I. S.Idea is the object of thought. YtI think on, whatever it be, I call idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. 'Tis an act—i.e. volition, i.e. as contradistinguished to effects—the Will.I. Mo.Locke, in B. 4. c. 5, assigns not the right cause why mental propositions are so difficult. It is not because of complex but because of abstract ideas. Yeidea of a horse is as complex as that of fortitude. Yet in saying the“horse is white”I form a mental proposition with ease. But when I say“fortitude is a virtue”I shall find a mental proposition hard, or not at all to be come at.S.Pure intellect I understand not181.Locke is in yeright in those things wherein he differs from yeCartesians, and they cannot but allow of his opinions, if they stick to their own principles or causes of Existence & other abstract ideas.G. S.The properties of all things are in God, i.e. there is in the Deity Understanding as well as Will. He is no blind agent, and in truth a blind agent is a contradiction182.G.I am certain there is a God, tho' I do not perceive Him—have no intuition of Him. This not difficult if we rightly understand wtis meant by certainty.S.It seems that the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal, incorruptible.S.Qu. whether perception must of necessity precede volition?S. Mo.Error is not in the Understanding, but in the Will. What I understand or perceive, that I understand. There can be no errour in this.Mo. N.Mem. To take notice of Locke's woman afraid of a wetting, in the Introd., to shew there may be reasoning about ideas or things.M.Say Des Cartes & Malbranch, God hath given us strong inclinations to think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that[pg 052]bodies do exist. Pray wtmean they by this? Would they have it that the ideas of imagination are images of, and proceed from, the ideas of sense? This is true, but cannot be their meaning; for they speak of ideas of sense as themselves proceeding from, being like unto—I know not wt183.M. S.Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum in intellectu. V. Tract. de Methodo.S.Qu. May there not be an Understanding without a Will?S.Understanding is in some sort an action.S.Silly of Hobbs, &c. to speak of the Will as if it were motion, with which it has no likeness.M.Ideas of Sense are the real things or archetypes. Ideas of imagination, dreams, &c. are copies, images, of these.M.My doctrines rightly understood, all that philosophy of Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared enemy of religion, comes to the ground.G.Hobbs & Spinosa make God extended. Locke also seems to do the same184.I. E.Ens, res, aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales. Spinosa, p. 76, prop. 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account of their original. Also of the original of all universals—Homo, Canis, &c.G.Spinosa (vid. Præf. Opera Posthum.) will have God to be“omnium rerum causa immanens,”and to countenance this produces that of St. Paul,“in Him we live,”&c. Now this of St. Paul may be explained by my doctrine as well as Spinosa's, or Locke's, or Hobbs's, or Raphson's185, &c.S.The Will ispurus actus, or rather pure spirit not imaginable,[pg 053]not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object of the understanding, no wise perceivable.S.Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble ytmay be made of the word“it”) to act, cause, will, operate. Its substance is not knowable, not being an idea.G.Why may we not conceive it possible for God to create things out of nothing? Certainly we ourselves create in some wise whenever we imagine.E. N.“Ex nihilo nihil fit.”This (saith Spinoza, Opera Posth. p. 464) and the like are calledveritates æternæ, because“nullam fidem habent extra mentem.”To make this axiom have a positive signification, one should express it thus: Every idea has a cause, i.e. is produced by a Will186.P.The philosophers talk much of a distinction 'twixt absolute & relative things, or 'twixt things considered in their own nature & the same things considered with respect to us. I know not wtthey mean by“things considered in themselves.”This is nonsense, jargon.S.It seems there can be no perception—no idea—without Will, seeing there are no ideas so indifferent but one had rather have them than annihilation, or annihilation than them. Or if there be such an equal balance, there must be an equal mixture of pleasure and pain to cause it; there being no ideas perfectly void of all pain & uneasiness, but wtare preferable to annihilation.Recipe in animum tuum, per cogitationem vehementem, rerum ipsarum, non literarum aut sonorum imagines. Hobbs against Wallis.'Tis a perfection we may imagine in superior spirits, that they can see a great deal at once with the utmost clearness and distinction; whereas we can only see a point187.Mem. WnI treat of mathematiques to enquire into the controversy 'twixt Hobbes and Wallis.[pg 054]G.Every sensation of mine, which happens in consequence of the general known laws of nature, & is from without, i.e. independent of my will, demonstrates the being of a God, i.e. of an unextended, incorporeal spirit, which is omnipresent, omnipotent, &c.M.I say not with J.S. [John Sergeant] that weseesolids. I reject his“solid philosophy”—solidity being only perceived by touch188.S.It seems to me that will and understanding—volitions and ideas—cannot be separated, that either cannot be possibly without the other.E. S.Some ideas or other I must have, so long as I exist or will. But no one idea or sort of ideas being essential189.M.The distinction between idea and ideatum I cannot otherwise conceive than by making one the effect or consequence of dream, reverie, imagination—the other of sense and the constant laws of nature.P.Dico quod extensio non concipitur in se et per se, contra quam dicit Spinoza in Epist. 2aad Oldenburgium.G.My definition of the word God I think much clearer than those of Des Cartes & Spinoza, viz.“Ens summe perfectum & absolute infinitum,”or“Ens constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque est infinitum190.”'Tis chiefly the connexion betwixt tangible and visible ideas that deceives, and not the visible ideas themselves.S.But the grand mistake is that we know not what we mean by“we,”or“selves,”or“mind,”&c. 'Tis most sure & certain that our ideas are distinct from the mind, i.e. the Will, the Spirit191.S.I must not mention the understanding as a faculty or[pg 055]part of the mind. I must include understanding & will in the word Spirit—by which I mean all that is active. I must not say that the understanding diners not from the particular ideas, or the will from particular volitions.S.The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea.N. S.I say there are no causes (properly speaking) but spiritual, nothing active but Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal; 'tis only annexing a new sort of signification to the word cause, & why may not others as well retain the old one, and call one idea the cause of another which always follows it? I answer, If you do so I shall drive you into many absurditys: you cannot avoid running into opinions you'll be glad to disown, if you stick firmly to that signification of the word Cause.Mo.In valuing good we reckon too much on the present & our own.Mo.There be two sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as a spur or incitement to somewhat else, & has a visible relation and subordination thereto; the other is not. Thus the pleasure of eating is of the former sort, of musick of the later sort. These may be used for recreation, those not but in order to their end.Mo. N.Three sorts of useful knowledge—that of Coexistence, to be treated of in our Principles of Natural Philosophy; that of Relation, in Mathematiques; that of Definition, or inclusion, or words (which perhaps differs not from that of relation), in Morality192.S.Will, understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as they are acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists in their objects, circumstances, &c.N.We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes—physical & spiritual.N.The physical may more properly be called occasions. Yet (to comply) we may call them causes—but then we must mean causes ytdo nothing.S.According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness[pg 056]so long as we live, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c.; for he will have even the continuance of an action to be in his sense an action, & so requires a volition, & this an uneasiness.I.I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration. I must cancell all passages that look like that sort of pride, that raising of expectation in my friend.I.If this be the case, surely a man had better not philosophize at all: no more than a deformed person ought to cavil to behold himself by the reflex light of a mirrour.I.Or thus, like deformed persons who, having beheld themselves by the reflex light of a mirrour, are displeased with their diseases.M.What can an idea be like but another idea? We can compare it with nothing else—a sound like a sound, a colour like a colour.M.Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot be smelt, a colour is like a thing whcannot be seen?M. S.Bodies exist without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but distinct from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether different therefrom193.P.Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity of colours.P.Motion is an abstract idea, i.e. there is no such idea that can be conceived by itself.I.Contradictions cannot be both true. Men are obliged to answer objections drawn from consequences. Introd.S.The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar. The learned are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas.Speculative Math, as if a man was all day making hard knots on purpose to unty them again.Tho' it might have been otherwise, yet it is convenient the same thing wchis M.V. should be also M.T., or very near it.S.I must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name“pure act,”but rather pure spirit, or active being.[pg 057]S.I must not say the Will or Understanding are all one, but that they are both abstract ideas, i.e. none at all—they not being evenrationedifferent from the Spirit,quâfaculties, or active.S.Dangerous to make idea & thing terms convertible194. That were the way to prove spirits are nothing.Mo.Qu. whetherveritasstands not for an abstract idea?M.'Tis plain the moderns must by their own principles own there are no bodies, i.e. no sort of bodies without the mind, i.e. unperceived.S. G.Qu. whether the Will can be the object of prescience or any knowledge?P.If there were only one ball in the world, it could not be moved. There could be no variety of appearance.According to the doctrine of infinite divisibility, there must be some smell of a rose, v. g. at an infinite distance from it.M.Extension, tho' it exist only in the mind, yet is no property of the mind. The mind can exist without it, tho' it cannot without the mind. But in Book II. I shall at large shew the difference there is betwixt the Soul and Body or extended being.S.'Tis an absurd question wchLocke puts, whether man be free to will?Mem. To enquire into the reason of the rule for determining questions in Algebra.It has already been observed by others that names are nowhere of more necessary use than in numbering.M. P.I will grant you that extension, colour, &c. may be said to be without the mind in a double respect, i.e. as independent of our will, and as distinct from the mind.Mo. N.Certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs, had he a memory and imagination most strong and capacious. Therefore reasoning & science doth not altogether depend upon words or names195.[pg 058]N.I think not that things fall out of necessity. The connexion of no two ideas is necessary; 'tis all the result of freedom, i.e. 'tis all voluntary196.M. S.If a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun & firmament, you will not sayheorhis mindis the sun, or is extended, tho' neither sun or firmament be without mind.S.'Tis strange to find philosophers doubting & disputing whether they have ideas of spiritual things or no. Surely 'tis easy to know. Vid. De Vries197,De Ideis Innatis, p. 64.S.De Vries will have it that we know the mind agrees with things not by idea but sense or conscientia. So will Malbranch. This a vain distinction.August 28th, 1708. The Adventure of the [Shirt?].It were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth, honour, & fortune, would take that care of themselves, by education, industry, literature, & a love of virtue, to surpass all other men in knowledge & all other qualifications necessary for great actions, as far as they do in quality & titles; that princes out of them might always chose men fit for all employments and high trusts. Clov. B. 7.One eternity greater than another of the same kind.In what sense eternity may be limited.G. T.Whether succession of ideas in the Divine intellect?T.Time is the train of ideas succeeding each other.Duration not distinguish'd from existence.Succession explain'd by before, between, after, & numbering.Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure?Duration infinitely divisible, time not so.[pg 059]
I. S.Idea is the object of thought. YtI think on, whatever it be, I call idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. 'Tis an act—i.e. volition, i.e. as contradistinguished to effects—the Will.I. Mo.Locke, in B. 4. c. 5, assigns not the right cause why mental propositions are so difficult. It is not because of complex but because of abstract ideas. Yeidea of a horse is as complex as that of fortitude. Yet in saying the“horse is white”I form a mental proposition with ease. But when I say“fortitude is a virtue”I shall find a mental proposition hard, or not at all to be come at.S.Pure intellect I understand not181.Locke is in yeright in those things wherein he differs from yeCartesians, and they cannot but allow of his opinions, if they stick to their own principles or causes of Existence & other abstract ideas.G. S.The properties of all things are in God, i.e. there is in the Deity Understanding as well as Will. He is no blind agent, and in truth a blind agent is a contradiction182.G.I am certain there is a God, tho' I do not perceive Him—have no intuition of Him. This not difficult if we rightly understand wtis meant by certainty.S.It seems that the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal, incorruptible.S.Qu. whether perception must of necessity precede volition?S. Mo.Error is not in the Understanding, but in the Will. What I understand or perceive, that I understand. There can be no errour in this.Mo. N.Mem. To take notice of Locke's woman afraid of a wetting, in the Introd., to shew there may be reasoning about ideas or things.M.Say Des Cartes & Malbranch, God hath given us strong inclinations to think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that[pg 052]bodies do exist. Pray wtmean they by this? Would they have it that the ideas of imagination are images of, and proceed from, the ideas of sense? This is true, but cannot be their meaning; for they speak of ideas of sense as themselves proceeding from, being like unto—I know not wt183.M. S.Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum in intellectu. V. Tract. de Methodo.S.Qu. May there not be an Understanding without a Will?S.Understanding is in some sort an action.S.Silly of Hobbs, &c. to speak of the Will as if it were motion, with which it has no likeness.M.Ideas of Sense are the real things or archetypes. Ideas of imagination, dreams, &c. are copies, images, of these.M.My doctrines rightly understood, all that philosophy of Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared enemy of religion, comes to the ground.G.Hobbs & Spinosa make God extended. Locke also seems to do the same184.I. E.Ens, res, aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales. Spinosa, p. 76, prop. 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account of their original. Also of the original of all universals—Homo, Canis, &c.G.Spinosa (vid. Præf. Opera Posthum.) will have God to be“omnium rerum causa immanens,”and to countenance this produces that of St. Paul,“in Him we live,”&c. Now this of St. Paul may be explained by my doctrine as well as Spinosa's, or Locke's, or Hobbs's, or Raphson's185, &c.S.The Will ispurus actus, or rather pure spirit not imaginable,[pg 053]not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object of the understanding, no wise perceivable.S.Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble ytmay be made of the word“it”) to act, cause, will, operate. Its substance is not knowable, not being an idea.G.Why may we not conceive it possible for God to create things out of nothing? Certainly we ourselves create in some wise whenever we imagine.E. N.“Ex nihilo nihil fit.”This (saith Spinoza, Opera Posth. p. 464) and the like are calledveritates æternæ, because“nullam fidem habent extra mentem.”To make this axiom have a positive signification, one should express it thus: Every idea has a cause, i.e. is produced by a Will186.P.The philosophers talk much of a distinction 'twixt absolute & relative things, or 'twixt things considered in their own nature & the same things considered with respect to us. I know not wtthey mean by“things considered in themselves.”This is nonsense, jargon.S.It seems there can be no perception—no idea—without Will, seeing there are no ideas so indifferent but one had rather have them than annihilation, or annihilation than them. Or if there be such an equal balance, there must be an equal mixture of pleasure and pain to cause it; there being no ideas perfectly void of all pain & uneasiness, but wtare preferable to annihilation.Recipe in animum tuum, per cogitationem vehementem, rerum ipsarum, non literarum aut sonorum imagines. Hobbs against Wallis.'Tis a perfection we may imagine in superior spirits, that they can see a great deal at once with the utmost clearness and distinction; whereas we can only see a point187.Mem. WnI treat of mathematiques to enquire into the controversy 'twixt Hobbes and Wallis.