M.There is a philosopher151who says we can get an idea of substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea. Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him, is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in his and the Schoolmen's sense of that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance.E.N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract general idea.Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of magnitudes and distances.I.'Tis evident ytwnthe solitary man should be taught to speak, the words would give him no other new ideas (save only the sounds, and complex ideas which, tho' unknown before, may be signified by language) beside wthe had before. If he had not, could not have, an abstract idea before, he cannot have it after he is taught to speak.Mo.“Homo est homo,”&c. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus, &c. Now, if these identical propositions are sought after in the mind, they will not be found. There are no identical mental propositions. 'Tis all about sounds and terms.Mo.Hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas, and proving by intermediate ideas, comes to nothing152.Mo.We may have certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. without other ideas than the words, and their standing for one idea, i.e. their being to be used indifferently.Mo.It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas, but only about words. 'Tis improper to say, I am certain I see, I feel, &c. There are no mental propositions[pg 044]form'd answering to these words, & in simple perception 'tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and consequently no certainty153.Mo.The reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs is, that they are perfectly arbitrary & in our power—made at pleasure.Mo.The obscure ambiguous termrelation, which is said to be the largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us.Mo.Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that does not depend on some false principle; or at best on some principle of nature, which is yeeffect of God's will, and we know not how soon it may be changed.I.Qu. What becomes of theæternæ veritates? Ans. They vanish154.I.But, say you, I find it difficult to look beneath the words and uncover my ideas. Say I, Use will make it easy. In the sequel of my Book the cause of this difficulty shall be more clearly made out.I.To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it.E.“Cogito ergo sum.”Tautology. No mental proposition answering thereto.N. Mo.Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of ideas—as to identity and diversity, and real existence, vanisheth; of relation, becometh merely nominal; of co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this latter our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this only real knowledge seemeth to be found155.P.We must wththe mob place certainty in the senses156.'Tis a man's duty, 'tis the fruit of friendship, to speak well of his friend. Wonder not therefore that I do wtI do.I.A man of slow parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. Even my shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me in this matter—'twill make me bring the object nearer to my thoughts. A purblind person, &c. Introd.[pg 045]S.Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk ofjudicium intellectuspreceding the volition: I thinkjudiciumincludes volition. I can by no means distinguish these—judicium,intellectus,indifferentia, uneasiness to many things accompanying or preceding every volition, as e.g. the motion of my hand.S.Qu. Wtmean you by my perceptions, my volitions? Both all the perceptions I perceive or conceive157, &c. are mine; all the volitions I am conscious to are mine.S.Homo est agens liberum. What mean they byhomoandagensin this place?E.Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity & Existence? I believe not. Yet if they are suggested by all the ways of sensation, 'tis strange they should want them158.I.It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the more time and pains men have consum'd in the study of philosophy, by so much the more they look upon themselves to be ignorant & weak creatures. They discover flaws and imperfections in their faculties wchother men never spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of admitting many inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for true. There is nothing they touch with their hand, or behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides much larger and more numerous than wtis perceived, & at length turn scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this proceeds from, &c. Exord. Introd.159I.These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common single information of sense. They grasp at knowledge by sheafs & bundles. ('Tis well if, catching at too much at once, they hold nothing but emptiness & air.) They in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas.It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects see more m.v.'s at once, i.e. that their visual systems are the largest.Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary that, instead of being (wnduly us'd or in their own nature) prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge,[pg 046]or an hindrance to knowledge, without them there could in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration.Mem. To be eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and recalling men to Common Sense160.S.We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but as so many selves. We suppose ourselves affected wthsuch & such thoughts & such and such sensations161.S.Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty which chiefly serves to discriminate us from brutes? I question whether a brute does or can imagine a blue horse or chimera.Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion. Useful to enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions.Mo.Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics.S.Perception is passive, but this not distinct from idea. Therefore there can be no idea of volition.Algebraic species or letters are denominations of denominations. Therefore Arithmetic to be treated of before Algebra.2 crowns are called ten shillings. Hence may appear the value of numbers.Complex ideas are the creatures of the mind. Hence may appear the nature of numbers. This to be deeply discuss'd.I am better informed & shall know more by telling me there are 10,000 men, than by shewing me them all drawn up. I shall better be able to judge of the bargain you'd have me make wnyou tell me how much (i.e. the name of ye) money lies on the table, than by offering and shewing it without naming. I regard not the idea, the looks, but the names. Hence may appear the nature of numbers.Children are unacquainted with numbers till they have made some progress in language. This could not be if they were ideas suggested by all the senses.[pg 047]Numbers are nothing but names—never words.Mem. Imaginary roots—to unravel that mystery.Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers.In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number. They only seek a denomination. This is all can be of use to them.Take away the signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and pray wtremains?These are sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless but for practice in societies of men. No speculative knowledge, no comparing of ideas in them162.Qu. whether Geometry may not properly be reckon'd amongst the mixt mathematics—Arithmetic & Algebra being the only abstracted pure, i.e. entirely nominal—Geometry being an application of these to points163?Mo.Locke of Trifling Propositions. [b. 4. c. 8] Mem. Well to observe & con over that chapter.E.Existence, Extension, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas. They are words, unknown and useless to the vulgar.Mo.Sensual pleasure is thesummum bonum. This the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the Gospels, may clearly be demonstrated.Mo.Sensual pleasure, quâ pleasure, is good & desirable by a wise man164. But if it be contemptible, 'tis not quâ pleasure but quâ pain, or cause of pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure.I.WnI consider, the more objects we see at once the more distant they are, and that eye which beholds a great many things can see none of them near.I.ByideaI mean any sensible or imaginable thing165.M. S.To be sure or certain of wtwe do not actually perceive166(I say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether[pg 048]passive; there must be a disposition to act; there must be assent, wchis active. Nay, what do I talk; there must be actual volition.What do we demonstrate in Geometry but that lines are equal or unequal? i.e. may not be called by the same name167.I. M.I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen,“Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.”168I wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas.S. G.