CHAPTERI.

CHAPTERI.Enquiring, whether there be any thing in thenatureandconditionof man, toobligehim to think, that he is not to admit of any doctrines or institutions, as revealed from God, but such as his own reason can prove to be necessary from the nature of things.IBEGIN with enquiring what there is toobligea man to hold this opinion, because if there is not some strong and plain proof arising from thenatureandconditionof man, toobligehim thus to abide by the sole light of his own reason; it may be so far from being a duty, which he owes to God, that it may be reckoned amongst his most criminal presumptions. And the pleading for this authority of his own reason; may have the guilt of pleading for his greatest vanity. And if, as this writer observes,spiritual pride be the worst sort of pride,¹a confident reliance upon our own reason, as having a right to determine all matters between God and man, if itshould prove to be agroundless pretension, bids fair to be reckoned the highest instance of theworstkind of the worst of sins.¹Page 150.Every other instance of vanity, every degree of personal pride, and self-esteem, may be a pardonable weakness in comparison of this. For how small is that pride which only makes us prefer our own personal beauty or merit to that of our fellow-creatures, when compared with a self-confiding reason, which is too haughty to adore any thing in the divine counsels, which it cannot fully comprehend; or to submit to any directions from God, but such as its own wisdom could prescribe? Thus much is certain, that there can be nomediumin this matter. The claiming this authority to our own reason, must either be a very great duty, or among the greatest of sins.If it be asinto admit of anysecretsin divine providence, if it be acrimeto ascribe wisdom and goodness to God in things we cannot comprehend: if it be abasenessandmeannessof spirit to believe that God can teach usbetterormorethan we can teach ourselves: if it be ashameful apostacyfrom the dignity of our nature, to submit to anymysterious providenceover us, to comply with any other methods ofhomageandadoration, than such as we could of ourselves contrive and justify; then it is certainly a great duty to assert and maintain this authority of our own reason.On the other hand; if the profoundest humility towards God, be the highest instance of piety: if every thing within us and without us, if every thing we know of God, every thing we know of ourselves preaches up humility to us, as the foundation of every virtue, as the life and soul of all holiness: ifsinhad its beginning frompride, andhellbe the effect of it, ifdevilsare what they are through spiritual pride and self-conceit, then we have great reason to believe, that the claiming this authority to our reason, in opposition to the revealed wisdom of God, is not a frailty offleshandblood, but that same spiritual pride which turnedangelsintoapostatespirits.Since therefore this appealing to our own reason, as the absolutelyperfect ruleof all that ought to pass between God and man, has anappearanceof a pride of theworstkind, and such as unites us both in temper and conduct with the fallen spirits of darkness, it highly concerns every pleader on that side, to consider what grounds he proceeds upon, and to ask himself, what there is in thestateandconditionof human nature, to oblige him to think, that nothing can bedivineorholy, ornecessary, in religion, but whathumanreason dictates?I hope the reader will think this a fair state of the case, and that all the light we can have in this matter, must arise from a thorough consideration of thestateandconditionof man in this world. Ifwithout revelation he is free from mysteries as amoralandreligiousagent, then he has some plea from his state and condition to rejectrevealedmysteries.But if in a state of natural religion, he can’t acknowledge a divine providence or worship God, withoutas muchimplicit faith, and submission of his reason, as any revealed mysteries require; then hisstateandconditionin the world, condemns his refusal of any revelation sufficiently attested to come from God. This enquiry therefore into the state and condition of man, being so plainly the true point of the controversy, I hope to obtain the reader’s impartial attention to it.Had mankind continued in a state ofperfect innocence, without ever failing in their duty either to God or man, yet even in such a state, they could never have known what God would or would not reveal to them, but by some express revelation from him. And as God might intend to raise them to some higher, and unknown state of perfection; so he might raise them to it by the revelation of such things as their own reason, though uncorrupt, yet could not have discovered.But if man, in a state ofinnocence, could have no pretence to set himself against divine revelation, and make his own reason thefinal judgeof what God could, or could not reveal to him; much less has he any pretence for so doing in his present state ofsin,ignorance, andmisery. Hisnatureandconditionis so far from furnishing him with reasons against revelation, against anysupernaturalhelp from God; that it seems to be inconsolable without it; and every circumstance of his life prepares him to hope for terms ofmercyand deliverance from his present guilt and misery, not according toschemesof hisowncontrivance, not from hisown knowledgeof thenature, andreason, andfitnessof things, but from someincomprehensible depthof divine goodness.For if sin, and misery, and ignorance, cannot convince us of our own weakness, cannot prepare us to accept of anymethodsofatoningfor our guilt, but such as our own disordered reason can suggest, we are not far from the hardened state of those miserable spirits, that make war against God.For to insist upon theprerogativeof our own nature, as qualifying us to make our own peace with God, and to reject theatonementwhich he has provided for us, because we esteem it more fit and reasonable, that ourown repentanceshould be sufficient without it, is the same height ofprideandimpiety, as to affirm, that we have no need of any repentance at all.For as mankind, if they had continued in a state ofinnocence, could not have known how their innocence was to be rewarded, or what changes of state God intended them for, but as revelation had discovered these things unto them: so after they werefalleninto a state of guilt and sin, theycould never know whatmiseryit would expose them to, orwhen, orhow, or whether they were ever to be delivered from it, and made as happy as if they hadneversinned; these are things that nothing but a revelation from God could teach them.So that for a sinner to pretend to appoint theatonementfor his own sins, or to think himself able to tell what itoughtto be, is as foolish and vain a presumption, as if man ininnocenceshould have pretended to appoint his own method of being changed into acherub.The writers against revelation appeal to thereasonandnatureof things, asinfalliblydiscovering every thing that a revelation from God can teach us.Thus our author;If the relations between things, and the fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must not God be an arbitrary being? But if God only commands what the nature of things shew to be fit, it is scarce possible that men should mistake their duty; since a mind that is attentive can as easily distinguish fit from unfit, as the eye can beauty from deformity¹.