Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 341) doubts whether S. Anna had learned from Richey’s despatches (chap. xviii,note 27) that Taylor’s forces had been depleted, and cites in evidence S. Anna’s declaration in defence of himself for going against Taylor when Scott was about to attack Vera Cruz (Apelación, 32). But (1) S. Anna was not a person to admit unnecessarily the strongest point of an accusation against him, and in fact the other point of his defence, cited by Rives, was not honest; (2) S. Anna here representing that he feared Scott was coming from Tampico to S. Luis Potosí shows again the disingenuousness of his defence, for he must have known that such a movement was impracticable; (3) it is hardly conceivable that Scott’s intercepted letter of Jan. 3 did not, like Marcy’s of Sept. 2, find its way to headquarters.
11.The forces taking part in the campaign seem to have been 9500 infantry from San Luis, 4000 (under Mejía) stationed at Matehuala, and1000 (under Parrodi) from Tula, 6000 cavalry in four brigades (Torrejón at Las Bocas near S. L. P., Juvera at Venado, Andrade at Cedral, and Miñón at La Encarnación), and 900 engineers, artillery and sappers—a total of 21,400 including officers. These numbers are taken from Rápida Ojeada and from a San Luis letter (the figures of which were stated positively to have come from a member of Santa Anna’s staff) printed inEl Republicanoof February 12, which substantially agree. Santa Anna’s figures were smaller but perhaps did not include Miñón’s and Parrodi’s troops. Those of the Spanish minister were somewhat larger. There seem to have been seventeen guns (three 24-pounders and three 16’s, all of which were siege or fortress guns, and for field pieces five 12’s, five 8’s and a 7-inch howitzer) which, as well as most of the ammunition, appear to have gone forward January 27. Urrea was at the same time to pass from Tula into Tamaulipas, strike at Taylor’s communications and threaten Monterey. Probably there were bodies of irregulars at points not named above.
It occurs to the author at this point to remark that consistency in the use of the article in geographical names is hardly practicable. Even Mexican maps have not been consistent; and for us it would (e.g.) be an affectation to use the article with such well-known names as Puebla and Saltillo.
12.At certain points in the desert there were large wells; and in each of these a wide wheel, carrying buckets, was turned by mule power.
13.The main part of the army arrived Feb. 17–19 (Apuntes, 96). Taylor thought he could not move more than about 6000 men some 125 miles (supposed to be about 140) from a well-stocked base, Camargo, through a region supplied with water, subsistence and forage, and could not transport 18-pounders (chap. xi,note 5). After Miñón advanced to Potosí, Andrade occupied La Encarnación (night of Feb. 11). The wheel pumps were then set in operation, but by Feb. 19 they were worn out. The only ample supply of water was then seven or eight miles away, but it had to be used for the animals. The distance from S. L. Potosí to Agua Nueva by rail is about 223 miles.
14.Feb. 19 two brigades of cavalry had not arrived. The figures may or may not have included these and Miñón’s force. Probably they did include many whose duties kept them from the firing line (Republicano, May 3, 1847). The original reports of the officers regarding numbers and operations have disappeared from76.
15.To and at La Encarnación.Carleton, Buena Vista, 23, 229. León, Méx., 474. García, Juárez, 67. LondonTimes, May 10.Journal Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 443. Giménez, Mems., 98. Sierra, Evolution, 219. Le Clercq, Voyage, 31–49. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847. Sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 8, note. Rápida Ojeada, 4, 7–9, etc. Ordóñez, Refutación, 5, 8, etc.61Lamar to Bliss, Apr. 21. Rodríguez, Breve Reseña, 1848, 57.Republicano, Feb. 12; Mar. 24; May 3.80S. Anna to gov. México state, Jan. 27.Epoca, Jan. 19, 26; Feb. 25. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 389. Balbontín, Invasión, 60–9, 78. Apuntes, 88, 91–7. S. Anna, Manifiesto, Mar., 1848.Id., Apelación, 24–7, 32; app., 67. Muro, Miscelánea, 73–5. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 153–8. De Peyster, Kearny, 127.Diario, June 13.Monitor Repub., Nov. 30.Journal of U. S. Artillery, July, 1892, p. 294. Rápida Ojeada, ii, 4, 6, 7.Niles, Mar. 27, p. 62.73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 445, 1846. Encarnacion Prisoners, 43. Steele,Amer. Campaigns, i, 125.76S. Anna, Jan. 19, 26; Feb. 2, 11, 17, 27. The author has been over the greater part of the route.
16.One cannot be sure enough now regarding the truth of the various allegations regarding the lateral routes to say what Santa Anna might have done. If he had reason (as he seems to have had) to believe that he could surprise Agua Nueva, it would have been unwise to choose a circuitous route of doubtful practicability. No Mexican came to give him information about the ground (76Mora, April 23, 1847).
