T.The same τὸ νῦν not common to all intelligences.Time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure.Extension not infinitely divisible in one sense.Revolutions immediately measure train of ideas, mediately duration.T.Time a sensation; therefore onely in yemind.Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of yesoul easily conceiv'd, or rather the immortality of the person, that of yesoul not being necessary for ought we can see.Swiftness of ideas compar'd with ytof motions shews the wisdom of God.Wtif succession of ideas were swifter, wtif slower?M.Fall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism, dispute about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by material substances.Extension a sensation, therefore not without the mind.M.In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire hot, &c.Primary ideas prov'd not to exist in matter; after the same manner ytsecondary ones are prov'd not to exist therein.Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension suppose length without breadth, or invisible length, wchis absurd.M.World wthout thought isnec quid,nec quantum,nec quale, &c.M.'Tis wondrous to contemplate yeWorld empty'd of all intelligences.Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist. All other things are not so much existences as manners of yeexistence of persons198.Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not compleatly known?Infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external existence of extension; but the later is false, ergo yeformer also.Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at 1stsight?Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are[pg 060]different from those ideas perceived by touch wchgoe by the same name.Diagonal incommensurable wthyeside. Quære how this can be in my doctrine?N.Qu. how to reconcile Newton's 2 sorts of motion with my doctrine?Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginableper se.Molyneux's blind man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or extended at first sight199.Extension so far from being incompatible wth, yt'tis impossible it should exist without thought.M. S.Extension itself or anything extended cannot think—these being meer ideas or sensations, whose essence we thoroughly know.No extension but surface perceivable by sight.M.Wnwe imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, 'tis only conceiving a person affected with these sensations.M.Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing void of perception—thought seeming to imply action], is a contradiction.Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion?T.In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other times.M.If a piece of matter have extension, that must be determined to a particular bigness & figure, but &c.Nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but powers. Hence a direct & brief demonstration of an active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on whom we depend.The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities, by the relation of yestory of the German Count.Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same name in all languages?Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the soul, or (otherwise thus) whether Being, added to yefaculties, compleat the real essence and adequate definition of the soul?N.Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, it be possible for us to know that any body is absolutely[pg 061]at rest, since that supposing ideas much slower than at present, bodies now apparently moving wdthen be apparently at rest?M.Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation?Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his own ideas, that he should compare them to these, and make these like unto them?T.The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as ytof a man200.Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated 3 several ways:—1st. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible inch, thence it will follow ytunequals are equals, wchis absurd: for at what distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the tangible inch?2d. One made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs, or any thing he touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot length, if tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea—sed falsum id, ergo et hoc.3dly. From Molyneux's problem, wchotherwise is falsely solv'd by Locke and him201.M.Nothing but ideas perceivable202.A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving them each. Ergo, he cannot say anything wchis not an idea is like or unlike an idea.Bodies &c. do exist even wnnot perceived—they being powers in the active being203.Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. an inconceivable idea,] Locke says204.Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension, also is] encreated & diminish'd by parts. Hence taken for the same.[pg 062]If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether tangible or visible, or both?Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true in a double sense.Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany'd wthpleasure & pain: hence thought to exist in matter; as also for that it was conceiv'd common to 2 senses, [as also the constant perception of 'em].Blind at 1stsight could not tell how near what he saw was to him, nor even whether it be wthout him or in his eye205. Qu. Would he not think the later?Blind at 1stsight could not know ytwthe saw was extended, until he had seen and touched some one self-same thing—not knowing howminimum tangibilewould look in vision.M.Mem. That homogeneous particles be brought in to answer the objection of God's creating sun, plants, &c. before animals.In every bodie two infinite series of extension—the one of tangible, the other of visible.All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point.Ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in bodies.M.Homogeneous portions of matter—useful to contemplate them.Extension if in matter changes its relation wthminimum visibile, wchseems to be fixt.Qu. whether m.v. be fix'd?M.Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended, or have an infinite series of extension.M.If the world be granted to consist of Matter, 'tis the mind gives it beauty and proportion.WtI have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in all men between a visible & tangible inch.Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because they have no common measure; also because their simplest constituent parts or elements are specifically different, viz.punctum visibile & tangibile. N. B. The former seems to be no good reason.[pg 063]M. N.By immateriality is solv'd the cohesion of bodies, or rather the dispute ceases.Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity, i.e. neither infinitely small or great.Greatest possible extension seen under an angle wchwill be less than 180 degrees, the legs of wchangle proceed from the ends of the extension.N.Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without the mind, 'tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them; the mind, even according to the materialists, perceiving onely the impressions made upon its brain, or rather the ideas attending these impressions206.Unityin abstractonot at all divisible, it being as it were a point, or with Barrow nothing at all;in concretonot divisiblead infinitum, there being no one idea demonstrablead infinitum.M.Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, or onely of their relations?M.Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask wtsolidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he will know. Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extension of space is continuity of unsolid, &c.Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity of visible points, tangible extension is a continuity of tangible points?M.Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in wthsceptics, Fardella207, &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, wchthey doubt of.M.I am more certain of yeexistence & reality of bodies than Mr. Locke; since he pretends onely to wthe calls sensitive knowledge208, whereas I think I have demonstrative[pg 064]knowledge of their existence—by them meaning combinations of powers in an unknown substratum209.M.Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the figure and extension of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely divisible, those not so.'Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because the edges of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense.Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day.S.Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely?Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. Such do intersect in a point at all angles. After the same way colour is abstract from extension.Every position alters the line.Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other ideas, v.g. idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an inch?The idea of an inch length not one determin'd idea. Hence enquire the reason why we are out in judging of extension by the sight; for which purpose 'tis meet also to consider the frequent & sudden changes of extension by position.No stated ideas of length without a minimum.M.Material substance banter'd by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19.M.In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space &c. cease210.Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of them at all times too small to be felt, we should have confounded tangible & visible extension and figure?T.Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day does not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a day?But one only colour & its degrees.[pg 065]Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in assigning the cause of microscopes magnifying objects.Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at 1stgive the name of distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since he would take distance ytthat he had perceived bytouchto be something existing without his mind, but he would certainly think that nothingseenwas without his mind211?S.Space without any bodies existingin rerum naturawould not be extended, as not having parts—in that parts are assigned to it wthrespect to body; from whence also the notion of distance is taken. Now without either parts or distance or mind, how can there be Space, or anything beside one uniform Nothing?Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he saw to be without his mind, or not in a point—the one from microscopic eyes, the other from not perceiving distance, i.e. radius of the visual sphere.M.The trees are in the park, i.e. whether I will or no, whether I imagine anything about them or no. Let me but go thither and open my eyes by day, & I shall not avoid seeing them.By extension blind [man] would mean either the perception caused in his touch by something he calls extended, or else the power of raising that perception; wchpower is without, in the thing termed extended. Now he could not know either of these to be in things visible till he had try'd.Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension, figures, & motion—and not visible212.A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho' the visible idea it yields be less than wtit was; therefore the bigness or tangible extension of the body is different from the visible extension.Extension or space no simple idea—length, breadth, & solidity being three several ideas.[pg 066]Depth or soliditynowperceived by sight213.Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder than a stone or tree; he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills, these having no power at all214.Length perceivable by hearing—length & breadth by sight—length, breadth, & depth by touch.G.Wtaffects us must be a thinking thing, for wtthinks not cannot subsist.Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind, depending entirely on its consideration, & being more or less as the mind pleases215.Mem. Quære whether extension be equally a sensation with colour? The mob use not the word extension. 'Tis an abstract term of the Schools.P.Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but in the body is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section.Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise seen than colours felt by the German Count.M.“Of”and“thing”causes of mistake.The visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will not be greater or less than mine.Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry do not divers of them suppose the existence of lines &c. without the mind?T.Whether motion be the measure of duration? Locke, b. 2. c. 14. s. 19.Lines & points conceiv'd as terminations different ideas from those conceiv'd absolutely.Every position alters a line.S.Blind man at 1stwould not take colours to be without his mind; but colours would seem to be in the same place with the coloured extension: therefore extension wdnot seem to be without the mind.[pg 067]All visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the centre are absolutely equal.Infinite number—why absurd—not rightly solv'd by Locke216.Qu. how 'tis possible we should see flats or right lines?Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon217?Qu. why we see things erect when painted inverted218?T.Question put by Mr. Deering touching the thief and paradise.
T.The same τὸ νῦν not common to all intelligences.Time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure.Extension not infinitely divisible in one sense.Revolutions immediately measure train of ideas, mediately duration.T.Time a sensation; therefore onely in yemind.Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of yesoul easily conceiv'd, or rather the immortality of the person, that of yesoul not being necessary for ought we can see.Swiftness of ideas compar'd with ytof motions shews the wisdom of God.Wtif succession of ideas were swifter, wtif slower?M.Fall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism, dispute about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by material substances.Extension a sensation, therefore not without the mind.M.In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire hot, &c.Primary ideas prov'd not to exist in matter; after the same manner ytsecondary ones are prov'd not to exist therein.Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension suppose length without breadth, or invisible length, wchis absurd.M.World wthout thought isnec quid,nec quantum,nec quale, &c.M.'Tis wondrous to contemplate yeWorld empty'd of all intelligences.Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist. All other things are not so much existences as manners of yeexistence of persons198.Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not compleatly known?Infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external existence of extension; but the later is false, ergo yeformer also.Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at 1stsight?Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are[pg 060]different from those ideas perceived by touch wchgoe by the same name.Diagonal incommensurable wthyeside. Quære how this can be in my doctrine?N.Qu. how to reconcile Newton's 2 sorts of motion with my doctrine?Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginableper se.Molyneux's blind man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or extended at first sight199.Extension so far from being incompatible wth, yt'tis impossible it should exist without thought.M. S.Extension itself or anything extended cannot think—these being meer ideas or sensations, whose essence we thoroughly know.No extension but surface perceivable by sight.M.Wnwe imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, 'tis only conceiving a person affected with these sensations.M.Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing void of perception—thought seeming to imply action], is a contradiction.Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion?T.In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other times.M.If a piece of matter have extension, that must be determined to a particular bigness & figure, but &c.Nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but powers. Hence a direct & brief demonstration of an active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on whom we depend.The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities, by the relation of yestory of the German Count.Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same name in all languages?Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the soul, or (otherwise thus) whether Being, added to yefaculties, compleat the real essence and adequate definition of the soul?N.Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, it be possible for us to know that any body is absolutely[pg 061]at rest, since that supposing ideas much slower than at present, bodies now apparently moving wdthen be apparently at rest?M.Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation?Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his own ideas, that he should compare them to these, and make these like unto them?T.The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as ytof a man200.Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated 3 several ways:—1st. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible inch, thence it will follow ytunequals are equals, wchis absurd: for at what distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the tangible inch?2d. One made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs, or any thing he touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot length, if tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea—sed falsum id, ergo et hoc.3dly. From Molyneux's problem, wchotherwise is falsely solv'd by Locke and him201.M.Nothing but ideas perceivable202.A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving them each. Ergo, he cannot say anything wchis not an idea is like or unlike an idea.Bodies &c. do exist even wnnot perceived—they being powers in the active being203.Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. an inconceivable idea,] Locke says204.Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension, also is] encreated & diminish'd by parts. Hence taken for the same.[pg 062]If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether tangible or visible, or both?Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true in a double sense.Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany'd wthpleasure & pain: hence thought to exist in matter; as also for that it was conceiv'd common to 2 senses, [as also the constant perception of 'em].Blind at 1stsight could not tell how near what he saw was to him, nor even whether it be wthout him or in his eye205. Qu. Would he not think the later?Blind at 1stsight could not know ytwthe saw was extended, until he had seen and touched some one self-same thing—not knowing howminimum tangibilewould look in vision.M.Mem. That homogeneous particles be brought in to answer the objection of God's creating sun, plants, &c. before animals.In every bodie two infinite series of extension—the one of tangible, the other of visible.All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point.Ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in bodies.M.Homogeneous portions of matter—useful to contemplate them.Extension if in matter changes its relation wthminimum visibile, wchseems to be fixt.Qu. whether m.v. be fix'd?M.Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended, or have an infinite series of extension.M.If the world be granted to consist of Matter, 'tis the mind gives it beauty and proportion.WtI have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in all men between a visible & tangible inch.Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because they have no common measure; also because their simplest constituent parts or elements are specifically different, viz.punctum visibile & tangibile. N. B. The former seems to be no good reason.[pg 063]M. N.By immateriality is solv'd the cohesion of bodies, or rather the dispute ceases.Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity, i.e. neither infinitely small or great.Greatest possible extension seen under an angle wchwill be less than 180 degrees, the legs of wchangle proceed from the ends of the extension.N.Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without the mind, 'tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them; the mind, even according to the materialists, perceiving onely the impressions made upon its brain, or rather the ideas attending these impressions206.Unityin abstractonot at all divisible, it being as it were a point, or with Barrow nothing at all;in concretonot divisiblead infinitum, there being no one idea demonstrablead infinitum.M.Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, or onely of their relations?M.Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask wtsolidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he will know. Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extension of space is continuity of unsolid, &c.Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity of visible points, tangible extension is a continuity of tangible points?M.Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in wthsceptics, Fardella207, &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, wchthey doubt of.M.I am more certain of yeexistence & reality of bodies than Mr. Locke; since he pretends onely to wthe calls sensitive knowledge208, whereas I think I have demonstrative[pg 064]knowledge of their existence—by them meaning combinations of powers in an unknown substratum209.M.Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the figure and extension of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely divisible, those not so.'Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because the edges of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense.Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day.S.Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely?Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. Such do intersect in a point at all angles. After the same way colour is abstract from extension.Every position alters the line.Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other ideas, v.g. idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an inch?The idea of an inch length not one determin'd idea. Hence enquire the reason why we are out in judging of extension by the sight; for which purpose 'tis meet also to consider the frequent & sudden changes of extension by position.No stated ideas of length without a minimum.M.Material substance banter'd by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19.M.In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space &c. cease210.Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of them at all times too small to be felt, we should have confounded tangible & visible extension and figure?T.Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day does not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a day?But one only colour & its degrees.[pg 065]Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in assigning the cause of microscopes magnifying objects.Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at 1stgive the name of distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since he would take distance ytthat he had perceived bytouchto be something existing without his mind, but he would certainly think that nothingseenwas without his mind211?S.Space without any bodies existingin rerum naturawould not be extended, as not having parts—in that parts are assigned to it wthrespect to body; from whence also the notion of distance is taken. Now without either parts or distance or mind, how can there be Space, or anything beside one uniform Nothing?Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he saw to be without his mind, or not in a point—the one from microscopic eyes, the other from not perceiving distance, i.e. radius of the visual sphere.M.The trees are in the park, i.e. whether I will or no, whether I imagine anything about them or no. Let me but go thither and open my eyes by day, & I shall not avoid seeing them.By extension blind [man] would mean either the perception caused in his touch by something he calls extended, or else the power of raising that perception; wchpower is without, in the thing termed extended. Now he could not know either of these to be in things visible till he had try'd.Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension, figures, & motion—and not visible212.A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho' the visible idea it yields be less than wtit was; therefore the bigness or tangible extension of the body is different from the visible extension.Extension or space no simple idea—length, breadth, & solidity being three several ideas.[pg 066]Depth or soliditynowperceived by sight213.Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder than a stone or tree; he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills, these having no power at all214.Length perceivable by hearing—length & breadth by sight—length, breadth, & depth by touch.G.Wtaffects us must be a thinking thing, for wtthinks not cannot subsist.Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind, depending entirely on its consideration, & being more or less as the mind pleases215.Mem. Quære whether extension be equally a sensation with colour? The mob use not the word extension. 'Tis an abstract term of the Schools.P.Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but in the body is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section.Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise seen than colours felt by the German Count.M.“Of”and“thing”causes of mistake.The visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will not be greater or less than mine.Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry do not divers of them suppose the existence of lines &c. without the mind?T.Whether motion be the measure of duration? Locke, b. 2. c. 14. s. 19.Lines & points conceiv'd as terminations different ideas from those conceiv'd absolutely.Every position alters a line.S.Blind man at 1stwould not take colours to be without his mind; but colours would seem to be in the same place with the coloured extension: therefore extension wdnot seem to be without the mind.[pg 067]All visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the centre are absolutely equal.Infinite number—why absurd—not rightly solv'd by Locke216.Qu. how 'tis possible we should see flats or right lines?Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon217?Qu. why we see things erect when painted inverted218?T.Question put by Mr. Deering touching the thief and paradise.
