FOOTNOTES:

Mr. Hildreth, referring to the close of this year, says: "So far, indeed, as related to America, Great Britain had good reason to be satisfied with the late campaign. Georgia was entirely subdued, and the royal government re-established. Thepossession of Charleston, Augusta, Ninety-Six, and Camden, supported by an army in the field, secured entire control over all the wealthy parts of South Carolina. North Carolina was full of Tories, anxiously awaiting the approach of Cornwallis. The three Southern States were incapable of helping themselves, and those further north, exhausted and penniless, were little able to send assistance. It seemed as if the promises so often made by Lord George Germaine's American correspondents were now about to be fulfilled, and the rebel colonies to sink beneath the accumulated pressure of this long-protracted struggle."[48]

Thus, at the close of 1780, the military conflicts were almost invariably successful on the side of the British; the resources of the revolutionists in both money and men were exhausted, and their hopes of success utterly extinguished without foreign aid. But though the British were successful on the fields of battle, they everywhere lost in the confidence, esteem, and affections of the people, even of the Loyalists. Yet the prospects of the war party of independence were gloomy indeed. General Washington felt that some great achievement was necessary to revive the hopes of his fellow-countrymen, and save from dissolution his daily decreasing army. His only hope was in aid from France. His words were:

"Without an immediate, ample, and efficacious succour in money, we may make a feeble and expiring effort in our next campaign,in all probability the period of our opposition. Next to a loan in money,a constant naval superiority on these coastsis the object the most interesting."

FOOTNOTES:[34]"The commissaries, greatly in debt, had neither money nor credit, and starvation began to stare the soldiers in the face. To support his army, Washington was again obliged to resort to the harsh expedient of levying contributions on the surrounding country. Each county was called upon for a certain quantity of flour and meat; but as the civil authorities took the matter of supply in hand, for which certificates were given by the commissaries on the appraisement of two magistrates, the use of force did not become necessary." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 301.)[35]"Washington's entire force scarcely exceeded ten thousand men, a number not equal to the (British) garrison of New York; and even of these a considerable number were militia drafts, whose terms of service were fast expiring."—Ib., p. 303.But though New York was in possession of the British, and strongly garrisoned, apprehensions were entertained of attacks upon the several English garrison posts in the State from invasions of marauding parties of the revolutionary army, from facilities of approach on account of the freezing over of all the rivers from the extreme severity of this winter. It is singular that while Benjamin Franklin was leader of the Revolutionists, and now United States Minister to France, his son was one of the leaders of the Loyalists. "It was now," says Mr. Hildreth, "that the 'Board of Associated Loyalists' was formed, of which Franklin, late Royal Governor of New Jersey, released by exchange from his tedious confinement in Connecticut, was made president. Washington, however, was in no condition to undertake an attack, and the winter passed off with few skirmishes." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 303.)[36]Ib., pp. 311, 312.[37]"In the siege, the British lost seventy-six killed and one hundred and eighty-nine wounded; the Americans about an equal number. The prisoners, exclusive of sailors, amounted to five thousand six hundred and eighteen, counting all the adult males of the town." (Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap. lii., p. 253.)[38]Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xx., pp. 337, 338.Yet in the face of the facts above stated by Dr. Ramsay, who was an officer on General Washington's staff, and afterwards member of Congress, where he had access to the official documents and letters from which he compiled his history, Mr. Bancroft makes the following statements and remarks: "The value of the spoil, which was distributed by English and Hessian commissaries of captures, amounted to about £300,000 sterling, so that the dividend of a major-general exceeded 4,000 guineas. There was no restraint on private rapine; the silver plate of the planters was carried off; all negroes that had belonged to the rebels were seized, even though they had themselves sought an asylum within the British lines; and at one embarkation 2,000 were shipped to a market in the West Indies. British officers thought more of amassing fortunes than of re-uniting the empire. The patriots were not allowed to appoint attorneys to manage or sell their estates, a sentence of confiscation hung over the whole land, and British protection was granted only in return for the unconditional promise of loyalty." (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., pp. 305, 306.)[39]"Sir Henry Clinton, having left about 4,000 men for Southern service, embarked early in June with the main army for New York. On his departure the command devolved on Lieutenant-General Cornwallis." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xx., p. 341.)"They saw South Carolina apparently won back to the royal cause, and with some probability that North Carolina would follow the example. But at this crisis intelligence reached Sir Henry Clinton that the Americans upon the Hudson (under the command of General Washington) were on the point of receiving considerable succours; that a French fleet sent to their aid, with several French regiments on board, might soon be expected off the New England coasts. Sir Henry deemed it his duty to provide in person for the safety of his principal charge. In the first days of June he accordingly re-embarked for New York, with a portion of his army; leaving, however, about 4,000 men under Lord Cornwallis's command. The instructions given to Lord Cornwallis were to consider the maintenance of Charleston, and in general of South Carolina, as his main and indispensable objects; but consistently with these, he was left at liberty to make 'a solid move,' as it was termed, into North Carolina, if he judged it proper or found it possible." (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., p. 70.)On the eve of leaving Charleston for New York, Sir Henry reported to the British Colonial Minister, Lord Germaine: "The inhabitants from every quarter declare their allegiance to the King, and offer their services in arms. There are few men in South Carolina who are not either our prisoners or in arms with us."[40]Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., p. 306."The universal panic consequent on the capture of Charleston had suspended all resistance to the British army. The men of Beaufort, of Ninety-Six, and of Camden, had capitulated under the promise of security. They believed that they were to be treated as neutrals or as prisoners on parole. There remained to them no possibility of flight with their families; and if they were inclined to take up arms, there was no American army around which they could rally." (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., p. 307.)"No organized American force was now left in either of the Carolinas. The three most Southern States had not a battalion in the field, nor were the next three much better provided. The Virginia line had been mostly captured at Charleston, or dispersed in subsequent engagements. The same was the case with the North Carolina regiments. The recent battle of Camden had reduced the Maryland line to a single regiment—the Delaware line to a single company." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 316.)[41]"On the 22nd of May, confiscation of property and other punishments were denounced against all who should thereafter oppose the King in arms, or hinder any one from joining his forces. On the 1st of June, a proclamation by the Commissioners Clinton and Arbuthnot, offered pardon to the penitent on their immediate return to allegiance; to the loyal, the promise of their former political immunities, including freedom from taxation, except by their own Legislature. This policy of moderation might have familiarized the Carolinians once more to the British Government; but the proclamation was not communicated to Cornwallis—so that when, three weeks later, two leading men, one of whom had been in a high station, and both principally concerned in the rebellion, went to that officer to surrender themselves under its provisions, he could only answer that he had no knowledge of its existence."On the 3rd of June (the day of his departure from Charleston), Clinton, by a proclamation which he alone signed, cut up British authority in Carolina by the roots. He required all the inhabitants of the province, even those outside of Charleston, 'who were now prisoners on parole,' to take an active part in securing the royal government. 'Should they neglect to return to their allegiance,' so ran the proclamation, 'they will be treated as rebels to the government of the King.' He never reflected that many who accepted protection from fear or convenience, did so in the expectation of living in a state of neutrality, and that they might say, 'If wemust fight, let us fight on the side of our friends, of our countrymen of America.'" (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., pp. 307, 308.)[42]"Earl (afterwards Marquis) Cornwallis was born in 1738. Early in life he had embraced the military profession, which he pursued with undeviating honour, though variable success. In him the want of any shining talents was in a great measure supplied by probity, by punctuality, by steady courage, by vigilant attention to his duties. In 1776, on the Declaratory Bill, he had shown his conciliatory temper to the colonies; denying, with Lord Camden and only three Peers besides, any right we had to tax them while they remained unrepresented in the House of Commons. When, however, the war broke forth, he acted solely as became a soldier. Under Lord Cornwallis was now serving a young officer of no common spirit and daring, destined, like himself, to attain, at another period, the highest office that an Englishman out of England can fill—the office of Governor-General of India. This was Francis Lord Rawdon, subsequently better known, first as Earl of Moira, and then as Marquis of Hastings. In the ensuing battle of Camden, where he held a second rank, he played a distinguished part; he was not yet twenty-six years of age, and he had already gained renown five years before, in the battle of Bunker's Hill." (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., p. 71.)[43]Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap. iii., p. 254."There was no longer any armed American force in South Carolina; and Lord Cornwallis resorted to energetic means of preventing disaffection. All those who were found in arms after they had submitted to British protection were considered as having forfeited their lives, and several of them were hung on the spot. But these severities, instead of their intended effect, produced a strong reaction."—Ib., p. 256.[44]Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., pp. 75, 76.[45]"While the war raged in South Carolina, the campaign of 1780, in the Northern States, was barren of important events. The campaign of 1780 passed away in the Northern States, as has been related, in successive disappointments and reiterated distresses. The country was exhausted; the continental currency expiring. The army, for want of subsistence, was kept inactive and brooding over its calamities. While these disasters were openly menacing the ruin of the American cause, treachery was silently undermining it. A distinguished officer (General Arnold) engaged, for a stipulated sum of money, to betray into the hands of the British an important post committed to his care," etc. (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxiv., pp. 364-377.)[46]"Congress could do nothing, and confessed that it could do nothing. 'We have required,' thus they wrote to the States on the 15th of January, 1781, 'aids of men, provisions and money; the States alone have authority to execute.' Since Congress itself made a public confession of its powerlessness, nothing remained butto appeal to Francefor rescue, not from a foreign enemy, but from the evils consequent on its own want of government. 'If France lends not a speedy aid,' wrote General Greene from the South to her Minister in Philadelphia, 'I fear the country will be for ever lost.' It was therefore resolved for the moment to despatch to Versailles, as a special minister, one who had lived in the midst of the ever-increasing distresses of the army, to set them before the Government of France in the most striking light. The choice fell on the younger Laurens, of South Carolina. To this agent Washington confided a statement of the condition of the country; and with dignity and candour avowed that it had reached a crisis out of which it could not rise by its own unassisted strength. To Franklin he wrote in the same strain; and La Fayette addressed a like memorial of ripe wisdom to Vergennes" (the French Minister for Foreign Affairs). (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap., xix., pp. 417, 418.)"Scarce any one of the States had as yet sent an eighth part of its quota into the field; and there was no prospect of a glorious offensive campaign, unless their generous allies should help them with money, and with a fleet strong enough to secure the superiority at sea."—Ib., p. 425.[47]It was in the latter part of this year, 1780, that the treachery of General Arnold and the melancholy tragedy of Major André's execution took place.[48]Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xli., p. 331."Though British conquests had rapidly succeeded each other, yet no advantages accrued to the victors. The minds of the people were unsubdued, or rather were alienated from every idea of returning to their former allegiance. Such was their temper, that the expense of retaining them in subjection would have exceeded all the profits of the conquest. British garrisons kept down open resistance, in the vicinity of the places where they were established; but as soon as they were withdrawn and the people left to themselves, a spirit of revolt hostile to Great Britain always displayed itself; and the standard of independence, whenever it was prudently raised, never wanted followers among the active and spirited part of the community." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xx., p. 363.)