17.From La Encarnación to Carnero Pass.Carleton, Buena Vista, 232. Semmes, Service, 121. Gamboa, Impug., 23.Epoca, Feb. 25. Balbontín, Invasión, 69, 70, 79. Apuntes, 97. S. Anna, Apelación, 25. Ordóñez, Refutación.Republicano, Mar. 24. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 156–8.Diario, June 13 (Ordóñez). Diccionario Universal (Itinerarios).76Mora, Feb. 25.76S. Anna, Feb. 27.
18.McCulloch had made a previous expedition to La Encarnación and found cavalry there.
19.Santa Anna attributed to a deserter named Váldez the failure of his plan to surprise Taylor (Apelación, 26), but the story of Váldez in itself probably would not have had much effect on Taylor. At La Hedionda May sent Lieut. Sturgis on a scouting expedition. Firing was heard later, and Sturgis, being captured, did not return. This La Hedionda was often called La Hedionda Grande.
20.Chamberlain’s147diary states in detail, quoting the remarks made, how Wool, supported by the officers, forced the withdrawal from Agua Nueva by threatening to lead the troops back himself rather than see them sacrificed. This is startling, but cannot easily be rejected. Of all the military men known to the author Chamberlain was the most sternly soldierlike. He rose from the ranks to a brevet brigadier-generalship, and he vouched for the correctness of his diary, which had been kept strictly for himself. When not acting as Wool’s orderly he served as one of May’s dragoons, who were commonly used by Taylor as a sort of bodyguard. The reason given by Taylor for retreating (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 132) was that his position could be turned on either side; but he knew that long before, or should have known it.
As the routeviaLa Hedionda debouched in the rear of Buena Vista, one asks why the reason which seems mainly to have caused the retreat did not veto the stand actually taken. Wool must have seen this point; and one suspects that he used the alarm produced by the reports of the scouts to bring about a withdrawal to the position he had long preferred, reckoning also that, should it prove necessary to retire farther, this could much more easily be done from Buena Vista than from Agua Nueva. Evidently the sudden retreat fatigued the troops as well as discouraged them; and not having become acquainted with the peculiar ground on which they were to fight, they were repeatedly taken by surprise during the battle that followed. By retreating Taylor gave up the advantage, on which he had insisted, of forcing S. Anna to fight at the very edge of a desert (chap. xviii,note 39).
21.At night wagons were sent to Agua Nueva for the stores, but the Gentlemen-Volunteers under Yell refused to load them. Hence the First Dragoons (regulars), who had slept only some three hours in as many days, were sent up to do the work (Chamberlain, diary). Marshall’s Kentucky horse reinforced Yell. The haste of the Americans was such that corn and beans, instead of being loaded into waiting wagons or destroyed, were thrown into a spring, where the Mexicans found them (officer’s diary inRepublicano, May 3, 1847). Yell’s instructions were to retire before midnight, taking the Second Kentucky with him from La Encantada.
22.Taylor’s operations Feb. 20–21 (including night of Feb. 21).299Posey to friend, Feb. 19.69Wool to Bliss, Feb. 7.147Chamberlain, diary.148Id., recollections. MadisonRecord, 1850 (Prickett).300Prickett, letters. Semmes, Service, 121–2. TampicoSentinel, Mar. 27. Scribner, Camp., 59. Smith, Remins., 37, 42.Picayune, Apr. 14 (Taylor). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97, 99, 132 (Taylor); 144 (Wool). J. Davis inCong. Globe, 31, 1, app., 1034–41.173Id., Address. Benham, Recolls.Journ. U. S. Artillery, July, 1892, p. 294. Davis, J. Davis, i, 336. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1168, 1176 (Taylor). Carleton, Buena Vista, 4, 12–21, 24–6, 45.Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 199 (No one can tell why Taylor did not fortify Saltillo before the battle), 443. N. Y.Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849.76Mora, Feb. 25.
The reason that led Taylor to neglect preparing Saltillo was no doubt the same that had led him previously to neglect preparations when the circumstances called for them.
1.Many of the Mexicans marched nearly forty-five miles in less than twenty-four hours. See Stevens, Camps., 18.
2.The statements regarding the time of day differ, but the account of the text appears to rest upon the most reliable evidence. See Wallace, Wallace, 40. Taylor’s verbal reply to the summons of Santa Anna is said to have been more forcible than elegant, but a courteous answer in writing was sent by Bliss.
3.Several officers seem to have noted the advantages of this battlefield, but Wool recommended it near the end of December and is entitled to the credit of the choice. The author visited the ground twice, and found that a good route for infantry and cavalry ran from La Encantada behind the hills west of Buena Vista valley, and entered this valley north of La Angostura. Apparently it could have been made practicable for cannon easily, and could have been used effectively by either general for a feint at least. Engineer Mansfield had a picket guard it during the afternoon and night of February 22.
