Chapter 10

FOOTNOTES:[40]Omitted by Author.—A.B.L.[41]This paper appears, from an independent source ['The Siege and Fall of Port Arthur,' by Major-General Kostenko, President of the Military Court of Port Arthur during the siege], to have been the copy of a telegram to the Tsar which Stössel had despatched to the Tsarbeforethis council meeting was held. According to Kostenko this telegram was: 'We cannot hold out more than a few days; am taking measures to prevent a street massacre'; and in his opinion Stössel did not read it out at this council meeting after the feeling of the members had been so strongly declared against surrender, because he was afraid of being arrested for having sent it.—A.B.L.

FOOTNOTES:

[40]Omitted by Author.—A.B.L.

[41]This paper appears, from an independent source ['The Siege and Fall of Port Arthur,' by Major-General Kostenko, President of the Military Court of Port Arthur during the siege], to have been the copy of a telegram to the Tsar which Stössel had despatched to the Tsarbeforethis council meeting was held. According to Kostenko this telegram was: 'We cannot hold out more than a few days; am taking measures to prevent a street massacre'; and in his opinion Stössel did not read it out at this council meeting after the feeling of the members had been so strongly declared against surrender, because he was afraid of being arrested for having sent it.—A.B.L.

CHAPTER XLI

THE FALL OF FORTIFICATION NO. 3—THE FAILURE OF THE DEFENCE AND MEDICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Thegarrison no longer showed the same steadiness that it had shown in the many desperate fights in the beginning of December. This was certainly owing to the example of Fort Chi-kuan-shan. The men's spirits seemed to have gone, and it was too late for the officers to stop the hæmorrhage from the moral wounds caused by Fock. A passionate desire for life was everywhere noticeable, and any attempt to persuade the men that it was their duty to die was now useless.

Early in the morning of the 31st Gorbatovsky was summoned by Fock to confer with him. The latter was, as usual, dilating on the splendid qualities of the men, and the pity it was to make them suffer needlessly, when a great pillar of smoke suddenly shot up from Fortification No. 3, followed by a tremendous explosion.

'I must go back, sir, and I will return at once and let you know what has happened.'

'Yes, come back as soon as you can.'

Gorbatovsky then went off. Without waiting for a report from him, Fock there and then, in the presence of Captain Rodionoff, of the Engineers, wrote out his orders for the abandonment of Fortification No. 3, and sent them off by (I think) a sailor. There was no reference, no wordto the Commandant, or even to Stössel. Comment is unnecessary; such action speaks for itself.

What had happened is best seen by reference to the diary:

'December 31.—About 6 a.m. General Gorbatovsky was summoned by General Fock to the third line of defences to confer. At 9 a.m. three successive explosions took place in Fortification No. 3. After a few minutes a telephone message came in from the work to say that the enemy had exploded two charges in the corners of one of the faces. At the moment when the garrison, led by its commanding officer, Captain Spredovy, dashed out of the quarters in the gorge casemate, in order to get out into the interior of the place before the Japanese could seize the parapet, a third charge was fired, which had been laid in the gorge itself. This charge destroyed the gorge casemates, and buried the commanding officer and 140 men under the débris. The fall of this mass of stuff caused the hand-grenades heaped up in the casemates to detonate and set off four mines, laid under the foundations. The wounded and remnants of the garrison were thus shut up in the casemate, with only one small exit into the gorge ditch, through which they had to crawl. Not being able to get into the interior of the work, the garrison could do nothing to hold the position. The enemy perceived this at once, quickly got into the interior of the work, and seized the gorge, where they brought machine-guns. About 10 o'clock we saw a white flag on the fortification. It is not known who raised it. General Stössel and the Fortress Commandant were informed, and within a quarter of an hour the following order was received from General Stössel:

'"In view of the difficulty of getting out of the Fortification, the remainder of the garrison may surrender; those who can escape may try to."

'This order was transmitted by telephone to the work, whence a list of those alive and wounded was telephoned back. The telephone was then cut to prevent the enemy hearing what we said. It was thought that, having seized the fortification, they would try and storm Tumulus Battery. General Gorbatovsky, therefore, ordered the garrison of this battery to be reinforced by one company of infantry, and a company of sailors to be sent into the trenches of the second line from Laperoff's battery along Vladimir and Mitrofanieff Batteries. About eleven o'clock the enemy's fire ceased. Gorbatovsky decided to hold the second line, having Tumulus Battery on the left flank and Eagle's Nest on the right. He told the Commandant of this, and asked leave to carry it out at night....'

