear open to a possible raid from across the river, such as the Rumanians had attempted on October 2, 1916, unsuccessfully, to be sure, but sufficiently to show that the whole bank of the river must beguarded. The farther Mackensen advanced northward the more men he would require to guard his rear along the river. For the time being, at least, the river created a deadlock, with the advantage to whichever side should be on the defensive. The Rumanians might very well now have left a minimum force guarding the river bank while they turned their main forces northward to stem the tide of Teuton invasion through the passes.
For over a week this seemed exactly what the Rumanians were doing. On November 4, 1916, the situation along the Rumanian front in the mountains looked extremely well for King Ferdinand's armies. At no point had the Teutons made any appreciable headway, while in two regions, in the Jiul Valley and southeast of Kronstadt, Bucharest reported substantial gains. Berlin and Vienna both admitted that the Rumanians had recaptured Rosca, a frontier height east of the Predeal Pass.[Back to Contents]
MACKENSEN PRESSED BACK
On November 6, 1916, came the news from Bucharest that the Rumanian and Russian forces in northern Dobrudja had again assumed the offensive and that Mackensen's line was giving way; and that in retiring his troops had burned the villages of Daeni, Gariot, Rosman, and Gaidar. Full details of these operations were never issued, but as day after day passed it became obvious that the Russo-Rumanian armies were indeed making a determined effort to regain the ground lost in Dobrudja.
On November 9, 1916, it was announced through London that the Russian General Sakharov had been transferred from Galicia and was now in command of the allied forces in Dobrudja; that he had succeeded in pushing Mackensen's lines back from Hirsova on the Danube, where a gunboat flotilla was cooperatingwith him, and that Mackensen was now retreating through Topal, twelve miles farther south, and was only thirteen miles north of the Cernavoda-Constanza railroad. On November 10, 1916, an official announcement from Petrograd stated that "on the Danube front our cavalry and infantry detachments occupied the station of Dunareav, three versts from Cernavoda. We are fighting for possession of the Cernavoda Bridge. More than two hundred corpses have been counted on the captured ground. A number of prisoners and machine guns have also been captured. We have occupied the town of Hirsova and the village of Musluj and the heights three versts south of Delgeruiv and five versts southwest of Fasmidja." On the following day the Russian ships began bombarding Constanza and set fire to the town which, according to the Petrograd reports, was burned to the ground. At the same time a Russian force advancing southward along the right bank of the Danube occupied the villages of Ghisdarechti and Topal. On that same date Sofia also reported heavy fighting and an enemy advance near the Cernavoda Bridge. Two days later, on the 13th, an indirect report through London stated that the Russians had crossed the Danube south of the bridge, behind Mackensen's front. This was not officially confirmed, but apparently another attempt was made to strike Mackensen's rear from across the river.
Meanwhile the Russo-Rumanian line was pressing Mackensen's front back, hammering especially on his left wing up against the river, until he was a bare few miles north of the railroad and thirty miles south of the point farthest north he had been able to reach. Here he seems to have held fast, for further reports of fighting on the Danube front become vague and contradictory. At any rate, the Russo-Rumanian advance stopped short of victory, as the recapture of the Cernavoda-Constanza railroad would have been. That Mackensen's retreat may have been voluntary, to encourage the enemy to advance and thereby weaken his front on the Transylvanian front, seems possible in the light of later events. Also, it was possible that his forces had been weakened by Bulgarian regiments being withdrawn and sent down to the Macedonian front, where Monastir was in gravedanger and was presently to fall to the French-Russian-Serbian forces. From this moment a silence settles over this front; when Mackensen again emerges into the light shed by official dispatches, it is to execute some of the most brilliant moves that have yet been made during the entire war.[Back to Contents]
THE RUMANIANS PRESSED BACK
Meanwhile hard fighting had been going on on the Transylvanian front, one day favoring one side and on the next day favoring the other. On November 5, 1916, the Germans regained Rosca heights, which the Rumanians had taken on the 3d. On the 7th the Russians were pressing the Germans hard below Dorna Vatra, while southeast of Red Tower Pass and near the Vulkan Pass the Rumanians suffered reverses, losing a thousand men as prisoners, according to the Vienna and Berlin dispatches. But before another week had passed it became evident that the Teutons were gaining, whether because of superior artillery, or because the Rumanians had weakened this front for the sake of the Dobrudja offensive. For each step the Teutons fell back they advanced two. Not unlike a skillful boxer Falkenhayn feinted at one point, then struck hard at another unexpectedly. Without doubt skill and superior knowledge, as well as superior organization, were on the side of the invaders. By the middle of the month the Rumanians were being forced back, both in the Alt and the Jiul valleys, facts which could not be hidden by the dispatches from Bucharest announcing the capture of a machine gun at one point or a few dozen prisoners at another. A few days later the London papers were commenting on the extremely dangerous situation in Rumania.