“Nihil dat quod non habet,”or, the effect is contained in the cause, is an axiom I do not understand or believe to be true.E.Whoever shall cast his eyes on the writings of old or new philosophers, and see the noise is made about formal and objective Being, Will, &c.G.Absurd to argue the existence of God from his idea. We have no idea of God. 'Tis impossible169.M. E.Cause of much errour & confusion that men knew not what was meant by Reality170.I.Des Cartes, in Med. 2, says the notion of this particular wax is less clear than that of wax in general; and in the same Med., a little before, he forbears to consider bodies in general, because (says he) these general conceptions are usually confused.M. S.Des Cartes, in Med. 3, calls himself a thinking substance, and a stone an extended substance; and adds that they both agree in this, that they are substances. And in the next paragraph he calls extension a mode of substance.S.'Tis commonly said by the philosophers, that if the soul of man were self-existent it would have given itself all possible perfection. This I do not understand.[pg 049]Mo.Mem. To excite men to the pleasures of the eye & the ear, which surfeit not, nor bring those evils after them, as others.S.We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only between their effects. 'Tis one Will, one Act—distinguished by the effects. This Will, this Act, is the Spirit, i.e. operative principle, soul, &c. No mention of fears and jealousies, nothing like a party.M.Locke in his 4thBook171, and Des Cartes in Med. 6, use the same argument for the existence of objects, viz. that sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our will.S.While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly willing; my acquiescing in the present state is willing.E.The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different from imagination or perception172. Volition or Will, Wchis not imaginable, regard must not be had to its existence(?) ... First Book.Mo.There are four sorts of propositions:—“Gold is a metal;”“Gold is yellow;”“Gold is fixt;”“Gold is not a stone”—of which the first, second, and third are only nominal, and have no mental propositions answering them.M.Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute what Des Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med., viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsely than truely—that sense of pain tells me not my foot is bruised or broken, but I, having frequently observed these two ideas, viz. of that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together, do erroneously take them to be inseparable by a necessity of Nature—as if Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free will of God173.M. S.Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject of several acts. Ans. to 2dobjection of Hobbs.S.Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying thought is to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer. Object.S.Hobbs in his Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of[pg 050]the scholastiques—“the will wills,”&c. So does Locke. I am of another mind174.S.Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner.E. S.Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs's doctrine, &c.M. P. E.Malbranch in his illustration175differs widely from me. He doubts of the existence of bodies. I doubt not in the least of this.P.I differ from Cartesians in that I make extension, colour, &c. to exist really in bodies independent of our mind176. All yecarefully and lucidly to be set forth.M. P.Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to say the things—the effects themselves—do really exist, even wnnot actually perceived; but still with relation to perception177.The great use of the Indian figures above the Roman shews arithmetic to be about signs, not ideas—or at least not ideas different from the characters themselves178.M. N.Reasoning there may be about things or ideas, or about actions; but demonstration can be only verbal. I question, no matter &c.G.Quoth Des Cartes, The idea of God is not made by me, for I can neither add to nor subtract from it. No more can he add to or take from any other idea, even of his own making.S.The not distinguishing 'twixt Will and ideas is a grand mistake with Hobbs. He takes those things for nothing which are not ideas179.M.Say you, At this rate all's nothing but idea—mere phantasm. I answer, Everything as real as ever. I hope to call a thing idea makes it not the less real. Truly I should perhaps have stuck to the word thing, and not mentioned[pg 051]the word idea, were it not for a reason, and I think a good one too, which I shall give in the Second Book180.
M.There is a philosopher151who says we can get an idea of substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea. Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him, is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in his and the Schoolmen's sense of that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance.E.N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract general idea.Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of magnitudes and distances.I.'Tis evident ytwnthe solitary man should be taught to speak, the words would give him no other new ideas (save only the sounds, and complex ideas which, tho' unknown before, may be signified by language) beside wthe had before. If he had not, could not have, an abstract idea before, he cannot have it after he is taught to speak.Mo.“Homo est homo,”&c. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus, &c. Now, if these identical propositions are sought after in the mind, they will not be found. There are no identical mental propositions. 'Tis all about sounds and terms.Mo.Hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas, and proving by intermediate ideas, comes to nothing152.Mo.We may have certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. without other ideas than the words, and their standing for one idea, i.e. their being to be used indifferently.Mo.It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas, but only about words. 'Tis improper to say, I am certain I see, I feel, &c. There are no mental propositions[pg 044]form'd answering to these words, & in simple perception 'tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and consequently no certainty153.Mo.The reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs is, that they are perfectly arbitrary & in our power—made at pleasure.Mo.The obscure ambiguous termrelation, which is said to be the largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us.Mo.Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that does not depend on some false principle; or at best on some principle of nature, which is yeeffect of God's will, and we know not how soon it may be changed.I.Qu. What becomes of theæternæ veritates? Ans. They vanish154.I.But, say you, I find it difficult to look beneath the words and uncover my ideas. Say I, Use will make it easy. In the sequel of my Book the cause of this difficulty shall be more clearly made out.I.To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it.E.“Cogito ergo sum.”Tautology. No mental proposition answering thereto.N. Mo.Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of ideas—as to identity and diversity, and real existence, vanisheth; of relation, becometh merely nominal; of co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this latter our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this only real knowledge seemeth to be found155.P.We must wththe mob place certainty in the senses156.'Tis a man's duty, 'tis the fruit of friendship, to speak well of his friend. Wonder not therefore that I do wtI do.I.A man of slow parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. Even my shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me in this matter—'twill make me bring the object nearer to my thoughts. A purblind person, &c. Introd.[pg 045]S.Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk ofjudicium intellectuspreceding the volition: I thinkjudiciumincludes volition. I can by no means distinguish these—judicium,intellectus,indifferentia, uneasiness to many things accompanying or preceding every volition, as e.g. the motion of my hand.S.Qu. Wtmean you by my perceptions, my volitions? Both all the perceptions I perceive or conceive157, &c. are mine; all the volitions I am conscious to are mine.S.Homo est agens liberum. What mean they byhomoandagensin this place?E.Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity & Existence? I believe not. Yet if they are suggested by all the ways of sensation, 'tis strange they should want them158.I.It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the more time and pains men have consum'd in the study of philosophy, by so much the more they look upon themselves to be ignorant & weak creatures. They discover flaws and imperfections in their faculties wchother men never spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of admitting many inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for true. There is nothing they touch with their hand, or behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides much larger and more numerous than wtis perceived, & at length turn scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this proceeds from, &c. Exord. Introd.159I.These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common single information of sense. They grasp at knowledge by sheafs & bundles. ('Tis well if, catching at too much at once, they hold nothing but emptiness & air.) They in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas.It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects see more m.v.'s at once, i.e. that their visual systems are the largest.Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary that, instead of being (wnduly us'd or in their own nature) prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge,[pg 046]or an hindrance to knowledge, without them there could in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration.Mem. To be eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and recalling men to Common Sense160.S.We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but as so many selves. We suppose ourselves affected wthsuch & such thoughts & such and such sensations161.S.Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty which chiefly serves to discriminate us from brutes? I question whether a brute does or can imagine a blue horse or chimera.Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion. Useful to enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions.Mo.Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics.S.Perception is passive, but this not distinct from idea. Therefore there can be no idea of volition.Algebraic species or letters are denominations of denominations. Therefore Arithmetic to be treated of before Algebra.2 crowns are called ten shillings. Hence may appear the value of numbers.Complex ideas are the creatures of the mind. Hence may appear the nature of numbers. This to be deeply discuss'd.I am better informed & shall know more by telling me there are 10,000 men, than by shewing me them all drawn up. I shall better be able to judge of the bargain you'd have me make wnyou tell me how much (i.e. the name of ye) money lies on the table, than by offering and shewing it without naming. I regard not the idea, the looks, but the names. Hence may appear the nature of numbers.Children are unacquainted with numbers till they have made some progress in language. This could not be if they were ideas suggested by all the senses.[pg 047]Numbers are nothing but names—never words.Mem. Imaginary roots—to unravel that mystery.Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers.In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number. They only seek a denomination. This is all can be of use to them.Take away the signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and pray wtremains?These are sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless but for practice in societies of men. No speculative knowledge, no comparing of ideas in them162.Qu. whether Geometry may not properly be reckon'd amongst the mixt mathematics—Arithmetic & Algebra being the only abstracted pure, i.e. entirely nominal—Geometry being an application of these to points163?Mo.Locke of Trifling Propositions. [b. 4. c. 8] Mem. Well to observe & con over that chapter.E.Existence, Extension, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas. They are words, unknown and useless to the vulgar.Mo.Sensual pleasure is thesummum bonum. This the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the Gospels, may clearly be demonstrated.Mo.Sensual pleasure, quâ pleasure, is good & desirable by a wise man164. But if it be contemptible, 'tis not quâ pleasure but quâ pain, or cause of pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure.I.WnI consider, the more objects we see at once the more distant they are, and that eye which beholds a great many things can see none of them near.I.ByideaI mean any sensible or imaginable thing165.M. S.To be sure or certain of wtwe do not actually perceive166(I say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether[pg 048]passive; there must be a disposition to act; there must be assent, wchis active. Nay, what do I talk; there must be actual volition.What do we demonstrate in Geometry but that lines are equal or unequal? i.e. may not be called by the same name167.I. M.I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen,“Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.”168I wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas.S. G.“Nihil dat quod non habet,”or, the effect is contained in the cause, is an axiom I do not understand or believe to be true.E.Whoever shall cast his eyes on the writings of old or new philosophers, and see the noise is made about formal and objective Being, Will, &c.G.Absurd to argue the existence of God from his idea. We have no idea of God. 'Tis impossible169.M. E.Cause of much errour & confusion that men knew not what was meant by Reality170.I.Des Cartes, in Med. 2, says the notion of this particular wax is less clear than that of wax in general; and in the same Med., a little before, he forbears to consider bodies in general, because (says he) these general conceptions are usually confused.M. S.Des Cartes, in Med. 3, calls himself a thinking substance, and a stone an extended substance; and adds that they both agree in this, that they are substances. And in the next paragraph he calls extension a mode of substance.S.'Tis commonly said by the philosophers, that if the soul of man were self-existent it would have given itself all possible perfection. This I do not understand.[pg 049]Mo.Mem. To excite men to the pleasures of the eye & the ear, which surfeit not, nor bring those evils after them, as others.S.We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only between their effects. 'Tis one Will, one Act—distinguished by the effects. This Will, this Act, is the Spirit, i.e. operative principle, soul, &c. No mention of fears and jealousies, nothing like a party.M.Locke in his 4thBook171, and Des Cartes in Med. 6, use the same argument for the existence of objects, viz. that sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our will.S.While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly willing; my acquiescing in the present state is willing.E.The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different from imagination or perception172. Volition or Will, Wchis not imaginable, regard must not be had to its existence(?) ... First Book.Mo.There are four sorts of propositions:—“Gold is a metal;”“Gold is yellow;”“Gold is fixt;”“Gold is not a stone”—of which the first, second, and third are only nominal, and have no mental propositions answering them.M.Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute what Des Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med., viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsely than truely—that sense of pain tells me not my foot is bruised or broken, but I, having frequently observed these two ideas, viz. of that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together, do erroneously take them to be inseparable by a necessity of Nature—as if Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free will of God173.M. S.Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject of several acts. Ans. to 2dobjection of Hobbs.S.Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying thought is to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer. Object.S.Hobbs in his Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of[pg 050]the scholastiques—“the will wills,”&c. So does Locke. I am of another mind174.S.Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner.E. S.Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs's doctrine, &c.M. P. E.Malbranch in his illustration175differs widely from me. He doubts of the existence of bodies. I doubt not in the least of this.P.I differ from Cartesians in that I make extension, colour, &c. to exist really in bodies independent of our mind176. All yecarefully and lucidly to be set forth.M. P.Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to say the things—the effects themselves—do really exist, even wnnot actually perceived; but still with relation to perception177.The great use of the Indian figures above the Roman shews arithmetic to be about signs, not ideas—or at least not ideas different from the characters themselves178.M. N.Reasoning there may be about things or ideas, or about actions; but demonstration can be only verbal. I question, no matter &c.G.Quoth Des Cartes, The idea of God is not made by me, for I can neither add to nor subtract from it. No more can he add to or take from any other idea, even of his own making.S.The not distinguishing 'twixt Will and ideas is a grand mistake with Hobbs. He takes those things for nothing which are not ideas179.M.Say you, At this rate all's nothing but idea—mere phantasm. I answer, Everything as real as ever. I hope to call a thing idea makes it not the less real. Truly I should perhaps have stuck to the word thing, and not mentioned[pg 051]the word idea, were it not for a reason, and I think a good one too, which I shall give in the Second Book180.