From Stössel's order and subsequent dispositions on that day it is clear that he had no idea of the relationship between the second and third lines. Among other things he ordered the left flank of the second line to be held, while part of the third line was held (Stonebroken Ridge and Big Hill). From this it was plain that Stössel had never seen the second line of positions, and had never been on the hills near.

After the fall of Erh-lung-shan Fort the besiegers opened a heavy fire on the north-east front from Tumulus Battery to Eagle's Nest. At 1 p.m. on January 1 they delivered an attack from the fort on Rocky Ridge. Our troops having lost heart, and being badly demoralized, gave way; but our gun-fire checked the enemy's assault, and the position remained in our possession. However, despite the very strict and definite orders given by the Commandant that the Chinese Wall from Rocky Ridge was to be held at all costs (it was quite possible), as soon as dusk came on, the abandonment of this wall and Rocky Ridge began under Fock's orders. The retirement was executed without any interference from the enemy, andwe were able to take with us all except the heavier guns. At five o'clock on January 1 our troops were distributed along the second line—Tumulus Battery, Vladimir Battery, Mitrofanieff Hills, Eagle's Nest, the portion of the Chinese Wall behind Chi-kuan-shan Fort, and Kuropatkin Lunette.

The enemy having now arrived at such a position, it seems a fitting moment to mention in what directions the organization of Port Arthur as a fortress had most failed.

By this time most of the many grave defects in the original conception and subsequent execution of the material defences of this stronghold had become only too painfully clear, though it had not needed the test of bitter experience to make the more glaring errors obvious. There were terrible faults in the original tactical arrangement of the defences and in the details of the works themselves.

The main line of permanent forts, the girdle, was much too close to the objects to be protected—i.e., the dockyard and town. The positions fortified by us were so close that, before capturing these positions, the enemy were able to bombard the place, damage our fleet, and demoralize the population. Some points of vital importance were entirely unprovided with permanent works—i.e., 203 Metre Hill, Angle and Long Hills—and were left for an improvised fortification, which was carried out in a scrambling way after the place had been completely invested. So little had these three positions been considered important that until after May 18 no paths to them had ever been made. Accepting the main line originally chosen, such as it was, there were further defects in the forts themselves. They were in many cases badly sited. On the eastern front the enemy had commanding positions within two miles (Ta-ku-shan, Sia-gu-shan), from which the interior of our defence could beseen and fired into, and our communications shelled. This seriously hampered the movement of troops and the transport of munitions. They were also badly designed for their sites, having no good field of fire and much dead ground in front of them. It is not enough to say they were ill-concealed—they were ingenuously conspicuous. As regards armament, our long-range heavy guns, designed to fight the enemy's siege artillery, were placed right in the front, by which all the advantages to be obtained by their ranging power was thrown away. They naturally drew a concentration of the enemy's fire, and were soon rendered useless. They were a positive curse to the works in which they were placed, for they attracted a fire on to these works, to which they could not efficiently reply. In design many of the forts failed. They were not defiladed; they had no covered communications and no proper shelters. The parapets were feebly revetted with stones and sand-bags, and not having sufficient traverses, could be swept by enfilade fire. The concrete was not covered with earth, but was fully exposed. Lastly, such as they were, our forts were not finished and ready by the time they were wanted.

The faults in the choice of position and ground were largely due to the fact that the scheme was originally a paper scheme, worked out on the map instead of on the ground. When the local engineers saw things on the ground, it was too late for any alteration—the scheme had been approved and confirmed. The paucity of works, their half-finished condition, and the absolute lack of many essentials, however, were all due to a cheese-paring, misplaced economy. Money was scarce for the vital defences of Arthur, while millions were being poured out on the palaces and wharves of Dalny, on a well-equipped harbour, which was eventually to help the Japanese.

Let us now turn to the medical organization of theFortress. Did that correspond to the needs of the besieged Fortress? What influence had that on its fate?

At the beginning of the war, in spite of the growth of the garrison, there were the following hospitals: (1) A mixed hospital of 400 beds; (2) the Reserve Hospital No. 1, 200 beds; (3) the Port Hospital, 40 beds; (4) two small civil hospitals. Of course, this quantity of hammocks could not possibly suffice to meet the needs of a garrison 50,000 strong. If to the garrison be added the fleet, the civilian and native population, the number of beds appears yet more absurd. According to the field service regulations, the proportion of beds to strength of troops should be 1 to 8; the proportion existing at the commencement of the war was 1 to 100! In March was opened the Naval Hospital, 200 beds, increased in July to 500; in April Reserve Hospital No. 6, 210 beds; in May three reserve hospitals, 630 beds; in June three reserve hospitals and a mobile hospital, 630 beds. After the fortnight's assaults in August, when all the hospitals were filled with wounded and were threatened with dysentery, Reserve Hospital No. 11 was opened, with 1,200 beds, in the naval barracks.

