No sharing betwixt God & Nature or second causes in my doctrine.M.Materialists must allow the earth to be actually mov'd by the attractive power of every stone that falls from the air, with many other the like absurditys.Enquire concerning the pendulum clock, &c.; whether those inventions of Huygens, &c. be attained to by my doctrine.The ... & ... & ... &c. of time are to be cast away and neglected, as so many noughts or nothings.Mem. To make experiments concerning minimums and their colours, whether they have any or no, & whether they can be of that green wchseems to be compounded of yellow and blue.S.Qu. Whether it were not betternotto call the operations of the mind ideas—confining this term to things sensible73?E.Mem. diligently to set forth how that many of the ancient philosophers run into so great absurditys as even to deny the existence of motion, and of those other things they perceiv'd actually by their senses. This sprung from their not knowing wtExistence was, and wherein it consisted. This the source of all their folly. 'Tis on the discovering of the nature and meaning and import of Existence that I chiefly insist. This puts a wide difference betwixt the[pg 018]sceptics &c. & me. This I think wholly new. I am sure this is new to me74.We have learn'd from Mr. Locke that there may be, and that there are, several glib, coherent, methodical discourses, which nevertheless amount to just nothing. This by him intended with relation to the Scholemen. We may apply it to the Mathematicians.Qu. How can all words be said to stand for ideas? The word blue stands for a colour without any extension, or abstract from extension. But we have not an idea of colour without extension. We cannot imagine colour without extension.Locke seems wrongly to assign a double use of words: one for communicating & the other for recording our thoughts. 'Tis absurd to use words for recording our thoughts to ourselves, or in our private meditations75.No one abstract simple idea like another. Two simple ideas may be connected with one & the same 3dsimple idea, or be intromitted by one & the same sense. But consider'd in themselves they can have nothing common, and consequently no likeness.Qu. How can there be any abstract ideas of colours? It seems not so easily as of tastes or sounds. But then all ideas whatsoever are particular. I can by no means conceive an abstract general idea. 'Tis one thing to abstract one concrete idea from another of a different kind, & another thing to abstract an idea from all particulars of the same kind76.N.Mem. Much to recommend and approve of experimental philosophy.S.What means Cause as distinguish'd from Occasion? Nothing but a being wchwills, when the effect follows the volition. Those things that happen from without we are not the cause of. Therefore there is some other Cause of them, i.e. there is a Being that wills these perceptions in us77.[pg 019]S.[78It should be said, nothing but a Will—a Being which wills being unintelligible.]One square cannot be double of another. Hence the Pythagoric theorem is false.Some writers of catoptrics absurd enough to place the apparent place of the object in the Barrovian case behind the eye.Blew and yellow chequers still diminishing terminate in green. This may help to prove the composition of green.There is in green 2 foundations of 2 relations of likeness to blew & yellow. Therefore green is compounded.A mixt cause will produce a mixt effect. Therefore colours are all compounded that we see.Mem. To consider Newton's two sorts of green.N. B. My abstract & general doctrines ought not to be condemn'd by the Royall Society. 'Tis wttheir meeting did ultimately intend. V. Sprat's History S. R.79Mem. To premise a definition of idea80.I. Mo.The 2 great principles of Morality—the being of a God & the freedom of man. Those to be handled in the beginning of the Second Book81.Subvertitur geometria ut non practica sed speculativa.Archimedes's proposition about squaring the circle has nothing to do with circumferences containing less than 96 points; & if the circumference contain 96 points it may be apply'd, but nothing will follow against indivisibles. V. Barrow.Those curve lines that you can rectify geometrically. Compare them with their equal right lines & by a microscope you shall discover an inequality. Hence my squaring of the circle as good and exact as the best.M.Qu. whether the substance of body or anything else be[pg 020]any more than the collection of concrete ideas included in that thing? Thus the substance of any particular body is extension, solidity, figure82. Of general abstract body we can have no idea.I.Mem. Most carefully to inculcate and set forth that the endeavouring to express abstract philosophic thoughts by words unavoidably runs a man into difficulties. This to be done in the Introduction83.Mem. To endeavour most accurately to understand what is meant by this axiom: Quæ sibi mutuo congruunt æqualia sunt.Qu. what the geometers mean by equality of lines, & whether, according to their definition of equality, a curve line can possibly be equal to a right line?If wthme you call those lines equal wchcontain an equal number of points, then there will be no difficulty. That curve is equal to a right line wchcontains the same points as the right one doth.M.I take not away substances. I ought not to be accused of discarding substance out of the reasonable world84. I onely reject the philosophic sense (wchin effect is no sense) of the word substance. Ask a man not tainted with their jargon wthe means by corporeal substance, or the substance of body. He shall answer, bulk, solidity, and such like sensible qualitys. These I retain. The philosophic nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale, whereof I have no idea, I discard; if a man may be said to discard that which never had any being, was never so much as imagin'd or conceiv'd.M.In short, be not angry. You lose nothing, whether real or chimerical. Wtever you can in any wise conceive or imagine, be it never so wild, so extravagant, & absurd, much good may it do you. You may enjoy it for me. I'll never deprive you of it.[pg 021]N. B. I am more for reality than any other philosophers85. They make a thousand doubts, & know not certainly but we may be deceiv'd. I assert the direct contrary.A line in the sense of mathematicians is not meer distance. This evident in that there are curve lines.Curves perfectly incomprehensible, inexplicable, absurd, except we allow points.I.If men look for a thing where it's not to be found, be they never so sagacious, it is lost labour. If a simple clumsy man knows where the game lies, he though a fool shall catch it sooner than the most fleet & dexterous that seek it elsewhere. Men choose to hunt for truth and knowledge anywhere rather than in their own understanding, where 'tis to be found.M.All knowledge onely about ideas. Locke, B. 4. c. 1.S.It seems improper, & liable to difficulties, to make the word person stand for an idea, or to make ourselves ideas, or thinking things ideas.I.Abstract ideas cause of much trifling and mistake.Mathematicians seem not to speak clearly and coherently of equality. They nowhere define wtthey mean by that word when apply'd to lines.Locke says the modes of simple ideas, besides extension and number, are counted by degrees. I deny there are any modes or degrees of simple ideas. What he terms such are complex ideas, as I have proved.Wtdo the mathematicians mean by considering curves as polygons? Either they are polygons or they are not. If they are, why do they give them the name of curves? Why do not they constantly call them polygons, & treat them as such? If they are not polygons, I think it absurd to use polygons in their stead. Wtis this but to pervert language? to adapt an idea to a name that belongs not to it but to a different idea?The mathematicians should look to their axiom, Quæ[pg 022]congruunt sunt æqualia. I know not what they mean by bidding me put one triangle on another. The under triangle is no triangle—nothing at all, it not being perceiv'd. I ask, must sight be judge of this congruentia or not? If it must, then all lines seen under the same angle are equal, wchthey will not acknowledge. Must the touch be judge? But we cannot touch or feel lines and surfaces, such as triangles, &c., according to the mathematicians themselves. Much less can we touch a line or triangle that's cover'd by another line or triangle.Do you mean by saying one triangle is equall to another, that they both take up equal spaces? But then the question recurs, what mean you by equal spaces? If you meanspatia congruentia, answer the above difficulty truly.I can mean (for my part) nothing else by equal triangles than triangles containing equal numbers of points.I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines wch'tis indifferent whether of them I take, lines in wchI observe by my senses no difference, & wchtherefore have the same name.Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases? but then imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight. Say you, pure intellect must be judge. I reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the mind.If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician in things of which I am certain, 'tis to avoid disputes, to make men careful to think before they answer, to discuss my arguments before they go to refute them. I would by no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty & submission to better judgments. WtI lay before you are undoubted theorems; not plausible conjectures of my own, nor learned opinions of other men. I pretend not to prove them by figures, analogy, or authority. Let them stand or fall by their own evidence.N.When you speak of the corpuscularian essences of bodys, to reflect on sect. 11. & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke. Motion supposes not solidity. A meer colour'd extension may give us the idea of motion.[pg 023]P.Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke.M.Well, say you, according to this new doctrine, all is but meer idea—there is nothing wchis not anens rationis. I answer, things are as real, and existin rerum natura, as much as ever. The difference betweenentia realia&entia rationismay be made as properly now as ever. Do but think before you speak. Endeavour rightly to comprehend my meaning, and you'll agree with me in this.N.Fruitless the distinction 'twixt real and nominal essences.We are not acquainted with the meaning of our words. Real, extension, existence, power, matter, lines, infinite, point, and many more are frequently in our mouths, when little, clear, and determin'd answers them in our understandings. This must be well inculcated.M.Vain is the distinction 'twixt intellectual and material world86. V. Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is far more beautiful than this.S.Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not forMo.them the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all. All ... of introversion, meditation, contemplation, and spiritual acts, as if these could be exerted before we had ideas from without by the senses, are manifestly absurd. This may be of great use in that it makes the happyness of the life to come more conceivable and agreeable to our present nature. The schoolemen & refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest.The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes is, that we do not consider our own notions. I mean consider them in themselves—fix, settle, and determine them,—we regarding them with relation to each other only. In short, we are much out in study[ing] the relations of things before we study them absolutely and in themselves. Thus we study to find out the relations of figures to one another, the relations also of number, without endeavouring rightly to understand the nature of extension and number in themselves. This we think[pg 024]is of no concern, of no difficulty; but if I mistake not 'tis of the last importance,Mo.I allow not of the distinction there is made 'twixt profit and pleasure.Mo.I'd never blame a man for acting upon interest. He's a fool that acts on any other principles. The not considering these things has been of ill consequence in morality.My positive assertions are no less modest than those that are introduced with“It seems to me,”“I suppose,”&c.; since I declare, once for all, that all I write or think is entirely about things as they appear to me. It concerns no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine. This in the Preface.I.Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings one with another. 1st. Words signifying the operations of the mind are taken from sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words as used by the vulgar are taken in some latitude, their signification is confused. Hence if a man use words in a determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either of not being understood, or of speaking improperly. All this remedyed by studying the understanding.Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering the word one. All number consists in relations87.Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the Schoolemen.M. P.We have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other things besides ourselves & order, præcedaneous88. To the knowledge of our own existence—in that we must have ideas or else we cannot think.S.We move our legs ourselves. 'Tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from Malbranch89.Mo.Mem. Nicely to discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke90.M.Mem. Again and again to mention & illustrate the doctrine of the reality of things, rerum natura, &c.M.WtI say is demonstration—perfect demonstration. Wherever men have fix'd & determin'd ideas annexed to[pg 025]their words they can hardly be mistaken. Stick but to my definition of likeness, and 'tis a demonstration ytcolours are not simple ideas, all reds being like, &c. So also in other things. This to be heartily insisted on.E.The abstract idea of Being or Existence is never thought of by the vulgar. They never use those words standing for abstract ideas.M.I must not say the words thing, substance, &c. have been the cause of mistakes, but the not reflecting on their meaning. I will be still for retaining the words. I only desire that men would think before they speak, and settle the meaning of their words.Mo.I approve not of that which Locke says, viz. truth consists in the joining and separating of signs.I.Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without treating of words and propositions. This makes for me against abstract general ideas. Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6.I.Men have been very industrious in travelling forward. They have gone a great way. But none have gone backward beyond the Principles. On that side there lies much terra incognita to be travel'd over and discovered by me. A vast field for invention.Twelve inches not the same idea with a foot. Because a man may perfectly conceive a foot who never thought of an inch.A foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this respect, viz. they contain both the same number of points.[Forasmuch as] to be used.Mem. To mention somewhat wchmay encourage the study of politiques, and testify of me ytI am well dispos'd toward them.I.If men did not use words for ideas they would never have thought of abstract ideas. Certainly genera and species are not abstract general ideas. Abstract ideas include a contradiction in their nature. Vide Locke91, lib. 4. c. 7. s. 9.A various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a various or mixt effect. This demonstrable from the[pg 026]definition of a cause; which way of demonstrating must be frequently made use of in my Treatise, & to that end definitions often præmis'd. Hence 'tis evident that, according to Newton's doctrine, colours cannot be simple ideas.M.I am the farthest from scepticism of any man. I know with an intuitive knowledge the existence of other things as well as my own soul. This is wtLocke nor scarce any other thinking philosopher will pretend to92.I.Doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all the sciences. Mem. Barrow's remark. Entirely owing to language.Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas by words amongst the uses and not the abuses of language.I.Of great use & yelast importance to contemplate a man put into the world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see how after long experience he would know wthout words. Such a one would never think of genera and species or abstract general ideas.I.Wonderful in Locke that he could, wnadvanced in years, see at all thro' a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & was consequently thick. This more to be admir'd than ythe did not see farther.Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either as including or excluding identity of circumstances, such as time, place, &c.Mo.I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer, wiser, &c. than I. This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. 'Tis certain that if the happyness of my acquaintance encreases, & mine not proportionably, mine must decrease. The not understanding this & the doctrine about relative good, discuss'd with French, Madden93, &c., to be noticed as 2 causes of mistake in judging of moral matters.Mem. To observe (wnyou talk of the division of ideas into simple and complex) that there may be another cause[pg 027]of the undefinableness of certain ideas besides that which Locke gives; viz. the want of names.M.Mem. To begin the First Book94not with mention of sensation and reflection, but instead of sensation to use perception or thought in general.
No sharing betwixt God & Nature or second causes in my doctrine.M.Materialists must allow the earth to be actually mov'd by the attractive power of every stone that falls from the air, with many other the like absurditys.Enquire concerning the pendulum clock, &c.; whether those inventions of Huygens, &c. be attained to by my doctrine.The ... & ... & ... &c. of time are to be cast away and neglected, as so many noughts or nothings.Mem. To make experiments concerning minimums and their colours, whether they have any or no, & whether they can be of that green wchseems to be compounded of yellow and blue.S.Qu. Whether it were not betternotto call the operations of the mind ideas—confining this term to things sensible73?E.Mem. diligently to set forth how that many of the ancient philosophers run into so great absurditys as even to deny the existence of motion, and of those other things they perceiv'd actually by their senses. This sprung from their not knowing wtExistence was, and wherein it consisted. This the source of all their folly. 'Tis on the discovering of the nature and meaning and import of Existence that I chiefly insist. This puts a wide difference betwixt the[pg 018]sceptics &c. & me. This I think wholly new. I am sure this is new to me74.We have learn'd from Mr. Locke that there may be, and that there are, several glib, coherent, methodical discourses, which nevertheless amount to just nothing. This by him intended with relation to the Scholemen. We may apply it to the Mathematicians.Qu. How can all words be said to stand for ideas? The word blue stands for a colour without any extension, or abstract from extension. But we have not an idea of colour without extension. We cannot imagine colour without extension.Locke seems wrongly to assign a double use of words: one for communicating & the other for recording our thoughts. 'Tis absurd to use words for recording our thoughts to ourselves, or in our private meditations75.No one abstract simple idea like another. Two simple ideas may be connected with one & the same 3dsimple idea, or be intromitted by one & the same sense. But consider'd in themselves they can have nothing common, and consequently no likeness.Qu. How can there be any abstract ideas of colours? It seems not so easily as of tastes or sounds. But then all ideas whatsoever are particular. I can by no means conceive an abstract general idea. 'Tis one thing to abstract one concrete idea from another of a different kind, & another thing to abstract an idea from all particulars of the same kind76.N.Mem. Much to recommend and approve of experimental philosophy.S.What means Cause as distinguish'd from Occasion? Nothing but a being wchwills, when the effect follows the volition. Those things that happen from without we are not the cause of. Therefore there is some other Cause of them, i.e. there is a Being that wills these perceptions in us77.[pg 019]S.[78It should be said, nothing but a Will—a Being which wills being unintelligible.]One square cannot be double of another. Hence the Pythagoric theorem is false.Some writers of catoptrics absurd enough to place the apparent place of the object in the Barrovian case behind the eye.Blew and yellow chequers still diminishing terminate in green. This may help to prove the composition of green.There is in green 2 foundations of 2 relations of likeness to blew & yellow. Therefore green is compounded.A mixt cause will produce a mixt effect. Therefore colours are all compounded that we see.Mem. To consider Newton's two sorts of green.N. B. My abstract & general doctrines ought not to be condemn'd by the Royall Society. 'Tis wttheir meeting did ultimately intend. V. Sprat's History S. R.79Mem. To premise a definition of idea80.I. Mo.The 2 great principles of Morality—the being of a God & the freedom of man. Those to be handled in the beginning of the Second Book81.Subvertitur geometria ut non practica sed speculativa.Archimedes's proposition about squaring the circle has nothing to do with circumferences containing less than 96 points; & if the circumference contain 96 points it may be apply'd, but nothing will follow against indivisibles. V. Barrow.Those curve lines that you can rectify geometrically. Compare them with their equal right lines & by a microscope you shall discover an inequality. Hence my squaring of the circle as good and exact as the best.M.Qu. whether the substance of body or anything else be[pg 020]any more than the collection of concrete ideas included in that thing? Thus the substance of any particular body is extension, solidity, figure82. Of general abstract body we can have no idea.I.Mem. Most carefully to inculcate and set forth that the endeavouring to express abstract philosophic thoughts by words unavoidably runs a man into difficulties. This to be done in the Introduction83.Mem. To endeavour most accurately to understand what is meant by this axiom: Quæ sibi mutuo congruunt æqualia sunt.Qu. what the geometers mean by equality of lines, & whether, according to their definition of equality, a curve line can possibly be equal to a right line?If wthme you call those lines equal wchcontain an equal number of points, then there will be no difficulty. That curve is equal to a right line wchcontains the same points as the right one doth.M.I take not away substances. I ought not to be accused of discarding substance out of the reasonable world84. I onely reject the philosophic sense (wchin effect is no sense) of the word substance. Ask a man not tainted with their jargon wthe means by corporeal substance, or the substance of body. He shall answer, bulk, solidity, and such like sensible qualitys. These I retain. The philosophic nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale, whereof I have no idea, I discard; if a man may be said to discard that which never had any being, was never so much as imagin'd or conceiv'd.M.In short, be not angry. You lose nothing, whether real or chimerical. Wtever you can in any wise conceive or imagine, be it never so wild, so extravagant, & absurd, much good may it do you. You may enjoy it for me. I'll never deprive you of it.