[pg 054]G.Every sensation of mine, which happens in consequence of the general known laws of nature, & is from without, i.e. independent of my will, demonstrates the being of a God, i.e. of an unextended, incorporeal spirit, which is omnipresent, omnipotent, &c.M.I say not with J.S. [John Sergeant] that weseesolids. I reject his“solid philosophy”—solidity being only perceived by touch188.S.It seems to me that will and understanding—volitions and ideas—cannot be separated, that either cannot be possibly without the other.E. S.Some ideas or other I must have, so long as I exist or will. But no one idea or sort of ideas being essential189.M.The distinction between idea and ideatum I cannot otherwise conceive than by making one the effect or consequence of dream, reverie, imagination—the other of sense and the constant laws of nature.P.Dico quod extensio non concipitur in se et per se, contra quam dicit Spinoza in Epist. 2aad Oldenburgium.G.My definition of the word God I think much clearer than those of Des Cartes & Spinoza, viz.“Ens summe perfectum & absolute infinitum,”or“Ens constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque est infinitum190.”'Tis chiefly the connexion betwixt tangible and visible ideas that deceives, and not the visible ideas themselves.S.But the grand mistake is that we know not what we mean by“we,”or“selves,”or“mind,”&c. 'Tis most sure & certain that our ideas are distinct from the mind, i.e. the Will, the Spirit191.S.I must not mention the understanding as a faculty or[pg 055]part of the mind. I must include understanding & will in the word Spirit—by which I mean all that is active. I must not say that the understanding diners not from the particular ideas, or the will from particular volitions.S.The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea.N. S.I say there are no causes (properly speaking) but spiritual, nothing active but Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal; 'tis only annexing a new sort of signification to the word cause, & why may not others as well retain the old one, and call one idea the cause of another which always follows it? I answer, If you do so I shall drive you into many absurditys: you cannot avoid running into opinions you'll be glad to disown, if you stick firmly to that signification of the word Cause.Mo.In valuing good we reckon too much on the present & our own.Mo.There be two sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as a spur or incitement to somewhat else, & has a visible relation and subordination thereto; the other is not. Thus the pleasure of eating is of the former sort, of musick of the later sort. These may be used for recreation, those not but in order to their end.Mo. N.Three sorts of useful knowledge—that of Coexistence, to be treated of in our Principles of Natural Philosophy; that of Relation, in Mathematiques; that of Definition, or inclusion, or words (which perhaps differs not from that of relation), in Morality192.S.Will, understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as they are acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists in their objects, circumstances, &c.N.We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes—physical & spiritual.N.The physical may more properly be called occasions. Yet (to comply) we may call them causes—but then we must mean causes ytdo nothing.S.According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness[pg 056]so long as we live, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c.; for he will have even the continuance of an action to be in his sense an action, & so requires a volition, & this an uneasiness.I.I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration. I must cancell all passages that look like that sort of pride, that raising of expectation in my friend.I.If this be the case, surely a man had better not philosophize at all: no more than a deformed person ought to cavil to behold himself by the reflex light of a mirrour.I.Or thus, like deformed persons who, having beheld themselves by the reflex light of a mirrour, are displeased with their diseases.M.What can an idea be like but another idea? We can compare it with nothing else—a sound like a sound, a colour like a colour.M.Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot be smelt, a colour is like a thing whcannot be seen?M. S.Bodies exist without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but distinct from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether different therefrom193.P.Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity of colours.P.Motion is an abstract idea, i.e. there is no such idea that can be conceived by itself.I.Contradictions cannot be both true. Men are obliged to answer objections drawn from consequences. Introd.S.The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar. The learned are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas.Speculative Math, as if a man was all day making hard knots on purpose to unty them again.Tho' it might have been otherwise, yet it is convenient the same thing wchis M.V. should be also M.T., or very near it.S.I must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name“pure act,”but rather pure spirit, or active being.[pg 057]S.I must not say the Will or Understanding are all one, but that they are both abstract ideas, i.e. none at all—they not being evenrationedifferent from the Spirit,quâfaculties, or active.S.Dangerous to make idea & thing terms convertible194. That were the way to prove spirits are nothing.Mo.Qu. whetherveritasstands not for an abstract idea?M.'Tis plain the moderns must by their own principles own there are no bodies, i.e. no sort of bodies without the mind, i.e. unperceived.S. G.Qu. whether the Will can be the object of prescience or any knowledge?P.If there were only one ball in the world, it could not be moved. There could be no variety of appearance.According to the doctrine of infinite divisibility, there must be some smell of a rose, v. g. at an infinite distance from it.M.Extension, tho' it exist only in the mind, yet is no property of the mind. The mind can exist without it, tho' it cannot without the mind. But in Book II. I shall at large shew the difference there is betwixt the Soul and Body or extended being.S.'Tis an absurd question wchLocke puts, whether man be free to will?Mem. To enquire into the reason of the rule for determining questions in Algebra.It has already been observed by others that names are nowhere of more necessary use than in numbering.M. P.I will grant you that extension, colour, &c. may be said to be without the mind in a double respect, i.e. as independent of our will, and as distinct from the mind.Mo. N.Certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs, had he a memory and imagination most strong and capacious. Therefore reasoning & science doth not altogether depend upon words or names195.[pg 058]N.I think not that things fall out of necessity. The connexion of no two ideas is necessary; 'tis all the result of freedom, i.e. 'tis all voluntary196.M. S.If a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun & firmament, you will not sayheorhis mindis the sun, or is extended, tho' neither sun or firmament be without mind.S.'Tis strange to find philosophers doubting & disputing whether they have ideas of spiritual things or no. Surely 'tis easy to know. Vid. De Vries197,De Ideis Innatis, p. 64.S.De Vries will have it that we know the mind agrees with things not by idea but sense or conscientia. So will Malbranch. This a vain distinction.August 28th, 1708. The Adventure of the [Shirt?].It were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth, honour, & fortune, would take that care of themselves, by education, industry, literature, & a love of virtue, to surpass all other men in knowledge & all other qualifications necessary for great actions, as far as they do in quality & titles; that princes out of them might always chose men fit for all employments and high trusts. Clov. B. 7.One eternity greater than another of the same kind.In what sense eternity may be limited.G. T.Whether succession of ideas in the Divine intellect?T.Time is the train of ideas succeeding each other.Duration not distinguish'd from existence.Succession explain'd by before, between, after, & numbering.Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure?Duration infinitely divisible, time not so.[pg 059]