Although, when once the war had started, it was daily to be expected that the enemy might land and Port Arthur be thus completely cut off, from the moment the first shot was fired the equipping of the hospitals with medical and other appliances was carried out at snail's pace. During the three months when the Fortress was in direct communication with the capital, no single additional bed was added—that is, omitting the Naval Hospital and theMongolia, opened within two months of the beginning of the war for a special purpose. The former was arranged for during peace-time and the building had already been finished. It was only with the arrival of the new Commandant and the Sanitary Inspector of the Fortress, CivilCouncillor Subotin, that the organization of the medical service was gradually placed on some sort of footing. Their efforts were not particularly fruitful, because, instead of immediately giving effect to the urgent representations and applications of the Commandant, the authorities in the north spilt seas of ink, and continued thus to spend their time till we were cut off. At the beginning of the strict investment (after the fights on the advanced positions) there were only 2,500 beds in the hospitals under the Military and Naval Departments, and in the three hospital buildings taken over by the Red Cross there were only 500 beds, or a total of 3,000—one-third of the proper number. During the period of the strict blockade the number of beds increased. According to official statistics, another 1,500 were added; but this addition can only be taken as nominal, as there were practically no reserves in the medical store depôts at the beginning of the war, and it was impossible to procure any locally. But still, accepting these official figures, during the worst period in Arthur 4,500 sick and wounded could be tended. The minimum figure of sick at the end of the siege, which cannot be disputed, was 15,000; the actual number was more like 18,000. To show how these 'extra' 10,000 to 12,000 suffering soldiers found shelter or relief means the unveiling of the most revolting picture of the siege. About half of these 'extra' cases were distributedsomewherein the hospitals above mentioned, and the remainder were put in hastily-run-up sheds—little cemeteries of living beings. In these during the last month of the siege there were sometimes as many as a thousand sick men crowded together, under the charge of one medical man, often a surgeon, who could only be a helpless spectator of their sufferings.

Just glance at one of these 'infernos' in the month of December. Outside it is freezing; inside, in spite of themusty and sickening stench, the cold is intense. On all sides is filth, nothing but filth, and on it and amongst it crawl millions of greasy grey lice. The silence is only broken by the sighs and groans of the sick and the hungry—for all in here are both sick and hungry. Death, the Liberator, is also here. He is in every corner, at the doors, at the windows, crawling along the floors and on to the bed-boards; he envelops everything—and waits. At the front a man dies suddenly, and all is over. In the hospitals Death is fought. But here, here, everything is in his power—he only has to wait. Second after second, minute after minute, hour after hour, men pass into eternity, into oblivion. There are hundreds of cases of scurvy. They lie side by side on the floor, on the bed-boards, underneath them, just as they were placed when they came in—some in great-coats, some in tunics, some in miserable boots, some barefooted. The faces are shapeless, swollen, and distorted, and upon the yellow skin are large dark blue bruises. The swollen gums, covered with hideous sores, project out of many grinning mouths, and show the lack of teeth, which are continuously falling out.... Here, far away from their friends and relations, forgotten by all, in horrible, complete consciousness, they are silently waiting the end.

And to think that much of this suffering might have been spared these men had the Medical Service been properly organized, had the highest authorities done their duty, instead of busying themselves with writing orders. Things would not have been so bad even if Stössel had confirmed the resolution of the Council of War about the killing of horses on December 8. Feeding the garrison on horses' flesh and white bread would at once have checked the growth of disease; and there were more than 3,000 horses and 3,000,000 pounds of flour in the Fortress.

The hospitals which existed in peace-time and the hospitals which expanded before the strict blockade answered their purpose fairly well. Those which were opened after the commencement of the strict blockade were far from doing so. They had no linen, nor beds, nor medical supplies, to say nothing of a sufficient quantity of trained nurses or doctors. The most disgraceful in this respect were Reserve Field Hospital No. 2, of 1,200 beds, opened for infectious cases and Mobile Field Hospital No. 5 (4th Division, General Fock), situated on Tiger's Peninsula. What could be expected from hospitals opened after the August assaults, when there was nothing left in the place with which to equip them? For the 1,200 beds of No. 2 only four doctors were told off. This hospital was renowned throughout the Fortress for its horrors: there is no need to describe them. A commission was appointed, which found the internal organization and arrangements of the hospital so revolting that the Hospital Inspector was immediately removed, and in his place was appointed M. Menshoff, who had recently been Chief of the Police in Dalny. Of 3,500 patients received into it, 1,500 died. Mobile Hospital No. 5 was little better.

