[2]The German wordvergleichen,meaning "to compare," contains the root "equal"(gleich)which cannot be rendered in English. TR.
[2]The German wordvergleichen,meaning "to compare," contains the root "equal"(gleich)which cannot be rendered in English. TR.
502.
In regard to thememory,we must unlearn a great deal: here we meet with the greatest temptation to assume the existence of a "soul," which, irrespective of time, reproduces and recognises again and again, etc. What I have experienced, however, continues to live "in the memory"; I have nothing to do with it when memory "comes," my will is inactive in regard to it, as in the case of the coming and going of a thought. Something happens, of which I become conscious: now something similar comes—who has called it forth? Who has awakened it?
503.
The whole apparatus of knowledge is an abstracting and simplifying apparatus—not directed at knowledge, but at theappropriationof things: "end" and "means" are as remote from the essence of this apparatus as "concepts" are. By the "end" and the "means" a process is appropriated (—a process isinventedwhich may be grasped), but by "concepts" one appropriates the "things" which constitute the process.
504.
Consciousnessbegins outwardly as co-ordination and knowledge of impressions,—at first it is at the point which is remotest from the biological centre of the individual; but it is a process which deepens and which tends to become more and more an inner function, continually approaching nearer to the centre.
505.
Our perceptions, as we understand them—that is to say, the sum of all those perceptions the consciousness whereof was useful and essential to us and to the whole organic processes which preceded us: therefore they do not include all perceptions (for instance, not the electrical ones);—that is to say, we havesensesonly for a definite selection of perceptions—such perceptions as concern us with a view to our self-preservation.Consciousness extends so far only as it is useful.There can be no doubt that all our sense-perceptions are entirely permeatedby valuations (useful or harmful—consequently, pleasant or painful). Every particular colour; besides being a colour, expresses a value to us (although we seldom admit it, or do so only after it has affected us exclusively for a long time, as in the case of convicts in gaol or lunatics). Insects likewise react in different ways to different colours: some like this shade, the others that. Ants are a case in point.
506.
In the beginningimageshow images originate in the mind must be explained. Thenwords,applied to images. Finallyconcepts,possible only when there are words—the assembling of several pictures into a whole which is not for the eye but for the ear (word). The small amount of emotion which the "word" generates,—that is, then, which the view of the similar pictures generates, for which one word is used,—this simple emotion is the common factor, the basis of a concept. That weak feelings should all be regarded as alike,as the same,is the fundamental fact. There is therefore a confusion of two very intimately associated feelings in theascertainmentof these feelings;—but who is it that ascertains?Faithis the very first step in every sensual impression: a sort of yea-saying is thefirstintellectual activity! A "holding-a-thing-to-be-true" is the beginning. It were our business, therefore, to explain how the "holding-of-a-thing-to-be-true" arose! What sensation lies beneath the comment "true"?
507.
Thevaluation, "I believe that this and that is so," is the essence of "truth." In all valuations, the conditions ofpreservationand ofgrowthfind expression. All ourorgans and sensesof knowledge have been developed only in view of the conditions of preservation and growth. Thetrustin reason and its categories, the trust in dialectics, and also thevaluationof logic, prove only thatexperiencehas taught the usefulness of these things to life: not their "truth." The prerequisites of all living things and of their lives is: that there should be a large amount of faith, that it should be possible to pass definite judgments on things, and thatthere should be no doubtat all concerning all essential values. Thus it is necessary that something should be assumed to be true,notthat itistrue.
"Therealworld and the world ofappearance"— I trace this contrast to therelation of values.We have positedourconditions of existence as theattributes of beingin general. Owing to the fact that, in order to prosper, we must be stable in our belief, we developed the idea that the real world was neither a changing nor an evolving one, but a world ofbeing.
(e)The Origin of Reason and Logic.
508.
Originally there was chaos among our ideas. Those ideas which were able to stand side by sideremained over, the greater number perished—and are still perishing.