[34]"The commissaries, greatly in debt, had neither money nor credit, and starvation began to stare the soldiers in the face. To support his army, Washington was again obliged to resort to the harsh expedient of levying contributions on the surrounding country. Each county was called upon for a certain quantity of flour and meat; but as the civil authorities took the matter of supply in hand, for which certificates were given by the commissaries on the appraisement of two magistrates, the use of force did not become necessary." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 301.)

[35]"Washington's entire force scarcely exceeded ten thousand men, a number not equal to the (British) garrison of New York; and even of these a considerable number were militia drafts, whose terms of service were fast expiring."—Ib., p. 303.But though New York was in possession of the British, and strongly garrisoned, apprehensions were entertained of attacks upon the several English garrison posts in the State from invasions of marauding parties of the revolutionary army, from facilities of approach on account of the freezing over of all the rivers from the extreme severity of this winter. It is singular that while Benjamin Franklin was leader of the Revolutionists, and now United States Minister to France, his son was one of the leaders of the Loyalists. "It was now," says Mr. Hildreth, "that the 'Board of Associated Loyalists' was formed, of which Franklin, late Royal Governor of New Jersey, released by exchange from his tedious confinement in Connecticut, was made president. Washington, however, was in no condition to undertake an attack, and the winter passed off with few skirmishes." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 303.)

But though New York was in possession of the British, and strongly garrisoned, apprehensions were entertained of attacks upon the several English garrison posts in the State from invasions of marauding parties of the revolutionary army, from facilities of approach on account of the freezing over of all the rivers from the extreme severity of this winter. It is singular that while Benjamin Franklin was leader of the Revolutionists, and now United States Minister to France, his son was one of the leaders of the Loyalists. "It was now," says Mr. Hildreth, "that the 'Board of Associated Loyalists' was formed, of which Franklin, late Royal Governor of New Jersey, released by exchange from his tedious confinement in Connecticut, was made president. Washington, however, was in no condition to undertake an attack, and the winter passed off with few skirmishes." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 303.)

[36]Ib., pp. 311, 312.

[37]"In the siege, the British lost seventy-six killed and one hundred and eighty-nine wounded; the Americans about an equal number. The prisoners, exclusive of sailors, amounted to five thousand six hundred and eighteen, counting all the adult males of the town." (Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap. lii., p. 253.)

[38]Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xx., pp. 337, 338.Yet in the face of the facts above stated by Dr. Ramsay, who was an officer on General Washington's staff, and afterwards member of Congress, where he had access to the official documents and letters from which he compiled his history, Mr. Bancroft makes the following statements and remarks: "The value of the spoil, which was distributed by English and Hessian commissaries of captures, amounted to about £300,000 sterling, so that the dividend of a major-general exceeded 4,000 guineas. There was no restraint on private rapine; the silver plate of the planters was carried off; all negroes that had belonged to the rebels were seized, even though they had themselves sought an asylum within the British lines; and at one embarkation 2,000 were shipped to a market in the West Indies. British officers thought more of amassing fortunes than of re-uniting the empire. The patriots were not allowed to appoint attorneys to manage or sell their estates, a sentence of confiscation hung over the whole land, and British protection was granted only in return for the unconditional promise of loyalty." (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., pp. 305, 306.)

[38]Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xx., pp. 337, 338.

Yet in the face of the facts above stated by Dr. Ramsay, who was an officer on General Washington's staff, and afterwards member of Congress, where he had access to the official documents and letters from which he compiled his history, Mr. Bancroft makes the following statements and remarks: "The value of the spoil, which was distributed by English and Hessian commissaries of captures, amounted to about £300,000 sterling, so that the dividend of a major-general exceeded 4,000 guineas. There was no restraint on private rapine; the silver plate of the planters was carried off; all negroes that had belonged to the rebels were seized, even though they had themselves sought an asylum within the British lines; and at one embarkation 2,000 were shipped to a market in the West Indies. British officers thought more of amassing fortunes than of re-uniting the empire. The patriots were not allowed to appoint attorneys to manage or sell their estates, a sentence of confiscation hung over the whole land, and British protection was granted only in return for the unconditional promise of loyalty." (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., pp. 305, 306.)

[39]"Sir Henry Clinton, having left about 4,000 men for Southern service, embarked early in June with the main army for New York. On his departure the command devolved on Lieutenant-General Cornwallis." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xx., p. 341.)"They saw South Carolina apparently won back to the royal cause, and with some probability that North Carolina would follow the example. But at this crisis intelligence reached Sir Henry Clinton that the Americans upon the Hudson (under the command of General Washington) were on the point of receiving considerable succours; that a French fleet sent to their aid, with several French regiments on board, might soon be expected off the New England coasts. Sir Henry deemed it his duty to provide in person for the safety of his principal charge. In the first days of June he accordingly re-embarked for New York, with a portion of his army; leaving, however, about 4,000 men under Lord Cornwallis's command. The instructions given to Lord Cornwallis were to consider the maintenance of Charleston, and in general of South Carolina, as his main and indispensable objects; but consistently with these, he was left at liberty to make 'a solid move,' as it was termed, into North Carolina, if he judged it proper or found it possible." (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., p. 70.)On the eve of leaving Charleston for New York, Sir Henry reported to the British Colonial Minister, Lord Germaine: "The inhabitants from every quarter declare their allegiance to the King, and offer their services in arms. There are few men in South Carolina who are not either our prisoners or in arms with us."

"They saw South Carolina apparently won back to the royal cause, and with some probability that North Carolina would follow the example. But at this crisis intelligence reached Sir Henry Clinton that the Americans upon the Hudson (under the command of General Washington) were on the point of receiving considerable succours; that a French fleet sent to their aid, with several French regiments on board, might soon be expected off the New England coasts. Sir Henry deemed it his duty to provide in person for the safety of his principal charge. In the first days of June he accordingly re-embarked for New York, with a portion of his army; leaving, however, about 4,000 men under Lord Cornwallis's command. The instructions given to Lord Cornwallis were to consider the maintenance of Charleston, and in general of South Carolina, as his main and indispensable objects; but consistently with these, he was left at liberty to make 'a solid move,' as it was termed, into North Carolina, if he judged it proper or found it possible." (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., p. 70.)

On the eve of leaving Charleston for New York, Sir Henry reported to the British Colonial Minister, Lord Germaine: "The inhabitants from every quarter declare their allegiance to the King, and offer their services in arms. There are few men in South Carolina who are not either our prisoners or in arms with us."

[40]Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., p. 306."The universal panic consequent on the capture of Charleston had suspended all resistance to the British army. The men of Beaufort, of Ninety-Six, and of Camden, had capitulated under the promise of security. They believed that they were to be treated as neutrals or as prisoners on parole. There remained to them no possibility of flight with their families; and if they were inclined to take up arms, there was no American army around which they could rally." (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., p. 307.)"No organized American force was now left in either of the Carolinas. The three most Southern States had not a battalion in the field, nor were the next three much better provided. The Virginia line had been mostly captured at Charleston, or dispersed in subsequent engagements. The same was the case with the North Carolina regiments. The recent battle of Camden had reduced the Maryland line to a single regiment—the Delaware line to a single company." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 316.)