T.The same τὸ νῦν not common to all intelligences.Time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure.Extension not infinitely divisible in one sense.Revolutions immediately measure train of ideas, mediately duration.T.Time a sensation; therefore onely in yemind.Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of yesoul easily conceiv'd, or rather the immortality of the person, that of yesoul not being necessary for ought we can see.Swiftness of ideas compar'd with ytof motions shews the wisdom of God.Wtif succession of ideas were swifter, wtif slower?M.Fall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism, dispute about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by material substances.Extension a sensation, therefore not without the mind.M.In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire hot, &c.Primary ideas prov'd not to exist in matter; after the same manner ytsecondary ones are prov'd not to exist therein.Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension suppose length without breadth, or invisible length, wchis absurd.M.World wthout thought isnec quid,nec quantum,nec quale, &c.M.'Tis wondrous to contemplate yeWorld empty'd of all intelligences.Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist. All other things are not so much existences as manners of yeexistence of persons198.Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not compleatly known?Infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external existence of extension; but the later is false, ergo yeformer also.Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at 1stsight?Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are[pg 060]different from those ideas perceived by touch wchgoe by the same name.Diagonal incommensurable wthyeside. Quære how this can be in my doctrine?N.Qu. how to reconcile Newton's 2 sorts of motion with my doctrine?Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginableper se.Molyneux's blind man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or extended at first sight199.Extension so far from being incompatible wth, yt'tis impossible it should exist without thought.M. S.Extension itself or anything extended cannot think—these being meer ideas or sensations, whose essence we thoroughly know.No extension but surface perceivable by sight.M.Wnwe imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, 'tis only conceiving a person affected with these sensations.M.Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing void of perception—thought seeming to imply action], is a contradiction.Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion?T.In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other times.M.If a piece of matter have extension, that must be determined to a particular bigness & figure, but &c.Nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but powers. Hence a direct & brief demonstration of an active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on whom we depend.The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities, by the relation of yestory of the German Count.Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same name in all languages?Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the soul, or (otherwise thus) whether Being, added to yefaculties, compleat the real essence and adequate definition of the soul?N.Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, it be possible for us to know that any body is absolutely[pg 061]at rest, since that supposing ideas much slower than at present, bodies now apparently moving wdthen be apparently at rest?M.Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation?Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his own ideas, that he should compare them to these, and make these like unto them?T.The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as ytof a man200.Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated 3 several ways:—1st. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible inch, thence it will follow ytunequals are equals, wchis absurd: for at what distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the tangible inch?2d. One made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs, or any thing he touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot length, if tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea—sed falsum id, ergo et hoc.3dly. From Molyneux's problem, wchotherwise is falsely solv'd by Locke and him201.M.Nothing but ideas perceivable202.A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving them each. Ergo, he cannot say anything wchis not an idea is like or unlike an idea.Bodies &c. do exist even wnnot perceived—they being powers in the active being203.Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. an inconceivable idea,] Locke says204.Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension, also is] encreated & diminish'd by parts. Hence taken for the same.[pg 062]If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether tangible or visible, or both?Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true in a double sense.Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany'd wthpleasure & pain: hence thought to exist in matter; as also for that it was conceiv'd common to 2 senses, [as also the constant perception of 'em].Blind at 1stsight could not tell how near what he saw was to him, nor even whether it be wthout him or in his eye205. Qu. Would he not think the later?Blind at 1stsight could not know ytwthe saw was extended, until he had seen and touched some one self-same thing—not knowing howminimum tangibilewould look in vision.M.Mem. That homogeneous particles be brought in to answer the objection of God's creating sun, plants, &c. before animals.In every bodie two infinite series of extension—the one of tangible, the other of visible.All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point.Ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in bodies.M.Homogeneous portions of matter—useful to contemplate them.Extension if in matter changes its relation wthminimum visibile, wchseems to be fixt.Qu. whether m.v. be fix'd?M.Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended, or have an infinite series of extension.M.If the world be granted to consist of Matter, 'tis the mind gives it beauty and proportion.WtI have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in all men between a visible & tangible inch.Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because they have no common measure; also because their simplest constituent parts or elements are specifically different, viz.punctum visibile & tangibile. N. B. The former seems to be no good reason.[pg 063]M. N.By immateriality is solv'd the cohesion of bodies, or rather the dispute ceases.Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity, i.e. neither infinitely small or great.Greatest possible extension seen under an angle wchwill be less than 180 degrees, the legs of wchangle proceed from the ends of the extension.N.Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without the mind, 'tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them; the mind, even according to the materialists, perceiving onely the impressions made upon its brain, or rather the ideas attending these impressions206.Unityin abstractonot at all divisible, it being as it were a point, or with Barrow nothing at all;in concretonot divisiblead infinitum, there being no one idea demonstrablead infinitum.M.Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, or onely of their relations?M.Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask wtsolidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he will know. Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extension of space is continuity of unsolid, &c.Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity of visible points, tangible extension is a continuity of tangible points?M.Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in wthsceptics, Fardella207, &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, wchthey doubt of.M.I am more certain of yeexistence & reality of bodies than Mr. Locke; since he pretends onely to wthe calls sensitive knowledge208, whereas I think I have demonstrative[pg 064]knowledge of their existence—by them meaning combinations of powers in an unknown substratum209.M.Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the figure and extension of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely divisible, those not so.'Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because the edges of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense.Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day.S.Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely?Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. Such do intersect in a point at all angles. After the same way colour is abstract from extension.Every position alters the line.Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other ideas, v.g. idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an inch?The idea of an inch length not one determin'd idea. Hence enquire the reason why we are out in judging of extension by the sight; for which purpose 'tis meet also to consider the frequent & sudden changes of extension by position.No stated ideas of length without a minimum.M.Material substance banter'd by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19.M.In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space &c. cease210.Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of them at all times too small to be felt, we should have confounded tangible & visible extension and figure?T.Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day does not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a day?But one only colour & its degrees.[pg 065]Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in assigning the cause of microscopes magnifying objects.Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at 1stgive the name of distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since he would take distance ytthat he had perceived bytouchto be something existing without his mind, but he would certainly think that nothingseenwas without his mind211?S.Space without any bodies existingin rerum naturawould not be extended, as not having parts—in that parts are assigned to it wthrespect to body; from whence also the notion of distance is taken. Now without either parts or distance or mind, how can there be Space, or anything beside one uniform Nothing?Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he saw to be without his mind, or not in a point—the one from microscopic eyes, the other from not perceiving distance, i.e. radius of the visual sphere.M.The trees are in the park, i.e. whether I will or no, whether I imagine anything about them or no. Let me but go thither and open my eyes by day, & I shall not avoid seeing them.By extension blind [man] would mean either the perception caused in his touch by something he calls extended, or else the power of raising that perception; wchpower is without, in the thing termed extended. Now he could not know either of these to be in things visible till he had try'd.Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension, figures, & motion—and not visible212.A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho' the visible idea it yields be less than wtit was; therefore the bigness or tangible extension of the body is different from the visible extension.Extension or space no simple idea—length, breadth, & solidity being three several ideas.[pg 066]Depth or soliditynowperceived by sight213.Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder than a stone or tree; he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills, these having no power at all214.Length perceivable by hearing—length & breadth by sight—length, breadth, & depth by touch.G.Wtaffects us must be a thinking thing, for wtthinks not cannot subsist.Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind, depending entirely on its consideration, & being more or less as the mind pleases215.Mem. Quære whether extension be equally a sensation with colour? The mob use not the word extension. 'Tis an abstract term of the Schools.P.Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but in the body is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section.Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise seen than colours felt by the German Count.M.“Of”and“thing”causes of mistake.The visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will not be greater or less than mine.Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry do not divers of them suppose the existence of lines &c. without the mind?T.Whether motion be the measure of duration? Locke, b. 2. c. 14. s. 19.Lines & points conceiv'd as terminations different ideas from those conceiv'd absolutely.Every position alters a line.S.Blind man at 1stwould not take colours to be without his mind; but colours would seem to be in the same place with the coloured extension: therefore extension wdnot seem to be without the mind.[pg 067]All visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the centre are absolutely equal.Infinite number—why absurd—not rightly solv'd by Locke216.Qu. how 'tis possible we should see flats or right lines?Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon217?Qu. why we see things erect when painted inverted218?T.Question put by Mr. Deering touching the thief and paradise.