M.There is a philosopher151who says we can get an idea of substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea. Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him, is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in his and the Schoolmen's sense of that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance.E.N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract general idea.Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of magnitudes and distances.I.'Tis evident ytwnthe solitary man should be taught to speak, the words would give him no other new ideas (save only the sounds, and complex ideas which, tho' unknown before, may be signified by language) beside wthe had before. If he had not, could not have, an abstract idea before, he cannot have it after he is taught to speak.Mo.“Homo est homo,”&c. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus, &c. Now, if these identical propositions are sought after in the mind, they will not be found. There are no identical mental propositions. 'Tis all about sounds and terms.Mo.Hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas, and proving by intermediate ideas, comes to nothing152.Mo.We may have certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. without other ideas than the words, and their standing for one idea, i.e. their being to be used indifferently.Mo.It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas, but only about words. 'Tis improper to say, I am certain I see, I feel, &c. There are no mental propositions[pg 044]form'd answering to these words, & in simple perception 'tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and consequently no certainty153.Mo.The reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs is, that they are perfectly arbitrary & in our power—made at pleasure.Mo.The obscure ambiguous termrelation, which is said to be the largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us.Mo.Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that does not depend on some false principle; or at best on some principle of nature, which is yeeffect of God's will, and we know not how soon it may be changed.I.Qu. What becomes of theæternæ veritates? Ans. They vanish154.I.But, say you, I find it difficult to look beneath the words and uncover my ideas. Say I, Use will make it easy. In the sequel of my Book the cause of this difficulty shall be more clearly made out.I.To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it.E.“Cogito ergo sum.”Tautology. No mental proposition answering thereto.N. Mo.Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of ideas—as to identity and diversity, and real existence, vanisheth; of relation, becometh merely nominal; of co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this latter our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this only real knowledge seemeth to be found155.P.We must wththe mob place certainty in the senses156.'Tis a man's duty, 'tis the fruit of friendship, to speak well of his friend. Wonder not therefore that I do wtI do.I.A man of slow parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. Even my shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me in this matter—'twill make me bring the object nearer to my thoughts. A purblind person, &c. Introd.[pg 045]S.Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk ofjudicium intellectuspreceding the volition: I thinkjudiciumincludes volition. I can by no means distinguish these—judicium,intellectus,indifferentia, uneasiness to many things accompanying or preceding every volition, as e.g. the motion of my hand.S.Qu. Wtmean you by my perceptions, my volitions? Both all the perceptions I perceive or conceive157, &c. are mine; all the volitions I am conscious to are mine.S.Homo est agens liberum. What mean they byhomoandagensin this place?E.Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity & Existence? I believe not. Yet if they are suggested by all the ways of sensation, 'tis strange they should want them158.I.It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the more time and pains men have consum'd in the study of philosophy, by so much the more they look upon themselves to be ignorant & weak creatures. They discover flaws and imperfections in their faculties wchother men never spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of admitting many inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for true. There is nothing they touch with their hand, or behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides much larger and more numerous than wtis perceived, & at length turn scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this proceeds from, &c. Exord. Introd.159I.These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common single information of sense. They grasp at knowledge by sheafs & bundles. ('Tis well if, catching at too much at once, they hold nothing but emptiness & air.) They in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas.It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects see more m.v.'s at once, i.e. that their visual systems are the largest.Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary that, instead of being (wnduly us'd or in their own nature) prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge,[pg 046]or an hindrance to knowledge, without them there could in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration.Mem. To be eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and recalling men to Common Sense160.S.We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but as so many selves. We suppose ourselves affected wthsuch & such thoughts & such and such sensations161.S.Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty which chiefly serves to discriminate us from brutes? I question whether a brute does or can imagine a blue horse or chimera.Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion. Useful to enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions.Mo.Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics.S.Perception is passive, but this not distinct from idea. Therefore there can be no idea of volition.Algebraic species or letters are denominations of denominations. Therefore Arithmetic to be treated of before Algebra.2 crowns are called ten shillings. Hence may appear the value of numbers.Complex ideas are the creatures of the mind. Hence may appear the nature of numbers. This to be deeply discuss'd.I am better informed & shall know more by telling me there are 10,000 men, than by shewing me them all drawn up. I shall better be able to judge of the bargain you'd have me make wnyou tell me how much (i.e. the name of ye) money lies on the table, than by offering and shewing it without naming. I regard not the idea, the looks, but the names. Hence may appear the nature of numbers.Children are unacquainted with numbers till they have made some progress in language. This could not be if they were ideas suggested by all the senses.[pg 047]Numbers are nothing but names—never words.Mem. Imaginary roots—to unravel that mystery.Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers.In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number. They only seek a denomination. This is all can be of use to them.Take away the signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and pray wtremains?These are sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless but for practice in societies of men. No speculative knowledge, no comparing of ideas in them162.Qu. whether Geometry may not properly be reckon'd amongst the mixt mathematics—Arithmetic & Algebra being the only abstracted pure, i.e. entirely nominal—Geometry being an application of these to points163?Mo.Locke of Trifling Propositions. [b. 4. c. 8] Mem. Well to observe & con over that chapter.E.Existence, Extension, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas. They are words, unknown and useless to the vulgar.Mo.Sensual pleasure is thesummum bonum. This the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the Gospels, may clearly be demonstrated.Mo.Sensual pleasure, quâ pleasure, is good & desirable by a wise man164. But if it be contemptible, 'tis not quâ pleasure but quâ pain, or cause of pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure.I.WnI consider, the more objects we see at once the more distant they are, and that eye which beholds a great many things can see none of them near.I.ByideaI mean any sensible or imaginable thing165.M. S.To be sure or certain of wtwe do not actually perceive166(I say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether[pg 048]passive; there must be a disposition to act; there must be assent, wchis active. Nay, what do I talk; there must be actual volition.What do we demonstrate in Geometry but that lines are equal or unequal? i.e. may not be called by the same name167.I. M.I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen,“Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.”168I wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas.S. G.“Nihil dat quod non habet,”or, the effect is contained in the cause, is an axiom I do not understand or believe to be true.E.Whoever shall cast his eyes on the writings of old or new philosophers, and see the noise is made about formal and objective Being, Will, &c.G.Absurd to argue the existence of God from his idea. We have no idea of God. 'Tis impossible169.M. E.Cause of much errour & confusion that men knew not what was meant by Reality170.I.Des Cartes, in Med. 2, says the notion of this particular wax is less clear than that of wax in general; and in the same Med., a little before, he forbears to consider bodies in general, because (says he) these general conceptions are usually confused.M. S.Des Cartes, in Med. 3, calls himself a thinking substance, and a stone an extended substance; and adds that they both agree in this, that they are substances. And in the next paragraph he calls extension a mode of substance.S.'Tis commonly said by the philosophers, that if the soul of man were self-existent it would have given itself all possible perfection. This I do not understand.[pg 049]Mo.Mem. To excite men to the pleasures of the eye & the ear, which surfeit not, nor bring those evils after them, as others.S.We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only between their effects. 'Tis one Will, one Act—distinguished by the effects. This Will, this Act, is the Spirit, i.e. operative principle, soul, &c. No mention of fears and jealousies, nothing like a party.M.Locke in his 4thBook171, and Des Cartes in Med. 6, use the same argument for the existence of objects, viz. that sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our will.S.While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly willing; my acquiescing in the present state is willing.E.The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different from imagination or perception172. Volition or Will, Wchis not imaginable, regard must not be had to its existence(?) ... First Book.Mo.There are four sorts of propositions:—“Gold is a metal;”“Gold is yellow;”“Gold is fixt;”“Gold is not a stone”—of which the first, second, and third are only nominal, and have no mental propositions answering them.M.Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute what Des Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med., viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsely than truely—that sense of pain tells me not my foot is bruised or broken, but I, having frequently observed these two ideas, viz. of that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together, do erroneously take them to be inseparable by a necessity of Nature—as if Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free will of God173.M. S.Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject of several acts. Ans. to 2dobjection of Hobbs.S.Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying thought is to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer. Object.S.Hobbs in his Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of[pg 050]the scholastiques—“the will wills,”&c. So does Locke. I am of another mind174.S.Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner.E. S.Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs's doctrine, &c.M. P. E.Malbranch in his illustration175differs widely from me. He doubts of the existence of bodies. I doubt not in the least of this.P.I differ from Cartesians in that I make extension, colour, &c. to exist really in bodies independent of our mind176. All yecarefully and lucidly to be set forth.M. P.Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to say the things—the effects themselves—do really exist, even wnnot actually perceived; but still with relation to perception177.The great use of the Indian figures above the Roman shews arithmetic to be about signs, not ideas—or at least not ideas different from the characters themselves178.M. N.Reasoning there may be about things or ideas, or about actions; but demonstration can be only verbal. I question, no matter &c.G.Quoth Des Cartes, The idea of God is not made by me, for I can neither add to nor subtract from it. No more can he add to or take from any other idea, even of his own making.S.The not distinguishing 'twixt Will and ideas is a grand mistake with Hobbs. He takes those things for nothing which are not ideas179.M.Say you, At this rate all's nothing but idea—mere phantasm. I answer, Everything as real as ever. I hope to call a thing idea makes it not the less real. Truly I should perhaps have stuck to the word thing, and not mentioned[pg 051]the word idea, were it not for a reason, and I think a good one too, which I shall give in the Second Book180.