[pg 021]N. B. I am more for reality than any other philosophers85. They make a thousand doubts, & know not certainly but we may be deceiv'd. I assert the direct contrary.A line in the sense of mathematicians is not meer distance. This evident in that there are curve lines.Curves perfectly incomprehensible, inexplicable, absurd, except we allow points.I.If men look for a thing where it's not to be found, be they never so sagacious, it is lost labour. If a simple clumsy man knows where the game lies, he though a fool shall catch it sooner than the most fleet & dexterous that seek it elsewhere. Men choose to hunt for truth and knowledge anywhere rather than in their own understanding, where 'tis to be found.M.All knowledge onely about ideas. Locke, B. 4. c. 1.S.It seems improper, & liable to difficulties, to make the word person stand for an idea, or to make ourselves ideas, or thinking things ideas.I.Abstract ideas cause of much trifling and mistake.Mathematicians seem not to speak clearly and coherently of equality. They nowhere define wtthey mean by that word when apply'd to lines.Locke says the modes of simple ideas, besides extension and number, are counted by degrees. I deny there are any modes or degrees of simple ideas. What he terms such are complex ideas, as I have proved.Wtdo the mathematicians mean by considering curves as polygons? Either they are polygons or they are not. If they are, why do they give them the name of curves? Why do not they constantly call them polygons, & treat them as such? If they are not polygons, I think it absurd to use polygons in their stead. Wtis this but to pervert language? to adapt an idea to a name that belongs not to it but to a different idea?The mathematicians should look to their axiom, Quæ[pg 022]congruunt sunt æqualia. I know not what they mean by bidding me put one triangle on another. The under triangle is no triangle—nothing at all, it not being perceiv'd. I ask, must sight be judge of this congruentia or not? If it must, then all lines seen under the same angle are equal, wchthey will not acknowledge. Must the touch be judge? But we cannot touch or feel lines and surfaces, such as triangles, &c., according to the mathematicians themselves. Much less can we touch a line or triangle that's cover'd by another line or triangle.Do you mean by saying one triangle is equall to another, that they both take up equal spaces? But then the question recurs, what mean you by equal spaces? If you meanspatia congruentia, answer the above difficulty truly.I can mean (for my part) nothing else by equal triangles than triangles containing equal numbers of points.I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines wch'tis indifferent whether of them I take, lines in wchI observe by my senses no difference, & wchtherefore have the same name.Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases? but then imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight. Say you, pure intellect must be judge. I reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the mind.If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician in things of which I am certain, 'tis to avoid disputes, to make men careful to think before they answer, to discuss my arguments before they go to refute them. I would by no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty & submission to better judgments. WtI lay before you are undoubted theorems; not plausible conjectures of my own, nor learned opinions of other men. I pretend not to prove them by figures, analogy, or authority. Let them stand or fall by their own evidence.N.When you speak of the corpuscularian essences of bodys, to reflect on sect. 11. & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke. Motion supposes not solidity. A meer colour'd extension may give us the idea of motion.[pg 023]P.Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke.M.Well, say you, according to this new doctrine, all is but meer idea—there is nothing wchis not anens rationis. I answer, things are as real, and existin rerum natura, as much as ever. The difference betweenentia realia&entia rationismay be made as properly now as ever. Do but think before you speak. Endeavour rightly to comprehend my meaning, and you'll agree with me in this.N.Fruitless the distinction 'twixt real and nominal essences.We are not acquainted with the meaning of our words. Real, extension, existence, power, matter, lines, infinite, point, and many more are frequently in our mouths, when little, clear, and determin'd answers them in our understandings. This must be well inculcated.M.Vain is the distinction 'twixt intellectual and material world86. V. Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is far more beautiful than this.S.Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not forMo.them the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all. All ... of introversion, meditation, contemplation, and spiritual acts, as if these could be exerted before we had ideas from without by the senses, are manifestly absurd. This may be of great use in that it makes the happyness of the life to come more conceivable and agreeable to our present nature. The schoolemen & refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest.The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes is, that we do not consider our own notions. I mean consider them in themselves—fix, settle, and determine them,—we regarding them with relation to each other only. In short, we are much out in study[ing] the relations of things before we study them absolutely and in themselves. Thus we study to find out the relations of figures to one another, the relations also of number, without endeavouring rightly to understand the nature of extension and number in themselves. This we think[pg 024]is of no concern, of no difficulty; but if I mistake not 'tis of the last importance,Mo.I allow not of the distinction there is made 'twixt profit and pleasure.Mo.I'd never blame a man for acting upon interest. He's a fool that acts on any other principles. The not considering these things has been of ill consequence in morality.My positive assertions are no less modest than those that are introduced with“It seems to me,”“I suppose,”&c.; since I declare, once for all, that all I write or think is entirely about things as they appear to me. It concerns no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine. This in the Preface.I.Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings one with another. 1st. Words signifying the operations of the mind are taken from sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words as used by the vulgar are taken in some latitude, their signification is confused. Hence if a man use words in a determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either of not being understood, or of speaking improperly. All this remedyed by studying the understanding.Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering the word one. All number consists in relations87.Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the Schoolemen.M. P.We have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other things besides ourselves & order, præcedaneous88. To the knowledge of our own existence—in that we must have ideas or else we cannot think.S.We move our legs ourselves. 'Tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from Malbranch89.Mo.Mem. Nicely to discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke90.M.Mem. Again and again to mention & illustrate the doctrine of the reality of things, rerum natura, &c.M.WtI say is demonstration—perfect demonstration. Wherever men have fix'd & determin'd ideas annexed to[pg 025]their words they can hardly be mistaken. Stick but to my definition of likeness, and 'tis a demonstration ytcolours are not simple ideas, all reds being like, &c. So also in other things. This to be heartily insisted on.E.The abstract idea of Being or Existence is never thought of by the vulgar. They never use those words standing for abstract ideas.M.I must not say the words thing, substance, &c. have been the cause of mistakes, but the not reflecting on their meaning. I will be still for retaining the words. I only desire that men would think before they speak, and settle the meaning of their words.Mo.I approve not of that which Locke says, viz. truth consists in the joining and separating of signs.I.Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without treating of words and propositions. This makes for me against abstract general ideas. Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6.I.Men have been very industrious in travelling forward. They have gone a great way. But none have gone backward beyond the Principles. On that side there lies much terra incognita to be travel'd over and discovered by me. A vast field for invention.Twelve inches not the same idea with a foot. Because a man may perfectly conceive a foot who never thought of an inch.A foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this respect, viz. they contain both the same number of points.[Forasmuch as] to be used.Mem. To mention somewhat wchmay encourage the study of politiques, and testify of me ytI am well dispos'd toward them.I.If men did not use words for ideas they would never have thought of abstract ideas. Certainly genera and species are not abstract general ideas. Abstract ideas include a contradiction in their nature. Vide Locke91, lib. 4. c. 7. s. 9.A various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a various or mixt effect. This demonstrable from the[pg 026]definition of a cause; which way of demonstrating must be frequently made use of in my Treatise, & to that end definitions often præmis'd. Hence 'tis evident that, according to Newton's doctrine, colours cannot be simple ideas.M.I am the farthest from scepticism of any man. I know with an intuitive knowledge the existence of other things as well as my own soul. This is wtLocke nor scarce any other thinking philosopher will pretend to92.I.Doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all the sciences. Mem. Barrow's remark. Entirely owing to language.Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas by words amongst the uses and not the abuses of language.I.Of great use & yelast importance to contemplate a man put into the world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see how after long experience he would know wthout words. Such a one would never think of genera and species or abstract general ideas.I.Wonderful in Locke that he could, wnadvanced in years, see at all thro' a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & was consequently thick. This more to be admir'd than ythe did not see farther.Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either as including or excluding identity of circumstances, such as time, place, &c.Mo.I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer, wiser, &c. than I. This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. 'Tis certain that if the happyness of my acquaintance encreases, & mine not proportionably, mine must decrease. The not understanding this & the doctrine about relative good, discuss'd with French, Madden93, &c., to be noticed as 2 causes of mistake in judging of moral matters.Mem. To observe (wnyou talk of the division of ideas into simple and complex) that there may be another cause[pg 027]of the undefinableness of certain ideas besides that which Locke gives; viz. the want of names.M.Mem. To begin the First Book94not with mention of sensation and reflection, but instead of sensation to use perception or thought in general.
