Chapter 83

199Lane,Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, i. 382sq.Cf.Burckhardt,Arabic Proverbs, p. 100.

200Lane,Modern Egyptians, i. 383. Muir,Life of Mahomet, i. p. lxxiii.sq.n. †.

201Lane,Modern Egyptians, i. 383sq.

202Vámbéry,Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, p. 232.

The Homeric poems make us acquainted with gods and men who have recourse to fraud and lying whenever it suits their purpose.203The great Zeus makes no difficultyin sending a lying dream to Agamemnon. Pallas Athene is guilty of gross deceit and treachery to Hector; she expressly recommends dissimulation, and loves Odysseus on account of his deceitful character.204No man deals more in feigned stories than this master of cunning, who makes a boast of his falsehood.205In the period which lies between the Homeric age and the Persian wars veracity made perhaps some progress among the Greeks,206but it never became one of their national virtues.207Yet in the Greek literature deceit is frequently condemned as a vice, and truthfulness praised as a virtue.208Achilles expresses his horror of lying.209“Not to tell a lie,” was one of the maxims of Solon.210Pindar strongly censures a character like that of Odysseus,211and ends up his eulogy on Psaumis by the assurance that he never would contaminate his speech with a lie.212According to Pythagoras, men become like gods when they speak the truth.213According to Plato, the habit of lying makes the soul ugly214; “truth is the beginning of every good thing, both to gods and men.”215Yet a distinction should be made between different kinds of untruth. Though the many are too fond of saying that at proper times and places falsehood may often be right,216it must be admitted that a lie is in certain cases useful and not hateful, as in dealing with enemies, or when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm.217Moreover, the rulers of the State are allowed to lie for the public good, just as physicians make use of medicines; and they will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for this purpose.218On the other hand, if the ruler catches anybody besides himself lying in theState, lie will punish him for introducing a practice “which is equally subversive and destructive of ships or State.”219Next to him who takes a false oath, he who tells a falsehood in the presence of his superiors—elders, parents, or rulers—is most hateful to the gods.220

203Cf.Kames,Sketches of the History of Man, iv. 150sq.; Mahaffy,Social Life in Greece, p. 26sqq.

204Odyssey, xiii. 331sq.

205Ibid.ix. 19sq.

206Schmidt,Die Ethik der alten Griechen, ii. 413.

207Cf.Thucydides, iii. 83.

208See Schmidt,op. cit.ii. 403sqq.

209Iliad, ix. 312sq.

210Diogenes Laertius,Vitæ philosophorum, i. 2 (60).

211Pindar,Nemea, viii. 26.

212Idem,Olympia, iv. 17.

213Stobæus,op. cit.xi. 25, vol. i. 312.

214Plato,Gorgias, p. 524sq.

215Idem,Leges, v. 730.

216Ibid.xi. 916.

217Plato,Respublica, ii. 382.

218Ibid.iii. 389; v. 459.

219Plato,Respublica, iii. 389.

220Idem,Leges, xi. 917.Idem,Respublica, iii. 389.

Not without reason did the Romans of the republican age contrast their ownfideswith the mendacity of the Greeks and the perfidy of the Phœnicians. “The goddess of faith (of human and social faith),” says Gibbon, “was worshipped, not only in her temples, but in the lives of the Romans; and if that nation was deficient in the more amiable qualities of benevolence and generosity, they astonished the Greeks by their sincere and simple performance of the most burdensome engagements.”221Their annals are adorned with signal examples of uprightness, which, though to a great extent fictitious, yet bear testimony to the estimation in which that quality was held.222The Greeks had no Regulus who “chose to deliver himself up to a cruel death rather than to falsify his word to the enemy.”223The basest forms of falsehood were severely punished by law. According to the Twelve Tables, any one who had slandered or libelled another by imputing to him a wrongful or immoral act, was to be scourged to death,224and capital punishment was also inflicted on false witnesses225and corrupt judges.226However, already before the end of the Republic dishonesty, perjuries, and forgeries became common in Rome.227

221Gibbon,History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, v. 311.

222Cf.Inge,Society in Rome under the Cæsars, p. 33sq.

223Cicero,De officiis, i. 13.

224Lex Duodecim Tabularum, viii. 1.

225Ibid.viii. 23. Aulus Gellius,Noctes Atticæ, xx. i. 53.

226Lex Duodecim Tabularum, ix. 3. Aulus Gellius,op. cit.xx. i. 7.