[40]Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., p. 306.

"The universal panic consequent on the capture of Charleston had suspended all resistance to the British army. The men of Beaufort, of Ninety-Six, and of Camden, had capitulated under the promise of security. They believed that they were to be treated as neutrals or as prisoners on parole. There remained to them no possibility of flight with their families; and if they were inclined to take up arms, there was no American army around which they could rally." (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., p. 307.)

"No organized American force was now left in either of the Carolinas. The three most Southern States had not a battalion in the field, nor were the next three much better provided. The Virginia line had been mostly captured at Charleston, or dispersed in subsequent engagements. The same was the case with the North Carolina regiments. The recent battle of Camden had reduced the Maryland line to a single regiment—the Delaware line to a single company." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 316.)

[41]"On the 22nd of May, confiscation of property and other punishments were denounced against all who should thereafter oppose the King in arms, or hinder any one from joining his forces. On the 1st of June, a proclamation by the Commissioners Clinton and Arbuthnot, offered pardon to the penitent on their immediate return to allegiance; to the loyal, the promise of their former political immunities, including freedom from taxation, except by their own Legislature. This policy of moderation might have familiarized the Carolinians once more to the British Government; but the proclamation was not communicated to Cornwallis—so that when, three weeks later, two leading men, one of whom had been in a high station, and both principally concerned in the rebellion, went to that officer to surrender themselves under its provisions, he could only answer that he had no knowledge of its existence."On the 3rd of June (the day of his departure from Charleston), Clinton, by a proclamation which he alone signed, cut up British authority in Carolina by the roots. He required all the inhabitants of the province, even those outside of Charleston, 'who were now prisoners on parole,' to take an active part in securing the royal government. 'Should they neglect to return to their allegiance,' so ran the proclamation, 'they will be treated as rebels to the government of the King.' He never reflected that many who accepted protection from fear or convenience, did so in the expectation of living in a state of neutrality, and that they might say, 'If wemust fight, let us fight on the side of our friends, of our countrymen of America.'" (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., pp. 307, 308.)

"On the 3rd of June (the day of his departure from Charleston), Clinton, by a proclamation which he alone signed, cut up British authority in Carolina by the roots. He required all the inhabitants of the province, even those outside of Charleston, 'who were now prisoners on parole,' to take an active part in securing the royal government. 'Should they neglect to return to their allegiance,' so ran the proclamation, 'they will be treated as rebels to the government of the King.' He never reflected that many who accepted protection from fear or convenience, did so in the expectation of living in a state of neutrality, and that they might say, 'If wemust fight, let us fight on the side of our friends, of our countrymen of America.'" (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., pp. 307, 308.)

[42]"Earl (afterwards Marquis) Cornwallis was born in 1738. Early in life he had embraced the military profession, which he pursued with undeviating honour, though variable success. In him the want of any shining talents was in a great measure supplied by probity, by punctuality, by steady courage, by vigilant attention to his duties. In 1776, on the Declaratory Bill, he had shown his conciliatory temper to the colonies; denying, with Lord Camden and only three Peers besides, any right we had to tax them while they remained unrepresented in the House of Commons. When, however, the war broke forth, he acted solely as became a soldier. Under Lord Cornwallis was now serving a young officer of no common spirit and daring, destined, like himself, to attain, at another period, the highest office that an Englishman out of England can fill—the office of Governor-General of India. This was Francis Lord Rawdon, subsequently better known, first as Earl of Moira, and then as Marquis of Hastings. In the ensuing battle of Camden, where he held a second rank, he played a distinguished part; he was not yet twenty-six years of age, and he had already gained renown five years before, in the battle of Bunker's Hill." (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., p. 71.)

[43]Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap. iii., p. 254."There was no longer any armed American force in South Carolina; and Lord Cornwallis resorted to energetic means of preventing disaffection. All those who were found in arms after they had submitted to British protection were considered as having forfeited their lives, and several of them were hung on the spot. But these severities, instead of their intended effect, produced a strong reaction."—Ib., p. 256.

[43]Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap. iii., p. 254.

"There was no longer any armed American force in South Carolina; and Lord Cornwallis resorted to energetic means of preventing disaffection. All those who were found in arms after they had submitted to British protection were considered as having forfeited their lives, and several of them were hung on the spot. But these severities, instead of their intended effect, produced a strong reaction."—Ib., p. 256.

[44]Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., pp. 75, 76.

[45]"While the war raged in South Carolina, the campaign of 1780, in the Northern States, was barren of important events. The campaign of 1780 passed away in the Northern States, as has been related, in successive disappointments and reiterated distresses. The country was exhausted; the continental currency expiring. The army, for want of subsistence, was kept inactive and brooding over its calamities. While these disasters were openly menacing the ruin of the American cause, treachery was silently undermining it. A distinguished officer (General Arnold) engaged, for a stipulated sum of money, to betray into the hands of the British an important post committed to his care," etc. (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxiv., pp. 364-377.)

[46]"Congress could do nothing, and confessed that it could do nothing. 'We have required,' thus they wrote to the States on the 15th of January, 1781, 'aids of men, provisions and money; the States alone have authority to execute.' Since Congress itself made a public confession of its powerlessness, nothing remained butto appeal to Francefor rescue, not from a foreign enemy, but from the evils consequent on its own want of government. 'If France lends not a speedy aid,' wrote General Greene from the South to her Minister in Philadelphia, 'I fear the country will be for ever lost.' It was therefore resolved for the moment to despatch to Versailles, as a special minister, one who had lived in the midst of the ever-increasing distresses of the army, to set them before the Government of France in the most striking light. The choice fell on the younger Laurens, of South Carolina. To this agent Washington confided a statement of the condition of the country; and with dignity and candour avowed that it had reached a crisis out of which it could not rise by its own unassisted strength. To Franklin he wrote in the same strain; and La Fayette addressed a like memorial of ripe wisdom to Vergennes" (the French Minister for Foreign Affairs). (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap., xix., pp. 417, 418.)"Scarce any one of the States had as yet sent an eighth part of its quota into the field; and there was no prospect of a glorious offensive campaign, unless their generous allies should help them with money, and with a fleet strong enough to secure the superiority at sea."—Ib., p. 425.

"Scarce any one of the States had as yet sent an eighth part of its quota into the field; and there was no prospect of a glorious offensive campaign, unless their generous allies should help them with money, and with a fleet strong enough to secure the superiority at sea."—Ib., p. 425.

[47]It was in the latter part of this year, 1780, that the treachery of General Arnold and the melancholy tragedy of Major André's execution took place.

[48]Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xli., p. 331."Though British conquests had rapidly succeeded each other, yet no advantages accrued to the victors. The minds of the people were unsubdued, or rather were alienated from every idea of returning to their former allegiance. Such was their temper, that the expense of retaining them in subjection would have exceeded all the profits of the conquest. British garrisons kept down open resistance, in the vicinity of the places where they were established; but as soon as they were withdrawn and the people left to themselves, a spirit of revolt hostile to Great Britain always displayed itself; and the standard of independence, whenever it was prudently raised, never wanted followers among the active and spirited part of the community." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xx., p. 363.)

[48]Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xli., p. 331.

"Though British conquests had rapidly succeeded each other, yet no advantages accrued to the victors. The minds of the people were unsubdued, or rather were alienated from every idea of returning to their former allegiance. Such was their temper, that the expense of retaining them in subjection would have exceeded all the profits of the conquest. British garrisons kept down open resistance, in the vicinity of the places where they were established; but as soon as they were withdrawn and the people left to themselves, a spirit of revolt hostile to Great Britain always displayed itself; and the standard of independence, whenever it was prudently raised, never wanted followers among the active and spirited part of the community." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xx., p. 363.)

The French and Congress Allies in 1781 Recover Virginia—Surrender of Lord Cornwallis—Results.

Under the adverse circumstances andgloom which attended and closed the year 1780, as stated in the preceding chapter, Washington felt the necessity of doing something bold and great to revive the confidence of his countrymen and arrest the decline of his army.