4.This space was to be closed, if necessary, with two wagons loaded with stone. The parapet was occupied by two companies of the First Illinois under Lieut. Col. Weatherford. The main American position was over-manned. S. Anna could not have carried it against Washington’s guns and infantry flanking fire from the edge of the plateau, and men were urgently needed for the American left.
5.330The American forces in action at Buena Vista were as follows: Dragoons under Bvt. Lieut. Col. May (First, 133; Second, 76), 209; Third Artillery (Co. C under Capt. Bragg, three guns—the fourth being at Saltillo; Co. E under Capt. Sherman, four guns), 150; Fourth Artillery, Capt. Washington, eight guns, 117; Arkansas horse, Col. Yell, 479; First Kentucky (two squadrons of cavalry and a battalion of mounted riflemen), Col. Marshall, 330; Second Kentucky, Col. McKee, 571; First Mississippi, Col. Davis, 368; Indiana Brigade (Second regt. under Col. Bowles and Third under Col. Lane), Gen. Lane, 1253, including a rifle battalion offour companies under Major Gorman; First Illinois, Col. Hardin, 580; Second Illinois, Col. Bissell, 573; Texas volunteer company (attached to Second Illinois), Capt. Conner, 61; Major McCulloch’s Texan scouts, 27. The figures include officers and men. The general staff numbered forty-one. Three hundred and sixty-four of the men were on the sick list. A company of the First Artillery, a few men of the Third Artillery, two Mississippi companies and four Illinois companies were at Saltillo. All except the dragoons and artillery were volunteers. Only the artillery, dragoons, Mississippi regiment, and Conner’s company had been under fire, and some of these men were raw recruits; but Col. Davis and all the field officers of the Second Kentucky were West Pointers. Mostly Wool’s men had been well trained. McCulloch’s company probably served under May. All the corps not otherwise described were infantry. In the volunteer horse certain companies appear to have been regarded as true cavalry and certain others as only mounted infantry. A similar fact was noted in connection with the battle of Sacramento (p. 309).
6.Miñón issued from the Palomas de Adentro pass.
7.No satisfactory explanation of Taylor’s trips to Saltillo was made. The city had been in greater danger of attack from Miñón while the Americans were eighteen miles away at Agua Nueva than after they retired. Taylor should have ascertained seasonably that Palomas Pass was practicable for cavalry, and have done whatever was necessary. Wool appears to have barricaded the streets of Saltillo before going to Agua Nueva (N. Y.Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849), and Butler began a redoubt, which seems to have been the only external defence. Taylor’s escort were not needed as laborers. Major Warren, the governor of Saltillo, Capt. Webster of the First Artillery, who had charge of the redoubt, and First Lieut. Shover, of the Third Artillery, stationed not far away in the old camp, were competent officers; and the first two made no allusion in their reports to Taylor’s visits, while the third only said that the General ordered him to watch Miñón, and, if attacked, defend his post to the last extremity—which were his obvious duties. There seems to have been no particular reason to anticipate a night attack. Taylor did not suggest this as a reason for going to the city. Especially is it surprising that he left his work at Saltillo, whatever it was, so incomplete on the morning of February 22 that he had to return in the evening. Santa Anna, after the exhausting march just made, could not be expected to strike decisively that day, whereas such an attack was almost certain to be made the next morning, and it was Taylor’s duty to be on the ground at that time.
8.Events of Feb. 22; the battlefield.Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97–9 (Taylor); 98 (S. Anna); 144 (Wool); 163 (Marshall); 169 (Fry); 171 (Roane); 174 (Weatherford); 175 (Bissell); 181 (Gen. Lane); 186 (Col. Lane); 189 (Gorman); 197 (May); 203 (Sherman); 205 (Warren); 206 (Webster); 207 (Shover). Carleton, B. Vista, 5–9, 27–49, 177–86. González, Aguascalientes, 158. French, Two Wars, 77–8.Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 443.190Ewing, diary. RaleighStar, Aug. 18.276Neville diary.Delta, Mar. 14, 1848.69Wool to Taylor, Jan. 20.147Chamberlain, diary.148Id., recolls.110Barbour, diary.Vedette, iv, no. 8 (Lee).8Anon. diary.61[Wool] to Jones, Jan. 17.300Prickett, letters. Rápida Ojeada.Diario, Apr. 17. MatamorosAmer. Flag, Mar. 20.Republicano, May 3.80Ampudia to gov. Méx. state, Oct. 10. Balbontín, Invasión, 71–3. Apuntes, 98–100. Taylor and his Generals, 166. S. Anna, Apelación, 25–7. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 55. Scribner,Camp., 62, note. Smith, Chile con Carne, 214–5. Smith, Remins., 37, 48.Picayune, Apr. 14 (Taylor); May 21; Sept. 7; Oct. 19; Dec. 3.Delta, July 11.Revue des Deux Mondes, Aug. 1, 413–4. Benham, Recolls.Nat. Intelligencer, Apr. 7.Spirit of the Times, May 1. Napoleon, Maxims, p. 26. Wallace, Wallace, 40. Davis, J. Davis, i, 340. Profess. Memoirs corps of engineers, no. 31, p. 110. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 145. Carreño, Jefes, ccxxxii. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1168 (Taylor). Stevens, Camps., 18. Encarnacion Prisoners, 34, 38–9. N. Y.Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849.Littellno. 155. Romero, Geog. and Stat. Notes.76Reports of S. Anna, Uraga, Memontesdeoca, Zamara, Mig. Andrade, Guzman, Trejo, Juvera, Mora.