227Inge,op. cit.p. 35.

The ancient Scandinavians considered it disgraceful for a man to tell a lie, to break a promise, or to commit a treacherous act.228To kill or rob openly was a pardonable offence, if an offence at all; but he who did it secretly was anithinger, a “hateful man,” unless indeed he afterwardsopenly declared his deed.229In the Irish Senchus Mór it is said that not only false witness, but lying in general, deprives the guilty person of “half his honour-price up to the third time”;230and, according to the commentary to the Book of Aicill, the double of his own full honour-price is due from each person who commits the crime of secret murder.231

228Maurer,Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes, ii. 154, 183sq.Rosenberg,Nordboernes Aandsliv, i. 487.

229Wilda,Strafrecht der Germanen, p. 569. Nordström,Bidrag till den svenska samhälls-författningens historia, ii. 320sqq.Keyser,Efterladte Skrifter, ii. pt. i. 361. Rosenberg,Nordboernes Aandsliv, i. 487. von Amira, ‘Recht,’ in Paul’sGrundriss der germanischen Philologie, ii. pt. ii. 173.

230Ancient Laws of Ireland, i. 57.

231Ibid.iii. 99.

In the Old Testament there are recorded, from the patriarchal age, some cases of lying, which, far from being condemned, in no way prevented the liar being a special object of divine favour. It must be admitted, however, that undue importance has been attached to some of these acts of falsehood,232which were committed among foreigners with a view to escaping an impending danger.233For instance, when Isaac, dwelling in Gerar, said of his wife that she was his sister, for fear lest the men of the place should kill him,234he did a thing which few conscientious men under similar circumstances would hesitate to do. As for Jacob’s long course of double-dealing with his father-in-law, who was equally greedy and unscrupulous, it should be remembered that they were natives of different lands.235Again, when Jacob, at the instigation of his mother, grossly deceived his own blind father, the intriguers, as has been pointed out,236manifestly felt that the blessing extorted from Isaac ought to descend upon Jacob rather than upon Esau, and inasmuch as the word of the father was held to carry with it divine validity and potency, the securing of it by fair means or foul was deemed an urgent necessity. It is obvious that the ancient Hebrews did not condemn deceit as wrong in the abstract, and that they were very unscrupulous in the use of means. WheneverDavid was threatened by any danger, he immediately employed a falsehood which served his turn; though not incapable of generosity, he deceived enemies and friends indifferently, and there is probably no record of treachery and lying consistently pursued which surpasses in baseness his affair with his faithful servant Uriah the Hittite.237It is true that his conduct towards Uriah was condemned; “the thing that David had done displeased the Lord.”238But it is significant that Yahveh himself occasionally had recourse to deceit for the purpose of carrying out his plans. In order to ruin Ahab he commissioned a lying spirit to deceive his prophets;239and once he threatened to use deception as a means of taking revenge upon idolaters.240But to bear false witness against a neighbour was strictly prohibited;241the false witness should suffer the punishment which he was minded to bring upon the person whom he calumniated.242In Ecclesiasticus lying is severely censured:—“A lie is a foul blot in a man, yet it is continually in the mouth of the untaught. A thief is better than a man that is accustomed to lie: but they both shall have destruction to heritage. The disposition of a liar is dishonourable, and his shame is ever with him.”243“Lying lips are abomination to the Lord: but they that deal truly are his delight.”244According to the Talmud, “four shall not enter Paradise: the scoffer, the liar, the hypocrite, and the slanderer.”245Only for the sake of peace, and especially domestic peace, may a man tell a lie without sinning;246but he who changes his word commits as heavy a sin as he who worships idols.247The duty of truthfulness was particularly emphasised by the Essenes.248He who entered their sect had to pledge himself always to lovetruth and strive to reclaim all liars.249“They are eminent for fidelity,” says Josephus. “Whatsoever they say also is firmer than an oath; but swearing is avoided by them, and they esteem it worse than perjury; for they say that he who cannot be believed without [swearing by] God is already condemned.”250

232E.g., by McCurdy, ‘Moral Evolution of the Old Testament,’ inAmerican Journal of Theology, i. 665sq.; von Jhering,Zweck im Recht, ii. 606sq.; Spencer,Principles of Ethics, i. 402.

233Genesis, xii. 12sq.; xx. 2.

234Ibid.xxvi. 7.

235Ibid.ch. xxix.sqq.

236McCurdy,loc. cit.p. 666.