Under these circumstances, a campaign of operations was devised and agreed upon by Washington and the commander of the French troops. The centres of British power in America were the army of about ten thousand men in New York, under the immediate command of Sir Henry Clinton, who was, indeed, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in North America; and secondly, the army of Virginia, about seven thousand men, under the command of Earl Cornwallis; and thirdly, the garrison of Charleston, South Carolina, under the command of Lord Rawdon; Savannah, the capital of Georgia, was also occupied by a British garrison. Washington's plan was to pretend an attack upon New York, but to make a real attack upon the army of Virginia, with the view of extinguishing British power in the Southern States. So well was the appearance of an intended attack upon New York kept up, that Sir Henry Clinton made all needful preparations for its defence, and actually ordered Lord Cornwallis to send a detachment of his men to New York to strengthen its defence; but after their embarkation for that purpose the order was countermanded, and Lord Cornwallis was allowed to retain them. Nothing could be more complete than the deception practised upon SirHenry Clinton; nor did he suspect the real intention of the allied armies until they had crossed the Hudson and were on their way, through the Jerseys, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, to Virginia.[49]

"In the latter end of August," says Dr. Ramsay, "the American army began their march to Virginia from the neighbourhood of New York. Washington had advanced as far as Chester before he received information of the arrival of De Grasse. The French troops marched at the same time, for the same place. In the course of this summer they passed through all the extensive settlements which lie between Newport and Yorktown. It seldom if ever happened before, that an army led through a foreign country at so great a distance from their own, among a people of different principles, customs, language, and religion, behaved with so much regularity. In their march to Yorktown they had to pass through five hundred miles of a country abounding in fruit, and at a time when the most delicious productions of nature, growing on and near the public highways, presented both opportunity and temptation to gratifytheir appetites, yet so complete was their discipline, that in this long march scarce an instance could be produced of a peach or an apple being taken without the consent of the inhabitants."[50]

On the 14th of September, Washington and De Rochambeau, in advance of their armies and with their respective staffs of officers, arrived at Williamsburg; and with Generals Chastellux, Du Portail, and Knox, visited Count de Grasse on board his famous ship, theVille de Paris, and agreed on the plan of operations against Earl Cornwallis at Yorktown, on York river, to which the allied armies at once proceeded, for the purpose of besieging it. On the 1st day of October, General Washington was able to report to the President of Congress that the investment of the place was completed. "Gloucester (on the opposite side of the river, not a mile wide there), which was held by Colonel Dundas, was beleaguered by some Virginian troops, and by the French legion of the Duke de Lauzun. Yorktown, where Cornwallis in person, and with his main force, commanded, saw to his left the division of La Fayette, and to his right the division of St. Simon. Other bodies of troops filled the space between them, while Washington and Rochambeau fixed their posts near together, towards the centre. They brought up fifty pieces of cannon, for the most part heavy, by aid from the French ships, as also sixteen mortars, and they lost no time in commencing their first parallel against the town.[51]By the 9th the first parallel was completed, when the town and its defences were cannonaded and shelled. Within another week a second parallel was completed withinthree hundred yards of the defences, two redoubts stormed and taken—one by the French and the other by the Americans—and the further defence of the town rendered impossible."

"Down to this time, the 15th of October, Lord Cornwallis had expected reinforcements of ships and troops from New York;[52]but he now despaired of aid from that quarter, and attempted to escape with his army in the night across the river, which was prevented by a storm, when the only alternative left him was to surrender on the best terms he could obtain. On the morning of the 17th he sent a flag of truce to Washington, proposing a cessation of arms, and a treaty for the capitulation of his post. Hostilities ceased; the terms of surrender were discussed and agreed upon on the 18th by four commissioners, two field officers being named on each side. The army, and all that belonged to it, was surrendered to Washington; and the ships and seamen to Count de Grasse" (Tucker).

"All the artillery and public stores in the two forts, together with the shipping and boats in the two harbours, were to be surrendered by the English. On the other hand, private property of every kind was to be respected by the Americans and French. The garrisons of York and Gloucester were to march out with the same honours of war as had been granted by Sir Henry Clinton at Charleston; the land forces to remain prisoners of the United States, and the naval forces prisoners of France. The soldiers were to be kept in Virginia, Maryland, or Pennsylvania, and as much by regiments as possible. The general staff and other officers not left with the troops to be permitted to go to New York, or to Europe, on parole."[53]

The battle of Yorktown, and the surrender of Lord Cornwallis to the arms of the French and the Americans, may be regarded as the last battle of importance of the civil war in America. American writers and orators are fond of saying that here was brought face to face on the battle-field the strength of Old England and Young America, and the latter prevailed. No statement can be more unfounded, and no boast more groundless than this. England, without an ally, was at war with three kingdoms—France, Spain, and Holland—the most potent naval and military powers of Europe; while were also arrayed against her, by an "armed neutrality," Russia,Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden. England was armed to the teeth for the defence of her own shores against threatened invasion, while her navies were maintaining in sundry battles the honour of the British flag on three seas.

A small part only of the British land and naval forces was on the coast of America; yet there were garrisons at Savannah and Charleston, and a much larger military force at New York, under the command of Sir Henry Clinton, than that of Yorktown, under Lord Cornwallis. In the following campaign the English fleet was victorious over the French fleet in the West Indies, capturing the great shipVille de Paris, and taking Count de Grasse himself prisoner. In the siege of Yorktown there were about 18,000 of the allied army of French and Americans, besides ships of the line and sailors, while the effective men under command of Lord Cornwallis amounted to less than 4,000. It was a marvel of skill and courage that with an army so small, and in a town so exposed and so incapable of being strongly fortified, and against an allied force so overwhelming, Lord Cornwallis was able to sustain a siege for a fortnight, until he despaired of reinforcements from New York.

Be it also observed, that the greater part of the forces besieging Yorktown were not Americans, but French, who supplied the shipping and artillery; in short, all the attacking forces by water, and a duplicate land enemy—the one part under the command of Count de Rochambeau, and the other part under the command of the Marquis de La Fayette. Had it not been for the French fleet and the French land forces, Washington would not have attempted an attack upon Yorktown. The success of the siege was, therefore, more French than American, though Washington had the nominal command of the allied army.

No one can doubt the undaunted courage and matchless skill of Washington, and his great superiority over any English general ever sent against him; nor can the bravery and endurance of his army be justly questioned; nor the dash and boldness and gallantry of the French army. But it is idle to speak of the siege of Yorktown as a trial of strength between Young America and Old England. And it is equally incorrect to say that the resources of England, in men or money, in ships or land forces, were exhausted, or that England was compelledto make peace in consequence of the disaster of Lord Cornwallis. There had been a peace party, both in and out of Parliament, opposed to the American war from the beginning. That party included some of the ablest statesmen in England, and increased in strength and influence from year to year, by exposing the incompetence, extravagance, and corruption of the Administration, the failure of all their plans, and the non-fulfilment of any of their promises in regard to America; that although they could defeat the Americans in the field of battle, they had not conquered and they could not conquer the hearts of the people, who became more and more alienated from England by the very example and depredations of the British officers and soldiers. The surrender of Lord Cornwallis, the importance of which was greatly magnified, increased the intensity of English feeling against the continuance of the American war, until the peace party actually gained a majority in the House of Commons, compelled the retirement of the old and corrupt Ministry, which had been the cause of all the oppressions in the American colonies and all the miseries of the war. Session after session, the leaders of the Opposition in both the Lords and Commons moved resolutions condemning the American war and the manner of conducting it; the Duke of Richmond, the Marquis of Rockingham, the Earl of Shelburne in the Lords; and General Conway, Mr. Fox, Mr. Burke, Lord John Cavendish, Mr. Hartley, Mr. Dunning (afterwards Lord Ashburton), and Sir James Lowther in the Commons. Several resolutions were introduced into the Commons condemnatory of the war in America, with a view of reducing the colonies to submission, and were defeated by small majorities—in one a majority of ten, and in another a majority of onlyone. At length they were censured and rejected by the Commons without a division.

On the 22nd of February, General Conway moved "That an address should be presented to his Majesty, to implore his Majesty to listen to the advice of his Commons, that the war in America might no longer be pursued for the impracticable purpose of reducing the inhabitants of that country to obedience by force, and to express their hopes that his Majesty's desire to restore the public tranquillity might be forwarded and made effectual by a happy reconciliation with the revolted colonies."

After a lengthened debate, this resolution was negatived—one hundred and ninety-three for the resolution, against it one hundred and ninety-four—a majority of one for the continuance of the war.

The motion having been objected to as vague in its terms, General Conway, on the 27th of February, introduced another motion, the same in substance with the previous one, but varied in phraseology, so as to meet the rules of the House, and more explicit in its terms. This resolution was strongly opposed by the Ministry; and after a long debate the Attorney-General moved the adjournment of the House: For the adjournment voted two hundred and fifteen; against it, two hundred and thirty-four—majority of nineteen against the Ministry—so that the original question, and an address to the King, framed upon the resolution, were then earned without a division.[54]The King returned a gracious but vague answer.

General Conway, after moving a vote of thanks to the King for his gracious answer, followed by moving a resolution: "That this House would consider as enemies to his Majesty and the country all those who should advise or by any means attempt the further prosecution of offensive war, on the continent of North America, for the purpose of reducing the revolted colonies to obedience by force." This motion, after a feeble opposition from the Ministry, was allowed to pass without a division.

It might be supposed, under these circumstances, that the Ministry would forthwith resign; but they continued to hold on to office, which they had held for twelve years, to the great injury of England and her colonies.