No sharing betwixt God & Nature or second causes in my doctrine.M.Materialists must allow the earth to be actually mov'd by the attractive power of every stone that falls from the air, with many other the like absurditys.Enquire concerning the pendulum clock, &c.; whether those inventions of Huygens, &c. be attained to by my doctrine.The ... & ... & ... &c. of time are to be cast away and neglected, as so many noughts or nothings.Mem. To make experiments concerning minimums and their colours, whether they have any or no, & whether they can be of that green wchseems to be compounded of yellow and blue.S.Qu. Whether it were not betternotto call the operations of the mind ideas—confining this term to things sensible73?E.Mem. diligently to set forth how that many of the ancient philosophers run into so great absurditys as even to deny the existence of motion, and of those other things they perceiv'd actually by their senses. This sprung from their not knowing wtExistence was, and wherein it consisted. This the source of all their folly. 'Tis on the discovering of the nature and meaning and import of Existence that I chiefly insist. This puts a wide difference betwixt the[pg 018]sceptics &c. & me. This I think wholly new. I am sure this is new to me74.We have learn'd from Mr. Locke that there may be, and that there are, several glib, coherent, methodical discourses, which nevertheless amount to just nothing. This by him intended with relation to the Scholemen. We may apply it to the Mathematicians.Qu. How can all words be said to stand for ideas? The word blue stands for a colour without any extension, or abstract from extension. But we have not an idea of colour without extension. We cannot imagine colour without extension.Locke seems wrongly to assign a double use of words: one for communicating & the other for recording our thoughts. 'Tis absurd to use words for recording our thoughts to ourselves, or in our private meditations75.No one abstract simple idea like another. Two simple ideas may be connected with one & the same 3dsimple idea, or be intromitted by one & the same sense. But consider'd in themselves they can have nothing common, and consequently no likeness.Qu. How can there be any abstract ideas of colours? It seems not so easily as of tastes or sounds. But then all ideas whatsoever are particular. I can by no means conceive an abstract general idea. 'Tis one thing to abstract one concrete idea from another of a different kind, & another thing to abstract an idea from all particulars of the same kind76.N.Mem. Much to recommend and approve of experimental philosophy.S.What means Cause as distinguish'd from Occasion? Nothing but a being wchwills, when the effect follows the volition. Those things that happen from without we are not the cause of. Therefore there is some other Cause of them, i.e. there is a Being that wills these perceptions in us77.[pg 019]S.[78It should be said, nothing but a Will—a Being which wills being unintelligible.]One square cannot be double of another. Hence the Pythagoric theorem is false.Some writers of catoptrics absurd enough to place the apparent place of the object in the Barrovian case behind the eye.Blew and yellow chequers still diminishing terminate in green. This may help to prove the composition of green.There is in green 2 foundations of 2 relations of likeness to blew & yellow. Therefore green is compounded.A mixt cause will produce a mixt effect. Therefore colours are all compounded that we see.Mem. To consider Newton's two sorts of green.N. B. My abstract & general doctrines ought not to be condemn'd by the Royall Society. 'Tis wttheir meeting did ultimately intend. V. Sprat's History S. R.79Mem. To premise a definition of idea80.I. Mo.The 2 great principles of Morality—the being of a God & the freedom of man. Those to be handled in the beginning of the Second Book81.Subvertitur geometria ut non practica sed speculativa.Archimedes's proposition about squaring the circle has nothing to do with circumferences containing less than 96 points; & if the circumference contain 96 points it may be apply'd, but nothing will follow against indivisibles. V. Barrow.Those curve lines that you can rectify geometrically. Compare them with their equal right lines & by a microscope you shall discover an inequality. Hence my squaring of the circle as good and exact as the best.M.Qu. whether the substance of body or anything else be[pg 020]any more than the collection of concrete ideas included in that thing? Thus the substance of any particular body is extension, solidity, figure82. Of general abstract body we can have no idea.I.Mem. Most carefully to inculcate and set forth that the endeavouring to express abstract philosophic thoughts by words unavoidably runs a man into difficulties. This to be done in the Introduction83.Mem. To endeavour most accurately to understand what is meant by this axiom: Quæ sibi mutuo congruunt æqualia sunt.Qu. what the geometers mean by equality of lines, & whether, according to their definition of equality, a curve line can possibly be equal to a right line?If wthme you call those lines equal wchcontain an equal number of points, then there will be no difficulty. That curve is equal to a right line wchcontains the same points as the right one doth.M.I take not away substances. I ought not to be accused of discarding substance out of the reasonable world84. I onely reject the philosophic sense (wchin effect is no sense) of the word substance. Ask a man not tainted with their jargon wthe means by corporeal substance, or the substance of body. He shall answer, bulk, solidity, and such like sensible qualitys. These I retain. The philosophic nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale, whereof I have no idea, I discard; if a man may be said to discard that which never had any being, was never so much as imagin'd or conceiv'd.M.In short, be not angry. You lose nothing, whether real or chimerical. Wtever you can in any wise conceive or imagine, be it never so wild, so extravagant, & absurd, much good may it do you. You may enjoy it for me. I'll never deprive you of it.[pg 021]N. B. I am more for reality than any other philosophers85. They make a thousand doubts, & know not certainly but we may be deceiv'd. I assert the direct contrary.A line in the sense of mathematicians is not meer distance. This evident in that there are curve lines.Curves perfectly incomprehensible, inexplicable, absurd, except we allow points.I.If men look for a thing where it's not to be found, be they never so sagacious, it is lost labour. If a simple clumsy man knows where the game lies, he though a fool shall catch it sooner than the most fleet & dexterous that seek it elsewhere. Men choose to hunt for truth and knowledge anywhere rather than in their own understanding, where 'tis to be found.M.All knowledge onely about ideas. Locke, B. 4. c. 1.S.It seems improper, & liable to difficulties, to make the word person stand for an idea, or to make ourselves ideas, or thinking things ideas.I.Abstract ideas cause of much trifling and mistake.Mathematicians seem not to speak clearly and coherently of equality. They nowhere define wtthey mean by that word when apply'd to lines.Locke says the modes of simple ideas, besides extension and number, are counted by degrees. I deny there are any modes or degrees of simple ideas. What he terms such are complex ideas, as I have proved.Wtdo the mathematicians mean by considering curves as polygons? Either they are polygons or they are not. If they are, why do they give them the name of curves? Why do not they constantly call them polygons, & treat them as such? If they are not polygons, I think it absurd to use polygons in their stead. Wtis this but to pervert language? to adapt an idea to a name that belongs not to it but to a different idea?The mathematicians should look to their axiom, Quæ[pg 022]congruunt sunt æqualia. I know not what they mean by bidding me put one triangle on another. The under triangle is no triangle—nothing at all, it not being perceiv'd. I ask, must sight be judge of this congruentia or not? If it must, then all lines seen under the same angle are equal, wchthey will not acknowledge. Must the touch be judge? But we cannot touch or feel lines and surfaces, such as triangles, &c., according to the mathematicians themselves. Much less can we touch a line or triangle that's cover'd by another line or triangle.Do you mean by saying one triangle is equall to another, that they both take up equal spaces? But then the question recurs, what mean you by equal spaces? If you meanspatia congruentia, answer the above difficulty truly.I can mean (for my part) nothing else by equal triangles than triangles containing equal numbers of points.I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines wch'tis indifferent whether of them I take, lines in wchI observe by my senses no difference, & wchtherefore have the same name.Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases? but then imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight. Say you, pure intellect must be judge. I reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the mind.If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician in things of which I am certain, 'tis to avoid disputes, to make men careful to think before they answer, to discuss my arguments before they go to refute them. I would by no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty & submission to better judgments. WtI lay before you are undoubted theorems; not plausible conjectures of my own, nor learned opinions of other men. I pretend not to prove them by figures, analogy, or authority. Let them stand or fall by their own evidence.N.When you speak of the corpuscularian essences of bodys, to reflect on sect. 11. & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke. Motion supposes not solidity. A meer colour'd extension may give us the idea of motion.[pg 023]P.Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke.M.Well, say you, according to this new doctrine, all is but meer idea—there is nothing wchis not anens rationis. I answer, things are as real, and existin rerum natura, as much as ever. The difference betweenentia realia&entia rationismay be made as properly now as ever. Do but think before you speak. Endeavour rightly to comprehend my meaning, and you'll agree with me in this.N.Fruitless the distinction 'twixt real and nominal essences.We are not acquainted with the meaning of our words. Real, extension, existence, power, matter, lines, infinite, point, and many more are frequently in our mouths, when little, clear, and determin'd answers them in our understandings. This must be well inculcated.M.Vain is the distinction 'twixt intellectual and material world86. V. Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is far more beautiful than this.S.Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not forMo.them the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all. All ... of introversion, meditation, contemplation, and spiritual acts, as if these could be exerted before we had ideas from without by the senses, are manifestly absurd. This may be of great use in that it makes the happyness of the life to come more conceivable and agreeable to our present nature. The schoolemen & refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest.The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes is, that we do not consider our own notions. I mean consider them in themselves—fix, settle, and determine them,—we regarding them with relation to each other only. In short, we are much out in study[ing] the relations of things before we study them absolutely and in themselves. Thus we study to find out the relations of figures to one another, the relations also of number, without endeavouring rightly to understand the nature of extension and number in themselves. This we think[pg 024]is of no concern, of no difficulty; but if I mistake not 'tis of the last importance,Mo.I allow not of the distinction there is made 'twixt profit and pleasure.Mo.I'd never blame a man for acting upon interest. He's a fool that acts on any other principles. The not considering these things has been of ill consequence in morality.My positive assertions are no less modest than those that are introduced with“It seems to me,”“I suppose,”&c.; since I declare, once for all, that all I write or think is entirely about things as they appear to me. It concerns no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine. This in the Preface.I.Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings one with another. 1st. Words signifying the operations of the mind are taken from sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words as used by the vulgar are taken in some latitude, their signification is confused. Hence if a man use words in a determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either of not being understood, or of speaking improperly. All this remedyed by studying the understanding.Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering the word one. All number consists in relations87.Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the Schoolemen.M. P.We have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other things besides ourselves & order, præcedaneous88. To the knowledge of our own existence—in that we must have ideas or else we cannot think.S.We move our legs ourselves. 'Tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from Malbranch89.Mo.Mem. Nicely to discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke90.M.Mem. Again and again to mention & illustrate the doctrine of the reality of things, rerum natura, &c.M.WtI say is demonstration—perfect demonstration. Wherever men have fix'd & determin'd ideas annexed to[pg 025]their words they can hardly be mistaken. Stick but to my definition of likeness, and 'tis a demonstration ytcolours are not simple ideas, all reds being like, &c. So also in other things. This to be heartily insisted on.E.The abstract idea of Being or Existence is never thought of by the vulgar. They never use those words standing for abstract ideas.M.I must not say the words thing, substance, &c. have been the cause of mistakes, but the not reflecting on their meaning. I will be still for retaining the words. I only desire that men would think before they speak, and settle the meaning of their words.Mo.I approve not of that which Locke says, viz. truth consists in the joining and separating of signs.I.Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without treating of words and propositions. This makes for me against abstract general ideas. Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6.I.Men have been very industrious in travelling forward. They have gone a great way. But none have gone backward beyond the Principles. On that side there lies much terra incognita to be travel'd over and discovered by me. A vast field for invention.Twelve inches not the same idea with a foot. Because a man may perfectly conceive a foot who never thought of an inch.A foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this respect, viz. they contain both the same number of points.[Forasmuch as] to be used.Mem. To mention somewhat wchmay encourage the study of politiques, and testify of me ytI am well dispos'd toward them.I.If men did not use words for ideas they would never have thought of abstract ideas. Certainly genera and species are not abstract general ideas. Abstract ideas include a contradiction in their nature. Vide Locke91, lib. 4. c. 7. s. 9.A various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a various or mixt effect. This demonstrable from the[pg 026]definition of a cause; which way of demonstrating must be frequently made use of in my Treatise, & to that end definitions often præmis'd. Hence 'tis evident that, according to Newton's doctrine, colours cannot be simple ideas.M.I am the farthest from scepticism of any man. I know with an intuitive knowledge the existence of other things as well as my own soul. This is wtLocke nor scarce any other thinking philosopher will pretend to92.I.Doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all the sciences. Mem. Barrow's remark. Entirely owing to language.Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas by words amongst the uses and not the abuses of language.I.Of great use & yelast importance to contemplate a man put into the world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see how after long experience he would know wthout words. Such a one would never think of genera and species or abstract general ideas.I.Wonderful in Locke that he could, wnadvanced in years, see at all thro' a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & was consequently thick. This more to be admir'd than ythe did not see farther.Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either as including or excluding identity of circumstances, such as time, place, &c.Mo.I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer, wiser, &c. than I. This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. 'Tis certain that if the happyness of my acquaintance encreases, & mine not proportionably, mine must decrease. The not understanding this & the doctrine about relative good, discuss'd with French, Madden93, &c., to be noticed as 2 causes of mistake in judging of moral matters.Mem. To observe (wnyou talk of the division of ideas into simple and complex) that there may be another cause[pg 027]of the undefinableness of certain ideas besides that which Locke gives; viz. the want of names.M.Mem. To begin the First Book94not with mention of sensation and reflection, but instead of sensation to use perception or thought in general.