M.There is a philosopher151who says we can get an idea of substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea. Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him, is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in his and the Schoolmen's sense of that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance.E.N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract general idea.Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of magnitudes and distances.I.'Tis evident ytwnthe solitary man should be taught to speak, the words would give him no other new ideas (save only the sounds, and complex ideas which, tho' unknown before, may be signified by language) beside wthe had before. If he had not, could not have, an abstract idea before, he cannot have it after he is taught to speak.Mo.“Homo est homo,”&c. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus, &c. Now, if these identical propositions are sought after in the mind, they will not be found. There are no identical mental propositions. 'Tis all about sounds and terms.Mo.Hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas, and proving by intermediate ideas, comes to nothing152.Mo.We may have certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. without other ideas than the words, and their standing for one idea, i.e. their being to be used indifferently.Mo.It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas, but only about words. 'Tis improper to say, I am certain I see, I feel, &c. There are no mental propositions[pg 044]form'd answering to these words, & in simple perception 'tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and consequently no certainty153.Mo.The reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs is, that they are perfectly arbitrary & in our power—made at pleasure.Mo.The obscure ambiguous termrelation, which is said to be the largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us.Mo.Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that does not depend on some false principle; or at best on some principle of nature, which is yeeffect of God's will, and we know not how soon it may be changed.I.Qu. What becomes of theæternæ veritates? Ans. They vanish154.I.But, say you, I find it difficult to look beneath the words and uncover my ideas. Say I, Use will make it easy. In the sequel of my Book the cause of this difficulty shall be more clearly made out.I.To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it.E.“Cogito ergo sum.”Tautology. No mental proposition answering thereto.N. Mo.Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of ideas—as to identity and diversity, and real existence, vanisheth; of relation, becometh merely nominal; of co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this latter our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this only real knowledge seemeth to be found155.P.We must wththe mob place certainty in the senses156.'Tis a man's duty, 'tis the fruit of friendship, to speak well of his friend. Wonder not therefore that I do wtI do.I.A man of slow parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. Even my shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me in this matter—'twill make me bring the object nearer to my thoughts. A purblind person, &c. Introd.[pg 045]S.Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk ofjudicium intellectuspreceding the volition: I thinkjudiciumincludes volition. I can by no means distinguish these—judicium,intellectus,indifferentia, uneasiness to many things accompanying or preceding every volition, as e.g. the motion of my hand.S.Qu. Wtmean you by my perceptions, my volitions? Both all the perceptions I perceive or conceive157, &c. are mine; all the volitions I am conscious to are mine.S.Homo est agens liberum. What mean they byhomoandagensin this place?E.Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity & Existence? I believe not. Yet if they are suggested by all the ways of sensation, 'tis strange they should want them158.I.It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the more time and pains men have consum'd in the study of philosophy, by so much the more they look upon themselves to be ignorant & weak creatures. They discover flaws and imperfections in their faculties wchother men never spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of admitting many inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for true. There is nothing they touch with their hand, or behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides much larger and more numerous than wtis perceived, & at length turn scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this proceeds from, &c. Exord. Introd.159I.These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common single information of sense. They grasp at knowledge by sheafs & bundles. ('Tis well if, catching at too much at once, they hold nothing but emptiness & air.) They in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas.It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects see more m.v.'s at once, i.e. that their visual systems are the largest.Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary that, instead of being (wnduly us'd or in their own nature) prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge,[pg 046]or an hindrance to knowledge, without them there could in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration.Mem. To be eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and recalling men to Common Sense160.S.We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but as so many selves. We suppose ourselves affected wthsuch & such thoughts & such and such sensations161.S.Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty which chiefly serves to discriminate us from brutes? I question whether a brute does or can imagine a blue horse or chimera.Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion. Useful to enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions.Mo.Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics.S.Perception is passive, but this not distinct from idea. Therefore there can be no idea of volition.Algebraic species or letters are denominations of denominations. Therefore Arithmetic to be treated of before Algebra.2 crowns are called ten shillings. Hence may appear the value of numbers.Complex ideas are the creatures of the mind. Hence may appear the nature of numbers. This to be deeply discuss'd.I am better informed & shall know more by telling me there are 10,000 men, than by shewing me them all drawn up. I shall better be able to judge of the bargain you'd have me make wnyou tell me how much (i.e. the name of ye) money lies on the table, than by offering and shewing it without naming. I regard not the idea, the looks, but the names. Hence may appear the nature of numbers.Children are unacquainted with numbers till they have made some progress in language. This could not be if they were ideas suggested by all the senses.