I. S.Idea is the object of thought. YtI think on, whatever it be, I call idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. 'Tis an act—i.e. volition, i.e. as contradistinguished to effects—the Will.I. Mo.Locke, in B. 4. c. 5, assigns not the right cause why mental propositions are so difficult. It is not because of complex but because of abstract ideas. Yeidea of a horse is as complex as that of fortitude. Yet in saying the“horse is white”I form a mental proposition with ease. But when I say“fortitude is a virtue”I shall find a mental proposition hard, or not at all to be come at.S.Pure intellect I understand not181.Locke is in yeright in those things wherein he differs from yeCartesians, and they cannot but allow of his opinions, if they stick to their own principles or causes of Existence & other abstract ideas.G. S.The properties of all things are in God, i.e. there is in the Deity Understanding as well as Will. He is no blind agent, and in truth a blind agent is a contradiction182.G.I am certain there is a God, tho' I do not perceive Him—have no intuition of Him. This not difficult if we rightly understand wtis meant by certainty.S.It seems that the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal, incorruptible.S.Qu. whether perception must of necessity precede volition?S. Mo.Error is not in the Understanding, but in the Will. What I understand or perceive, that I understand. There can be no errour in this.Mo. N.Mem. To take notice of Locke's woman afraid of a wetting, in the Introd., to shew there may be reasoning about ideas or things.M.Say Des Cartes & Malbranch, God hath given us strong inclinations to think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that[pg 052]bodies do exist. Pray wtmean they by this? Would they have it that the ideas of imagination are images of, and proceed from, the ideas of sense? This is true, but cannot be their meaning; for they speak of ideas of sense as themselves proceeding from, being like unto—I know not wt183.M. S.Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum in intellectu. V. Tract. de Methodo.S.Qu. May there not be an Understanding without a Will?S.Understanding is in some sort an action.S.Silly of Hobbs, &c. to speak of the Will as if it were motion, with which it has no likeness.M.Ideas of Sense are the real things or archetypes. Ideas of imagination, dreams, &c. are copies, images, of these.M.My doctrines rightly understood, all that philosophy of Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared enemy of religion, comes to the ground.G.Hobbs & Spinosa make God extended. Locke also seems to do the same184.I. E.Ens, res, aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales. Spinosa, p. 76, prop. 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account of their original. Also of the original of all universals—Homo, Canis, &c.G.Spinosa (vid. Præf. Opera Posthum.) will have God to be“omnium rerum causa immanens,”and to countenance this produces that of St. Paul,“in Him we live,”&c. Now this of St. Paul may be explained by my doctrine as well as Spinosa's, or Locke's, or Hobbs's, or Raphson's185, &c.S.The Will ispurus actus, or rather pure spirit not imaginable,[pg 053]not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object of the understanding, no wise perceivable.S.Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble ytmay be made of the word“it”) to act, cause, will, operate. Its substance is not knowable, not being an idea.G.Why may we not conceive it possible for God to create things out of nothing? Certainly we ourselves create in some wise whenever we imagine.E. N.“Ex nihilo nihil fit.”This (saith Spinoza, Opera Posth. p. 464) and the like are calledveritates æternæ, because“nullam fidem habent extra mentem.”To make this axiom have a positive signification, one should express it thus: Every idea has a cause, i.e. is produced by a Will186.P.The philosophers talk much of a distinction 'twixt absolute & relative things, or 'twixt things considered in their own nature & the same things considered with respect to us. I know not wtthey mean by“things considered in themselves.”This is nonsense, jargon.S.It seems there can be no perception—no idea—without Will, seeing there are no ideas so indifferent but one had rather have them than annihilation, or annihilation than them. Or if there be such an equal balance, there must be an equal mixture of pleasure and pain to cause it; there being no ideas perfectly void of all pain & uneasiness, but wtare preferable to annihilation.Recipe in animum tuum, per cogitationem vehementem, rerum ipsarum, non literarum aut sonorum imagines. Hobbs against Wallis.'Tis a perfection we may imagine in superior spirits, that they can see a great deal at once with the utmost clearness and distinction; whereas we can only see a point187.Mem. WnI treat of mathematiques to enquire into the controversy 'twixt Hobbes and Wallis.[pg 054]G.Every sensation of mine, which happens in consequence of the general known laws of nature, & is from without, i.e. independent of my will, demonstrates the being of a God, i.e. of an unextended, incorporeal spirit, which is omnipresent, omnipotent, &c.M.I say not with J.S. [John Sergeant] that weseesolids. I reject his“solid philosophy”—solidity being only perceived by touch188.S.It seems to me that will and understanding—volitions and ideas—cannot be separated, that either cannot be possibly without the other.E. S.Some ideas or other I must have, so long as I exist or will. But no one idea or sort of ideas being essential189.M.The distinction between idea and ideatum I cannot otherwise conceive than by making one the effect or consequence of dream, reverie, imagination—the other of sense and the constant laws of nature.P.Dico quod extensio non concipitur in se et per se, contra quam dicit Spinoza in Epist. 2aad Oldenburgium.G.My definition of the word God I think much clearer than those of Des Cartes & Spinoza, viz.“Ens summe perfectum & absolute infinitum,”or“Ens constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque est infinitum190.”'Tis chiefly the connexion betwixt tangible and visible ideas that deceives, and not the visible ideas themselves.S.But the grand mistake is that we know not what we mean by“we,”or“selves,”or“mind,”&c. 'Tis most sure & certain that our ideas are distinct from the mind, i.e. the Will, the Spirit191.S.I must not mention the understanding as a faculty or[pg 055]part of the mind. I must include understanding & will in the word Spirit—by which I mean all that is active. I must not say that the understanding diners not from the particular ideas, or the will from particular volitions.S.The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea.N. S.I say there are no causes (properly speaking) but spiritual, nothing active but Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal; 'tis only annexing a new sort of signification to the word cause, & why may not others as well retain the old one, and call one idea the cause of another which always follows it? I answer, If you do so I shall drive you into many absurditys: you cannot avoid running into opinions you'll be glad to disown, if you stick firmly to that signification of the word Cause.Mo.In valuing good we reckon too much on the present & our own.Mo.There be two sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as a spur or incitement to somewhat else, & has a visible relation and subordination thereto; the other is not. Thus the pleasure of eating is of the former sort, of musick of the later sort. These may be used for recreation, those not but in order to their end.Mo. N.Three sorts of useful knowledge—that of Coexistence, to be treated of in our Principles of Natural Philosophy; that of Relation, in Mathematiques; that of Definition, or inclusion, or words (which perhaps differs not from that of relation), in Morality192.S.Will, understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as they are acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists in their objects, circumstances, &c.N.We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes—physical & spiritual.N.The physical may more properly be called occasions. Yet (to comply) we may call them causes—but then we must mean causes ytdo nothing.S.According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness[pg 056]so long as we live, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c.; for he will have even the continuance of an action to be in his sense an action, & so requires a volition, & this an uneasiness.I.I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration. I must cancell all passages that look like that sort of pride, that raising of expectation in my friend.I.If this be the case, surely a man had better not philosophize at all: no more than a deformed person ought to cavil to behold himself by the reflex light of a mirrour.I.Or thus, like deformed persons who, having beheld themselves by the reflex light of a mirrour, are displeased with their diseases.M.What can an idea be like but another idea? We can compare it with nothing else—a sound like a sound, a colour like a colour.M.Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot be smelt, a colour is like a thing whcannot be seen?M. S.Bodies exist without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but distinct from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether different therefrom193.P.Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity of colours.P.Motion is an abstract idea, i.e. there is no such idea that can be conceived by itself.I.Contradictions cannot be both true. Men are obliged to answer objections drawn from consequences. Introd.S.The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar. The learned are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas.Speculative Math, as if a man was all day making hard knots on purpose to unty them again.Tho' it might have been otherwise, yet it is convenient the same thing wchis M.V. should be also M.T., or very near it.S.I must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name“pure act,”but rather pure spirit, or active being.[pg 057]S.I must not say the Will or Understanding are all one, but that they are both abstract ideas, i.e. none at all—they not being evenrationedifferent from the Spirit,quâfaculties, or active.S.Dangerous to make idea & thing terms convertible194. That were the way to prove spirits are nothing.Mo.Qu. whetherveritasstands not for an abstract idea?M.'Tis plain the moderns must by their own principles own there are no bodies, i.e. no sort of bodies without the mind, i.e. unperceived.S. G.Qu. whether the Will can be the object of prescience or any knowledge?P.If there were only one ball in the world, it could not be moved. There could be no variety of appearance.According to the doctrine of infinite divisibility, there must be some smell of a rose, v. g. at an infinite distance from it.M.Extension, tho' it exist only in the mind, yet is no property of the mind. The mind can exist without it, tho' it cannot without the mind. But in Book II. I shall at large shew the difference there is betwixt the Soul and Body or extended being.S.'Tis an absurd question wchLocke puts, whether man be free to will?Mem. To enquire into the reason of the rule for determining questions in Algebra.It has already been observed by others that names are nowhere of more necessary use than in numbering.M. P.I will grant you that extension, colour, &c. may be said to be without the mind in a double respect, i.e. as independent of our will, and as distinct from the mind.Mo. N.Certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs, had he a memory and imagination most strong and capacious. Therefore reasoning & science doth not altogether depend upon words or names195.[pg 058]N.I think not that things fall out of necessity. The connexion of no two ideas is necessary; 'tis all the result of freedom, i.e. 'tis all voluntary196.M. S.If a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun & firmament, you will not sayheorhis mindis the sun, or is extended, tho' neither sun or firmament be without mind.S.'Tis strange to find philosophers doubting & disputing whether they have ideas of spiritual things or no. Surely 'tis easy to know. Vid. De Vries197,De Ideis Innatis, p. 64.S.De Vries will have it that we know the mind agrees with things not by idea but sense or conscientia. So will Malbranch. This a vain distinction.August 28th, 1708. The Adventure of the [Shirt?].It were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth, honour, & fortune, would take that care of themselves, by education, industry, literature, & a love of virtue, to surpass all other men in knowledge & all other qualifications necessary for great actions, as far as they do in quality & titles; that princes out of them might always chose men fit for all employments and high trusts. Clov. B. 7.One eternity greater than another of the same kind.In what sense eternity may be limited.G. T.Whether succession of ideas in the Divine intellect?T.Time is the train of ideas succeeding each other.Duration not distinguish'd from existence.Succession explain'd by before, between, after, & numbering.Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure?Duration infinitely divisible, time not so.[pg 059]
I. S.Idea is the object of thought. YtI think on, whatever it be, I call idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. 'Tis an act—i.e. volition, i.e. as contradistinguished to effects—the Will.I. Mo.Locke, in B. 4. c. 5, assigns not the right cause why mental propositions are so difficult. It is not because of complex but because of abstract ideas. Yeidea of a horse is as complex as that of fortitude. Yet in saying the“horse is white”I form a mental proposition with ease. But when I say“fortitude is a virtue”I shall find a mental proposition hard, or not at all to be come at.S.Pure intellect I understand not181.Locke is in yeright in those things wherein he differs from yeCartesians, and they cannot but allow of his opinions, if they stick to their own principles or causes of Existence & other abstract ideas.G. S.The properties of all things are in God, i.e. there is in the Deity Understanding as well as Will. He is no blind agent, and in truth a blind agent is a contradiction182.G.I am certain there is a God, tho' I do not perceive Him—have no intuition of Him. This not difficult if we rightly understand wtis meant by certainty.S.It seems that the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal, incorruptible.S.Qu. whether perception must of necessity precede volition?S. Mo.Error is not in the Understanding, but in the Will. What I understand or perceive, that I understand. There can be no errour in this.Mo. N.Mem. To take notice of Locke's woman afraid of a wetting, in the Introd., to shew there may be reasoning about ideas or things.M.Say Des Cartes & Malbranch, God hath given us strong inclinations to think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that[pg 052]bodies do exist. Pray wtmean they by this? Would they have it that the ideas of imagination are images of, and proceed from, the ideas of sense? This is true, but cannot be their meaning; for they speak of ideas of sense as themselves proceeding from, being like unto—I know not wt183.M. S.Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum in intellectu. V. Tract. de Methodo.S.Qu. May there not be an Understanding without a Will?S.Understanding is in some sort an action.S.Silly of Hobbs, &c. to speak of the Will as if it were motion, with which it has no likeness.M.Ideas of Sense are the real things or archetypes. Ideas of imagination, dreams, &c. are copies, images, of these.M.My doctrines rightly understood, all that philosophy of Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared enemy of religion, comes to the ground.G.Hobbs & Spinosa make God extended. Locke also seems to do the same184.I. E.Ens, res, aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales. Spinosa, p. 76, prop. 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account of their original. Also of the original of all universals—Homo, Canis, &c.G.Spinosa (vid. Præf. Opera Posthum.) will have God to be“omnium rerum causa immanens,”and to countenance this produces that of St. Paul,“in Him we live,”&c. Now this of St. Paul may be explained by my doctrine as well as Spinosa's, or Locke's, or Hobbs's, or Raphson's185, &c.S.The Will ispurus actus, or rather pure spirit not imaginable,[pg 053]not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object of the understanding, no wise perceivable.S.Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble ytmay be made of the word“it”) to act, cause, will, operate. Its substance is not knowable, not being an idea.G.Why may we not conceive it possible for God to create things out of nothing? Certainly we ourselves create in some wise whenever we imagine.E. N.“Ex nihilo nihil fit.”This (saith Spinoza, Opera Posth. p. 464) and the like are calledveritates æternæ, because“nullam fidem habent extra mentem.”To make this axiom have a positive signification, one should express it thus: Every idea has a cause, i.e. is produced by a Will186.P.The philosophers talk much of a distinction 'twixt absolute & relative things, or 'twixt things considered in their own nature & the same things considered with respect to us. I know not wtthey mean by“things considered in themselves.”This is nonsense, jargon.S.It seems there can be no perception—no idea—without Will, seeing there are no ideas so indifferent but one had rather have them than annihilation, or annihilation than them. Or if there be such an equal balance, there must be an equal mixture of pleasure and pain to cause it; there being no ideas perfectly void of all pain & uneasiness, but wtare preferable to annihilation.Recipe in animum tuum, per cogitationem vehementem, rerum ipsarum, non literarum aut sonorum imagines. Hobbs against Wallis.'Tis a perfection we may imagine in superior spirits, that they can see a great deal at once with the utmost clearness and distinction; whereas we can only see a point187.Mem. WnI treat of mathematiques to enquire into the controversy 'twixt Hobbes and Wallis.