The system of opening a hospital extension on the day of a big attack was hopeless. It led to the sudden concentration of the sick and wounded in the hospitals nearest to where the attack was taking place, and where there was most congestion and appalling confusion. The wounded sometimes received no medical assistance for days together, as the personnel, working as it did for twenty-four hours in the twenty-four, could not cope with such a big influx, and they were carried from one hospital to another, often dying on the road. Meanwhile, the other hospitals, situated some way off from the locality attacked, did not take their share, owing to this inefficient organization.

Many of the doctors made desperate efforts, but when dealing with masses like this individual efforts were drops in the ocean.

Subotin was the Fortress Sanitary Inspector, immediately subordinate to the Commandant, and he did his best; but there was no independent central organization in the Medical Service of the Fortress, which could have looked ahead and taken steps to distribute the sick properly in the hospitals during attacks. The Medical Service was dependent on the combatant authorities, whose hands were much taken up with fighting. What was required was a central administration, which could have foreseen what might happen and have controlled the arrangements. The officer in charge should have been invested with high rank and great authority, and should have had a properly trained personnel. Scurvy first made its appearance in the Fortress at a very early date: as early as April it appeared among the crew of thePallada, but, thanks to timely and energetic measures, it was then stamped out. Unfortunately, no material preventive measures were taken against its recurrence, with the exception of vague suggestions as to better food and to add green food to the rations, though where better food could be got or vegetables could be bought was difficult to say. The scurvy cases increased from hundreds in October and thousands in November to 10,000 in December. The hospitals were so full of it that men were afraid of going into them, and at the end of the siege preferred to remain on duty, even when sick.

Of 18,000 sick and wounded reported on the day the garrison marched out, 6,000 only were wounded; the balance were cases of scurvy. There were really more, as many men only slightly ill were doing duty. Dr. Kefel, of the Naval Hospital, on making an inspection of the men on one section of the right flank on December 11, foundthat 21 per cent. of these on duty had scurvy. Exactly a fortnight afterwards, on his inspecting the same section, he found 40½ per cent. suffering from it. These were the same men, for they had not been relieved.

It was pointed out in his report on this that: 'If the spreading of scurvy increases in the above arithmetical progression, then in every fortnight we shall have 200 more on the sick list out of every thousand in the fighting line, and in one and a half months there will be no men left fit for duty....

'If extreme measures are immediately taken, and we make use of all the meat, white bread, and antiscorbutic diet available, we may hope that those who are now well may not catch it, that the slight cases will not become worse, and that the worse cases will do tolerably well. Therefore there are before us two alternatives: to keep our food-supply and have, after a month and a half, not a single serviceable soldier, or to have eaten up our supplies of provisions at the end of six weeks, but during all that time to have kept the garrison in fighting strength. The strategist, not the arithmetician, can decide which is the more advantageous choice to make for the Fortress.'

When this report was laid before General Stössel, with a proposal to increase the ration, he replied: 'There cannot be so many men as this ill in that section. It is nonsense; there are not half that number there.' And so the question remained undecided. It was only at the very end that an order was given for a slight increase.

To the question, 'Was it possible to have avoided this epidemic of scurvy, and could we have checked it with what we had in Port Arthur?' the answer is undoubtedly 'Yes!'

How exactly this could have been done is a harder question to answer. From the moment we were cut off from the north the rations of the garrison were graduallycut short, and by November, when the men were physically and morally weakened, the rations were reduced to the minimum. Instead of bread, biscuits were issued, which could not really be counted as rations for scurvy cases, as to these they were as useful as stones.

The progress of the disease might have been checked if (1) a probable period of resistance had been thought out and fixed; (2) if rational use had been made of all sources of supply—horses, mules, cats, dogs, and flour. In the beginning of December more than 2,000,000 pounds of excellent flour was received. Had 3 pounds of white flour been issued per man, it would have lasted for three months. Half a pound of horse-flesh per man would have lasted for six weeks, though the number of horses for transport purposes would, of course, have been limited.

The first was not done, thanks to the chaos resulting from the harmful interference of Stössel and Fock.

The second was decided on at the council of December 8 (at which, by some incomprehensible oversight, the Sanitary Inspector of the Fortress was not asked to attend), but was not confirmed by Stössel.