509.
The kingdom of desires out of which logic grew: the gregarious instinct in the background. The assumption of similar facts is the first condition for "similar souls."For the purpose of mutual understanding and government.
510.
Concerning theorigin of logic.The fundamental proneness toequalisethings and tosee them equal, gets to be modified, and kept within bounds, by the consideration of what is useful or harmful—in fact, by considerations of success: it then becomes adapted in suchwise as to be gratified in a milder way, without at the same time denying life or endangering it. This whole process corresponds entirely with that external and mechanical process (which is its symbol) by which theprotoplasmcontinually assimilates, makes equal to itself, what it appropriates, and arranges it according to its own forms and requirements.
511.
Likeness and Similarity.
1. The coarser the organ the more apparent likenesses it sees;
2. The mindwillhave likeness—that is to say, the identification of one sensual impression with others already experienced: just as the bodyassimilatesinorganic matter.
For the understanding of Logic:—
The will which tends to see likeness everywhere is the will to power—the belief that something is so and so (the essence of a judgment), is the result of a will whichwould fain have itas similar as possible.
512.
Logic is bound up with the proviso: grantedthat identical cases exist. As a matter of fact, before one can think and conclude in a logical fashion,thisconditionmustfirst be assumed. That is to say, the will tological truthcannot be consummated before a fundamental falsification of all phenomena has been assumed. From which it follows that an instinct rules here, which is capable of employing both means: first, falsification; and secondly, the carrying out of its own point of view: logic does not spring from a will to truth.
513.
The inventive force which devised the categories, worked in the service of our need of security, of quick intelligibility, in the form of signs, sounds, and abbreviations.—"Substance," "subject," "object," "Being," "Becoming," are not matters of metaphysical truth. It was the powerful who made the names of things into law, and, among the powerful, it was the greatest artists in abstraction who created the categories.
514.
A moral—that is to say, a method of living which long experience and experiment have tested andproved efficient, at last enters consciousness as a law, as dominant.... And then the whole group of related values and conditions become part of it: it becomes venerable, unassailable, holy, true; a necessary part of its evolution is that its origin should be forgotten.... That is a sign that it has become master. Exactly the same thing might have happened with the categories of reason: the latter, after much groping and many trials, might have proved true through relative usefulness.... A stage was reached when they were grasped as a whole, and when they appealed to consciousness as a whole,—when belief in them was commanded,—that is to say, when they acted as if they commanded.... From that time forward they passed as a priori, as beyond experience, as irrefutable. And, possibly, they may have been the expression of no more than a certain practicality answering the ends of a race and a species,—their usefulness alone is their "truth."
515.
The object is, not "to know," but to schematise,—to impose as much regularity and form upon chaos, as our practical needs require. In the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was a need in us that was the determining power: not the need "to know," but to classify, to schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation. (The adjustment and interpretation of all similar and equal things,—the same process, which every sensual impressionundergoes, is the development of reason!) No pre-existing "idea" had anything to do with it: but utility, which teaches us that things can be reckoned with and managed, only when we view them roughly as equal....Finalityin reason is an effect, not a cause: Life degenerates with every other form of reason, although constant attempts are being made to attain to those other forms of reason;—for Life would then become too obscure, too unequal.
The categories are "truths" only in the sense that they are the conditions of our existence, just as Euclid's Space is a conditional "truth." (Between ourselves, as no one will maintain that men are absolutely necessary, reason, as well as Euclid's Space, are seen to be but an idiosyncrasy of one particular species of animals, one idiosyncrasy alone among many others....)
The subjective constraint which prevents one from contradicting here, is a biological constraint: the instinct which makes us see the utility of concluding as we do conclude, is in our blood, wearealmost this instinct.... But what simplicity it is to attempt to derive from this fact that we possess an absolute truth! ... The inability to contradict anything is a proof of impotence but not of "truth."
516.
We are not able to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: that is a principle of subjective experience—which is not in the least "necessary,"but only a sign of inability.