[pg 054]G.Every sensation of mine, which happens in consequence of the general known laws of nature, & is from without, i.e. independent of my will, demonstrates the being of a God, i.e. of an unextended, incorporeal spirit, which is omnipresent, omnipotent, &c.M.I say not with J.S. [John Sergeant] that weseesolids. I reject his“solid philosophy”—solidity being only perceived by touch188.S.It seems to me that will and understanding—volitions and ideas—cannot be separated, that either cannot be possibly without the other.E. S.Some ideas or other I must have, so long as I exist or will. But no one idea or sort of ideas being essential189.M.The distinction between idea and ideatum I cannot otherwise conceive than by making one the effect or consequence of dream, reverie, imagination—the other of sense and the constant laws of nature.P.Dico quod extensio non concipitur in se et per se, contra quam dicit Spinoza in Epist. 2aad Oldenburgium.G.My definition of the word God I think much clearer than those of Des Cartes & Spinoza, viz.“Ens summe perfectum & absolute infinitum,”or“Ens constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque est infinitum190.”'Tis chiefly the connexion betwixt tangible and visible ideas that deceives, and not the visible ideas themselves.S.But the grand mistake is that we know not what we mean by“we,”or“selves,”or“mind,”&c. 'Tis most sure & certain that our ideas are distinct from the mind, i.e. the Will, the Spirit191.S.I must not mention the understanding as a faculty or[pg 055]part of the mind. I must include understanding & will in the word Spirit—by which I mean all that is active. I must not say that the understanding diners not from the particular ideas, or the will from particular volitions.S.The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea.N. S.I say there are no causes (properly speaking) but spiritual, nothing active but Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal; 'tis only annexing a new sort of signification to the word cause, & why may not others as well retain the old one, and call one idea the cause of another which always follows it? I answer, If you do so I shall drive you into many absurditys: you cannot avoid running into opinions you'll be glad to disown, if you stick firmly to that signification of the word Cause.Mo.In valuing good we reckon too much on the present & our own.Mo.There be two sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as a spur or incitement to somewhat else, & has a visible relation and subordination thereto; the other is not. Thus the pleasure of eating is of the former sort, of musick of the later sort. These may be used for recreation, those not but in order to their end.Mo. N.Three sorts of useful knowledge—that of Coexistence, to be treated of in our Principles of Natural Philosophy; that of Relation, in Mathematiques; that of Definition, or inclusion, or words (which perhaps differs not from that of relation), in Morality192.S.Will, understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as they are acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists in their objects, circumstances, &c.N.We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes—physical & spiritual.N.The physical may more properly be called occasions. Yet (to comply) we may call them causes—but then we must mean causes ytdo nothing.S.According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness[pg 056]so long as we live, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c.; for he will have even the continuance of an action to be in his sense an action, & so requires a volition, & this an uneasiness.I.I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration. I must cancell all passages that look like that sort of pride, that raising of expectation in my friend.I.If this be the case, surely a man had better not philosophize at all: no more than a deformed person ought to cavil to behold himself by the reflex light of a mirrour.I.Or thus, like deformed persons who, having beheld themselves by the reflex light of a mirrour, are displeased with their diseases.M.What can an idea be like but another idea? We can compare it with nothing else—a sound like a sound, a colour like a colour.M.Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot be smelt, a colour is like a thing whcannot be seen?M. S.Bodies exist without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but distinct from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether different therefrom193.P.Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity of colours.P.Motion is an abstract idea, i.e. there is no such idea that can be conceived by itself.I.Contradictions cannot be both true. Men are obliged to answer objections drawn from consequences. Introd.S.The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar. The learned are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas.Speculative Math, as if a man was all day making hard knots on purpose to unty them again.Tho' it might have been otherwise, yet it is convenient the same thing wchis M.V. should be also M.T., or very near it.S.I must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name“pure act,”but rather pure spirit, or active being.[pg 057]S.I must not say the Will or Understanding are all one, but that they are both abstract ideas, i.e. none at all—they not being evenrationedifferent from the Spirit,quâfaculties, or active.S.Dangerous to make idea & thing terms convertible194. That were the way to prove spirits are nothing.Mo.Qu. whetherveritasstands not for an abstract idea?M.'Tis plain the moderns must by their own principles own there are no bodies, i.e. no sort of bodies without the mind, i.e. unperceived.S. G.Qu. whether the Will can be the object of prescience or any knowledge?P.If there were only one ball in the world, it could not be moved. There could be no variety of appearance.According to the doctrine of infinite divisibility, there must be some smell of a rose, v. g. at an infinite distance from it.M.Extension, tho' it exist only in the mind, yet is no property of the mind. The mind can exist without it, tho' it cannot without the mind. But in Book II. I shall at large shew the difference there is betwixt the Soul and Body or extended being.S.'Tis an absurd question wchLocke puts, whether man be free to will?Mem. To enquire into the reason of the rule for determining questions in Algebra.It has already been observed by others that names are nowhere of more necessary use than in numbering.M. P.I will grant you that extension, colour, &c. may be said to be without the mind in a double respect, i.e. as independent of our will, and as distinct from the mind.Mo. N.Certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs, had he a memory and imagination most strong and capacious. Therefore reasoning & science doth not altogether depend upon words or names195.[pg 058]N.I think not that things fall out of necessity. The connexion of no two ideas is necessary; 'tis all the result of freedom, i.e. 'tis all voluntary196.M. S.If a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun & firmament, you will not sayheorhis mindis the sun, or is extended, tho' neither sun or firmament be without mind.S.'Tis strange to find philosophers doubting & disputing whether they have ideas of spiritual things or no. Surely 'tis easy to know. Vid. De Vries197,De Ideis Innatis, p. 64.S.De Vries will have it that we know the mind agrees with things not by idea but sense or conscientia. So will Malbranch. This a vain distinction.August 28th, 1708. The Adventure of the [Shirt?].It were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth, honour, & fortune, would take that care of themselves, by education, industry, literature, & a love of virtue, to surpass all other men in knowledge & all other qualifications necessary for great actions, as far as they do in quality & titles; that princes out of them might always chose men fit for all employments and high trusts. Clov. B. 7.One eternity greater than another of the same kind.In what sense eternity may be limited.G. T.Whether succession of ideas in the Divine intellect?T.Time is the train of ideas succeeding each other.Duration not distinguish'd from existence.Succession explain'd by before, between, after, & numbering.Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure?Duration infinitely divisible, time not so.[pg 059]