[pg 047]Numbers are nothing but names—never words.Mem. Imaginary roots—to unravel that mystery.Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers.In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number. They only seek a denomination. This is all can be of use to them.Take away the signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and pray wtremains?These are sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless but for practice in societies of men. No speculative knowledge, no comparing of ideas in them162.Qu. whether Geometry may not properly be reckon'd amongst the mixt mathematics—Arithmetic & Algebra being the only abstracted pure, i.e. entirely nominal—Geometry being an application of these to points163?Mo.Locke of Trifling Propositions. [b. 4. c. 8] Mem. Well to observe & con over that chapter.E.Existence, Extension, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas. They are words, unknown and useless to the vulgar.Mo.Sensual pleasure is thesummum bonum. This the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the Gospels, may clearly be demonstrated.Mo.Sensual pleasure, quâ pleasure, is good & desirable by a wise man164. But if it be contemptible, 'tis not quâ pleasure but quâ pain, or cause of pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure.I.WnI consider, the more objects we see at once the more distant they are, and that eye which beholds a great many things can see none of them near.I.ByideaI mean any sensible or imaginable thing165.M. S.To be sure or certain of wtwe do not actually perceive166(I say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether[pg 048]passive; there must be a disposition to act; there must be assent, wchis active. Nay, what do I talk; there must be actual volition.What do we demonstrate in Geometry but that lines are equal or unequal? i.e. may not be called by the same name167.I. M.I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen,“Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.”168I wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas.S. G.“Nihil dat quod non habet,”or, the effect is contained in the cause, is an axiom I do not understand or believe to be true.E.Whoever shall cast his eyes on the writings of old or new philosophers, and see the noise is made about formal and objective Being, Will, &c.G.Absurd to argue the existence of God from his idea. We have no idea of God. 'Tis impossible169.M. E.Cause of much errour & confusion that men knew not what was meant by Reality170.I.Des Cartes, in Med. 2, says the notion of this particular wax is less clear than that of wax in general; and in the same Med., a little before, he forbears to consider bodies in general, because (says he) these general conceptions are usually confused.M. S.Des Cartes, in Med. 3, calls himself a thinking substance, and a stone an extended substance; and adds that they both agree in this, that they are substances. And in the next paragraph he calls extension a mode of substance.S.'Tis commonly said by the philosophers, that if the soul of man were self-existent it would have given itself all possible perfection. This I do not understand.[pg 049]Mo.Mem. To excite men to the pleasures of the eye & the ear, which surfeit not, nor bring those evils after them, as others.S.We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only between their effects. 'Tis one Will, one Act—distinguished by the effects. This Will, this Act, is the Spirit, i.e. operative principle, soul, &c. No mention of fears and jealousies, nothing like a party.M.Locke in his 4thBook171, and Des Cartes in Med. 6, use the same argument for the existence of objects, viz. that sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our will.S.While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly willing; my acquiescing in the present state is willing.E.The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different from imagination or perception172. Volition or Will, Wchis not imaginable, regard must not be had to its existence(?) ... First Book.Mo.There are four sorts of propositions:—“Gold is a metal;”“Gold is yellow;”“Gold is fixt;”“Gold is not a stone”—of which the first, second, and third are only nominal, and have no mental propositions answering them.M.Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute what Des Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med., viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsely than truely—that sense of pain tells me not my foot is bruised or broken, but I, having frequently observed these two ideas, viz. of that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together, do erroneously take them to be inseparable by a necessity of Nature—as if Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free will of God173.M. S.Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject of several acts. Ans. to 2dobjection of Hobbs.S.Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying thought is to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer. Object.S.Hobbs in his Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of[pg 050]the scholastiques—“the will wills,”&c. So does Locke. I am of another mind174.S.Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner.E. S.Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs's doctrine, &c.M. P. E.Malbranch in his illustration175differs widely from me. He doubts of the existence of bodies. I doubt not in the least of this.P.I differ from Cartesians in that I make extension, colour, &c. to exist really in bodies independent of our mind176. All yecarefully and lucidly to be set forth.M. P.Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to say the things—the effects themselves—do really exist, even wnnot actually perceived; but still with relation to perception177.The great use of the Indian figures above the Roman shews arithmetic to be about signs, not ideas—or at least not ideas different from the characters themselves178.M. N.Reasoning there may be about things or ideas, or about actions; but demonstration can be only verbal. I question, no matter &c.G.Quoth Des Cartes, The idea of God is not made by me, for I can neither add to nor subtract from it. No more can he add to or take from any other idea, even of his own making.S.The not distinguishing 'twixt Will and ideas is a grand mistake with Hobbs. He takes those things for nothing which are not ideas179.M.Say you, At this rate all's nothing but idea—mere phantasm. I answer, Everything as real as ever. I hope to call a thing idea makes it not the less real. Truly I should perhaps have stuck to the word thing, and not mentioned[pg 051]the word idea, were it not for a reason, and I think a good one too, which I shall give in the Second Book180.