237Cf.Kuenen,Religion of Israel, i. 327; McCurdy,loc. cit.p. 681.

2382 Samuel, xi. 27; xii. 1sqq.

2391 Kings, xxii. 20sqq.

240Ezekiel, xiv. 7sqq.Cf.Spencer,Principles of Ethics, i. 402.

241Deuteronomy, v. 20.

242Ibid.xix. 1 6sqq.

243Ecclesiasticus, xx. 24sqq.

244Proverbs, xii. 22.

245Deutsch,Literary Remains, p. 57.

246Hershon,Treasures of the Talmud, p. 69sq.

247Sanhedrin, fol. 92 A, quoted by Montefiore,Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews, p. 558.

248Philo Judæus,Quod liber sit quisque virtuti studet, p. 877 (Opera, ii. 458).

249Josephus,De bello Judaico, ii. 8. 7.

250Ibid.ii. 8. 6.

“Speak every man truth with his neighbour,”251was from early times regarded as one of the most imperative of Christian maxims.252According to St. Augustine, a lie is not permissible even when told with a view to saving the life of a neighbour; “since by lying eternal life is lost, never for any man’s temporal life must a lie be told.”253Yet all lies are not equally sinful; the degree of sinfulness depends on the mind of the liar and on the nature of the subject on which the lie is told.254This became the authorised doctrine of the Church.255Thomas Aquinas says that, although lying is always sinful, it is not a mortal sin if the end intended be not contrary to charity, “as appears in a jocose lie, that is intended to create some slight amusement, and in an officious lie, in which is intended even the advantage of our neighbour.”256Yet from early times we meet within the Christian Church a much less rigorous doctrine, which soon came to exercise a more powerful influence on the practice and feelings of men than did St. Augustine’s uncompromising love of truth. The Greek Fathers maintained that an untruth is not a lie when there is a “just cause”for it; and as a just cause they regarded not only self-defence, but also zeal for God’s honour.257This zeal, together with an indiscriminate devotion to the Church, led to those “pious frauds,” those innumerable falsifications of documents, inventions of legends, and forgeries of every description, which made the Catholic Church a veritable seat of lying, and most seriously impaired the sense of truth in the minds of Christians.258By a fiction, Papacy, as a divine institution, was traced back to the age of the Apostles, and in virtue of another fiction Constantine was alleged to have abdicated his imperial authority in Italy in favour of the successor of St. Peter.259The Bishop of Rome assumed the privilege of disengaging men from their oaths and promises. An oath which was contrary to the good of the Church was declared not to be binding.260The theory was laid down that, as faith was not to be kept with a tyrant, pirate, or robber, who kills the body, it was still less to be kept with an heretic, who kills the soul.261Private protestations were thought sufficient to relieve men in conscience from being bound by a solemn treaty or from the duty of speaking the truth; and an equivocation, or play upon words in which one sense is taken by the speaker and another sense intended by him for the hearer, was in some cases held permissible.262According to Alfonso de’ Liguori—who lived in the eighteenth century and was beatified in the nineteenth, and whose writings were declared by high authority not to contain a word that could be justly found fault with,263—there are three sorts of equivocation which may be employed for a good reason, even with the addition of a solemn oath. We are allowed to use ambiguously words having two senses, as the wordvolo, which means both to “wish” and to “fly”; sentences bearing two main meanings, as “This book is Peter’s,” which may mean either that the book belongs to Peter or that Peter is the author of it; words having two senses, one more common than the other or one literal and the other metaphorical—for instance, if a man is asked about something which it is in his interest to conceal, he may answer, “No, I say,” that is “I say the word ‘no’”264As for mental restrictions, again, such as are “purely mental,” and on that account cannot in any manner be discovered by other persons, are not permissible; but we may, for a good reason, make use of a “non-pure mental restriction,” which, in the nature of things, is discoverable, although it is not discovered by the person with whom we are dealing.265Thus it would be wrong secretly to insert the word “no” in an affirmative oath without any external sign; but it would not be wrong to insert it in a whispering voice or under the cover of a cough. The “good reason” for which equivocations and non-pure mental restrictions may be employed is defined as “any honest object, such as keeping our goods spiritual or temporal.”266In support of this casuistry it is uniformly said by Catholic apologists that each man has a right to act upon the defensive, that he has a right to keep guard over the knowledge which he possesses in the same way as he may defend his goods; and as for there being any deceit in the matter—why, soldiers use stratagems in war, and opponents use feints in fencing.267

251Ephesians, iv. 25.