To bring the matter to an issue, the following resolution was moved on the 8th of March by Lord John Cavendish, seconded by Mr. Powys:

"That it appears to this House, that since the year 1775 upwards of one hundred millions of money have been expended on the army and navy in a fruitless war.

"That it appears to this House, that during the above period we have lost the thirteen colonies of America, which anciently belonged to the Crown of Great Britain (except the ports of New York, Charleston, and Savannah), the newly acquired colony of Florida, many of our valuable West India and other islands, and those that remain are in the utmost danger.

"That it appears to this House, that Great Britain is at present engaged in an expensive war with America, France, Spain, and Holland, without a single ally.

"That it appears to this House, that the chief cause of all these misfortunes has been the want of foresight and ability in his Majesty's Ministers.[55]"

The facts stated in the first three of these resolutions were admitted on all sides; the discussion, therefore, turned upon the conclusion drawn in the last resolution, the justice of which was patent to all from the uniform failure and disgrace of the policy and all the separate measures of Ministers during the whole of their administration. It was attempted to be argued, in defence of Ministers, that misfortune did not always prove misconduct; that the failure of execution of measures might depend, not on those who planned them, but on the fault of those who were to execute them. But "this ground," says the Parliamentary Register, "appeared so weak, even to the friends of the Administration, that it was almost entirely deserted, except by the Ministers themselves; and the question was taken up with great art and ingenuity on other topics, as to who would succeed the Administration they were endeavouring to remove, and the diversity of opinions among them. But the efforts on the part of Ministers and their friends to create jealousies and discords among the members of the Opposition proved fruitless; and when the final vote was proposed, the Secretary of War evaded it by moving the order of the day, which was carried by a majority of ten."

In the interval between the 8th and 14th, every intrigue was employed to create discord among the members of the Opposition, and to bring about a coalition under the presidency of Lord North, and a resolution was moved to that effect, which was lost by a majority of only nine.

The Earl of Surrey gave notice that on the morning of the 20th inst. he would move, in substance, Lord John Cavendish's resolution directly condemnatory of the Ministry. On that morning Lord North and the Earl of Surrey rose at the same moment, and neither would give way to the other. The general cry was "Lord Surrey, and no adjournment." As soon as the House could be reduced to order, it was moved "That the Earl of Surrey be now heard," when Lord North, having obtained the right to speak, said, "I rise to speak to the motion before the House." He observed that had he been suffered to proceed before, he believed much unnecessary heat and disorder would have been prevented. He meant no disrespect to the noble earl; but as notice had been given that the object of the intended motion was the removal of his Majesty's Ministers, he meant to have acquainted the House that such a motion had become unnecessary. He could assure the House with authority thatthe present Administration was no more, and that his Majesty had come to a full determination of changing his Ministers; and that it was for the purpose of giving necessary time for new arrangements that he meant to have moved an adjournment.

The noble lord then took leave of the House as a Minister of the Crown, and with many kind and courteous words thanked them for the honourable support they had given him during so long a course of years.[56]

By such blows following each otherin the Commons, in rapid succession and with accelerated force, was driven from power an Administration which had inflicted greater evils upon the Crown, the constitution, the people of England and of the colonies, than any Administration since the Revolution of 1688.[57]

FOOTNOTES:[49]It appears, however, that in the first consultation, which "took place at Weathersfield, between Generals Washington, Knox, and Du Portail on the part of the Americans, and Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier Chastellux on the part of the French, it was agreed to lay siege to New York in concert with the French fleet, which was to arrive on the coast in the month of August. Washington addressed letters to the executive officers of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey, requiring them to fill up their battalions, and to have their quotas of six thousand two hundred militia in readiness within a week after the time they might be called for. But all these States not adding five hundred men to Washington's army, Sir Henry Clinton having received a reinforcement of three thousand Germans, and intelligence having been received that Count de Grasse, with a French fleet of twenty-eight ships and seven thousand troops (besides seamen), had sailed for the Chesapeake, Washington and Count de Rochambeau changed their plan of operations and determined to proceed to Virginia, and, in combination with the French fleet and soldiers, to capture the army under the command of Earl Cornwallis in Virginia. The appearance of an intention to attack New York was nevertheless kept up. While this deception was played off, the allied army crossed the North River on August 24th, and passed on by the way of Philadelphia through the intermediate country to Yorktown, Virginia. An attempt to reduce the British force in Virginia promised success with more expedition, and to secure an object of nearly equal importance to the reduction of New York." (Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxv., pp. 448-451.)[50]Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxv., pp. 450, 451.[51]Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxiv., p. 172."On the other hand, Lord Cornwallis is admitted to have shown most undaunted resolution. The officers under him, and the troops, German and English, all did their duty well. For some weeks they had laboured hard, and unremittingly, in raising their defences; and they were now prepared with equal spirit to maintain their half-completed works. But besides the enemy without, they had another within—an epidemic sickness, that stretched many hundreds helpless in their pallet-beds. Nor could they hinder Washington from completing his first parallel and opening his fire upon them in the evening of the 9th of October. For two days the fire was incessant from heavy cannon, and from mortars and howitzers, throwing shells in showers on the town, until, says Cornwallis, all our guns on the left were silenced, our works much damaged, and our loss of men considerable. By these shells, also, theCharon, a ship of forty-four guns, together with three British transports in the river, were set in flames and consumed."—Ib., p. 173.[52]Before the investment of Yorktown, Lord Cornwallis sent a despatch to Sir Henry Clinton, informing him of the delicacy and danger of his situation, and requesting reinforcements. On the evening of the 29th of September, Lord Cornwallis was cheered by the arrival of an express, bringing despatches from Sir Henry Clinton, dated the 24th, informing him that by the 5th of October a fleet of twenty-three sail of the line, three of which were three-deckers, with 5,000 men, rank and file, would start for his assistance. The auxiliary forces at New York were ready and eager to depart by the 5th of October; but the ships were delayed by the slowness and obstinacy of Admiral Arbuthnot. Sir Henry Clinton writes: "We had the misfortune to see almost every succeeding day produce some naval obstruction or other to protract our departure; and I am sorry to add, that it was the afternoon of the 19th before the fleet was fairly at sea. This was the day of Lord Cornwallis's capitulation. Five days afterwards the fleet with the 5,000 troops arrived off the Chesapeake, when they received the news of the surrender of Lord Cornwallis, and sailed back to New York. Had these auxiliary forces started from New York at the time promised, the siege of Yorktown would have been raised, the allied army defeated, and Lord Cornwallis and his little army would have been victors instead of prisoners."[53]Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxiv., pp. 177, 178."The officers were to retain their side arms and private property of every kind, but all property obviously belonging to inhabitants of the United States to be subject to be reclaimed; the soldiers to be supplied with the same rations as were allowed to soldiers in the service of Congress. Cornwallis endeavoured to obtain permission for the British and German troops to return to their respective countries, under no other restrictions than an engagement not to serve against France or America. He also tried to obtain an indemnity for those of the inhabitants who had joined him; but he was obliged to recede from the former, and also to consent that the loyalists in his camp should be given up to the unconditional mercy of their countrymen. His lordship, nevertheless, obtained (from Washington) permission for theBonettasloop of war to pass unexamined to New York. This gave an opportunity of screening such of the loyalists as were most obnoxious to the Americans." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxv., pp. 454, 455.)"The regular troops of France and America, employed in this siege, consisted of about 7,000 of the former (besides ships and seamen), and 5,500 of the latter; and they were assisted by about 4,000 militia. The troops of every kind that surrendered prisoners of war were about 7,000; but so great was the number of the sick and wounded, that there were only 3,800 capable of bearing arms."—Ib., p. 455.[54]During the discussion on this question, it had been argued that the Americans are fed, clothed, and paid by France; they are led on by French officers; the French and the American armies are incorporated into one; it was merely a locality that should give name to a war. France had formerly been fought with success in Germany, and there could be no solid objection to fighting her in America. General Conway argued that French troops did not cost more than £40 per man a year, while the expense of the English troops cost £100 per man a year. General Conway reminded the House that though seventy-three thousand men were voted and paid for, we had never above half that number in actual service. Government had, therefore, only to complete the regiments, and they would have more men in America than ever they had before. (Annual Register of Parliament for 1782, pp. 158-161.)[55]Annual Register of Parliament for 1782, Vol. XXIX., p. 173.[56]Abridged from the Parliamentary Register for 1782, Vol. XXV., Chap. vii. See also Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxv.Lord Mahon concludes his account of this Administration as follows:"Thus ended Lord North's Administration of twelve years. It is certainly strange, on contemplating these twelve years, to find so many harsh and rigorous measures proceed from the most gentle and good-humoured of Prime Ministers. Happy, had but greater firmness in maintaining his own opinions been joined to so much ability in defending opinions even when not his own."Even as to the disasters and miscarriages, however, which could not be denied in his Administration, the friends of Lord North contended that in truth he was not answerable for them. The points in his favour were argued a few days before his fall by Mr. George Onslow in the House of Commons. 'Why,' said Mr. Onslow, 'have we in this war with America such ill success? Mainly,' he continued, 'from the support and countenance given in that House to American rebellion. The army of Washington had been called by the Opposition "our army;" the cause of the Americans had been called "the cause of liberty;" and one gentleman (this was Mr. Burke), while lavishing his praises on Dr. Franklin and Mr. Laurens, had declared he would prefer a prison with them to freedom in company with those who were supporting the cause of England.' But this vindication, though spirited, nay, though true, is faulty; because, though true, it is not the whole truth; because it overlooks what no statesman should—the certainty that when free principles are at stake, dissensions will always arise in a free country."—Ib., pp. 209, 210.[57]I have not a shadow of doubt, that had the leaders in Congress adhered to their pretensions of contending and fighting for British constitutional rights, as aforetime, instead of renouncing those rights and declaring Independence in 1776, the changes which took place in the Administration in England in 1783 would have taken place in 1777; for the corrupt Administration showed as strong symptoms of decline, and was as manifestly "tottering to its fall" in the parliamentary session which commenced in 1776, as it did in the session which commenced in 1782. In both cases its predictions and assured successes had been completely falsified; in both cases the indignation of the nation was aroused against the Administration, and the confidence of Parliament was on the point of being withdrawn in 1776-77, as it was withdrawn in the session of 1782-83; but in 1776, the Congress, instead of adhering to its heretofore professed principles, was induced by its leaders, as related in Chapter xxvi., to renounce its former principles; to falsify all its former professions to its advocates in England and fellow-subjects in America; to renounce the maintenance of the constitutional rights of British subjects; to adopt a Declaration of Independence, of eternal separation from England; to extinguish the national life of the British empire and the unity of the Anglo-Saxon race, and seek an alliance with their own and Great Britain's hereditary enemies for a war upon their mother country, which had protected them for a hundred years against the French and Spaniards, who had also employed and rewarded the Indians to destroy them.