I. S.
I. S.
Idea is the object of thought. YtI think on, whatever it be, I call idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. 'Tis an act—i.e. volition, i.e. as contradistinguished to effects—the Will.
I. Mo.
I. Mo.
Locke, in B. 4. c. 5, assigns not the right cause why mental propositions are so difficult. It is not because of complex but because of abstract ideas. Yeidea of a horse is as complex as that of fortitude. Yet in saying the“horse is white”I form a mental proposition with ease. But when I say“fortitude is a virtue”I shall find a mental proposition hard, or not at all to be come at.
S.
S.
Pure intellect I understand not181.
Locke is in yeright in those things wherein he differs from yeCartesians, and they cannot but allow of his opinions, if they stick to their own principles or causes of Existence & other abstract ideas.
G. S.
G. S.
The properties of all things are in God, i.e. there is in the Deity Understanding as well as Will. He is no blind agent, and in truth a blind agent is a contradiction182.
G.
G.
I am certain there is a God, tho' I do not perceive Him—have no intuition of Him. This not difficult if we rightly understand wtis meant by certainty.
S.
S.
It seems that the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal, incorruptible.
S.
S.
Qu. whether perception must of necessity precede volition?
S. Mo.
S. Mo.
Error is not in the Understanding, but in the Will. What I understand or perceive, that I understand. There can be no errour in this.
Mo. N.
Mo. N.
Mem. To take notice of Locke's woman afraid of a wetting, in the Introd., to shew there may be reasoning about ideas or things.
M.
M.
Say Des Cartes & Malbranch, God hath given us strong inclinations to think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that[pg 052]bodies do exist. Pray wtmean they by this? Would they have it that the ideas of imagination are images of, and proceed from, the ideas of sense? This is true, but cannot be their meaning; for they speak of ideas of sense as themselves proceeding from, being like unto—I know not wt183.
M. S.
M. S.
Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum in intellectu. V. Tract. de Methodo.
S.
S.
Qu. May there not be an Understanding without a Will?
S.
S.
Understanding is in some sort an action.
S.
S.
Silly of Hobbs, &c. to speak of the Will as if it were motion, with which it has no likeness.
M.
M.
Ideas of Sense are the real things or archetypes. Ideas of imagination, dreams, &c. are copies, images, of these.
M.
M.
My doctrines rightly understood, all that philosophy of Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared enemy of religion, comes to the ground.
G.
G.
Hobbs & Spinosa make God extended. Locke also seems to do the same184.
I. E.
I. E.
Ens, res, aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales. Spinosa, p. 76, prop. 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account of their original. Also of the original of all universals—Homo, Canis, &c.
G.
G.
Spinosa (vid. Præf. Opera Posthum.) will have God to be“omnium rerum causa immanens,”and to countenance this produces that of St. Paul,“in Him we live,”&c. Now this of St. Paul may be explained by my doctrine as well as Spinosa's, or Locke's, or Hobbs's, or Raphson's185, &c.
S.
S.
The Will ispurus actus, or rather pure spirit not imaginable,[pg 053]not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object of the understanding, no wise perceivable.
S.
S.
Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble ytmay be made of the word“it”) to act, cause, will, operate. Its substance is not knowable, not being an idea.
G.
G.
Why may we not conceive it possible for God to create things out of nothing? Certainly we ourselves create in some wise whenever we imagine.
E. N.
E. N.
“Ex nihilo nihil fit.”This (saith Spinoza, Opera Posth. p. 464) and the like are calledveritates æternæ, because“nullam fidem habent extra mentem.”To make this axiom have a positive signification, one should express it thus: Every idea has a cause, i.e. is produced by a Will186.
P.
P.
The philosophers talk much of a distinction 'twixt absolute & relative things, or 'twixt things considered in their own nature & the same things considered with respect to us. I know not wtthey mean by“things considered in themselves.”This is nonsense, jargon.
S.
S.
It seems there can be no perception—no idea—without Will, seeing there are no ideas so indifferent but one had rather have them than annihilation, or annihilation than them. Or if there be such an equal balance, there must be an equal mixture of pleasure and pain to cause it; there being no ideas perfectly void of all pain & uneasiness, but wtare preferable to annihilation.
Recipe in animum tuum, per cogitationem vehementem, rerum ipsarum, non literarum aut sonorum imagines. Hobbs against Wallis.
'Tis a perfection we may imagine in superior spirits, that they can see a great deal at once with the utmost clearness and distinction; whereas we can only see a point187.
Mem. WnI treat of mathematiques to enquire into the controversy 'twixt Hobbes and Wallis.
G.
G.
Every sensation of mine, which happens in consequence of the general known laws of nature, & is from without, i.e. independent of my will, demonstrates the being of a God, i.e. of an unextended, incorporeal spirit, which is omnipresent, omnipotent, &c.
M.
M.