9.The data relating to the Mexican batteries, when collated, cannot be fully harmonized.E.g.Carleton puts the 24-pounders on the American left near the mountain, but from Mexican sources it seems clear that they remained near the road, and Wallace (Wallace, 50) says the same. Washington states that he was most of the time under the fire of heavy guns. Of course the Mexican left had to be protected, and it would have been very hard to move these clumsy iron pieces on the rough ground. Gen. Pérez stated after the battle that from lack of forage the draught animals had been too weak to draw the artillery up the hills.
10.Bowles was personally brave, but had been away much of the time and did not understand his work (65orders 281). His men keenly realized this (Perry, Indiana, 292), and hence went into the battle shaky. Lane knew how they felt (Scribner, Camp., 62); and apparently he should not have placed them far in advance and alone to meet overwhelming numbers. It should be added, however, that (1) he intended to give his personal attention to the regiment (Scribner, Camp., 62), and (2) the Mississippi Rifles (to whom a position had been assigned the previous evening) were expected to join the Second Indiana at an early hour (Barbour, diary). Had they not been absent with Taylor, one may fairly say, Bowles would not have given his fatal order, and the American flank would in all probability not have been turned; or, had the order been given, the Second Indiana would almost certainly have rallied upon the Mississippians, and the virtual loss of Marshall’s troops would have been avoided. The gap created by the absence of the Mississippi regiment should have been filled by recalling McKee and Bragg from the west side as soon as the formation of Santa Anna’s columns indicated where he intended to strike and by ordering the reserved artillery to the plateau. The cause of Bowles’s order is not certain; but O’Brien’s horses, when attached to the guns for the purpose of advancing, faced of course to the rear, and it seems probable that Bowles misunderstood this as a sign of withdrawal. The worst feature of his order was that he specified no place to stop.
Lieut. Col. Haddon of the Second Indiana stated in 1848 that the regiment was rallied on the south edge of a ravine, but was ordered by Taylor himself, who had then arrived, to cross to the other side of it, and, as a body of Mexicans charged it just then, it broke and ran (Perry, Indiana, 292). Certainly Taylor exhibited a peculiar resentment toward the regiment, opposed having the affair investigated (ibid., 163, 313) and endeavored to hush it up (ibid., 276). Other officers were doubtless as censurable as Bowles, but he was the most conspicuous delinquent and became the scapegoat.
11.The failure of this attack on Buena Vista was said by a Mexican officer to have been due to Gen. Andrade, who failed to coöperate, andprevented a large force of infantry from doing so (Republicano, May 3, 1847). Yell was a gallant but negligent officer. He did not know how to manoeuvre his men, and only a portion of them fought here (Niles, May 8, 1847, p. 157;Spirit of the Times, May 1). He was far in advance of them when he fell (Carleton, B. Vista, 93). American guns came up and also some dragoons, and helped complete the repulse of the enemy. The skirmish lasted only a few minutes.
What the Arkansas men lacked was not courage, but the discipline (and the resulting skill and confidence) against which they had protested while on the Chihuahua expedition (p. 274). Benham states that Marshall would not go back to the field though urged by Taylor personally to do so (Recolls.). All this resulted from a mistake of Wool’s. He understood that the bench was an extremely valuable position, and should therefore have occupied it in advance, and thrown up a breastwork there, dismounting the volunteer cavalry, and placing them behind this and other works (Chamberlain). One part of the lancers (“cuirassiers”) retreated; the other part crossed to the opposite side of the valley, and returned behind the hills (see note 3) to Santa Anna’s position. On reappearing they were taken for Americans and caused great alarm (Balbontín, Invasión, 87). This suggests what the effect might have been had either Santa Anna or Taylor used this route for a feint or attack.