[49]It appears, however, that in the first consultation, which "took place at Weathersfield, between Generals Washington, Knox, and Du Portail on the part of the Americans, and Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier Chastellux on the part of the French, it was agreed to lay siege to New York in concert with the French fleet, which was to arrive on the coast in the month of August. Washington addressed letters to the executive officers of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey, requiring them to fill up their battalions, and to have their quotas of six thousand two hundred militia in readiness within a week after the time they might be called for. But all these States not adding five hundred men to Washington's army, Sir Henry Clinton having received a reinforcement of three thousand Germans, and intelligence having been received that Count de Grasse, with a French fleet of twenty-eight ships and seven thousand troops (besides seamen), had sailed for the Chesapeake, Washington and Count de Rochambeau changed their plan of operations and determined to proceed to Virginia, and, in combination with the French fleet and soldiers, to capture the army under the command of Earl Cornwallis in Virginia. The appearance of an intention to attack New York was nevertheless kept up. While this deception was played off, the allied army crossed the North River on August 24th, and passed on by the way of Philadelphia through the intermediate country to Yorktown, Virginia. An attempt to reduce the British force in Virginia promised success with more expedition, and to secure an object of nearly equal importance to the reduction of New York." (Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxv., pp. 448-451.)

[50]Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxv., pp. 450, 451.

[51]Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxiv., p. 172."On the other hand, Lord Cornwallis is admitted to have shown most undaunted resolution. The officers under him, and the troops, German and English, all did their duty well. For some weeks they had laboured hard, and unremittingly, in raising their defences; and they were now prepared with equal spirit to maintain their half-completed works. But besides the enemy without, they had another within—an epidemic sickness, that stretched many hundreds helpless in their pallet-beds. Nor could they hinder Washington from completing his first parallel and opening his fire upon them in the evening of the 9th of October. For two days the fire was incessant from heavy cannon, and from mortars and howitzers, throwing shells in showers on the town, until, says Cornwallis, all our guns on the left were silenced, our works much damaged, and our loss of men considerable. By these shells, also, theCharon, a ship of forty-four guns, together with three British transports in the river, were set in flames and consumed."—Ib., p. 173.

[51]Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxiv., p. 172.

"On the other hand, Lord Cornwallis is admitted to have shown most undaunted resolution. The officers under him, and the troops, German and English, all did their duty well. For some weeks they had laboured hard, and unremittingly, in raising their defences; and they were now prepared with equal spirit to maintain their half-completed works. But besides the enemy without, they had another within—an epidemic sickness, that stretched many hundreds helpless in their pallet-beds. Nor could they hinder Washington from completing his first parallel and opening his fire upon them in the evening of the 9th of October. For two days the fire was incessant from heavy cannon, and from mortars and howitzers, throwing shells in showers on the town, until, says Cornwallis, all our guns on the left were silenced, our works much damaged, and our loss of men considerable. By these shells, also, theCharon, a ship of forty-four guns, together with three British transports in the river, were set in flames and consumed."—Ib., p. 173.

[52]Before the investment of Yorktown, Lord Cornwallis sent a despatch to Sir Henry Clinton, informing him of the delicacy and danger of his situation, and requesting reinforcements. On the evening of the 29th of September, Lord Cornwallis was cheered by the arrival of an express, bringing despatches from Sir Henry Clinton, dated the 24th, informing him that by the 5th of October a fleet of twenty-three sail of the line, three of which were three-deckers, with 5,000 men, rank and file, would start for his assistance. The auxiliary forces at New York were ready and eager to depart by the 5th of October; but the ships were delayed by the slowness and obstinacy of Admiral Arbuthnot. Sir Henry Clinton writes: "We had the misfortune to see almost every succeeding day produce some naval obstruction or other to protract our departure; and I am sorry to add, that it was the afternoon of the 19th before the fleet was fairly at sea. This was the day of Lord Cornwallis's capitulation. Five days afterwards the fleet with the 5,000 troops arrived off the Chesapeake, when they received the news of the surrender of Lord Cornwallis, and sailed back to New York. Had these auxiliary forces started from New York at the time promised, the siege of Yorktown would have been raised, the allied army defeated, and Lord Cornwallis and his little army would have been victors instead of prisoners."

[53]Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxiv., pp. 177, 178."The officers were to retain their side arms and private property of every kind, but all property obviously belonging to inhabitants of the United States to be subject to be reclaimed; the soldiers to be supplied with the same rations as were allowed to soldiers in the service of Congress. Cornwallis endeavoured to obtain permission for the British and German troops to return to their respective countries, under no other restrictions than an engagement not to serve against France or America. He also tried to obtain an indemnity for those of the inhabitants who had joined him; but he was obliged to recede from the former, and also to consent that the loyalists in his camp should be given up to the unconditional mercy of their countrymen. His lordship, nevertheless, obtained (from Washington) permission for theBonettasloop of war to pass unexamined to New York. This gave an opportunity of screening such of the loyalists as were most obnoxious to the Americans." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxv., pp. 454, 455.)"The regular troops of France and America, employed in this siege, consisted of about 7,000 of the former (besides ships and seamen), and 5,500 of the latter; and they were assisted by about 4,000 militia. The troops of every kind that surrendered prisoners of war were about 7,000; but so great was the number of the sick and wounded, that there were only 3,800 capable of bearing arms."—Ib., p. 455.

[53]Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxiv., pp. 177, 178.

"The officers were to retain their side arms and private property of every kind, but all property obviously belonging to inhabitants of the United States to be subject to be reclaimed; the soldiers to be supplied with the same rations as were allowed to soldiers in the service of Congress. Cornwallis endeavoured to obtain permission for the British and German troops to return to their respective countries, under no other restrictions than an engagement not to serve against France or America. He also tried to obtain an indemnity for those of the inhabitants who had joined him; but he was obliged to recede from the former, and also to consent that the loyalists in his camp should be given up to the unconditional mercy of their countrymen. His lordship, nevertheless, obtained (from Washington) permission for theBonettasloop of war to pass unexamined to New York. This gave an opportunity of screening such of the loyalists as were most obnoxious to the Americans." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxv., pp. 454, 455.)

"The regular troops of France and America, employed in this siege, consisted of about 7,000 of the former (besides ships and seamen), and 5,500 of the latter; and they were assisted by about 4,000 militia. The troops of every kind that surrendered prisoners of war were about 7,000; but so great was the number of the sick and wounded, that there were only 3,800 capable of bearing arms."—Ib., p. 455.

[54]During the discussion on this question, it had been argued that the Americans are fed, clothed, and paid by France; they are led on by French officers; the French and the American armies are incorporated into one; it was merely a locality that should give name to a war. France had formerly been fought with success in Germany, and there could be no solid objection to fighting her in America. General Conway argued that French troops did not cost more than £40 per man a year, while the expense of the English troops cost £100 per man a year. General Conway reminded the House that though seventy-three thousand men were voted and paid for, we had never above half that number in actual service. Government had, therefore, only to complete the regiments, and they would have more men in America than ever they had before. (Annual Register of Parliament for 1782, pp. 158-161.)

[55]Annual Register of Parliament for 1782, Vol. XXIX., p. 173.