M.
M.
There is a philosopher151who says we can get an idea of substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea. Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him, is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in his and the Schoolmen's sense of that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance.
E.
E.
N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract general idea.
Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of magnitudes and distances.
I.
I.
'Tis evident ytwnthe solitary man should be taught to speak, the words would give him no other new ideas (save only the sounds, and complex ideas which, tho' unknown before, may be signified by language) beside wthe had before. If he had not, could not have, an abstract idea before, he cannot have it after he is taught to speak.
Mo.
Mo.
“Homo est homo,”&c. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus, &c. Now, if these identical propositions are sought after in the mind, they will not be found. There are no identical mental propositions. 'Tis all about sounds and terms.
Mo.
Mo.
Hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas, and proving by intermediate ideas, comes to nothing152.
Mo.
Mo.
We may have certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. without other ideas than the words, and their standing for one idea, i.e. their being to be used indifferently.
Mo.
Mo.
It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas, but only about words. 'Tis improper to say, I am certain I see, I feel, &c. There are no mental propositions[pg 044]form'd answering to these words, & in simple perception 'tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and consequently no certainty153.
Mo.
Mo.
The reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs is, that they are perfectly arbitrary & in our power—made at pleasure.
Mo.
Mo.
The obscure ambiguous termrelation, which is said to be the largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us.
Mo.
Mo.
Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that does not depend on some false principle; or at best on some principle of nature, which is yeeffect of God's will, and we know not how soon it may be changed.
I.
I.
Qu. What becomes of theæternæ veritates? Ans. They vanish154.
I.
I.
But, say you, I find it difficult to look beneath the words and uncover my ideas. Say I, Use will make it easy. In the sequel of my Book the cause of this difficulty shall be more clearly made out.
I.
I.
To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it.
E.
E.
“Cogito ergo sum.”Tautology. No mental proposition answering thereto.
N. Mo.
N. Mo.
Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of ideas—as to identity and diversity, and real existence, vanisheth; of relation, becometh merely nominal; of co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this latter our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this only real knowledge seemeth to be found155.
P.
P.
We must wththe mob place certainty in the senses156.
'Tis a man's duty, 'tis the fruit of friendship, to speak well of his friend. Wonder not therefore that I do wtI do.
I.
I.
A man of slow parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. Even my shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me in this matter—'twill make me bring the object nearer to my thoughts. A purblind person, &c. Introd.
S.
S.
Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk ofjudicium intellectuspreceding the volition: I thinkjudiciumincludes volition. I can by no means distinguish these—judicium,intellectus,indifferentia, uneasiness to many things accompanying or preceding every volition, as e.g. the motion of my hand.
S.
S.
Qu. Wtmean you by my perceptions, my volitions? Both all the perceptions I perceive or conceive157, &c. are mine; all the volitions I am conscious to are mine.
S.
S.
Homo est agens liberum. What mean they byhomoandagensin this place?
E.
E.
Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity & Existence? I believe not. Yet if they are suggested by all the ways of sensation, 'tis strange they should want them158.
I.
I.
It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the more time and pains men have consum'd in the study of philosophy, by so much the more they look upon themselves to be ignorant & weak creatures. They discover flaws and imperfections in their faculties wchother men never spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of admitting many inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for true. There is nothing they touch with their hand, or behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides much larger and more numerous than wtis perceived, & at length turn scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this proceeds from, &c. Exord. Introd.159
I.
I.
These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common single information of sense. They grasp at knowledge by sheafs & bundles. ('Tis well if, catching at too much at once, they hold nothing but emptiness & air.) They in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas.
It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects see more m.v.'s at once, i.e. that their visual systems are the largest.
Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary that, instead of being (wnduly us'd or in their own nature) prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge,[pg 046]or an hindrance to knowledge, without them there could in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration.
Mem. To be eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and recalling men to Common Sense160.
S.
S.
We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but as so many selves. We suppose ourselves affected wthsuch & such thoughts & such and such sensations161.
S.
S.
Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty which chiefly serves to discriminate us from brutes? I question whether a brute does or can imagine a blue horse or chimera.
Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion. Useful to enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions.
Mo.
Mo.
Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics.
S.
S.
Perception is passive, but this not distinct from idea. Therefore there can be no idea of volition.
Algebraic species or letters are denominations of denominations. Therefore Arithmetic to be treated of before Algebra.