12.A bitterly contested question was whether Wool advised retreat during the battle. The truth appears to be that, as Benham fully explains, he advised preparing to retire, that Taylor gave an order accordingly to Washington, and that a zealous subaltern began to move; but that Taylor, almost instantly reflecting on the moral effect that a sign of retreat would have on the volunteers, countermanded the order. Wool would not have advised retreating from what he considered the best position, except in the case of absolute necessity.
13.Bragg now had three guns, for the one that had been under Lieut. Kilburn had rejoined him. It is worth mention that Bragg gives his ammunition expenditure, Feb. 23, as about 250 rounds per gun (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 202), an unparalleled record for muzzle-loading cannon.
14.The Americans looked upon this as a ruse of Santa Anna, designed to save the men in the recess of the mountain; but the Mexicans give the view of the text (e.g.Apuntes, 102), and a field officer (probably Col. Bissell), who went with Hardin and McKee to meet the Mexican officers, stated that they had no white flag (Littell, no. 155, p. 234). The fact that so much consideration was paid to their absurd question suggests that Taylor was not averse to a parley. Many of the Mexicans in the recess endeavored to escape by scaling the mountain (Carleton, B. Vista, 105).
15.As the Mexican artillery could not cross the long ravine, the Mexicans in the north field were almost predestined to fail, but had Santa Anna attacked the centre vigorously at this time with all his remaining forces, the American artillery would have had to stay on the plateau, and hence in that respect the two sides would have been equal in the north field. Santa Anna’s critics charged that he simply threw his troops into the battle, and left them without guidance or support. Not knowing how much he was hampered by misconduct on the part of subordinates one must be cautious, but the criticism seems mainly just. He should have concentrated on the American left and centre, sending merely a small force to amuse Washington, and making feints on the west side of theroad and from behind the western hills. Again, as we see from the Mexican reports, he gave too much attention to the details of the operations, and he was unable to adapt his plans to the quick manoeuvring of the American artillery. He attributed his defeat to Miñón’s failing to attack Taylor’s rear (Negrete, Invasión, ii, 378); but Miñón had not force enough to do this effectively, and such a duty had not been assigned to him (Balbontín, Invasión, 71). Giménez (Memorias) charged it to the want of subordination, precision and morale on the part of the officers and the effect of their criticisms of Santa Anna upon the soldiers.
16.Benham (Recollections, 24) states that (as he learned from Mansfield) Chilton, Taylor’s aide, told Mansfield that he carried this order, and was cautioned by Mansfield not to mention the fact. Wallace (Wallace, 47) says Chilton carried the order, and gives his language. Wool states that this final affair occurred under Taylor’s eye and direction (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 149). W. A. Richardson, a captain in one of these regiments, and also Col. Bissell stated that the order emanated from Taylor (CharlestonCourier, Jan. 20, 1854). Weatherford, who succeeded Hardin, gives the language of the order in his report. Lombardini, general-in-chief of the Mexican infantry, had been wounded, and hence Pérez, second in that command, took his place. It has been said that Santa Anna should have led the charge, but he stated that his old wound had reopened (76Feb. 23).
17.The redoubt at Saltillo commanded most of the approaches. It was held by Capt. Webster with two 24-pound howitzers, a company of the First Artillery, and an Illinois company. At the train and headquarters camp on the right of the redoubt Lieut. Shover had one of Bragg’s 6-pounders and two Mississippi companies. The three remaining Illinois companies (two having been detached from each of the regiments) remained in the city. Miñón found that on account of the broken ground he could do nothing (Miñón inDelta, June 16, 1847), and soon retired. Shover pursued him for some distance with his gun, the Mississippians and a yelling crowd of stragglers and teamsters, followed by Lieut. Donaldson of Webster’s company with one of the howitzers. It was believed that Miñón lost fifty or sixty men. Many Mexican irregulars gathered near Saltillo but they accomplished nothing.
18.Once, it was said, Col. McKee sent his adjutant to inform the General that he was surrounded, and to ask what should be done. With convincing energy Taylor replied, “Go and tell your Colonel that he has got them just where he wants them, and now is the time to give them Jesse”; upon which the adjutant, whose face had been a picture of despair, clapped spurs to his horse, rushed back and delivered the message at the top of his voice with a spirit that every soldier caught instantly. Whether the story is literally true or not, it doubtless represents the most important part played by Taylor, and this was invaluable. If Taylor made the remark, however, he doubtless used a stronger Biblical word than “Jesse.” According to Gen. Chamberlain, instead of saying, “Give them a little more grape, Mr. Bragg,” he exclaimed, “Double-shot your guns and give ’em hell!” Rev. Theodore Parker said (Sermon) that the following anecdote appeared to be “very well authenticated.” Seeing McKee’s regiment stagger, Taylor cried as if the men could hear him, “By God, this will not do; this is not the way for Kentuckians to behave.” Then they rallied, and rising in his stirrups he shouted, “Hurrah for Old Kentuck! That’s the way to do it. Give ’em hell, damn ’em!” There is ample reason to believe that such Taylor could be on the battlefield.