No sharing betwixt God & Nature or second causes in my doctrine.M.Materialists must allow the earth to be actually mov'd by the attractive power of every stone that falls from the air, with many other the like absurditys.Enquire concerning the pendulum clock, &c.; whether those inventions of Huygens, &c. be attained to by my doctrine.The ... & ... & ... &c. of time are to be cast away and neglected, as so many noughts or nothings.Mem. To make experiments concerning minimums and their colours, whether they have any or no, & whether they can be of that green wchseems to be compounded of yellow and blue.S.Qu. Whether it were not betternotto call the operations of the mind ideas—confining this term to things sensible73?E.Mem. diligently to set forth how that many of the ancient philosophers run into so great absurditys as even to deny the existence of motion, and of those other things they perceiv'd actually by their senses. This sprung from their not knowing wtExistence was, and wherein it consisted. This the source of all their folly. 'Tis on the discovering of the nature and meaning and import of Existence that I chiefly insist. This puts a wide difference betwixt the[pg 018]sceptics &c. & me. This I think wholly new. I am sure this is new to me74.We have learn'd from Mr. Locke that there may be, and that there are, several glib, coherent, methodical discourses, which nevertheless amount to just nothing. This by him intended with relation to the Scholemen. We may apply it to the Mathematicians.Qu. How can all words be said to stand for ideas? The word blue stands for a colour without any extension, or abstract from extension. But we have not an idea of colour without extension. We cannot imagine colour without extension.Locke seems wrongly to assign a double use of words: one for communicating & the other for recording our thoughts. 'Tis absurd to use words for recording our thoughts to ourselves, or in our private meditations75.No one abstract simple idea like another. Two simple ideas may be connected with one & the same 3dsimple idea, or be intromitted by one & the same sense. But consider'd in themselves they can have nothing common, and consequently no likeness.Qu. How can there be any abstract ideas of colours? It seems not so easily as of tastes or sounds. But then all ideas whatsoever are particular. I can by no means conceive an abstract general idea. 'Tis one thing to abstract one concrete idea from another of a different kind, & another thing to abstract an idea from all particulars of the same kind76.N.Mem. Much to recommend and approve of experimental philosophy.S.What means Cause as distinguish'd from Occasion? Nothing but a being wchwills, when the effect follows the volition. Those things that happen from without we are not the cause of. Therefore there is some other Cause of them, i.e. there is a Being that wills these perceptions in us77.[pg 019]S.[78It should be said, nothing but a Will—a Being which wills being unintelligible.]One square cannot be double of another. Hence the Pythagoric theorem is false.Some writers of catoptrics absurd enough to place the apparent place of the object in the Barrovian case behind the eye.Blew and yellow chequers still diminishing terminate in green. This may help to prove the composition of green.There is in green 2 foundations of 2 relations of likeness to blew & yellow. Therefore green is compounded.A mixt cause will produce a mixt effect. Therefore colours are all compounded that we see.Mem. To consider Newton's two sorts of green.N. B. My abstract & general doctrines ought not to be condemn'd by the Royall Society. 'Tis wttheir meeting did ultimately intend. V. Sprat's History S. R.79Mem. To premise a definition of idea80.I. Mo.The 2 great principles of Morality—the being of a God & the freedom of man. Those to be handled in the beginning of the Second Book81.Subvertitur geometria ut non practica sed speculativa.Archimedes's proposition about squaring the circle has nothing to do with circumferences containing less than 96 points; & if the circumference contain 96 points it may be apply'd, but nothing will follow against indivisibles. V. Barrow.Those curve lines that you can rectify geometrically. Compare them with their equal right lines & by a microscope you shall discover an inequality. Hence my squaring of the circle as good and exact as the best.M.Qu. whether the substance of body or anything else be[pg 020]any more than the collection of concrete ideas included in that thing? Thus the substance of any particular body is extension, solidity, figure82. Of general abstract body we can have no idea.I.Mem. Most carefully to inculcate and set forth that the endeavouring to express abstract philosophic thoughts by words unavoidably runs a man into difficulties. This to be done in the Introduction83.Mem. To endeavour most accurately to understand what is meant by this axiom: Quæ sibi mutuo congruunt æqualia sunt.Qu. what the geometers mean by equality of lines, & whether, according to their definition of equality, a curve line can possibly be equal to a right line?If wthme you call those lines equal wchcontain an equal number of points, then there will be no difficulty. That curve is equal to a right line wchcontains the same points as the right one doth.M.I take not away substances. I ought not to be accused of discarding substance out of the reasonable world84. I onely reject the philosophic sense (wchin effect is no sense) of the word substance. Ask a man not tainted with their jargon wthe means by corporeal substance, or the substance of body. He shall answer, bulk, solidity, and such like sensible qualitys. These I retain. The philosophic nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale, whereof I have no idea, I discard; if a man may be said to discard that which never had any being, was never so much as imagin'd or conceiv'd.M.In short, be not angry. You lose nothing, whether real or chimerical. Wtever you can in any wise conceive or imagine, be it never so wild, so extravagant, & absurd, much good may it do you. You may enjoy it for me. I'll never deprive you of it.[pg 021]N. B. I am more for reality than any other philosophers85. They make a thousand doubts, & know not certainly but we may be deceiv'd. I assert the direct contrary.A line in the sense of mathematicians is not meer distance. This evident in that there are curve lines.Curves perfectly incomprehensible, inexplicable, absurd, except we allow points.I.If men look for a thing where it's not to be found, be they never so sagacious, it is lost labour. If a simple clumsy man knows where the game lies, he though a fool shall catch it sooner than the most fleet & dexterous that seek it elsewhere. Men choose to hunt for truth and knowledge anywhere rather than in their own understanding, where 'tis to be found.M.All knowledge onely about ideas. Locke, B. 4. c. 1.S.It seems improper, & liable to difficulties, to make the word person stand for an idea, or to make ourselves ideas, or thinking things ideas.I.Abstract ideas cause of much trifling and mistake.Mathematicians seem not to speak clearly and coherently of equality. They nowhere define wtthey mean by that word when apply'd to lines.Locke says the modes of simple ideas, besides extension and number, are counted by degrees. I deny there are any modes or degrees of simple ideas. What he terms such are complex ideas, as I have proved.Wtdo the mathematicians mean by considering curves as polygons? Either they are polygons or they are not. If they are, why do they give them the name of curves? Why do not they constantly call them polygons, & treat them as such? If they are not polygons, I think it absurd to use polygons in their stead. Wtis this but to pervert language? to adapt an idea to a name that belongs not to it but to a different idea?The mathematicians should look to their axiom, Quæ[pg 022]congruunt sunt æqualia. I know not what they mean by bidding me put one triangle on another. The under triangle is no triangle—nothing at all, it not being perceiv'd. I ask, must sight be judge of this congruentia or not? If it must, then all lines seen under the same angle are equal, wchthey will not acknowledge. Must the touch be judge? But we cannot touch or feel lines and surfaces, such as triangles, &c., according to the mathematicians themselves. Much less can we touch a line or triangle that's cover'd by another line or triangle.Do you mean by saying one triangle is equall to another, that they both take up equal spaces? But then the question recurs, what mean you by equal spaces? If you meanspatia congruentia, answer the above difficulty truly.I can mean (for my part) nothing else by equal triangles than triangles containing equal numbers of points.I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines wch'tis indifferent whether of them I take, lines in wchI observe by my senses no difference, & wchtherefore have the same name.Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases? but then imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight. Say you, pure intellect must be judge. I reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the mind.If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician in things of which I am certain, 'tis to avoid disputes, to make men careful to think before they answer, to discuss my arguments before they go to refute them. I would by no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty & submission to better judgments. WtI lay before you are undoubted theorems; not plausible conjectures of my own, nor learned opinions of other men. I pretend not to prove them by figures, analogy, or authority. Let them stand or fall by their own evidence.N.When you speak of the corpuscularian essences of bodys, to reflect on sect. 11. & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke. Motion supposes not solidity. A meer colour'd extension may give us the idea of motion.[pg 023]P.Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke.M.Well, say you, according to this new doctrine, all is but meer idea—there is nothing wchis not anens rationis. I answer, things are as real, and existin rerum natura, as much as ever. The difference betweenentia realia&entia rationismay be made as properly now as ever. Do but think before you speak. Endeavour rightly to comprehend my meaning, and you'll agree with me in this.N.Fruitless the distinction 'twixt real and nominal essences.We are not acquainted with the meaning of our words. Real, extension, existence, power, matter, lines, infinite, point, and many more are frequently in our mouths, when little, clear, and determin'd answers them in our understandings. This must be well inculcated.M.Vain is the distinction 'twixt intellectual and material world86. V. Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is far more beautiful than this.S.Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not forMo.them the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all. All ... of introversion, meditation, contemplation, and spiritual acts, as if these could be exerted before we had ideas from without by the senses, are manifestly absurd. This may be of great use in that it makes the happyness of the life to come more conceivable and agreeable to our present nature. The schoolemen & refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest.The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes is, that we do not consider our own notions. I mean consider them in themselves—fix, settle, and determine them,—we regarding them with relation to each other only. In short, we are much out in study[ing] the relations of things before we study them absolutely and in themselves. Thus we study to find out the relations of figures to one another, the relations also of number, without endeavouring rightly to understand the nature of extension and number in themselves. This we think[pg 024]is of no concern, of no difficulty; but if I mistake not 'tis of the last importance,Mo.I allow not of the distinction there is made 'twixt profit and pleasure.Mo.I'd never blame a man for acting upon interest. He's a fool that acts on any other principles. The not considering these things has been of ill consequence in morality.My positive assertions are no less modest than those that are introduced with“It seems to me,”“I suppose,”&c.; since I declare, once for all, that all I write or think is entirely about things as they appear to me. It concerns no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine. This in the Preface.I.Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings one with another. 1st. Words signifying the operations of the mind are taken from sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words as used by the vulgar are taken in some latitude, their signification is confused. Hence if a man use words in a determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either of not being understood, or of speaking improperly. All this remedyed by studying the understanding.Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering the word one. All number consists in relations87.Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the Schoolemen.M. P.We have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other things besides ourselves & order, præcedaneous88. To the knowledge of our own existence—in that we must have ideas or else we cannot think.S.We move our legs ourselves. 'Tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from Malbranch89.Mo.Mem. Nicely to discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke90.M.Mem. Again and again to mention & illustrate the doctrine of the reality of things, rerum natura, &c.M.WtI say is demonstration—perfect demonstration. Wherever men have fix'd & determin'd ideas annexed to[pg 025]their words they can hardly be mistaken. Stick but to my definition of likeness, and 'tis a demonstration ytcolours are not simple ideas, all reds being like, &c. So also in other things. This to be heartily insisted on.E.The abstract idea of Being or Existence is never thought of by the vulgar. They never use those words standing for abstract ideas.M.I must not say the words thing, substance, &c. have been the cause of mistakes, but the not reflecting on their meaning. I will be still for retaining the words. I only desire that men would think before they speak, and settle the meaning of their words.Mo.I approve not of that which Locke says, viz. truth consists in the joining and separating of signs.I.Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without treating of words and propositions. This makes for me against abstract general ideas. Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6.I.Men have been very industrious in travelling forward. They have gone a great way. But none have gone backward beyond the Principles. On that side there lies much terra incognita to be travel'd over and discovered by me. A vast field for invention.Twelve inches not the same idea with a foot. Because a man may perfectly conceive a foot who never thought of an inch.A foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this respect, viz. they contain both the same number of points.[Forasmuch as] to be used.Mem. To mention somewhat wchmay encourage the study of politiques, and testify of me ytI am well dispos'd toward them.I.If men did not use words for ideas they would never have thought of abstract ideas. Certainly genera and species are not abstract general ideas. Abstract ideas include a contradiction in their nature. Vide Locke91, lib. 4. c. 7. s. 9.A various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a various or mixt effect. This demonstrable from the[pg 026]definition of a cause; which way of demonstrating must be frequently made use of in my Treatise, & to that end definitions often præmis'd. Hence 'tis evident that, according to Newton's doctrine, colours cannot be simple ideas.M.I am the farthest from scepticism of any man. I know with an intuitive knowledge the existence of other things as well as my own soul. This is wtLocke nor scarce any other thinking philosopher will pretend to92.I.Doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all the sciences. Mem. Barrow's remark. Entirely owing to language.Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas by words amongst the uses and not the abuses of language.I.Of great use & yelast importance to contemplate a man put into the world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see how after long experience he would know wthout words. Such a one would never think of genera and species or abstract general ideas.I.Wonderful in Locke that he could, wnadvanced in years, see at all thro' a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & was consequently thick. This more to be admir'd than ythe did not see farther.Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either as including or excluding identity of circumstances, such as time, place, &c.Mo.I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer, wiser, &c. than I. This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. 'Tis certain that if the happyness of my acquaintance encreases, & mine not proportionably, mine must decrease. The not understanding this & the doctrine about relative good, discuss'd with French, Madden93, &c., to be noticed as 2 causes of mistake in judging of moral matters.Mem. To observe (wnyou talk of the division of ideas into simple and complex) that there may be another cause[pg 027]of the undefinableness of certain ideas besides that which Locke gives; viz. the want of names.M.Mem. To begin the First Book94not with mention of sensation and reflection, but instead of sensation to use perception or thought in general.
No sharing betwixt God & Nature or second causes in my doctrine.
M.
M.
Materialists must allow the earth to be actually mov'd by the attractive power of every stone that falls from the air, with many other the like absurditys.
Enquire concerning the pendulum clock, &c.; whether those inventions of Huygens, &c. be attained to by my doctrine.
The ... & ... & ... &c. of time are to be cast away and neglected, as so many noughts or nothings.
Mem. To make experiments concerning minimums and their colours, whether they have any or no, & whether they can be of that green wchseems to be compounded of yellow and blue.
S.
S.
Qu. Whether it were not betternotto call the operations of the mind ideas—confining this term to things sensible73?
E.
E.
Mem. diligently to set forth how that many of the ancient philosophers run into so great absurditys as even to deny the existence of motion, and of those other things they perceiv'd actually by their senses. This sprung from their not knowing wtExistence was, and wherein it consisted. This the source of all their folly. 'Tis on the discovering of the nature and meaning and import of Existence that I chiefly insist. This puts a wide difference betwixt the[pg 018]sceptics &c. & me. This I think wholly new. I am sure this is new to me74.
We have learn'd from Mr. Locke that there may be, and that there are, several glib, coherent, methodical discourses, which nevertheless amount to just nothing. This by him intended with relation to the Scholemen. We may apply it to the Mathematicians.
Qu. How can all words be said to stand for ideas? The word blue stands for a colour without any extension, or abstract from extension. But we have not an idea of colour without extension. We cannot imagine colour without extension.
Locke seems wrongly to assign a double use of words: one for communicating & the other for recording our thoughts. 'Tis absurd to use words for recording our thoughts to ourselves, or in our private meditations75.
No one abstract simple idea like another. Two simple ideas may be connected with one & the same 3dsimple idea, or be intromitted by one & the same sense. But consider'd in themselves they can have nothing common, and consequently no likeness.
Qu. How can there be any abstract ideas of colours? It seems not so easily as of tastes or sounds. But then all ideas whatsoever are particular. I can by no means conceive an abstract general idea. 'Tis one thing to abstract one concrete idea from another of a different kind, & another thing to abstract an idea from all particulars of the same kind76.
N.
N.
Mem. Much to recommend and approve of experimental philosophy.
S.
S.
What means Cause as distinguish'd from Occasion? Nothing but a being wchwills, when the effect follows the volition. Those things that happen from without we are not the cause of. Therefore there is some other Cause of them, i.e. there is a Being that wills these perceptions in us77.
S.
S.
[78It should be said, nothing but a Will—a Being which wills being unintelligible.]
One square cannot be double of another. Hence the Pythagoric theorem is false.
Some writers of catoptrics absurd enough to place the apparent place of the object in the Barrovian case behind the eye.
Blew and yellow chequers still diminishing terminate in green. This may help to prove the composition of green.
There is in green 2 foundations of 2 relations of likeness to blew & yellow. Therefore green is compounded.
A mixt cause will produce a mixt effect. Therefore colours are all compounded that we see.
Mem. To consider Newton's two sorts of green.
N. B. My abstract & general doctrines ought not to be condemn'd by the Royall Society. 'Tis wttheir meeting did ultimately intend. V. Sprat's History S. R.79
Mem. To premise a definition of idea80.
I. Mo.
I. Mo.
The 2 great principles of Morality—the being of a God & the freedom of man. Those to be handled in the beginning of the Second Book81.
Subvertitur geometria ut non practica sed speculativa.
Archimedes's proposition about squaring the circle has nothing to do with circumferences containing less than 96 points; & if the circumference contain 96 points it may be apply'd, but nothing will follow against indivisibles. V. Barrow.
Those curve lines that you can rectify geometrically. Compare them with their equal right lines & by a microscope you shall discover an inequality. Hence my squaring of the circle as good and exact as the best.
M.
M.
Qu. whether the substance of body or anything else be[pg 020]any more than the collection of concrete ideas included in that thing? Thus the substance of any particular body is extension, solidity, figure82. Of general abstract body we can have no idea.
I.
I.
Mem. Most carefully to inculcate and set forth that the endeavouring to express abstract philosophic thoughts by words unavoidably runs a man into difficulties. This to be done in the Introduction83.
Mem. To endeavour most accurately to understand what is meant by this axiom: Quæ sibi mutuo congruunt æqualia sunt.
Qu. what the geometers mean by equality of lines, & whether, according to their definition of equality, a curve line can possibly be equal to a right line?
If wthme you call those lines equal wchcontain an equal number of points, then there will be no difficulty. That curve is equal to a right line wchcontains the same points as the right one doth.
M.
M.
I take not away substances. I ought not to be accused of discarding substance out of the reasonable world84. I onely reject the philosophic sense (wchin effect is no sense) of the word substance. Ask a man not tainted with their jargon wthe means by corporeal substance, or the substance of body. He shall answer, bulk, solidity, and such like sensible qualitys. These I retain. The philosophic nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale, whereof I have no idea, I discard; if a man may be said to discard that which never had any being, was never so much as imagin'd or conceiv'd.
M.
M.
In short, be not angry. You lose nothing, whether real or chimerical. Wtever you can in any wise conceive or imagine, be it never so wild, so extravagant, & absurd, much good may it do you. You may enjoy it for me. I'll never deprive you of it.
N. B. I am more for reality than any other philosophers85. They make a thousand doubts, & know not certainly but we may be deceiv'd. I assert the direct contrary.
A line in the sense of mathematicians is not meer distance. This evident in that there are curve lines.
Curves perfectly incomprehensible, inexplicable, absurd, except we allow points.
I.
I.