If, according to Aristotle, theprincipium contradictionisis the most certain of all principles; if it is the most ultimate of all, and the basis of every demonstration; if the principle of every other axiom lie within it: then one should analyse it all the more severely, in order to discover how many assumptionsalready lieat its root. It either assumes something concerning reality and Being, as if these had become known in some other sphere—that is to say, as if it wereimpossibleto ascribe the opposite attributes to it; or the proposition means: that the oppositesshouldnot be ascribed to it. In that case, logic would be an imperative,notdirected at the knowledge of truth, but at the adjusting and fixing of a worldwhich must seem true to us.
In short, the question is a debatable one: are the axioms of logic adequate to reality, or are they measures and means by which alone we can,createrealities, or the concept "reality"?... In order to affirm the first alternative, however, one would, as we have seen, require a previous knowledge of Being; which is certainly not the case. The proposition therefore contains nocriterion of truth,but animperativeconcerning that whichshouldpass as true.
Supposing there were no such thing as A identical with itself, as every logical (and mathematical) proposition presupposes, and that A is in itself anappearance,then logic would have a mere worldof appearanceas its first condition. As a matter of fact, we believe in that proposition, under the influence of an endlessempiricism which seems toconfirmit every minute. The "thing"—that is the real substratum of A;our belief in thingsis the first condition of our faith in logic. The A in logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction of the thing.... By not understanding this, and by making logic into a criterion ofreal being,we are already on the road to the classification of all those hypostases, substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc., as realities—that is to say, the conception of a metaphysical world or a "real world" (—this is, however, once more the world of appearance...).
The primitive acts of thought, affirmation, and negation, the holding of a thing for true, and the holding of a thing for not true,—in so far as they do not only presuppose a mere habit, but the veryrightto postulate truth or untruth at all,—are already dominated by a belief,that there is such a thing as knowledge for us,andthat judgments can really hit the truth:in short, logic never doubts that it is able to pronounce something concerning truth in itself (—that is to say, that to the thing which is in itself true, no opposite attributescanbe ascribed).
In this belief therereignsthe sensual and coarse prejudice that our sensations teach ustruthsconcerning things,—that I cannot at the same moment of time say of one and the same thing that it ishardandsoft.(The instinctive proof, "I cannot have two opposite sensations at once," is quitecoarseandfalse.)
That all contradiction in concepts should beforbidden, is the result of a belief, that weare ableto form concepts, that a concept not only characterises but alsoholdsthe essence of a thing.... As a matter of fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) only holds good ofassumed existences which we have created.Logic isthe attempt on our part to understand the actual world according to a scheme of Being devised by ourselves; or, more exactly, it is our attempt at making the actual world more calculable and more susceptible to formulation, for our own purposes....
517.
In order to be able to think and to draw conclusions, it is necessary toacknowledge that which exists:logic only deals with formulæ for things which are constant. That is why this acknowledgment would not in the least prove reality: "that which is" is part of our optics. The ego regarded as Being (not affected by either Becoming or evolution).
Theassumed worldof subject, substance, reason, etc., is necessary, an adjusting, simplifying falsifying, artificially-separating power resides in us. "Truth" is the will to be master over the manifold sensations that reach consciousness; it is the will toclassifyphenomena according to definite categories. In this way we start out with a belief in the "true nature" of things (we regard phenomena as real).
The character of the world in the process of Becomingis not susceptible of formulation;it is "false" and "contradicts itself."Knowledgeandthe process ofevolutionexclude each other.Consequently,knowledge must be something else: it must be preceded by a will to make things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must create theillusionofBeing.
518.
If our "ego" is the only form of Being, according to which we make and understand all Being: very good! In that case it were very proper to doubt whether anillusionof perspective were not active here—the apparent unity which everything assumes in our eyes on the horizon-line. Appealing to the body for our guidance, we are confronted by such appalling manifoldness, that for the sake of method it is allowable to use that phenomenon which isricherand more easily studied as a clue to the understanding of the poorer phenomenon.