T.The same τὸ νῦν not common to all intelligences.Time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure.Extension not infinitely divisible in one sense.Revolutions immediately measure train of ideas, mediately duration.T.Time a sensation; therefore onely in yemind.Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of yesoul easily conceiv'd, or rather the immortality of the person, that of yesoul not being necessary for ought we can see.Swiftness of ideas compar'd with ytof motions shews the wisdom of God.Wtif succession of ideas were swifter, wtif slower?M.Fall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism, dispute about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by material substances.Extension a sensation, therefore not without the mind.M.In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire hot, &c.Primary ideas prov'd not to exist in matter; after the same manner ytsecondary ones are prov'd not to exist therein.Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension suppose length without breadth, or invisible length, wchis absurd.M.World wthout thought isnec quid,nec quantum,nec quale, &c.M.'Tis wondrous to contemplate yeWorld empty'd of all intelligences.Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist. All other things are not so much existences as manners of yeexistence of persons198.Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not compleatly known?Infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external existence of extension; but the later is false, ergo yeformer also.Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at 1stsight?Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are[pg 060]different from those ideas perceived by touch wchgoe by the same name.Diagonal incommensurable wthyeside. Quære how this can be in my doctrine?N.Qu. how to reconcile Newton's 2 sorts of motion with my doctrine?Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginableper se.Molyneux's blind man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or extended at first sight199.Extension so far from being incompatible wth, yt'tis impossible it should exist without thought.M. S.Extension itself or anything extended cannot think—these being meer ideas or sensations, whose essence we thoroughly know.No extension but surface perceivable by sight.M.Wnwe imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, 'tis only conceiving a person affected with these sensations.M.Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing void of perception—thought seeming to imply action], is a contradiction.Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion?T.In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other times.M.If a piece of matter have extension, that must be determined to a particular bigness & figure, but &c.Nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but powers. Hence a direct & brief demonstration of an active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on whom we depend.The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities, by the relation of yestory of the German Count.Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same name in all languages?Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the soul, or (otherwise thus) whether Being, added to yefaculties, compleat the real essence and adequate definition of the soul?N.Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, it be possible for us to know that any body is absolutely[pg 061]at rest, since that supposing ideas much slower than at present, bodies now apparently moving wdthen be apparently at rest?M.Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation?Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his own ideas, that he should compare them to these, and make these like unto them?T.The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as ytof a man200.Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated 3 several ways:—1st. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible inch, thence it will follow ytunequals are equals, wchis absurd: for at what distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the tangible inch?2d. One made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs, or any thing he touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot length, if tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea—sed falsum id, ergo et hoc.3dly. From Molyneux's problem, wchotherwise is falsely solv'd by Locke and him201.M.Nothing but ideas perceivable202.A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving them each. Ergo, he cannot say anything wchis not an idea is like or unlike an idea.Bodies &c. do exist even wnnot perceived—they being powers in the active being203.Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. an inconceivable idea,] Locke says204.Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension, also is] encreated & diminish'd by parts. Hence taken for the same.[pg 062]If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether tangible or visible, or both?Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true in a double sense.Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany'd wthpleasure & pain: hence thought to exist in matter; as also for that it was conceiv'd common to 2 senses, [as also the constant perception of 'em].Blind at 1stsight could not tell how near what he saw was to him, nor even whether it be wthout him or in his eye205. Qu. Would he not think the later?Blind at 1stsight could not know ytwthe saw was extended, until he had seen and touched some one self-same thing—not knowing howminimum tangibilewould look in vision.M.Mem. That homogeneous particles be brought in to answer the objection of God's creating sun, plants, &c. before animals.In every bodie two infinite series of extension—the one of tangible, the other of visible.All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point.Ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in bodies.M.Homogeneous portions of matter—useful to contemplate them.Extension if in matter changes its relation wthminimum visibile, wchseems to be fixt.Qu. whether m.v. be fix'd?M.Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended, or have an infinite series of extension.M.If the world be granted to consist of Matter, 'tis the mind gives it beauty and proportion.WtI have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in all men between a visible & tangible inch.Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because they have no common measure; also because their simplest constituent parts or elements are specifically different, viz.punctum visibile & tangibile. N. B. The former seems to be no good reason.[pg 063]M. N.By immateriality is solv'd the cohesion of bodies, or rather the dispute ceases.Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity, i.e. neither infinitely small or great.Greatest possible extension seen under an angle wchwill be less than 180 degrees, the legs of wchangle proceed from the ends of the extension.N.Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without the mind, 'tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them; the mind, even according to the materialists, perceiving onely the impressions made upon its brain, or rather the ideas attending these impressions206.Unityin abstractonot at all divisible, it being as it were a point, or with Barrow nothing at all;in concretonot divisiblead infinitum, there being no one idea demonstrablead infinitum.M.Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, or onely of their relations?M.Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask wtsolidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he will know. Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extension of space is continuity of unsolid, &c.Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity of visible points, tangible extension is a continuity of tangible points?M.Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in wthsceptics, Fardella207, &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, wchthey doubt of.M.I am more certain of yeexistence & reality of bodies than Mr. Locke; since he pretends onely to wthe calls sensitive knowledge208, whereas I think I have demonstrative[pg 064]knowledge of their existence—by them meaning combinations of powers in an unknown substratum209.M.Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the figure and extension of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely divisible, those not so.'Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because the edges of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense.Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day.S.Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely?Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. Such do intersect in a point at all angles. After the same way colour is abstract from extension.Every position alters the line.Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other ideas, v.g. idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an inch?The idea of an inch length not one determin'd idea. Hence enquire the reason why we are out in judging of extension by the sight; for which purpose 'tis meet also to consider the frequent & sudden changes of extension by position.No stated ideas of length without a minimum.M.Material substance banter'd by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19.M.In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space &c. cease210.Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of them at all times too small to be felt, we should have confounded tangible & visible extension and figure?T.Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day does not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a day?But one only colour & its degrees.[pg 065]Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in assigning the cause of microscopes magnifying objects.Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at 1stgive the name of distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since he would take distance ytthat he had perceived bytouchto be something existing without his mind, but he would certainly think that nothingseenwas without his mind211?S.Space without any bodies existingin rerum naturawould not be extended, as not having parts—in that parts are assigned to it wthrespect to body; from whence also the notion of distance is taken. Now without either parts or distance or mind, how can there be Space, or anything beside one uniform Nothing?Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he saw to be without his mind, or not in a point—the one from microscopic eyes, the other from not perceiving distance, i.e. radius of the visual sphere.M.The trees are in the park, i.e. whether I will or no, whether I imagine anything about them or no. Let me but go thither and open my eyes by day, & I shall not avoid seeing them.By extension blind [man] would mean either the perception caused in his touch by something he calls extended, or else the power of raising that perception; wchpower is without, in the thing termed extended. Now he could not know either of these to be in things visible till he had try'd.Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension, figures, & motion—and not visible212.A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho' the visible idea it yields be less than wtit was; therefore the bigness or tangible extension of the body is different from the visible extension.Extension or space no simple idea—length, breadth, & solidity being three several ideas.[pg 066]Depth or soliditynowperceived by sight213.Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder than a stone or tree; he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills, these having no power at all214.Length perceivable by hearing—length & breadth by sight—length, breadth, & depth by touch.G.Wtaffects us must be a thinking thing, for wtthinks not cannot subsist.Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind, depending entirely on its consideration, & being more or less as the mind pleases215.Mem. Quære whether extension be equally a sensation with colour? The mob use not the word extension. 'Tis an abstract term of the Schools.P.Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but in the body is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section.Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise seen than colours felt by the German Count.M.“Of”and“thing”causes of mistake.The visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will not be greater or less than mine.Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry do not divers of them suppose the existence of lines &c. without the mind?T.Whether motion be the measure of duration? Locke, b. 2. c. 14. s. 19.Lines & points conceiv'd as terminations different ideas from those conceiv'd absolutely.Every position alters a line.S.Blind man at 1stwould not take colours to be without his mind; but colours would seem to be in the same place with the coloured extension: therefore extension wdnot seem to be without the mind.[pg 067]All visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the centre are absolutely equal.Infinite number—why absurd—not rightly solv'd by Locke216.Qu. how 'tis possible we should see flats or right lines?Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon217?Qu. why we see things erect when painted inverted218?T.Question put by Mr. Deering touching the thief and paradise.
T.
T.
The same τὸ νῦν not common to all intelligences.
Time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure.
Extension not infinitely divisible in one sense.
Revolutions immediately measure train of ideas, mediately duration.
T.
T.
Time a sensation; therefore onely in yemind.
Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of yesoul easily conceiv'd, or rather the immortality of the person, that of yesoul not being necessary for ought we can see.
Swiftness of ideas compar'd with ytof motions shews the wisdom of God.
Wtif succession of ideas were swifter, wtif slower?
M.
M.
Fall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism, dispute about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by material substances.
Extension a sensation, therefore not without the mind.
M.
M.
In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire hot, &c.
Primary ideas prov'd not to exist in matter; after the same manner ytsecondary ones are prov'd not to exist therein.
Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension suppose length without breadth, or invisible length, wchis absurd.
M.
M.
World wthout thought isnec quid,nec quantum,nec quale, &c.
M.
M.
'Tis wondrous to contemplate yeWorld empty'd of all intelligences.
Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist. All other things are not so much existences as manners of yeexistence of persons198.
Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not compleatly known?
Infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external existence of extension; but the later is false, ergo yeformer also.
Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at 1stsight?
Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are[pg 060]different from those ideas perceived by touch wchgoe by the same name.
Diagonal incommensurable wthyeside. Quære how this can be in my doctrine?
N.
N.
Qu. how to reconcile Newton's 2 sorts of motion with my doctrine?
Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginableper se.
Molyneux's blind man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or extended at first sight199.
Extension so far from being incompatible wth, yt'tis impossible it should exist without thought.
M. S.
M. S.
Extension itself or anything extended cannot think—these being meer ideas or sensations, whose essence we thoroughly know.
No extension but surface perceivable by sight.
M.
M.
Wnwe imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, 'tis only conceiving a person affected with these sensations.
M.
M.
Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing void of perception—thought seeming to imply action], is a contradiction.
Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion?
T.
T.
In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other times.
M.
M.
If a piece of matter have extension, that must be determined to a particular bigness & figure, but &c.
Nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but powers. Hence a direct & brief demonstration of an active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on whom we depend.
The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities, by the relation of yestory of the German Count.
Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same name in all languages?
Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the soul, or (otherwise thus) whether Being, added to yefaculties, compleat the real essence and adequate definition of the soul?
N.
N.
Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, it be possible for us to know that any body is absolutely[pg 061]at rest, since that supposing ideas much slower than at present, bodies now apparently moving wdthen be apparently at rest?
M.
M.
Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation?
Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his own ideas, that he should compare them to these, and make these like unto them?
T.
T.
The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as ytof a man200.
Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated 3 several ways:—
1st. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible inch, thence it will follow ytunequals are equals, wchis absurd: for at what distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the tangible inch?
2d. One made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs, or any thing he touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot length, if tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea—sed falsum id, ergo et hoc.
3dly. From Molyneux's problem, wchotherwise is falsely solv'd by Locke and him201.
M.
M.
Nothing but ideas perceivable202.
A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving them each. Ergo, he cannot say anything wchis not an idea is like or unlike an idea.
Bodies &c. do exist even wnnot perceived—they being powers in the active being203.
Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. an inconceivable idea,] Locke says204.
Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension, also is] encreated & diminish'd by parts. Hence taken for the same.
If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether tangible or visible, or both?
Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true in a double sense.
Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany'd wthpleasure & pain: hence thought to exist in matter; as also for that it was conceiv'd common to 2 senses, [as also the constant perception of 'em].
Blind at 1stsight could not tell how near what he saw was to him, nor even whether it be wthout him or in his eye205. Qu. Would he not think the later?