CHAPTER XLII

THE LAST DAY BUT ONE

Thedawn of January 1, 1905, ushered in an anxious day. All the roads near the forts were now so much under rifle and machine-gun fire that movement on them soon ceased. In the Staff Office of the section it was expected that the enemy would at any moment commence to pound and then storm Eagle's Nest, which was now the key to the position. Sure enough, about nine o'clock the bombardment commenced, shell after shell with clockwork regularity striking the top of the hill. The staff of the section went from their usual observation-place to the dressing station, from which an excellent view of the rearward slope of Eagle's Nest could be seen, and which had a telephone. At noon Captain Galitsinsky, who was in command of the work, began sending in alarming messages to the effect that the enemy, by repeated rushes, were successfully concentrating in force in front of the position, evidently with a view to an assault, and asked that he might be reinforced. The assault soon began, but made at first little progress in face of the garrison's steady fire. General Gorbatovsky, commanding the section, kept the Commandant regularly informed of the progress, and urged that our guns should increase their fire. Our fortress guns poured in a fairly heavy fire, but not so heavy as the circumstances warranted, as we had but few howitzers, which alone could have beeneffective. Galitsinsky continued anxiously to report the critical condition of the position. Gorbatovsky never left the telephone, talking all the time with either Fock, Biely, or the Commandant: he kept on begging for reserves to be sent up, saying that without reinforcements he could not guarantee the issue. Suddenly some infantry were seen running back from Tumulus Hill, and it was ascertained that the enemy, having climbed a spur in front of Eagle's Nest, had enfiladed some of our trenches. The men in them wavered and then ran. The presence of mind of Captain Stepanoff alone restored order and averted a panic. A party of fifty sailors were sent up to Galitsinsky, followed by a second party somewhat later, and the fight waged hotly, our men with difficulty holding their own.

At midday, while the issue of the fight was in the balance, Rear-Admiral Loschinsky received the following letter, No. 2,544 of January 1:

'The state of the Fortress is becoming so critical that its further resistance cannot be guaranteed. If it becomes necessary to surrender, it is essential that the most important papers and standards be sent away. I am, therefore, directed by General Stössel to ask you whether it will be possible to send a destroyer at any moment to Chifu on board which an officer could be despatched with such papers. If this can be arranged, the destroyer ought to keep under steam ready to depart, as it will be impossible to foresee the precise moment when she will be required. I have the honour to inquire if this can be done?'Reuss.'

'Reuss.'

Loschinsky replied to the effect that a destroyer would be kept always ready, and, to ship articles more conveniently, would lie under Electric Cliff. TheStatny, under Lieutenant Baron Kasinsky, was told off for this. While this took place the Commandant was occupied issuing orders for the defence of the north-eastern front, and it never entered his head that anyone was then thinking out arrangements in case of a surrender. He was not told of the letter sent to Loschinsky, although the latter, in his capacity of Commander of the coast defences, was immediately under him.

Meanwhile the assault on Eagle's Nest continued, and about 2.30 p.m. the telephone from it ceased to work. Everyone at the dressing station was busy with his glasses watching the top of the hill, which was shrouded in clouds of bursting shrapnel, when, to our intense surprise, Galitsinsky, the commander of the place, suddenly arrived.

'How? What's happened? Why?'

'I was the last to leave. None of our men are there now.'

He looked exhausted, dishevelled, overcome.

The staff were much perturbed, for the loss of this important tactical point decided the fate of the north-east front. Any minute the Japanese might force their way along the valley and commence a massacre. Our guns concentrated their fire on the position that a few hours before had been ours; but soon Lieutenant Malchenko could be discerned riding along the road past our position with a large white flag!

When he was seen, someone laughingly said:

'Looks as if he were taking our New Year greetings to Nogi.'

But he was not armed with empty greetings. Alas! he was taking to Japan an unexpected New Year's gift. He was the bearer of the following letter from GeneralStössel to General Baron Nogi, dated December, 1904 (no day of the month):

'Being acquainted with the general state of affairs in the theatre of war, I am of opinion that no object is to be gained by further opposition in Port Arthur, and so, to avoid useless loss of life, I am anxious to enter into negotiations for a capitulation. If your Excellency agrees, I would ask you to be so good as to appoint accredited persons to negotiate concerning the terms and arrangements for surrender, and to appoint a spot where they may meet my representatives.'

The despatch of theparlementairehad been decided on directly General Fock had brought word of the capture of Eagle's Nest, and Colonel Reuss had been immediately summoned to translate the above letter into English. No meeting of the Council of War was held. There was no attempt made to persuade Stössel to alter his decision to surrender. The Commandant was not even informed of the intention to despatch aparlementaire.