Finally: admitting that all is Becoming,knowledge is only possible when based on a belief in Being.
519.
If there is "only one form of Being, the ego," and all other forms of Being are made in its own image,—if, in short, the belief in the "ego," together with the belief in logic, stands and falls with the metaphysical truth of the categories of reason: if, in addition, the "ego" is shown to be something that isevolving: then——
520.
The continual transitions that occur, forbid our speaking of the "individual," etc.; the "number" of beings itself fluctuates. We should know nothing of time or of movement, if, in a rough way, we did not believe we saw things "standing still" behind or in front of things moving. We should also know just as little about cause and effect, and without the erroneous idea of "empty space" we should never have arrived at the concept of space at all. The principle of identity is based on the "fact of appearance" that there are some things alike. Strictly speaking, it would not be possible to "understand" and "know" an evolving world; something which is called "knowledge" exists only in so far as the "understanding" and "knowing" intellect already finds an adjusted and rough world to hand, fashioned out of a host of mere appearances, but become fixedtothe extent in which this kind of appearance has helped to preserve life; only to this extent is "knowledge" possible—that is to say, as a measuring of earlier and more recent errors by one another.
521.
Concerning logical appearance.—The concept "individual" and the concept "species" are equally false and only apparent. "Species" only expresses the fact that an abundance of similar creatures come forth at the same time, and that the speed of their further growth and of theirfurther transformation has been made almost imperceptible for a long time: so that the actual and trivial changes and increase of growth are of no account at all (—a stage of evolution in which the process of evolving is not visible, so that, not only does a state of equilibriumseemto have been reached, but the road is also made clear for the error of supposingthat an actual goal has been reached—and that evolution had a goal...).
The form seems to be something enduring, and therefore valuable; but the form was invented merely by ourselves; and however often "the same form is attained," it does not signify that itis the same form,—because something new always appears; and we alone, who compare, reckon the new with the old, in so far as it resembles the latter, and embody the two in the unity of "form." As if atypehad to be reached and were actually intended by the formative processes.
Form, species, law, idea, purpose—the same fault is made in respect of all these concepts, namely, that of giving a false realism to a piece of fiction: as if all phenomena were infused with some sort of obedient spirit—an artificial distinction is here made between thatwhichacts and thatwhichguides action (but both these things are only fixed in order to agree with our metaphysico-logical dogma: they are not "facts").
We should not interpret thisconstraintin ourselves, to imagine concepts, species, forms, purposes, and laws ("a world of identical cases") as if we were in a position to construct areal world; but asa constraint to adjust a world by means of whichour existencewill be ensured: we thereby create a world which is determinable, simplified, comprehensible, etc., for us.
The very same constraint is active inthe functions of the senseswhich support the reason—by means of simplification, coarsening, accentuation, and interpretation; whereon all "recognition," all the ability of making one's self intelligible rests. Ourneedshave made our senses so precise, that the "same world of appearance" always returns, and has thus acquired the semblance ofreality.
Our subjective constraint to have faith in logic, is expressive only of the fact that long before logic itself became conscious in us, we did nothingsave introduce its postulates into the nature of things:now we find ourselves in their presence,—we can no longer help it,—and now we would fain believe that this constraint is a guarantee of "truth." We it was who created the "thing," the "same thing," the subject, the attribute, the action, the object, the substance, and the form, after we had carried the process of equalising, coarsening, and simplifying as far as possible. The worldseemslogical to us, because we have already made it logical.
522.
Fundamental solution.—We believe in reason: this is, however, the philosophy of colourlessconcepts.Language is built upon the mostnaïfprejudices.
Now we read discord and problems into things, because we are able tothink onlyin the form of language—we also believe in the "eternal truth" of "wisdom" (for instance, subject, attribute, etc.).