19.The battle of Feb. 23. The reports of Taylor and his officers in Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97–209.267Reports of Miss. captains. Perry, Indiana, contains numerous letters. Carleton, Buena Vista,passim. Calderón, Rectif. Ceballos, Capítulos, 122–3. González, Aguascalientes, 159–60. Puga y Acal, Doc., 59. Rápida Ojeada, Segunda Parte, 9. Zarco, Historia, i, 259. French, Two Wars, 78–83.Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 443–4; xvii (Van Deusen). Neville, diary. Sierra, Evolution, i, 219.Delta, Mar. 14. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 291. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 182.69Wool to Taylor, Mar. 30.147Chamberlain, diary.148Id., recolls.69Bragg to [Bliss], Mar. 5.190Ewing, diary. Davis, Recolls., 212–3. Dix, Speeches, i, 210.330Taylor to brother, Mar. 27; Apr. 25; Sept. —. RaleighStar, Apr. 28; July 21; Aug. 18. CharlestonMercury, Apr. 8. Rowland, Register, 407, 410–12. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1904, pp. 49–50, 53–6; 1905, p. 209.61Gorman, report, Mar. 2.61O’Brien court of inquiry.61Gen. Lane, statement, May 19, 1849.65Gen. Lane court of inquiry.65Bowles court of inquiry. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 63.110Barbour, diary. Greensborough (N. C.)Morn. Post, Apr. 5, 1903 (O. R. Smith).8Anon. diary.61[Wool] to Jones, Jan. 17. MadisonRecord, 1850 (Prickett).300Prickett, letters. Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes). Zirckel, Tagebuch, 9. Appleton’s Biog. Dict. (Taylorby J. Davis). Johnson, Thomas, 24. McCormack, Koerner, i, 499, 504–5. Parker, Sermon.256Gen. Lane to Wool, May 20.256Wool to Marcy, June 12.277Taylor to Coombs, May 23. Wallace, Wallace, 44–51. Nebel and Kendall, The War Illustrated, 11–16. Semmes, Service, 120–2. Rápida Ojeada, i.5Anaya, memoria, [Nov., 1847]. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 60–5.Id., Apelación, 28. Gamboa, Impug., 24–5.185Bragg to Duncan, Apr. 4, 1847; Jan. 13, 1848. Kenly, Md. Vol., 264. TampicoSentinel, Mar. 27.Diario, Apr. 16.Republicano, Mar. 24; Apr. 17; May 3; June 20.80Ampudia to gov. Méx., Oct. 10.208Herran to Acal, Mar. 6. Noticia hist. de todos los Cuerpos.212Hastings, diary. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 33–5. Balbontín, Invasión, 80–8. Apuntes, 100–4. Taylor and his Generals, 166. Scribner, Campaign, 21, 59–71. Ordóñez, Refutación, i, ii. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 349. Grant, Memoirs, i, 138. Muro, Miscelánea, 75. Smith, Chile con Carne, 215–49. Smith, Reminiscences, 6, 50, 112. N. Orl.Picayune, Mar. 27; Apr. 14, 22; May 21; June 24.Delta, Apr. 4; May 30; June 6, 16; July 11.Tropic, Mar. 31. Upton, Milit. Policy, 209–10.Boletín de la Democracia, no. 11. Buhoup, Narrative, 120, 123.210Bragg to Hammond, May 4; Dec. 20.349Pattridge to Miss W., Aug. 25. Piatt, Thomas, 69. Quisenberry, Taylor, 34–5.Revue des Deux Mondes, Aug. 1, pp. 413–7. Benham, Recolls. Wash.Union, Apr. 6, 7; June 16; Aug. 25.Nat. Intelligencer, Apr. 7, 23; May 7, 21, 1847; Mar. 23, 1848. N. Y.Journ. of Commerce, Apr. 16.Monitor Repub., May 6, 16; Nov. 30.Spirit of the Times(H. von S.), May 1.Journ. of U. S. Artillery, July, 1892, p. 296; Oct., 1892, pp. 415–8. Halleck, Milit. Art, i, p. 415. Dodd, Davis, 87. CharlestonCourier, Apr. 20, 1847; Jan. 20, 1854. N. Y.Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849. Ceremonies.367Moore to Moore, Apr. 15. Davis, J. Davis, i, 341–50. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 145. Carreño, Jefes, ccxxxiv-v.Niles, Apr. 3, p. 80; Apr. 10, pp. 83–4; Apr. 24, p. 117; May 8, p. 156.92Accusación del Gral. S. Anna. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1115, 1169, 1181. Dix, Dix, i, 210–3. Madigan, cat. no. 2, 1914 (Bragg).210Alvord to Hammond, Feb. 24, 1848. Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 187. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans.ix, 50.South. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1851, 169–89.Littell, no. 155, pp. 233–5.251Lowry, narrative. Albert Pike, poem.76S. Anna, Feb. 23.76Id.to Adame, Feb. 26.76Mora, Mar. 31, res.