[56]Abridged from the Parliamentary Register for 1782, Vol. XXV., Chap. vii. See also Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxv.Lord Mahon concludes his account of this Administration as follows:"Thus ended Lord North's Administration of twelve years. It is certainly strange, on contemplating these twelve years, to find so many harsh and rigorous measures proceed from the most gentle and good-humoured of Prime Ministers. Happy, had but greater firmness in maintaining his own opinions been joined to so much ability in defending opinions even when not his own."Even as to the disasters and miscarriages, however, which could not be denied in his Administration, the friends of Lord North contended that in truth he was not answerable for them. The points in his favour were argued a few days before his fall by Mr. George Onslow in the House of Commons. 'Why,' said Mr. Onslow, 'have we in this war with America such ill success? Mainly,' he continued, 'from the support and countenance given in that House to American rebellion. The army of Washington had been called by the Opposition "our army;" the cause of the Americans had been called "the cause of liberty;" and one gentleman (this was Mr. Burke), while lavishing his praises on Dr. Franklin and Mr. Laurens, had declared he would prefer a prison with them to freedom in company with those who were supporting the cause of England.' But this vindication, though spirited, nay, though true, is faulty; because, though true, it is not the whole truth; because it overlooks what no statesman should—the certainty that when free principles are at stake, dissensions will always arise in a free country."—Ib., pp. 209, 210.

[56]Abridged from the Parliamentary Register for 1782, Vol. XXV., Chap. vii. See also Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxv.

Lord Mahon concludes his account of this Administration as follows:

"Thus ended Lord North's Administration of twelve years. It is certainly strange, on contemplating these twelve years, to find so many harsh and rigorous measures proceed from the most gentle and good-humoured of Prime Ministers. Happy, had but greater firmness in maintaining his own opinions been joined to so much ability in defending opinions even when not his own.

"Even as to the disasters and miscarriages, however, which could not be denied in his Administration, the friends of Lord North contended that in truth he was not answerable for them. The points in his favour were argued a few days before his fall by Mr. George Onslow in the House of Commons. 'Why,' said Mr. Onslow, 'have we in this war with America such ill success? Mainly,' he continued, 'from the support and countenance given in that House to American rebellion. The army of Washington had been called by the Opposition "our army;" the cause of the Americans had been called "the cause of liberty;" and one gentleman (this was Mr. Burke), while lavishing his praises on Dr. Franklin and Mr. Laurens, had declared he would prefer a prison with them to freedom in company with those who were supporting the cause of England.' But this vindication, though spirited, nay, though true, is faulty; because, though true, it is not the whole truth; because it overlooks what no statesman should—the certainty that when free principles are at stake, dissensions will always arise in a free country."—Ib., pp. 209, 210.

[57]I have not a shadow of doubt, that had the leaders in Congress adhered to their pretensions of contending and fighting for British constitutional rights, as aforetime, instead of renouncing those rights and declaring Independence in 1776, the changes which took place in the Administration in England in 1783 would have taken place in 1777; for the corrupt Administration showed as strong symptoms of decline, and was as manifestly "tottering to its fall" in the parliamentary session which commenced in 1776, as it did in the session which commenced in 1782. In both cases its predictions and assured successes had been completely falsified; in both cases the indignation of the nation was aroused against the Administration, and the confidence of Parliament was on the point of being withdrawn in 1776-77, as it was withdrawn in the session of 1782-83; but in 1776, the Congress, instead of adhering to its heretofore professed principles, was induced by its leaders, as related in Chapter xxvi., to renounce its former principles; to falsify all its former professions to its advocates in England and fellow-subjects in America; to renounce the maintenance of the constitutional rights of British subjects; to adopt a Declaration of Independence, of eternal separation from England; to extinguish the national life of the British empire and the unity of the Anglo-Saxon race, and seek an alliance with their own and Great Britain's hereditary enemies for a war upon their mother country, which had protected them for a hundred years against the French and Spaniards, who had also employed and rewarded the Indians to destroy them.

Change of Administration in England—Change of Policy for both England and the Colonies—Peace Negotiations at Paris—The Cause of the United Empire Loyalists.

During the adjournment of Parliamentfrom the 24th to the 28th of March, the new Administration was formed, and announced in the Commons on the 28th, when the House adjourned over the Easter holidays, to give time for the re-election of such members as had accepted office. The King first sent for the Earl of Shelburne to form a new Administration, naming some members of it; but the Earl of Shelburne declined, as unable to form an Administration upon such conditions, and recommended the King to send for the Marquis of Rockingham. The King refused to see Rockingham face to face, but requested Shelburne to be the bearer of a message to him; but Shelburne only consented on the condition of "full power and full confidence." "Necessity," relates the King, "made me yield to the advice of Lord Shelburne." Before accepting the offer of First Lord of the Treasury, the Marquis of Rockingham, without neglecting some minor matters, stipulated that there should be no veto to the independence of America.[58]But it was nearly three months before an Act passedthe Commons authorizing peace with America, and the acknowledgment of American Independence, and it was nearly a year before the treaty for that purpose was agreed upon.

In the meantime, "Immediately before the fall of Lord North's Ministry, in anticipation of that event, Dr. Franklin had written from Paris to Lord Shelburne with general expressions of his pacific views. On receiving that letter, Lord Shelburne, then Secretary of State, sent to Paris, as agent, Mr. Richard Oswald, a London merchant well versed in American affairs. Dr. Franklin readily conferred with Mr. Oswald, and put into his hands a paper drawn up by himself, suggesting that, in order to produce a thorough reconciliation, and to prevent any future quarrel on the North American continent, England should not only acknowledge the thirteen united States, but concede to them the Province of Canada. Such a project was not likely to find favour in the eyes of any British statesman. Mr. Oswald, however, undertook to return to England and lay it before his chief, Dr. Franklin, at his departure, expressing an earnest hope that all future communications to himself might pass through the same hands.

"Under these circumstances, the Cabinet determined that Mr. Oswald should go back to France and carry on the treaty with Franklin, though by no means with such concessions as the American philosopher desired."[59]

After the terminationof hostilities between Great Britain and the colonies, the American Commissioners evinced a desire to treat with England alone. Mr. Oswald, as early as July, 1782, wrote privately to Lord Shelburne, "The Commissionersof the colonies have shown a desire to treat and to end with us on a separate footing from the other Powers." "The separate negotiation thus arising was delayed," says Lord Mahon, "first by the severe illness of Dr. Franklin, and next by some points of form in the commission of Mr. Oswald. When at length the more solid part of the negotiation was commenced, the hints of Franklin for the cession of Canada were quietly dropped, with greater case from their having been transmitted in a confidential form. It is also worthy of note that Lord Shelburne prevailed, in his desire of acknowledging the independence of the United States, by an article of the treaty, and not, as Mr. Fox had wished, by a previous declaration."

The two most difficult questions of the treaty related to the fishing grounds of Newfoundland, and the Loyalists or "Tories," as they were called. The English were unwilling to concede the use of the fishing grounds, but the Americans were firm; the result was, that by the provisions of the treaty it was agreed that the Americans should have the right to take fish on the banks of Newfoundland, but not to dry or cure them on any of the King's settled dominions.[60]

But the question which transcendedall others in importance, with which this work has chiefly to do, was that of the Loyalists—a class which, by the testimony of American historians themselves, constituted, at the beginning of the war, a majority of the population of the colonies. Their numbers had been greatly reduced from various causes during the war; they had been plundered and scattered by the alternate ascendancy of opposite parties; they had all of them suffered in their property and liberty; many of them had suffered imprisonment, and not a few of them had been executed as criminals for preferring their oath of allegiance and connection with the mother country to a renunciation of their former profession of faith, and absolute submission to a newly self-created authority of rule and a new political creed. At the conclusion of the war, and in the treaty of peace, "the question of Loyalists or Tories," says Lord Mahon, "was, as it ought to be, a main object with the British Government to obtain, if possible, some restitution to the men who, in punishment for their continued allegiance to the King, had found their property confiscated andtheir persons banished. But from the first Dr. Franklin held out no hopes of any satisfaction on that point. 'The Commissioners,' he said, 'had no such power, nor had even Congress.'[61]They were willing that Congress should, with certain modifications, recommend those indemnities to the several States; and, as one of the negotiators from England tells us, they to the last 'continued to assert that the recommendation of Congress would have the effect we proposed.' The British diplomatists persevered in their original demand, and at one time there seemed a probability that the negotiations might break off, chiefly on this ground. Twice was Mr. Strachey, the Undersecretary of State, an able and experienced man, dispatched to Paris to aid Mr. Oswald with his counsel and co-operation. But at last the mind of Franklin, ever ingenious and fertile of resources, devised a counter scheme. He said that he would allow the losses which the Loyalists had suffered, provided another account were opened of the mischief they had done, as of slaves carried off, or houses burned; new Commissioners to be appointed to strike a balance between the two computations. At this formidable proposal, involving an endless train of discussions and disputes, the negotiators from England finally gave way."[62]

This account of the negotiation in regard to the United Empire Loyalists, taken from Lord Mahon's impartial history, is corroborated in all essential particulars by American historians. Mr. Bancroft says that "Franklin having already explained that nothing could be done for the Loyalists by the United States, as their estates had been confiscated by laws of particular States, which Congress had no power to repeal, he further demonstrates that Great Britain had forfeited every right to intercede for them by its conduct and example, to which end he read to Oswald the orders of the British in Carolina for confiscating and selling the lands and property of all patriots under the direction of the military; and he declared definitely that, though the separate governments might show compassion where it was deserved, the American Commissionersfor Peace could not make compensation of refugees a part of the treaty."