We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the control of language; the most we can do is to attain to an attitude of doubt concerning the question whether the boundary here really is a boundary.
Rational thought is a process of interpreting according to a scheme which we cannot reject.
(f) Consciousness.
523.
There is no greater error than that of making psychical and physical phenomena the two faces, the two manifestations of the same substance. By this means nothing is explained: the concept"substance"is utterly useless as a means of explanation.Consciousnessmay be regarded as secondary, almost an indifferent and superfluous thing, probably destined to disappear and to be superseded by perfect automatism—
When we observe mental phenomena we may be likened to the deaf and dumb who divine the spoken word, which they do not hear, from the movements of the speaker's lips. From the appearance of the inner mind we draw conclusions concerning invisible and other phenomena, which we could ascertain if our powers of observation were adequate for the purpose.
For this inner world we have no finer organs, and that is why acomplexity which is thousandfoldreaches our consciousness as a simple entity, and we invent a process of causation in it, despite the fact that we can perceive no cause either of the movement or of the change—the sequence of thoughts and feelings is nothing more than their becoming visible to consciousness. That this sequence has anything to do with a chain of causes is not worthy of belief: consciousness never communicates an example of cause and effect to us.
524.
The part "consciousness" plays,—It is essential that one should not mistake the part that "consciousness plays" it is ourrelation to the outer world; it was the outer world that developed it.On the other hand, thedirection—that is to say, the care and cautiousness which is concerned with the inter-relation of the bodily functions, doesnotenter into our consciousness any more than does thestoring activityof the intellect: that there is a superior controlling force at work in these things cannot be doubted—a sort of directing committee, in which the variousleading desiresmake their votes and their power felt. "Pleasure" and "pain" are indications which reach us from this sphere: as are alsoacts of willandideas.
In short:That which becomes conscious has causal relations which are completely and absolutely concealed from our knowledge—the sequence of thoughts, feelings, and ideas, in consciousness, doesnot signify that the order in which they come is a causal order: it isso apparently,however, in the highest degree. We havebasedthe whole of our notion ofintellect, reason, logic,etc., upon thisapparent truth(all these things do not exist: they are imaginary syntheses and entities), and we then projected the latter into andbehindall things!
As a ruleconsciousnessitself is understood to be the general sensorium and highest ruling centre; albeit, it is only ameans of communication:it was developed by intercourse, and with a view to the interests of intercourse.... "Intercourse" is understood, here, as "relation," and is intended to cover the action of the outer world upon us and our necessary response to it, as also our actual influenceuponthe outer world. It isnotthe conducting force, but anorgan of the latter.
525.
My principle, compressed into a formula which savours of antiquity, of Christianity, Scholasticism, and other kinds of musk: in the concept, "God isspirit," God as perfection is "denied...."
526.
Wherever people have observed a certain unity in the grouping of things,spirithas always been regarded as the cause of this co-ordination: an assumption for which reasons are entirely lacking. Why should the idea of a complex fact be one of the conditions of that fact? Or why shouldthenotionof a complex fact have to precede it as its cause?
We must be on our guard against explainingfinalityby the spirit: there is absolutely no reason whatever for ascribing to spirit the peculiar power of organising and systematising. The domain of the nervous system is much more extensive: the realm of consciousness is superadded. In the collective process of adaptation and systematising, consciousness plays no part at all.
527.
Physiologists, like philosophers, believe that consciousness increases invaluein proportion as itgainsin clearness: the most lucid consciousness and the most logical and impassive thought are of thefirstorder. Meanwhile—according to what standard is this value determined?—In regard to thedischarge of will-powerthe most superficial andmost simplethought is the most useful—it might therefore, etc. etc. (because it leaves few motives over).
Precision in actionis opposed to thefar-sightedand often uncertain judgments ofcaution:the latter is led by thedeeperinstinct.
528.
The chief error of psychologists:they regard the indistinct idea as of a lowerkindthan the distinct; but that which keeps at a distance from our consciousness and which is thereforeobscure, mayonthat very account be quite clear in itself.The fact that a thing becomes obscureis a questionof the perspective of consciousness.