A German ex-officer under Taylor said the battle was won, in spite of an unexampled ignorance of all tactical rules on the part of field officers, by the lion-like courage of the soldiers of certain regiments assisted by other fortunate circumstances (Zirckel, Tagebuch, 9). W. H. L. Wallace, adjutant of First Illinois, wrote: “I’ve no doubt—inter nos—had it been just as convenient for us, as for Santa Anna, tovamos[i.e.retreat] we would have been off for Monterey”; but we knew Miñón was in our rear, and believed that larger Mexican forces had been sent toward Monterey, and that the mountains were full of irregulars (Wallace, Wallace, 51; see also Balbontín, Invasión, 84).
20.Killed, 265; wounded, 408 (Ho. 24; 31, 1). Missing, 6. The Mississippi regiment lost more heavily than any other—one out of 3.75 men (Carleton, B. Vista, 212).
21.Aside from pluck and patriotism Taylor had a good reason for not giving up. Had he been defeated, he would probably have been punished for disobeying orders in advancing so far (see Polk, Diary, March 23, 1847). (Querying)173J. Davis, Address.
22.The greater part of the deserters appear to have gone to Agua Nueva (Balbontín, Invasión, 83), where they hoped to find provisions and water. Santa Anna should have had a guard on the road to check and reorganize these men. His policy of holding out expectations of booty reacted now, for many men left the ranks to rob the dead and wounded (Uraga inMonitor Repub., Nov. 30, 1847).
23.Balbontín (Invasión, 89) said that the troops felt confident of triumphing the next day, and therefore would not have deserted; but while this may have been true of the artillery (always a superior body) to which he belonged, it cannot have been true of the army in general. Thousands had deserted already.
24.The night of Feb. 23.Semmes, Service, 122. Ceballos, Capítulos, 122. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1115 (Taylor).69Wool to Taylor, Mar. 30. Chamberlain, diary.Id., recolls. Barbour, diary. Prickett, letters. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 99, 137 (Taylor); 144 (Wool).Delta, June 16; July 11. Benham, Recolls. Rápida Ojeada, i, ii. Ordóñez, Refutación, i, ii.5Anaya, Memoria.185Bragg to Duncan, Apr. 4.Republicano, Mar. 24; May 3. Carleton, B. Vista, 125–31, 191. French, Two Wars, 81–2.Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 443–4. Ewing, diary. Dix, Speeches, i, 213.330Memo. in Taylor’s letters to his brother.330Taylor to brother, Mar. 27. Nebel and Kendall, 13.267Bradford to J. Davis, Mar. 2. Perry, Indiana, 178, etc. Polk, Diary, Mar. 23. Sierra, Evolution, etc., i, 219.Independiente, Apr. 10. Balbontín, Invasión, 83, 89, 90–1, 93, 100–1. Apuntes, 104–7.118Berlandier, journal. S. Anna, Apelación, 29, 32, etc. Gamboa, Impug., 23–5. Scribner, Camp., 66.52Black, Mar. 6.Picayune, Mar. 24 (Sold. de la Patria); Apr. 11.Monitor Repub., May 6; Nov. 30.Niles, Apr. 10, p. 83. N. Y.Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., ix, 50.316Bragg to Sherman, Mar. 1, 1848.76S. Anna, Feb. 23, 26, 27.76Id.to Adame, Feb. 26.76J. M. Aguirre, Jan. 27, 1848. Wallace, Wallace, 40.
The Kentucky horse and the guns (First Artillery) should have been ordered up from Rinconada Pass as soon as Taylor found there was to be a battle (Ripley, War with Mex., i, 437–8). They could have guarded LaAngostura, and Washington’s field pieces would have been invaluable on the plateau.
25.The Mexicans were not driven away by hunger. Statements from persons knowing the facts regarding the provisions available at Agua Nueva differ so radically that we can reach no precise conclusion on that point; but certainly there were enough to support the army more than two days, and then enable it to move. Whatever provisions were at that place could have been brought to the battlefield (Balbontín, Invasión, 89). It seems as if there must also have been supplies at Patos and La Vaquería; and Miñón asserted later that, as he sent word to Santa Anna, he had plenty of provisions for the army (Delta, June 16). The question of water is more difficult; but there were many wagons, and enough could have been transported for say 6000 picked men. Apparently some water must have been brought up on Feb. 22 and 23. In short, had Santa Anna felt any assurance of being able to rout the Americans on Feb. 24, he would have tried to do so, knowing that abundant supplies lay at Saltillo. Possibly he might have remained in the vicinity and prepared for another battle, even if he could not fight again the next day; but probably he remembered Scott, and he had not counted upon remaining long at the north.