"This last demand (adequate indemnity for the confiscated property of loyal refugees) touched alike the sympathy and the sense of honour of England. The previous answer, that the Commissioners had no power to treat on the business of the Loyalists, was regarded as an allegation that though they claimed to have full power, they were not plenipotentiaries; that they were acting under thirteen separate sovereignties, which had no common head. To meet the exigence, Shelburne proposed either an extension of Nova Scotia to the Penobscot, or Kennebec, or the Saco, so that a province might be formed for the reception of Loyalists; or that a part of the money to be received from sales of the Ohio lands might be applied to their subsistence."

"On the 29th of November, 1782, Strachey, Oswald, and Fitzherbert, on the one side, and Jay, Franklin, Adams, and for the first time Laurens, on the other, came together for their last word at the apartments of Jay. The American Commissioners agreed that there should be no future confiscations nor prosecutions of Loyalists, that all pending prosecutions should be discontinued, and that Congress should recommend to the several States and their Legislatures, on behalf of refugees, amnesty and the restitution of their confiscated property." "On the 30th, the Commissioners of both countries signed and sealed fair copies of the Convention." "The treaty was not a compromise, nor a compact imposed by force, but a free and perfect solution and perpetual settlement of all that had been called in question."[63]

Dr. Ramsay observes: "From the necessity of the case, the Loyalists were sacrificed, nothing further than a simple recommendation for restitution being stipulated in their favour. * * The case of the Loyalists was undoubtedly a hard one, but unavoidable from the complex Constitution of the United States. The American Ministers engaged, as far as they were authorized, and Congress did all they constitutionally could; but this was no more than simply to recommend their case tothe several States, for the purpose of making them restitution. To have insisted on more, under such circumstances, would have been equivalent to saying that there should be no peace. It is true, much more was expected from the recommendations of Congress than resulted from them; but this was not the consequence of deception, but of misunderstanding the principles of the confederation. In conformity to the letter and spirit of the treaty, Congress urged, in strong terms, the propriety of making restitution to the Loyalists, but to procure it was beyond their power. * * There were doubtless among the Loyalists many worthy characters, friends of peace and lovers of justice. To such restitution was undoubtedly due, and to many such it was made; but it is one of the many calamities incident to war, that the innocent, from the impossibility of discrimination, are often involved in the same distress with the guilty.

"The return of the Loyalists to their former places of residence was as much disrelished by the Whig citizens of America as the proposal for reimbursing their confiscated property. In sundry places Committees were formed, who, in an arbitrary manner, opposed their peaceable residence. The sober and dispassionate citizens exerted themselves in checking these irregular measures; but such was the violence of party spirit, and so relaxed were the sinews of government, that, in opposition to legal authority and the private interference of the judicious and moderate, many indecent outrages were committed on the persons and property of the returning Loyalists.

"Nor were these all the sufferings of those Americans who had attached themselves to the royal cause. Being compelled to depart from their native country, many of them were obliged to take up their abodes in the inhospitable wilds of Nova Scotia, or on the barren shores of the Bahama Islands. Parliamentary relief was extended to them; but this was obtained with difficulty, and distributed with a partial hand. Some, who invented plausible tales of loyalty and distress, received much more than they ever possessed; while others, less artful, were not half reimbursed for their actual losses."[64]

Mr. Hildreth remarks, underdate of September, 1783, "that at New York a general release of prisoners had taken place on both sides; but the necessity of finding transports for the numerous Loyalists assembled there protracted the evacuation of New York. In consequence of laws still in force against them, several thousand American Loyalists found it necessary to abandon their country. A considerable portion of these exiles belonged to the wealthier classes; they had been officials, merchants, large landholders, conspicuous members of the colonial aristocracy. Those from the North settled principally in Nova Scotia or Canada, provinces the politics of which their descendants continued to control until quite recently. Those from the South found refuge in the Bahamas and other West India islands. Still objects of great popular odium, the Loyalists had little to expect from the stipulated recommendations of Congress in their favour. Some of the States, whose territory had been longest and most recently occupied by the enemy, were even inclined to enact new confiscations."[65]

In each and all of these historical statements it is clearly admitted that the claim of the Loyalists to compensation for loss of property was founded in equity, as well as in national policy. This is sanctioned by the admission of the American Commissioners and the recommendation of Congress. The want of power in Congress to do what is admitted to be an act of justice to the Loyalists is the plea for not restoring them the property which had gone into the hands of their opponents, who were proportionally enriched thereby. It was left to local avarice and local resentment to deal with the property of banished exiles.

What was claimed by and in behalf of the Loyalists accorded with the practice of even modern nations, as well as with the sentiments of humanity. When the Dutch provinces asserted their independence of Spain, and after a long and bloody war obtained the recognition of it, they cordially agreed to an act of oblivion, and even restored to those who had adhered to the cause of Spain, their property of every denomination that had been confiscated, or the full value of it. Even Spain herself had twice thus acted towards the province of Catalonia—first, on itsrevolting from that Crown, and calling in the assistance of France; and secondly, on its refusing to acknowledge the Bourbon family, at the beginning of the last century. Though the inhabitants had forfeited life and property, yet, on their return to obedience, life, possessions, laws and immunities remained inviolate. England had conducted herself in the same spirit towards that party in Ireland which had taken up arms in support of James the Second. No proscriptions took place, and every man, on submitting to Government, was admitted to the undisturbed enjoyment of his property. Had this spirit actuated, and these examples, with many others of like character, influenced the Americans, how much more honourable to them, and more consistent with sound policy, to efface at once all remembrance of internal discords, than to pursue, in the execrable spirit of revenge and avarice, those of their countrymen who differed from them in opinion in the late contest, and sided with Great Britain.[66]That the plea that Congress had no power in granting amnesty and compensation to the Loyalists was a mere pretext, is manifest from the fact that the Commissioners agreed that there should be no more confiscations or proscriptions against the Loyalists; for if the laws under which these prosecutions were instituted and confiscations made were State laws, with which Congress had no power to interfere, how could the Congress Commissioners stipulate that there should be no more confiscations or proscriptions?

Dr. Franklin, the most experienced and ablest of the American diplomatists, was the most crafty and overbearing against England. At the beginning of the negotiations for peace, he demurely proposed, and half converted Mr. Oswald to his proposition, to concede Canada (which at that time meant all British North America) to the United States, though his commission related simply to the independency of the thirteen colonies; and when the British Cabinet vetoed this extra-official and extravagant proposition, Dr. Franklin and his colleagues overreached the ignorance and weakness of the British diplomatists by carefully constructed maps for the purpose of making the boundary lines between the proposed possessions of Great Britain and the United States on their northern and north-western frontiers. These lines were so ingeniously drawn as to take from Great Britain and include in the United States the immense and valuable territories, back settlements, and the whole country between the Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi, and which have since become the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Missouri, Michigan, Minnesota, etc.—to not one foot of which the thirteen American colonies had the slightest claim—territories ample to compensate Loyalists for their losses and banishment, but whose interests, together with these most valuable possessions, were lost to Great Britain by the subserviency of the British Commissioner, Oswald (a London and American merchant), who looked to his own interests, and was the subservient tool and echo of Dr. Franklin. The above territories were a part of the domain of Congress, irrespective of any State, and therefore at the absolute disposal of Congress. Yet, with these immense accessions of resources, the American Commissioners professed that the Congress had no power or means to compensate the United Empire Loyalists for the confiscation and destruction of their property! One knows not at which most to marvel—the boldness, skill, and success of the American Commissioners, or the cowardice, ignorance, and recklessness of the British diplomatists.

The result of these negotiations was, that the adherents to Great Britain during the civil war were deprived of the amnesty and restoration of property upon any ground of right, as had been granted at the termination of civil strife by all civilized nations—to the restoration of what had been taken from them during the war—and turned over as suppliant culprits to the several States by whose laws their property had been confiscated, and themselves declared guilty of treason, and condemned to the death of traitors. Dr. Franklin, in the beginning of his negotiations, had proposed to give all that now constitutes British North America to the United States, and thus leave to the British Loyalists not an inch of ground on which to place their feet; but all that was now left to them, as far as America was concerned, was to prostrate themselves as suppliants before the Legislatures of the several States, each of which was for the most part a seething cauldron of passion and resentment against them.[67]

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