If men look for a thing where it's not to be found, be they never so sagacious, it is lost labour. If a simple clumsy man knows where the game lies, he though a fool shall catch it sooner than the most fleet & dexterous that seek it elsewhere. Men choose to hunt for truth and knowledge anywhere rather than in their own understanding, where 'tis to be found.
M.
M.
All knowledge onely about ideas. Locke, B. 4. c. 1.
S.
S.
It seems improper, & liable to difficulties, to make the word person stand for an idea, or to make ourselves ideas, or thinking things ideas.
I.
I.
Abstract ideas cause of much trifling and mistake.
Mathematicians seem not to speak clearly and coherently of equality. They nowhere define wtthey mean by that word when apply'd to lines.
Locke says the modes of simple ideas, besides extension and number, are counted by degrees. I deny there are any modes or degrees of simple ideas. What he terms such are complex ideas, as I have proved.
Wtdo the mathematicians mean by considering curves as polygons? Either they are polygons or they are not. If they are, why do they give them the name of curves? Why do not they constantly call them polygons, & treat them as such? If they are not polygons, I think it absurd to use polygons in their stead. Wtis this but to pervert language? to adapt an idea to a name that belongs not to it but to a different idea?
The mathematicians should look to their axiom, Quæ[pg 022]congruunt sunt æqualia. I know not what they mean by bidding me put one triangle on another. The under triangle is no triangle—nothing at all, it not being perceiv'd. I ask, must sight be judge of this congruentia or not? If it must, then all lines seen under the same angle are equal, wchthey will not acknowledge. Must the touch be judge? But we cannot touch or feel lines and surfaces, such as triangles, &c., according to the mathematicians themselves. Much less can we touch a line or triangle that's cover'd by another line or triangle.
Do you mean by saying one triangle is equall to another, that they both take up equal spaces? But then the question recurs, what mean you by equal spaces? If you meanspatia congruentia, answer the above difficulty truly.
I can mean (for my part) nothing else by equal triangles than triangles containing equal numbers of points.
I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines wch'tis indifferent whether of them I take, lines in wchI observe by my senses no difference, & wchtherefore have the same name.
Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases? but then imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight. Say you, pure intellect must be judge. I reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the mind.
If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician in things of which I am certain, 'tis to avoid disputes, to make men careful to think before they answer, to discuss my arguments before they go to refute them. I would by no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty & submission to better judgments. WtI lay before you are undoubted theorems; not plausible conjectures of my own, nor learned opinions of other men. I pretend not to prove them by figures, analogy, or authority. Let them stand or fall by their own evidence.
N.
N.
When you speak of the corpuscularian essences of bodys, to reflect on sect. 11. & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke. Motion supposes not solidity. A meer colour'd extension may give us the idea of motion.
P.
P.
Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke.
M.
M.
Well, say you, according to this new doctrine, all is but meer idea—there is nothing wchis not anens rationis. I answer, things are as real, and existin rerum natura, as much as ever. The difference betweenentia realia&entia rationismay be made as properly now as ever. Do but think before you speak. Endeavour rightly to comprehend my meaning, and you'll agree with me in this.
N.
N.
Fruitless the distinction 'twixt real and nominal essences.
We are not acquainted with the meaning of our words. Real, extension, existence, power, matter, lines, infinite, point, and many more are frequently in our mouths, when little, clear, and determin'd answers them in our understandings. This must be well inculcated.
M.
M.
Vain is the distinction 'twixt intellectual and material world86. V. Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is far more beautiful than this.
S.
S.
Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not for
Mo.
Mo.
them the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all. All ... of introversion, meditation, contemplation, and spiritual acts, as if these could be exerted before we had ideas from without by the senses, are manifestly absurd. This may be of great use in that it makes the happyness of the life to come more conceivable and agreeable to our present nature. The schoolemen & refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest.
The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes is, that we do not consider our own notions. I mean consider them in themselves—fix, settle, and determine them,—we regarding them with relation to each other only. In short, we are much out in study[ing] the relations of things before we study them absolutely and in themselves. Thus we study to find out the relations of figures to one another, the relations also of number, without endeavouring rightly to understand the nature of extension and number in themselves. This we think[pg 024]is of no concern, of no difficulty; but if I mistake not 'tis of the last importance,
Mo.
Mo.
I allow not of the distinction there is made 'twixt profit and pleasure.
Mo.
Mo.
I'd never blame a man for acting upon interest. He's a fool that acts on any other principles. The not considering these things has been of ill consequence in morality.
My positive assertions are no less modest than those that are introduced with“It seems to me,”“I suppose,”&c.; since I declare, once for all, that all I write or think is entirely about things as they appear to me. It concerns no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine. This in the Preface.
I.
I.
Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings one with another. 1st. Words signifying the operations of the mind are taken from sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words as used by the vulgar are taken in some latitude, their signification is confused. Hence if a man use words in a determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either of not being understood, or of speaking improperly. All this remedyed by studying the understanding.
Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering the word one. All number consists in relations87.
Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the Schoolemen.
M. P.
M. P.
We have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other things besides ourselves & order, præcedaneous88. To the knowledge of our own existence—in that we must have ideas or else we cannot think.
S.
S.
We move our legs ourselves. 'Tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from Malbranch89.
Mo.
Mo.
Mem. Nicely to discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke90.
M.
M.
Mem. Again and again to mention & illustrate the doctrine of the reality of things, rerum natura, &c.
M.
M.
WtI say is demonstration—perfect demonstration. Wherever men have fix'd & determin'd ideas annexed to[pg 025]their words they can hardly be mistaken. Stick but to my definition of likeness, and 'tis a demonstration ytcolours are not simple ideas, all reds being like, &c. So also in other things. This to be heartily insisted on.
E.
E.
The abstract idea of Being or Existence is never thought of by the vulgar. They never use those words standing for abstract ideas.
M.
M.
I must not say the words thing, substance, &c. have been the cause of mistakes, but the not reflecting on their meaning. I will be still for retaining the words. I only desire that men would think before they speak, and settle the meaning of their words.
Mo.
Mo.
I approve not of that which Locke says, viz. truth consists in the joining and separating of signs.
I.
I.
Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without treating of words and propositions. This makes for me against abstract general ideas. Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6.
I.
I.
Men have been very industrious in travelling forward. They have gone a great way. But none have gone backward beyond the Principles. On that side there lies much terra incognita to be travel'd over and discovered by me. A vast field for invention.
Twelve inches not the same idea with a foot. Because a man may perfectly conceive a foot who never thought of an inch.
A foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this respect, viz. they contain both the same number of points.
[Forasmuch as] to be used.
Mem. To mention somewhat wchmay encourage the study of politiques, and testify of me ytI am well dispos'd toward them.
I.
I.
If men did not use words for ideas they would never have thought of abstract ideas. Certainly genera and species are not abstract general ideas. Abstract ideas include a contradiction in their nature. Vide Locke91, lib. 4. c. 7. s. 9.
A various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a various or mixt effect. This demonstrable from the[pg 026]definition of a cause; which way of demonstrating must be frequently made use of in my Treatise, & to that end definitions often præmis'd. Hence 'tis evident that, according to Newton's doctrine, colours cannot be simple ideas.
M.
M.
I am the farthest from scepticism of any man. I know with an intuitive knowledge the existence of other things as well as my own soul. This is wtLocke nor scarce any other thinking philosopher will pretend to92.
I.
I.
Doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all the sciences. Mem. Barrow's remark. Entirely owing to language.
Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas by words amongst the uses and not the abuses of language.
I.
I.
Of great use & yelast importance to contemplate a man put into the world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see how after long experience he would know wthout words. Such a one would never think of genera and species or abstract general ideas.
I.
I.
Wonderful in Locke that he could, wnadvanced in years, see at all thro' a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & was consequently thick. This more to be admir'd than ythe did not see farther.
Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either as including or excluding identity of circumstances, such as time, place, &c.
Mo.
Mo.
I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer, wiser, &c. than I. This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. 'Tis certain that if the happyness of my acquaintance encreases, & mine not proportionably, mine must decrease. The not understanding this & the doctrine about relative good, discuss'd with French, Madden93, &c., to be noticed as 2 causes of mistake in judging of moral matters.
Mem. To observe (wnyou talk of the division of ideas into simple and complex) that there may be another cause[pg 027]of the undefinableness of certain ideas besides that which Locke gives; viz. the want of names.
M.
M.
Mem. To begin the First Book94not with mention of sensation and reflection, but instead of sensation to use perception or thought in general.