I say not with J.S. [John Sergeant] that weseesolids. I reject his“solid philosophy”—solidity being only perceived by touch188.
S.
S.
It seems to me that will and understanding—volitions and ideas—cannot be separated, that either cannot be possibly without the other.
E. S.
E. S.
Some ideas or other I must have, so long as I exist or will. But no one idea or sort of ideas being essential189.
M.
M.
The distinction between idea and ideatum I cannot otherwise conceive than by making one the effect or consequence of dream, reverie, imagination—the other of sense and the constant laws of nature.
P.
P.
Dico quod extensio non concipitur in se et per se, contra quam dicit Spinoza in Epist. 2aad Oldenburgium.
G.
G.
My definition of the word God I think much clearer than those of Des Cartes & Spinoza, viz.“Ens summe perfectum & absolute infinitum,”or“Ens constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque est infinitum190.”
'Tis chiefly the connexion betwixt tangible and visible ideas that deceives, and not the visible ideas themselves.
S.
S.
But the grand mistake is that we know not what we mean by“we,”or“selves,”or“mind,”&c. 'Tis most sure & certain that our ideas are distinct from the mind, i.e. the Will, the Spirit191.
S.
S.
I must not mention the understanding as a faculty or[pg 055]part of the mind. I must include understanding & will in the word Spirit—by which I mean all that is active. I must not say that the understanding diners not from the particular ideas, or the will from particular volitions.
S.
S.
The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea.
N. S.
N. S.
I say there are no causes (properly speaking) but spiritual, nothing active but Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal; 'tis only annexing a new sort of signification to the word cause, & why may not others as well retain the old one, and call one idea the cause of another which always follows it? I answer, If you do so I shall drive you into many absurditys: you cannot avoid running into opinions you'll be glad to disown, if you stick firmly to that signification of the word Cause.
Mo.
Mo.
In valuing good we reckon too much on the present & our own.
Mo.
Mo.
There be two sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as a spur or incitement to somewhat else, & has a visible relation and subordination thereto; the other is not. Thus the pleasure of eating is of the former sort, of musick of the later sort. These may be used for recreation, those not but in order to their end.
Mo. N.
Mo. N.
Three sorts of useful knowledge—that of Coexistence, to be treated of in our Principles of Natural Philosophy; that of Relation, in Mathematiques; that of Definition, or inclusion, or words (which perhaps differs not from that of relation), in Morality192.
S.
S.
Will, understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as they are acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists in their objects, circumstances, &c.
N.
N.
We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes—physical & spiritual.
N.
N.
The physical may more properly be called occasions. Yet (to comply) we may call them causes—but then we must mean causes ytdo nothing.
S.
S.
According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness[pg 056]so long as we live, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c.; for he will have even the continuance of an action to be in his sense an action, & so requires a volition, & this an uneasiness.
I.
I.
I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration. I must cancell all passages that look like that sort of pride, that raising of expectation in my friend.
I.
I.
If this be the case, surely a man had better not philosophize at all: no more than a deformed person ought to cavil to behold himself by the reflex light of a mirrour.
I.
I.
Or thus, like deformed persons who, having beheld themselves by the reflex light of a mirrour, are displeased with their diseases.
M.
M.
What can an idea be like but another idea? We can compare it with nothing else—a sound like a sound, a colour like a colour.
M.
M.
Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot be smelt, a colour is like a thing whcannot be seen?
M. S.
M. S.
Bodies exist without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but distinct from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether different therefrom193.
P.
P.
Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity of colours.
P.
P.
Motion is an abstract idea, i.e. there is no such idea that can be conceived by itself.
I.
I.
Contradictions cannot be both true. Men are obliged to answer objections drawn from consequences. Introd.
S.
S.
The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar. The learned are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas.
Speculative Math, as if a man was all day making hard knots on purpose to unty them again.
Tho' it might have been otherwise, yet it is convenient the same thing wchis M.V. should be also M.T., or very near it.
S.
S.
I must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name“pure act,”but rather pure spirit, or active being.
S.
S.
I must not say the Will or Understanding are all one, but that they are both abstract ideas, i.e. none at all—they not being evenrationedifferent from the Spirit,quâfaculties, or active.
S.
S.
Dangerous to make idea & thing terms convertible194. That were the way to prove spirits are nothing.
Mo.
Mo.
Qu. whetherveritasstands not for an abstract idea?
M.
M.
'Tis plain the moderns must by their own principles own there are no bodies, i.e. no sort of bodies without the mind, i.e. unperceived.
S. G.
S. G.
Qu. whether the Will can be the object of prescience or any knowledge?
P.
P.
If there were only one ball in the world, it could not be moved. There could be no variety of appearance.
According to the doctrine of infinite divisibility, there must be some smell of a rose, v. g. at an infinite distance from it.
M.
M.
Extension, tho' it exist only in the mind, yet is no property of the mind. The mind can exist without it, tho' it cannot without the mind. But in Book II. I shall at large shew the difference there is betwixt the Soul and Body or extended being.
S.
S.
'Tis an absurd question wchLocke puts, whether man be free to will?
Mem. To enquire into the reason of the rule for determining questions in Algebra.
It has already been observed by others that names are nowhere of more necessary use than in numbering.
M. P.
M. P.
I will grant you that extension, colour, &c. may be said to be without the mind in a double respect, i.e. as independent of our will, and as distinct from the mind.
Mo. N.
Mo. N.
Certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs, had he a memory and imagination most strong and capacious. Therefore reasoning & science doth not altogether depend upon words or names195.
N.
N.
I think not that things fall out of necessity. The connexion of no two ideas is necessary; 'tis all the result of freedom, i.e. 'tis all voluntary196.
M. S.
M. S.
If a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun & firmament, you will not sayheorhis mindis the sun, or is extended, tho' neither sun or firmament be without mind.
S.
S.
'Tis strange to find philosophers doubting & disputing whether they have ideas of spiritual things or no. Surely 'tis easy to know. Vid. De Vries197,De Ideis Innatis, p. 64.
S.
S.
De Vries will have it that we know the mind agrees with things not by idea but sense or conscientia. So will Malbranch. This a vain distinction.
August 28th, 1708. The Adventure of the [Shirt?].
It were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth, honour, & fortune, would take that care of themselves, by education, industry, literature, & a love of virtue, to surpass all other men in knowledge & all other qualifications necessary for great actions, as far as they do in quality & titles; that princes out of them might always chose men fit for all employments and high trusts. Clov. B. 7.
One eternity greater than another of the same kind.
In what sense eternity may be limited.
G. T.
G. T.
Whether succession of ideas in the Divine intellect?
T.
T.
Time is the train of ideas succeeding each other.
Duration not distinguish'd from existence.
Succession explain'd by before, between, after, & numbering.
Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure?
Duration infinitely divisible, time not so.