529.
The great misapprehensions:—
(1) The senselessoverestimation of consciousness,its elevation to the dignity of an entity: "a spirit," "a soul," something that feels, thinks, and wills;
(2) The spirit regarded as acause,especially where finality, system, and co-ordination appear;
(3) Consciousness classed as the highest form attainable, as the most superior kind of being, as "God";
(4) Will introduced wherever effects are observed;
(5) The "real world" regarded as the spiritual world, accessible by means of the facts of consciousness;
(6) Absolute knowledge regarded as the faculty of consciousness, wherever knowledge exists at all.
Consequences:—
Every step forward consists of a step forward in consciousness; every step backwards is a step into unconsciousness (unconsciousness was regarded as a falling-back upon thepassionsandsenses—as a state ofanimalism ....)
Man approaches reality and real being through dialectics: mandepartsfrom them by means of instincts, senses, and automatism....
To convert man into a spirit, would mean to make a god of him: spirit, will, goodness—all one.
All goodnessmust take its root in spirituality, must be a fact of consciousness.
Every step made towardssomething bettercan be only a step forward inconsciousness.
(g) Judgment. True—false.
530.
Kant's theological bias, his unconscious dogmatism, his moral outlook, ruled, guided, and directed him.
The πρῶτον ψεῡδος: how is the fact knowledge possible? Is knowledge a fact at all? What is knowledge? If we do notknowwhat knowledge is, we cannot possibly reply to the question, Is there such a thing as knowledge? Veryfine!But if I do not already "know" whether there is, or can be, such a thing as knowledge, I cannot reasonably ask the question, "What is knowledge?" Kantbelievesin the fact of knowledge: what he requires is a piece ofnaïveté: the knowledge of knowledge!
"Knowledge is judgment." But judgment is a belief that something is this or that! And not knowledge! "All knowledge consists in synthetic judgments" which have the character of beinguniversally true(the fact issoin all cases, and does not change), and which have the character of beingnecessary(the reverse of the proposition cannot be imagined to exist).
Thevalidityof a belief in knowledge is always taken for granted; as is also thevalidityof the feelings which conscience dictates. Heremoral ontologyis therulingbias.
The conclusion, therefore, is: (1) there are propositions which we believe to be universally true and necessary.
(2) This character of universal truth and of necessity cannot spring from experience.
(3) Consequently it must base itself upon no experience at all,but upon something else, it must be derived from another source of knowledge!
Kant concludes (1) that there are some propositions which hold good only on one condition; (2) this condition is that they do not spring from experience, but from pure reason.
Thus, the question is, whence do we derive our reasons forbelievingin the truth of such propositions? No, whence does our belief get its cause? But theorigin of a belief,of a strong conviction, is a psychological problem: and very limited and narrow experience frequently brings about such a belief!It already presupposesthat there are not only "dataa posteriori" but also "dataa priori"— that is to say, "previous to experience." Necessary and universal truth cannot be given by experience: it is therefore quite clear that it has come to us without experience at all?
There is no such thing as an isolated judgment!
An isolated judgment is never "true," it is never knowledge; only inconnection with,and whenrelated to,many other judgments, is a guarantee of its truth forthcoming.
What is the difference between true and false belief? What is knowledge? He "knows" it, that is heavenly! Necessary and universal truth cannot be givenby experience! It is therefore independent of experience,ofall experience! The view which comes quitea priori,and therefore independent of all experience,merely out of reason,is "pure knowledge"!
"The principles of logic, the principle of identity and of contradiction, are examples of pure knowledge, because they precede all experience."—But these principles are not cognitions, butregulative articles of faith.
In order to establish thea prioricharacter (the pure rationality) of mathematical axioms, spacemust be conceived as a form of pure reason.