The Teutons had been pushing especially hard against the extreme left of the Rumanian line in western Wallachia. On the 15th, after a week of continuous hammering, the Austro-Germansforced their way down from the summits after battering down the permanent frontier fortifications with their heavy mortars. Pushed down into the foothills, the Rumanians, who were now being reenforced by Russian forces, decided to make a stand on the range of hills running east and west and lying south of Turgujiulij, the first important town south of the mountains. Foggy weather favored the Russo-Rumanians and enabled them to take up a strong position at this point before being observed by the Germans. The latter began launching a series of assaults. For three days these frontal attacks were continued. Finally numbers told; the Rumanian center was broken. Then the German cavalry, which had been held in reserve, hurled itself through the breach and raced down through the valley toward the railroad, thirty miles distant, preventing the fleeing Russians and Rumanians from making any further stands. On the following day, the 19th, the cavalry had reached the Orsova-Craiova railroad and occupied it from Filliash, an important junction, to Strehaia station, a distance of twelve miles.
Two days later came the announcement that Craiova itself had been taken by the Teuton forces. This town is the center of an important grain district on the edge of the Wallachian Plain. From a military point of view the importance of its capture was in that it was a railroad junction and that the Germans now held the line of communication between the Orsova region, constituting the extreme western portion of Wallachia, and the rest of Rumania. As a matter of fact, as was to develop a few days later, the Teutons had broken through the main Rumanian lines, and in doing so had clipped off the tip of the Rumanian left wing. Some days later the capture of this force was announced, though it numbered much less than had at first been supposed—some seven thousand men.
But now a new danger suggested itself. The Teutonic invasion was heading toward the Danube. Should it reach the banks of that river there would be nothing to prevent a juncture between the forces of Falkenhayn and those under Mackensen, thereby forming a net which would be stretched clear across Rumania and swept eastward toward Bucharest. Falkenhaynhad only to clear the northern bank of the Danube, and nothing could prevent Mackensen's crossing; as was presently to develop, this fear was not without foundation. On the 24th came the announcement from Berlin that Falkenhayn had captured Turnu-Severin on the Danube and that Mackensen's troops had crossed in several places and effected a juncture with Falkenhayn's men. Farther north the Rumanians were reported to be falling back to positions along the Alt River, a swift, deep stream in its upper reaches which broadens out into many arms down on the plain and forms a difficult obstacle to an advancing army. At Slatina the bridge is over four hundred yards in length. This, apparently, was to be the new line of defense, running north and south. Still farther north, in the Carpathians, in Moldavia, the Austro-Germans were developing another strong offensive, and here, near Tulghes Pass, where the Russians held the line, a pitched battle of unusual fury developed, bringing the Austro-Germans to a standstill for the time being, at least. Again there came reports from Petrograd of activity along the front in Dobrudja, but this appears to have been at the most nothing but a demonstration to distract Mackensen from effecting any crossing farther up the Danube at a point where he might flank the Rumanian lines along the Alt. Throughout the countries of the Allies it was now generally recognized that Rumania was doomed, unless the Russians could send enough forces to rescue her.
On the 26th official dispatches from both Berlin and Bucharest stated that Mackensen had crossed the Danube at Zimnitza and was advancing toward Bucharest. The German statement had him in the outskirts of Alexandria, only forty-seven miles from the capital, and reported that the Rumanians were retreating eastward from the lower Alt. On the following day Berlin announced that the entire length of the Alt had been abandoned by the Rumanians, which was confirmed by a dispatch from Bucharest. This retreat had been forced by the crossing effected by Mackensen's troops to the rear of the line, threatening its flank and rear. That the danger to Bucharest was now being felt was obvious from the fact that on the following day the Rumanian Government and diplomatic authorities removed from Bucharestto Jassy, about two hundred miles northeastward, near the Russian frontier. On this date, too, it was reported that Mackensen had captured Giurgiu, which showed that he had advanced thirty miles during the past twenty-four hours. From Giurgiu there is direct rail connection with Bucharest: this line Mackensen could use for transport service, thus increasing the danger to the Rumanian main army that it might have its retreat cut off. Having abandoned the Alt line, the next logical line that the retreating Rumanians should have attempted to hold was the Vedea, another river running parallel to the Alt and emptying into the Danube. Here, too, there was a railroad running along the river bank, or close to it, which would have served as a supply line. But it was just this railroad which Mackensen had captured at Giurgiu. Once more he threatened the Rumanian flank, and so a stand at the Vedea became also impossible. Certainly the Teutons were now moving with extraordinary rapidity, and there was undoubtedly some truth in the Berlin statement that the Rumanians were fleeing eastward in a panic-stricken mass. Great quantities of war material were abandoned and captured by the advancing Teutons. It is significant, however, that neither Berlin nor Vienna were able to report the capture of any great amount of prisoners.