252Gass,Geschichte der christlichen Ethik, i. 90.

253St. Augustine,De mendacio, 6 (Migne,Patrologiæ cursus, xl. 494sq.).

254Idem,Enchiridion, 18 (Migne,op. cit.xl. 240);Idem,De mendacio, 21 (Migne, xl. 516). For St. Augustine’s views on lying see also his treatiseContra mendacium, addressed to Consentius (Migne, xl. 517sqq.), and Bindemann,Der heilige Augustinus, ii. 465sqq.

255Gratian,Decretum, ii. 22. 2. 12, 17.Catechism of the Council of Trent, iii. 9. 23.

256Thomas Aquinas,Summa theologica, ii.-ii.110. 3sq.St. Augustine says (De mendacio, 2 [Migne,op. cit.xl. 487sq.];Quæstiones in Genesim, 145,ad Gen.xliv. 15 [Migne, xxxiv. 587]) that jokes which “bear with them in the tone of voice, and in the very mood of the joker a most evident indication that he means no deceit,” are not accounted lies, though the thing he utters be not true. This statement is also incorporated in Gratian’sDecretum(ii. 22. 2. 18).

257Gass,op. cit.i. 91, 92, 236sqq.Newman,Apologia pro vita sua, p. 349sq.

258von Mosheim,Institutes of Ecclesiastical History, i. 275. Middleton,Free Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers, which are supposed to have subsisted in the Christian Church,passim. Lecky,Rise, and Influence of Rationalism in Europe, i. 396sqq.Gass,op. cit.i. 91, 235. von Eicken,System der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung, pp. 654-656, 663.

259von Eicken,op. cit.p. 656. Poole,Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought, p. 249.

260Gregory IX.Decretales, ii. 24. 27.

261Simancas,De catholicis institutionibus, xlvi. 52sq.p. 365sq.

262Alagona,Compendium manualis D. Navarri, xii. 88, p. 94sq.:—“Fur, qui est furatus aliquid, si interrogetur a judice non competenti, vel non juridice, an sit furatus tale quid, potest secura conscientia respondere simpliciter, non sum furatus, intelligendo intra se in tali die, vel anno.” See also Kames,op. cit.iv. 158sq.

263Meyrick,Moral and Devotional Theology of the Church of Rome, i. 3.

264Alfonso de’ Liguori,Theologia moralis, iii. 151, vol. i. 249.

265Ibid.iii. 152, vol. i. 249.

266Ibid.iii. 151, vol. i. 249.

267Meyrick,op. cit.i. 25

Adherence to truth and especially perfect fidelity to a promise were strongly insisted upon by the code of Chivalry.268However exacting or absurd the vow mightbe, a knight was compelled to perform it in all the strictness of the letter. A man frequently promised to grant whatever another should ask, and he would have lost the honour of his knighthood if he had declined from his word.269We are told by Lancelot du Lac that when King Artus had given his word to a knight to make him a present of his wife, he would neither listen to the lamentations of the unfortunate woman, nor to any representations which could be made him; he replied that a king must not go from his word, and the queen was accordingly delivered to the knight.270The knights taken in war were readily allowed liberty for the time they asked, on their word of honour that they would return of their own accord, whenever it should be required.271So great, it is said, was the knight's respect for an oath, a promise, or a vow, that when they lay under any of these restrictions, they appeared everywhere with little chains attached to their arms or habits to show all the world that they were slaves to their word; nor were these chains taken off till their promise had been performed, which sometimes extended to a term of four or five years.272It cannot be expected, of course, that reality should have always come up to the ideal. In the thirteenth century the Count of Champagne declared that he confided more in the lowest of his subjects than in his knights.273Moreover, the knightly duty of sincerity seems to have gone little beyond the formal fulfilment of an engagement. “The age of Chivalry was an age of chicane, and fraud, and trickery, which were not least conspicuous among the knightly classes.”274It is significant that the English law of the thirteenth century, though quite willing to admit in vague phrase that no one should be suffered to gain anything by fraud, was inclined to hold that a man has himself to thank if he is misled by deceit, the king’s court generally providing no remedy for him who tohis disadvantage had trusted the word of a liar.275Towards the end of the Middle Ages and later, crimes against the Mint and the offence of counterfeiting seals, usually accompanied by that of forging letters or official documents, were extremely common in England;276and false weights, false measures, and false pretences of all kinds were ordinary instruments of commerce.277

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