Hume had declared that there were noa priorisynthetic judgments. Kant says there are—the mathematical ones! And if there are such judgments, there may also be such things as metaphysics and a knowledge of things by means of pure reason!
Mathematics is possible under conditions which arenotallowed to metaphysics. All human knowledge is either experience or mathematics.
A judgment is synthetic—that is to say, it co-ordinates various ideas. It isa priori—that is to say, this co-ordination is universally true and necessary, and is arrived at, not by sensual experience, but by pure reason.
If there are such things asa priorijudgments, then reason must be able to co-ordinate: co-ordination is a form. Reason mustpossess a formative faculty.
531.
Judgingis our oldest faith; it is our habit of believing this to be true or false, of asserting ordenying, our certainty that something is thus and not otherwise, our belief that we really "know"—whatis believed to be true in all judgments?
What areattributes?—We did not regard changes in ourselves merely as such, but as "things in themselves," which are strange to us, and which we only "perceive"; and we didnotclass them as phenomena, but as Being, as "attributes"; and in addition we invented a creature to which they attach themselves—that is to say, we made theeffecttheworking cause,andthe latterwe madeBeing.But even in this plain statement, the concept "effect" is arbitrary: for in regard to those changes which occur in us, and of which we are convinced we ourselves arenotthe cause, we still argue that they must be effects: and this is in accordance with the belief that "every change must have its author";—but this belief in itself is already mythology; for itseparatesthe workingcause fromthe cause in work. When I say the "lightning flashes," I set the flash down, once as an action and a second time as a subject acting; and thus a thing is fancifully affixed to a phenomenon, which is not one with it, but which isstable,whichis,and does not "come."—To make the phenomenon the working cause,and to makethe effect into a thing—into Being:this is thedoubleerror, orinterpretation,of which we are guilty.
532.
TheJudgment—that is the faith: "This and this is so. In every judgment, therefore, there liesthe admission that an "identical" case has been met with: it thus takes some sort of comparison for granted, with the help of the memory. Judgment doesnotcreate the idea that an identical case seems to be there. It believes rather that it actually perceives such a case; it works on the hypothesis that there are such things as identical cases. But what is that mucholderfunction called, which must have been active much earlier, and which in itself equalises unequal cases and makes them alike? What is that second function called, which with this first one as a basis, etc. etc, "That which provokes the same sensations as another thing is equal to that other thing": but what is that called which makes sensations equal, which regards them as equal?—There could be no judgments if a sort of equalising process were not active within all sensations: memory is only possible by means of the underscoring of all that has already been experienced and learned. Before a judgment can be formed,the process of assimilation must already have been completed: thus, even here, an intellectual activity is to be observed which does not enter consciousness in at all the same way as the pain which accompanies a wound. Probably the psychic phenomena correspond to all the organic functions—that is to say, they consist of assimilation, rejection, growth, etc.
The essential thing is to start out from the body and to use it as the general clue. It is by far the richer phenomenon, and allows of much more accurate observation. The belief in the body is much more soundly established than the belief in spirit.
"However strongly a thing may be believed, the degree of belief is no criterion of its truth." But what is truth? Perhaps it is a form of faith, which has become a condition of existence? Thenstrengthwould certainly be a criterion; for instance, in regard to causality.
533.
Logical accuracy, transparency, considered as the criterion of truth ("omne illud verum est, quod clare et distincte percipitur."—Descartes): by this means the mechanical hypothesis of the world becomes desirable and credible.
But this is gross confusion: likesimplex sigillum veri.Whence comes the knowledge that the real nature of things stands inthisrelation to our intellect? Could it not be otherwise? Could it not be this, that the hypothesis which gives the intellect the greatest feeling of power and security, ispreferred, valued,and marked astrue—The intellect sets itsfreestandstrongest facultyandabilityas the criterion of what is most valuable, consequently of what istrue....
"True"—from the standpoint of sentiment—is that which most provokes sentiment ("I");from the standpoint of thought—is that which gives thought the greatest sensation of strength;from the standpoint of touch, sight, and hearing—is that which calls forth the greatest resistance.