The decision to give up the Fortress had really matured on the day of the last meeting of the Council of Defence, for General Stössel had that day despatched a telegram to the Tsar, in which he reported that the men had become worn out, and that the Fortress could not possibly hold out more than a few days.[42]

In this he was undoubtedly influenced by the desire to save the lives of his close friends. If any of them had opposed the despatch of theparlementaire, and had informed the Commandant of it, Stössel alone would never have dared to do it. But he was supported, and so risked ignoring Smirnoff and proposing the surrender.

Simultaneously with the despatch of theparlementaire,Rear-Admiral Wiren, commanding the battleship and cruiser division, received the following letter from Colonel Reuss:

'A letter has just been sent by aparlementairefrom General Stössel to General Baron Nogi proposing to begin negotiations for a capitulation; there is, therefore, only to-night for you to do what you consider necessary to your ships!'

Admiral Wiren, distinguished and gallant officer that he was, was thunderstruck at such tidings, and immediately went off to Admiral Grigorovitch, to whom it was also news. Thence he went to General Biely, and even to the Commandant, who were both equally thunderstruck at what he told them. From them he went to Stössel, where the information of what had been done was confirmed.

The troops, who very soon heard of it, no longer remained troops. It was absurd to count on their obedience. And is it to be wondered at? They had fought long, obstinately, doggedly, dying and suffering awful agonies. They had been accustomed to expect death, and now—now—what did they not hear? Their hopes rose. They longed for life. They did not wish to die, and no power on earth would have again made them exchange these hopes for death. After the news of the despatch of theparlementaire, it would have been impossible to inspire 30,000 worn-out men, whose minds had already been poisoned by the fatal doctrine of some of their leaders, with the idea that the Fortress should be held to the last, and the senior commanders recognized this. When the Commandant went to the Admirals, and a council was held, with him in the chair, to consider what had best be done to avert a shameful surrender, they all came to the inevitable conclusion that there was not the slightest hope of counting on the obedience of the troops already demoralized and knowing all about the negotiations. The arrest of Stössel, Fock, Reuss and others would have caused dissension in the garrison, perhaps a mutiny, and the last state of the Fortress would have been worse than the first. The Commandant and Admirals accordingly wisely refrained from taking any active steps, in order to avoid the awful scandal, which would only have increased the shame surrounding the surrender, and would have availed nothing.

Admiral Wiren issued orders for the ships under his command to be disabled by charges being exploded in their most vital parts (engines, boilers, etc.), but though every precaution was taken, the last demolitions were only brought off by the morning of January 2. TheSevastopolon that morning was tugged out by theSilachato a depth of 30 fathoms, and her Kingston valves[43]were opened, with the result that she heeled over to starboard and quietly foundered. It was impossible to blow up the large number of guns in the Fortress as well as its munitions of war, as, according to the terms of the capitulation, all the forts, guns, ammunition, etc., were to be handed over intact. During the afternoon and night several guns were destroyed and much ammunition was buried; but General Biely, by Stössel's direct orders, strictly forbade this, as the enemy had said they would make reprisals if the guns, etc., were found destroyed. Some obeyed, others did not. Certainly most of the Artillery spent the night destroying their weapons and equipment.

From the Raschevsky-Schwartz Diary, January 1, 1905.

'The firing gradually slackened, and about 6 p.m. ceased. Deathly silence took the place of the constant noise of firing and roars of explosions, even the whistling of bullets overhead ceased. Tired and anxious, we went to the dressing station, where we bolted some food, andthen went to the New Chinese town to the staff quarters of the section. We had scarcely lain down to snatch a little rest, when a mounted scout arrived with a letter from General Fock, in which he ordered Gorbatovsky immediately to carry out his orders, and abandon the third defensive section, for which he gave no reasons. He added that the section up to Fortification No. 2 was also to be evacuated. [On December 22, Fock, realizing the importance of this section, had ordered me to draw up a scheme for strengthening its defence. I had done this on the 23rd, and had carried the work out in two days.] Nothing was left for us but to obey the orders, and orders to this effect were accordingly issued by eight that evening. And so the whole of the north-eastern front and almost half of the eastern front was in the enemy's hands. The Fortress could no longer hold out, as all roads to the town were in the hands of the Japanese, and from Zaliterny Battery they could demolish the town at leisure. It is inexplicable how anyone understanding the great importance of this section and of B Battery could have ordered their abandonment without a fight.'At the same time a second message was received, in which it was said that the Japanese had agreed to the negotiations, and had ceased firing, requesting that we also should cease. The horrible day gave place to a warm, quiet night, and the unusual silence seemed uncanny. Suddenly explosion after explosion rang out from the harbour—our battleships being blown up. It was the last straw....'