2 crowns are called ten shillings. Hence may appear the value of numbers.
Complex ideas are the creatures of the mind. Hence may appear the nature of numbers. This to be deeply discuss'd.
I am better informed & shall know more by telling me there are 10,000 men, than by shewing me them all drawn up. I shall better be able to judge of the bargain you'd have me make wnyou tell me how much (i.e. the name of ye) money lies on the table, than by offering and shewing it without naming. I regard not the idea, the looks, but the names. Hence may appear the nature of numbers.
Children are unacquainted with numbers till they have made some progress in language. This could not be if they were ideas suggested by all the senses.
Numbers are nothing but names—never words.
Mem. Imaginary roots—to unravel that mystery.
Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers.
In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number. They only seek a denomination. This is all can be of use to them.
Take away the signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and pray wtremains?
These are sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless but for practice in societies of men. No speculative knowledge, no comparing of ideas in them162.
Qu. whether Geometry may not properly be reckon'd amongst the mixt mathematics—Arithmetic & Algebra being the only abstracted pure, i.e. entirely nominal—Geometry being an application of these to points163?
Mo.
Mo.
Locke of Trifling Propositions. [b. 4. c. 8] Mem. Well to observe & con over that chapter.
E.
E.
Existence, Extension, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas. They are words, unknown and useless to the vulgar.
Mo.
Mo.
Sensual pleasure is thesummum bonum. This the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the Gospels, may clearly be demonstrated.
Mo.
Mo.
Sensual pleasure, quâ pleasure, is good & desirable by a wise man164. But if it be contemptible, 'tis not quâ pleasure but quâ pain, or cause of pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure.
I.
I.
WnI consider, the more objects we see at once the more distant they are, and that eye which beholds a great many things can see none of them near.
I.
I.
ByideaI mean any sensible or imaginable thing165.
M. S.
M. S.
To be sure or certain of wtwe do not actually perceive166(I say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether[pg 048]passive; there must be a disposition to act; there must be assent, wchis active. Nay, what do I talk; there must be actual volition.
What do we demonstrate in Geometry but that lines are equal or unequal? i.e. may not be called by the same name167.
I. M.
I. M.
I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen,“Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.”168I wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas.
S. G.
S. G.
“Nihil dat quod non habet,”or, the effect is contained in the cause, is an axiom I do not understand or believe to be true.
E.
E.
Whoever shall cast his eyes on the writings of old or new philosophers, and see the noise is made about formal and objective Being, Will, &c.
G.
G.
Absurd to argue the existence of God from his idea. We have no idea of God. 'Tis impossible169.
M. E.
M. E.
Cause of much errour & confusion that men knew not what was meant by Reality170.
I.
I.
Des Cartes, in Med. 2, says the notion of this particular wax is less clear than that of wax in general; and in the same Med., a little before, he forbears to consider bodies in general, because (says he) these general conceptions are usually confused.
M. S.
M. S.
Des Cartes, in Med. 3, calls himself a thinking substance, and a stone an extended substance; and adds that they both agree in this, that they are substances. And in the next paragraph he calls extension a mode of substance.
S.
S.
'Tis commonly said by the philosophers, that if the soul of man were self-existent it would have given itself all possible perfection. This I do not understand.
Mo.
Mo.
Mem. To excite men to the pleasures of the eye & the ear, which surfeit not, nor bring those evils after them, as others.
S.
S.
We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only between their effects. 'Tis one Will, one Act—distinguished by the effects. This Will, this Act, is the Spirit, i.e. operative principle, soul, &c. No mention of fears and jealousies, nothing like a party.
M.
M.
Locke in his 4thBook171, and Des Cartes in Med. 6, use the same argument for the existence of objects, viz. that sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our will.
S.
S.
While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly willing; my acquiescing in the present state is willing.
E.
E.
The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different from imagination or perception172. Volition or Will, Wchis not imaginable, regard must not be had to its existence(?) ... First Book.
Mo.
Mo.
There are four sorts of propositions:—“Gold is a metal;”“Gold is yellow;”“Gold is fixt;”“Gold is not a stone”—of which the first, second, and third are only nominal, and have no mental propositions answering them.
M.
M.
Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute what Des Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med., viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsely than truely—that sense of pain tells me not my foot is bruised or broken, but I, having frequently observed these two ideas, viz. of that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together, do erroneously take them to be inseparable by a necessity of Nature—as if Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free will of God173.
M. S.
M. S.
Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject of several acts. Ans. to 2dobjection of Hobbs.
S.
S.
Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying thought is to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer. Object.
S.
S.
Hobbs in his Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of[pg 050]the scholastiques—“the will wills,”&c. So does Locke. I am of another mind174.
S.
S.
Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner.
E. S.
E. S.
Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs's doctrine, &c.
M. P. E.
M. P. E.
Malbranch in his illustration175differs widely from me. He doubts of the existence of bodies. I doubt not in the least of this.
P.
P.
I differ from Cartesians in that I make extension, colour, &c. to exist really in bodies independent of our mind176. All yecarefully and lucidly to be set forth.
M. P.
M. P.
Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to say the things—the effects themselves—do really exist, even wnnot actually perceived; but still with relation to perception177.
The great use of the Indian figures above the Roman shews arithmetic to be about signs, not ideas—or at least not ideas different from the characters themselves178.
M. N.
M. N.
Reasoning there may be about things or ideas, or about actions; but demonstration can be only verbal. I question, no matter &c.
G.
G.
Quoth Des Cartes, The idea of God is not made by me, for I can neither add to nor subtract from it. No more can he add to or take from any other idea, even of his own making.
S.
S.
The not distinguishing 'twixt Will and ideas is a grand mistake with Hobbs. He takes those things for nothing which are not ideas179.
M.
M.
Say you, At this rate all's nothing but idea—mere phantasm. I answer, Everything as real as ever. I hope to call a thing idea makes it not the less real. Truly I should perhaps have stuck to the word thing, and not mentioned[pg 051]the word idea, were it not for a reason, and I think a good one too, which I shall give in the Second Book180.