26.Taylor doubtless expected to obtain the men captured at La Encarnación, but they had gone south (see Encarnacion Prisoners). Santa Anna had very few to give up, for almost all Americans who had been or might have been captured were killed by his excited troops (Rápida Ojeada; Balbontín, Invasión, 81;Republicano, March 24, 1847).
27.The Mexican sequel.Rápida Ojeada, i, ii. Gamboa, Impug., 23–5, 27–9. Otero, Comunicación, 11.Republicano, Mar. 24; May 3.Epoca, Mar. 2, 11.208Herran to Acal, Mar. 6, 13. Balbontín, Invasión, 95–100. Apuntes, 108–15. S. Anna, Apelación, app., 39–55, 67. Ordóñez, Refutación, i, ii. Muro, Miscelánea, 77–8.52Black, Mar. 6.Picayune, Mar. 24 (Sold. de la Patria).Independiente, Apr. 10.Boletín de la Democracia, no. 21. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 99 (Taylor).Diario, Mar. 31 (S. Anna); June 13.Monitor Repub., Mar. 31; May 6; Nov. 30. Carreño, Jefes, ccxlii. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1115 (Taylor); 1125 (S. Anna). Dublán, Legislación, v, 267.82Gil to Ruano, Mar. 6.76S. Anna, Feb. 26, 27.76Id.to Adame, Feb. 26.76Comte. gen. Puebla, Mar. 3.76Comte. gen. Tabasco, proclam., Mar. 11.76Mora, Mar. 31, res.76Comte. gen. S. L. Potosí, Mar. 6.76A. Bustamante, Mar. 9.76Comte. gen. V. Cruz, Mar. 4.76Guerra, circular, Mar. 1.
28.The fortifications of Monterey had already been greatly improved. Col. Morgan, Lieut. Col. Irwin and Major Wall of the Second Ohio occupied respectively Cerralvo, Marín and Punta Aguda (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1123). Morgan distinguished himself by a march executed in the face of great odds, and Irwin went to his aid (ibid.). Urrea attacked at least one other train (Mar. 6), and did a large amount of damage. So great became the alarm of the Americans that Col. Curtis, now in charge at Camargo, sent an officer to Washington with a requisition for 50,000 volunteers (Nat. Intelligencer, Mar. 23).
29.The American sequel.330J. T. Taylor to Scott, Feb. 12.330Taylor to brother, Mar. 27. Perry, Indiana, 127–8, 137, 149. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 95. Polk, Diary, Jan. 5; Mar. 21–3; Apr. 1, 7.69Mesa to Trist, Mar. 3.169Taylor to Crittenden, Mar. 25; May 15.251Lowry, narrative.Amer. Pioneer, Mar. 8.272Memoir of Morgan. Henry,Camp. Sketches, 327–9. Rápida Ojeada, 9.139Campbell to D. C., Mar. 20. Meade, Letters, i, 143, 182.69Wool to Taylor, Mar. 7.60Marcy to Brooke, Mar. 22.Picayune, Feb. 18; Mar. 13, 28; Apr. 8. Kenly, Md. Vol., 263–4. TampicoSentinel, Mar. 27. Carleton, B. Vista, 153–4.60Marcy, Mar. 22, to Pierce; to Brooke; to Scott; to govs. Grant, Mems., i, 123. Smith, Chile con Carne, 151–71.Delta, Jan. 19. MatamorosAmer. Flag, Feb. 13, 17. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1118–9, 1123–5, 1131 (Taylor). Wash.Union, Mar. 23. N. Y.Journ. of Commerce, Jan. 8.Nat. Intelligencer, Mar. 23.Niles, Mar. 27, p. 59; May 1, p. 131; May 8, pp. 151–2.185Thomas to Duncan, Mar. 18. Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes). Parrodi, Memoria. Benham, Recolls.76S. Anna, Feb. 27.76Carbajal to Urrea, Mar. 8.76Mora to S. Anna, Mar. 17. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 49, 99, 210–5.245Curtis to Lamar, Mar. 1.108Buchanan to Bancroft, June 14.
As a number of the owners or holders of MSS. (whose names are preceded below by colons) did not desire to receive applications for the use of their papers, it has been thought best to omit all addresses.
Some documents belonging to large collections are, for convenience of citation, listed separately. A few verbal statements (so described) are included. The numbers preceding collections, etc., correspond to numbers preceding citations of MS. documents in the notes.
The complete Appendix follows the Notes of volume ii.