'At the same time a second message was received, in which it was said that the Japanese had agreed to the negotiations, and had ceased firing, requesting that we also should cease. The horrible day gave place to a warm, quiet night, and the unusual silence seemed uncanny. Suddenly explosion after explosion rang out from the harbour—our battleships being blown up. It was the last straw....'

The letter referred to above, in which General Gorbatovsky was ordered immediately to carry out instructions with regard to the abandonment of the third defensive position and the portion up to Fortification No. 2, is now in his possession. The abandonment of these positions was in no way warranted by circumstances, and to carry out such a retreat without fighting was most demoralizing to the troops. The negotiations for a capitulation were still before us, and had we retained something 'up our sleeve,' we could have bargained obstinately and have threatened to hold out longer, in order to obtain better terms. This threat would not have been an empty one.

At dark two huge conflagrations burst out from Eagle's Nest, lighting up the whole north-east front. Port Arthur lay silent—more silent than it had been for five long months—while the tongues of flame seemed to lick the low clouds which brooded over the Fortress and its triumphant foe. The silence was short-lived, however, for soon several muffled explosions from the direction of the harbour and the forts showed what Wiren was doing to his ships and the artillery to their guns. Another fire broke out near the harbour, and the town lay bathed in its blood-red glow. From the summit of Quail Hill the picture of Port Arthur on its last night—last night as a portion of the Russian Empire—was tragic enough. The place seemed to shudder at each dull explosion, as if it knew that it was near its end. Its former owners, having once more bought it at the cost of thousands of lives, were standing on the threshold of their great holiday and of the long-coveted prize.

FOOTNOTES:[42]The text of this message has been quoted.—A.B.L.[43]Valves which control the sea-water inlets of a ship.—E.D.S.

FOOTNOTES:

[42]The text of this message has been quoted.—A.B.L.

[43]Valves which control the sea-water inlets of a ship.—E.D.S.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE END

Almostbefore dawn next morning, on the eastern front near Signal Hill, was sounded the last note in the titanic struggle for Arthur. Some volleys rang out on the quiet air, died away into independent firing, then stopped. Boom! boom! went two guns, and then all was silent. It appeared that the Japanese, thinking that Signal Hill was only held by outposts, decided to seize it under cover of night. They advanced without even taking the usual military precautions. Unfortunately for them the hill was held by a company of infantry, which, having noticed their approach, allowed them to get within short range, and then poured volley after volley into them. Twenty dead and eighty wounded were left on the ground. They wavered, and our men charged with the bayonet. The fight continued for some moments, costing us five wounded and one killed.

At daybreak all the hills on both sides swarmed with men who had recently been foes: they stared at each other fascinated. The two great masses of men differed but little from each other. Both had come here to die, to die without a murmur and obediently. The only difference was that on the one side they died for duty and for an object understood by all, knowing their own superiority; on the other they died for the same reason, but feeling their inferiority. The latter it was who drank the bitter cup. Theirone hope now was that they should be spared the fate of being taken prisoners of war. Negotiations were being carried on that day, and, of course, those responsible would spare them the shame of imprisonment. But no! They had to drain the dregs.

ADMIRAL WIREN.

A carriage was seen driving from the District Staff Office; it proceeded quickly round the central Mandarin Road to the village of Siu-shuing, the place appointed for the meeting. In it was Colonel Reuss, who was escorted on horseback by Colonels Khvostoff, Dmitrevsky, Captains Schesnovitch, Golovan, Student Lebedeff (interpreter), and Malchenko. Before they started, General Stössel, in the presence of Fock, told them all that he had given all instructions and full authority for the conclusion of the capitulation confidentially to Reuss, and that Reuss had also been given a letter for General Baron Nogi. Stössel, Fock, and Reuss were nervous; they were also, it seems, in a great hurry, for no lawyer was asked to look over the terms of capitulation, nor was one present even when the terms were signed.

The Commandant, holding aloof from any participation in the surrender, sent the following cipher telegram to the Commander-in-Chief, dated January 2, No. 1,300:

'General Stössel has entered into negotiations with the enemy for surrendering the Fortress without informing me, and in spite of my opinion and that of the majority of the commanding officers.'