By the first of the month the Teutons had almost reached the Arges River, the last large stream that ran between them and the outer fortifications of Bucharest. Behind this river the Rumanians finally came to a stand, and now Berlin, instead of describing the precipitate flight of the enemy, spoke only of the hard fighting which was going on. At this time the German War Office also announced the capture of Campulung, which opened the road through the Torzburg Pass.
That Russia was now making strong efforts to relieve the pressure on the Rumanians before Bucharest became obvious on December 1, 1916, when it was reported from Petrograd that a Russian offensive had been begun on the Bukowina border and was spreading down along the Rumanian frontier south of Kirlibaba, along a front over two hundred miles in length. Here, according to the report, the Rumanians, in cooperation with theRussians, captured a whole range of heights in the Buzeu Valley southeast of Kronstadt, while the Russians themselves reported similar progress. At the same time Berlin, while also touching on the severity of the fighting in the north, reported that the Russians were hurling themselves against Mackensen's entire front in Dobrudja. The German reports admitted that here and there the Russian attacks effected slight local gains at tremendous cost. Whatever the actual facts, this offensive movement came too late to have any material results; Bucharest, at any rate, was doomed.[Back to Contents]
THE BATTLE OF THE RIVER ARGECHU
On December 3, 1916, what appears to have been a desperate battle from the German reports took place along the river Argechu in the region before Bucharest. This is a mountain stream which, from Piteshti to southwest of Titu, is sometimes a hundred yards in width and at some points twenty meters deep, though fords are found at frequent intervals. At this time, however, the river was well flooded and only the bridges were available for crossing. At this point strong detachments of Bulgarians, Austrians, and Germans coming together from the north, east, and south met with resistance from the Rumanians on the other side of the river. For an entire day the Rumanians held back the enemy, then suddenly broke and fled so abruptly that they had not time to destroy the bridges, over which the invaders streamed after the retreating Rumanians, capturing several thousands of prisoners.
On the following day the left wing of the Austro-Germans captured Tergovistea. At Piteshti the First Army of the Rumanians made another brief stand, but was driven back beyond the Titu junction of railroads from Bucharest to Campulung. South of Bucharest Russian and Rumanian forces also offered a stout resistance, but were finally compelled to retire when theenemy's cavalry cut around in their rear and threatened their line of retreat. During this one day the Germans claimed to have taken 8,000 prisoners, the Danube army capturing also thirty-five cannon and thirteen locomotives and a great amount of rolling stock.
It was not the battle along the Argechu, however, which was the cause of the immediate danger to Bucharest. The blow which decided the fate of the Rumanian capital came from the north. The real danger lay in the German forces coming down from the passes south of Kronstadt. Already Campulung was taken and the Argechu crossed in the north. Then the invaders streamed down the Prahova Valley, which begins at the passes and runs down southeast behind Bucharest. The Rumanians now had the choice of evacuating their capital or having it surrounded and besieged. Bucharest was a fortified city, but the Germans carried such guns as no fortifications built by the hand of man could resist. Antwerp had been the first demonstration of that fact.
The plan of holding the city had also several other objections. From a military point of view the city was of little value. Its retention would have had a certain moral value, in that it would have shown that the Rumanians were by no means entirely defeated, but as practically all the nations of Europe were now on one side or the other of the fighting line, this political effect would have found few to influence. To defend it, moreover, would have meant its complete destruction, and sooner or later the defending force would have been taken prisoners. There was no chance of saving the city from Teuton occupation, such occupation might be delayed, nothing more. Rather than waste a large force in a futile defense, the Rumanians decided to evacuate the capital without any effort to stay the advancing enemy at this point. This decision seems to have been taken some time before the city was in actual danger. The civilian population was leaving the city in a steady stream and every railroad carriage going eastward was crowded to full capacity.[Back to Contents]