"True"—from the standpoint of sentiment—is that which most provokes sentiment ("I");
from the standpoint of thought—is that which gives thought the greatest sensation of strength;
from the standpoint of touch, sight, and hearing—is that which calls forth the greatest resistance.
Thus it is thehighest degrees of activitywhich awaken belief in regard to theobject, in regard to its "reality." The sensations of strength, struggle, and resistance convince the subject that there is something which is being resisted.
534.
The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power.
535.
According to my way of thinking, "truth" does not necessarily mean the opposite of error, but, in the most fundamental cases, merely the relation of different errors to each other: thus one error might be older, deeper than another, perhaps altogether ineradicable, one without which organic creatures like ourselves could not exist; whereas other errors might not tyrannise over us to that extent as conditions of existence, but when measured according to the standard of those other "tyrants," could even be laid aside and "refuted." Why should an irrefutable assumption necessarily be "true"? This question may exasperate the logicians who limitthingsaccording to the limitations they find in themselves: but I have long since declared war with this logician's optimism.
536.
Everything simple is simply imaginary, but not "true." That which is real and true is, however, neither a unity nor reducible to a unity.
537.
What is truth?—Inertia;thathypothesis which brings satisfaction, the smallest expense of intellectual strength, etc.
538.
First proposition. Theeasierway of thinking always triumphs over the more difficult way;—dogmatically:simplex sigillum veri.—Dico: to suppose thatclearnessis any proof of truth, is absolute childishness. . . .
Second proposition. The teaching of Being, of things, and of all those constant entities, is ahundred times more easythan the teaching ofBecomingand of evolution. . .
Third proposition. Logic was intended to be a method offacilitatingthought: ameans of expression, —not truth. . . . Later on it got toactlike truth. . . .
539.
Parmenides said: "One can form no concept of the non-existent";—we are at the other extreme, and say, "That Of which a concept can be formed, is certainly fictional."
540.
There are many kinds of eyes. Even the Sphinx has eyes—therefore there must be many kinds of "truths," and consequently there can be no truth.
541.
Inscriptions over the porch of a modern lunatic asylum.
"That which is necessarily true in thought must be necessarily true in morality."—HERBERT SPENCER.
"The ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the inconceivableness of its negation,"—HERBERT SPENCER.
542.
If the character of existence were false,:—and this would be possible,—what would truth then be, all our truth? ... An unprincipled falsification of the false? A higher degree of falseness? ...
543.
In a world which was essentially false, truthfulness would be ananti-natural tendency: its only purpose would be to provide a means of attaining to ahigher degree of falsity.For a world of truth and Being to be simulated, the truthful one would first have to be created (it being understood that he must believe himself to be "truthful").
Simple, transparent, not in contradiction with himself, lasting, remaining always the same to himself, free from faults, sudden changes, dissimulation, and form: such a man conceives a world of Being as "God" in His own image.
In order that truthfulness may be possible, thewhole sphere in which man moves must be very tidy, small, and respectable: the advantage in every respect must be with the truthful one.—Lies, tricks, dissimulations, must cause astonishment.
544.
"Dissimulation"increases in accordance with the risingorder of rankamong organic beings. In the inorganic world it seems to be entirely absent. There power opposes power quite roughly—rusebegins in the organic world; plants are already masters of it. The greatest men, such as Cæsar and Napoleon (see Stendhal's remark concerning him),[3]as also the higher races (the Italians), the Greeks (Odysseus); the most supreme cunning, belongs to the veryessenceof the elevation of man. ... The problem of the actor. My Dionysian ideal.... The optics of all the organic functions, of all the strongest vital instincts: the power whichwillhave error in all life; error as the very first principle of thought itself. Before "thought" is possible, "fancy" must first have done its work; thepicturingof identical cases, of theseemingnessof identity, is more primeval than the cognition of identity.