Reuss, with his companions, soon reached the appointed spot. They were met by the Chief of the Staff of the Japanese Army, who handed to them the proposed text of the agreement,[44]written in English. He gave them an hour in which to think it over, and went away. Reuss then read the contents aloud to the others. Golovanbegan to protest; he was cut short. 'They are the victors; we must submit to their demands.' After a short conference and passionate protests from Khvostoff, Golovan, and Schesnovitch—as a matter of fact their protests were waste of breath, for Reuss alone had plenary powers, the others being only there for show—Reuss agreed to make three alterations: (1) That the garrison should not be made prisoners of war; (2) that officers should be permitted to take their orderlies with them; (3) that the allowance of baggage should be increased. The Japanese returned punctually within the hour, and took away the text of the capitulation with the alterations for consideration. After a quarter of an hour they returned, and said definitely:

'We only agree to the second alteration. Will you sign?'

Reuss pondered for a moment, then said:

'I will.'

I will not bore the reader with the terms of the convention, which are now well known, or the procedure of signing. No sooner was the shameful document signed than Reuss sent a Japanese messenger to Stössel with a note, saying:

'The capitulation is signed, and, in accordance with it, the destruction of all property must be immediately stopped.

Stössel at once replied:

'I have done everything; tell the Japanese.'

The news of the surrender being an accomplished fact soon spread among the garrison. Our men seemed suddenly to change their natures, all discipline went to the winds, and rioting commenced. Some, throwing their arms away, went straight down to the town, which became one vast scene of drunkenness and orgy. The shops and stores were looted, and wholesale robbery was the order of the day. The crowd broke up everythingthey could, amongst other things the library of theNovy Kry. The officers, seeing that it was hopeless to try and cope with their men, hid from the maddened crowds.

And now a few words as to General Stössel and how he took the surrender. When the riot was reported to him, he at once became alarmed, and asked for a hundred Japanese soldiers as a guard over his house and property. Nogi sent the men, fully armed and equipped. Fearing that matters would become serious, Stössel sent the following note to Smirnoff:

'The strictest steps must be taken at once to deal with the looting which has commenced. I would request you to be so kind as to send out patrols. Reuss tells me that the terms of the surrender are honourable. Please excuse pencil.'

It is difficult to understand what was in his mind when he wrote that note. Was he laughing at the Commandant, or had he gone off his head? As soon as Irman heard of the surrender he went to Smirnoff.

'Is it true, sir, that the Fortress has been surrendered?'

'I know nothing about it. Stössel has done everything without reference to me. Go and ask him.'

Irman went at once to Stössel, and having ascertained that the Fortress had been given up, he asked leave to go to Chifu on a destroyer: he wished to break through to the army in the north. But Stössel flatly refused permission, saying:

'Good heavens! what are you talking about? What are we to do with all the gold vases? How am I to get them away? Why, the Japanese might get them; we must save them.'

'If you want to make certain that the Japanese don't get them, sir, I should throw them into the sea,' was Irman's answer.

Stössel was referring to the gold vases, goblets, spoons, etc., looted from the Pekin Palace which were kept in Arthur. The gold plate had been kept under special arrangements in the quarter-guard of the 12th Regiment, but when this corps left for Manchuria the plate was left behind. On the evening of January 3 a mysterious cart arrived at the quarter-guard, and disappeared in the dark of the night.

Some of the questions put to Stössel later at the Commission of Inquiry, and his replies to them, may help to show how he was occupied at this time. When asked by Major-General Roops why he, contrary to all military regulations, took out of Arthur some thirty-eight cartloads of his own property, he replied:

'I did it with the permission of the Emperor of Japan.'

On being asked why he did not share the fate of the garrison and go into imprisonment, he answered:

'I was ordered not to by Her Imperial Highness the Tsarina.'

He had indeed received a telegram from the Empress in which she had said she would be glad to 'see him in Russia.' The Emperor and Russia did not at that time know what Stössel was!

When he was asked by the Commission why he surrendered Port Arthur on his own responsibility, and did not summon the Council of War to consider the question, he said:

'There was no time for that. I forestalled the Japanese, and did not give them the possibility of breaking into Arthur; I was thus able to prevent a street massacre.'

And this was the cry of all the whole Stössel clique before the Committee of Inquiry.

One extract from the diary and I have finished:

'January 2, 1905.—On the way to the rendezvous of the Japanese Commission appointed to take over, we metan officer of the Japanese General Staff who greeted us in Russian. Ribnikoff at once recognized him to be a man called Ito, who had been in Arthur for several years as a watchmaker!'

Small wonder they beat us!

So it ended—so ended Russian Port Arthur. From its loss—from this mighty struggle, this long-drawn-out nightmare of suffering, this death of all our aspirations—new hope is born to our nation, a hope of better days.

Salus patriæ. Suprema lex est.

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