Blind at 1stsight could not know ytwthe saw was extended, until he had seen and touched some one self-same thing—not knowing howminimum tangibilewould look in vision.
M.
M.
Mem. That homogeneous particles be brought in to answer the objection of God's creating sun, plants, &c. before animals.
In every bodie two infinite series of extension—the one of tangible, the other of visible.
All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point.
Ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in bodies.
M.
M.
Homogeneous portions of matter—useful to contemplate them.
Extension if in matter changes its relation wthminimum visibile, wchseems to be fixt.
Qu. whether m.v. be fix'd?
M.
M.
Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended, or have an infinite series of extension.
M.
M.
If the world be granted to consist of Matter, 'tis the mind gives it beauty and proportion.
WtI have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in all men between a visible & tangible inch.
Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because they have no common measure; also because their simplest constituent parts or elements are specifically different, viz.punctum visibile & tangibile. N. B. The former seems to be no good reason.
M. N.
M. N.
By immateriality is solv'd the cohesion of bodies, or rather the dispute ceases.
Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity, i.e. neither infinitely small or great.
Greatest possible extension seen under an angle wchwill be less than 180 degrees, the legs of wchangle proceed from the ends of the extension.
N.
N.
Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without the mind, 'tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them; the mind, even according to the materialists, perceiving onely the impressions made upon its brain, or rather the ideas attending these impressions206.
Unityin abstractonot at all divisible, it being as it were a point, or with Barrow nothing at all;in concretonot divisiblead infinitum, there being no one idea demonstrablead infinitum.
M.
M.
Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.
Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, or onely of their relations?
M.
M.
Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask wtsolidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he will know. Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extension of space is continuity of unsolid, &c.
Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity of visible points, tangible extension is a continuity of tangible points?
M.
M.
Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in wthsceptics, Fardella207, &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, wchthey doubt of.
M.
M.
I am more certain of yeexistence & reality of bodies than Mr. Locke; since he pretends onely to wthe calls sensitive knowledge208, whereas I think I have demonstrative[pg 064]knowledge of their existence—by them meaning combinations of powers in an unknown substratum209.
M.
M.
Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the figure and extension of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely divisible, those not so.
'Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because the edges of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense.
Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day.
S.
S.
Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely?
Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. Such do intersect in a point at all angles. After the same way colour is abstract from extension.
Every position alters the line.
Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other ideas, v.g. idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an inch?
The idea of an inch length not one determin'd idea. Hence enquire the reason why we are out in judging of extension by the sight; for which purpose 'tis meet also to consider the frequent & sudden changes of extension by position.
No stated ideas of length without a minimum.
M.
M.
Material substance banter'd by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19.
M.
M.
In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space &c. cease210.
Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of them at all times too small to be felt, we should have confounded tangible & visible extension and figure?
T.
T.
Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day does not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a day?
But one only colour & its degrees.
Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in assigning the cause of microscopes magnifying objects.
Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at 1stgive the name of distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since he would take distance ytthat he had perceived bytouchto be something existing without his mind, but he would certainly think that nothingseenwas without his mind211?
S.
S.
Space without any bodies existingin rerum naturawould not be extended, as not having parts—in that parts are assigned to it wthrespect to body; from whence also the notion of distance is taken. Now without either parts or distance or mind, how can there be Space, or anything beside one uniform Nothing?
Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he saw to be without his mind, or not in a point—the one from microscopic eyes, the other from not perceiving distance, i.e. radius of the visual sphere.
M.
M.
The trees are in the park, i.e. whether I will or no, whether I imagine anything about them or no. Let me but go thither and open my eyes by day, & I shall not avoid seeing them.
By extension blind [man] would mean either the perception caused in his touch by something he calls extended, or else the power of raising that perception; wchpower is without, in the thing termed extended. Now he could not know either of these to be in things visible till he had try'd.
Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension, figures, & motion—and not visible212.
A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho' the visible idea it yields be less than wtit was; therefore the bigness or tangible extension of the body is different from the visible extension.
Extension or space no simple idea—length, breadth, & solidity being three several ideas.
Depth or soliditynowperceived by sight213.
Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder than a stone or tree; he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills, these having no power at all214.
Length perceivable by hearing—length & breadth by sight—length, breadth, & depth by touch.
G.
G.
Wtaffects us must be a thinking thing, for wtthinks not cannot subsist.
Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind, depending entirely on its consideration, & being more or less as the mind pleases215.
Mem. Quære whether extension be equally a sensation with colour? The mob use not the word extension. 'Tis an abstract term of the Schools.
P.
P.
Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but in the body is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.
Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section.
Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise seen than colours felt by the German Count.
M.
M.
“Of”and“thing”causes of mistake.
The visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will not be greater or less than mine.
Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry do not divers of them suppose the existence of lines &c. without the mind?
T.
T.
Whether motion be the measure of duration? Locke, b. 2. c. 14. s. 19.
Lines & points conceiv'd as terminations different ideas from those conceiv'd absolutely.
Every position alters a line.
S.
S.
Blind man at 1stwould not take colours to be without his mind; but colours would seem to be in the same place with the coloured extension: therefore extension wdnot seem to be without the mind.
All visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the centre are absolutely equal.
Infinite number—why absurd—not rightly solv'd by Locke216.
Qu. how 'tis possible we should see flats or right lines?
Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon217?
Qu. why we see things erect when painted inverted218?
T.
T.
Question put by Mr. Deering touching the thief and paradise.