¹Page 30.It is granted, that there is a fitness and unfitness of actions founded in the nature of things, and resulting from the relations that persons and things bear to one another. It is also granted, that the reasonableness of most of the duties of children to their parents, of parents to their children,and of men to men, is very apparent, from the relations they bear to one another; and that several of the duties which we owe to God, plainly appear to us, as soon as we acknowledge the relation that is between God and us.But then, thiswhole argumentproves directly the contrary to that which this author intended to prove by it.I here therefore join with this author; I readily grant, that the nature, reason and relations of things and persons, and the fitness of actions resulting from thence, is thesole ruleof God’s actions. And I appeal to this one common principle, as a sufficient proof that a man cannot thus abide by thesole lightof his own reason, without contradicting the nature and reason of things, and denying this to be thesole ruleof God’s actions.* For if thefitnessof actions is founded in thenatureof things and persons, and this fitness be thesole ruleof God’s actions, it is certain that the rule by which he acts, must in many instances beentirelyinconceivable by us, so as not to be knownat all, and in no instancesfullyknown, orperfectlycomprehended.* For if God is to act according to afitness foundedin thenatureof things, and nothing can be fit for him to do, but what has its fitness founded in his ownincomprehensiblenature, must he not necessarily act by a ruleaboveall humancomprehension? If he must govern his actions by his own nature, he must act by arulethat is just asincomprehensibleto us as his own nature.* And we can be no farthercompetent judgesof thefitnessof the conduct of God, than we are competent judges of the divine nature; and can no more tell what is, or is notinfinitely wisein God, than we can raise ourselves to astateof infinite wisdom.So that if thefitnessof actions is founded in theparticular natureof things and persons, and the fitness of God’s actions must arise from that which isparticularto his nature, then we have from this argument, theutmost certaintythat theruleorreasonsof God’s actions must in many cases be entirely inconceivable by us, and in no cases perfectly apprehended; and for this very reason, because he is not anarbitrary being, that acts bymere will, but is governed in every thing he does, by the reason and nature of things.How mistaken therefore is this author, when he argues after this manner.If God requires things of us, whose fitness our reason can’t prove from the nature of things, must he not be an arbitrary being?For how can that prove God to be an arbitrary agent, which is the necessary consequence of his not being arbitrary?Supposing God not to be anarbitrary being, but to act constantly, as the perfections of his own nature make itfitandreasonablefor him to act, then there is an utter impossibility of our comprehendingthe reasonableness and fitness of many of his actions.* For instance; look at thereasonof things, and thefitnessof actions, and tell me how they moved God to create mankind in the state and condition they are in. Nothing is more above the reason of men, than to explain the reasonableness of God’s providence in creating man of such aformandcondition, to go throughsucha state of things as human life is. No revealed mysteries can more exceed the comprehension of man, than the state of human life itself.Shew me according to whatfitness, founded in thenatureof things, God’s infinite wisdom was determined to form you in such a manner, bring you into such a world, and suffer and preservesuch a stateof things, as human life is, and then you may have some pretence to believe no revealed doctrines, but such as your own reason can deduce from the nature of things.But whilst your ownform, whilstcreationandprovidenceare depths which you cannot thus look into, ’tis strangely absurd to pretend, that God cannot reveal any thing to you as a matter of religion, except your own reason can shew its foundation in the nature and reason of things.Revelation, you say, is on your account, and therefore you ought to see thereasonablenessandfitnessof it. And don’t you also say, that God has made you for yourown sake; ought you not therefore to know the reasonableness and fitnessof God’s forming you as you are? Don’t you say, that providence is for thesakeof man? Is it not therefore fit and reasonable, in the nature of things, that there should be nomysteries, orsecrets, in providence, but that man should so see its methods, as to be able to prove all its steps to be constantly fit and reasonable?Don’t you say, that theworldis for thesakeof man; is it not therefore fit and reasonable that man should see, that thepastandpresentstate of the world has been such as the reason and fitness of things required it should be?* Now if theimperfectstate of human nature, thecalamitiesof this life, thediseasesand mortality of human bodies, themethodsof God’s continual providence in governing human affairs, are things that as much concern us, as any methods of revealed religion; and if these are things that we cannot explain, according to anyfitnessorunfitnessfounded in thenatureof things, but must believe a great deal more of the infinite wisdom of God, than we can so explain; have we any reason to think, that God cannot, or ought not to raise us out of this unhappy state of things, help us to an higher order of life, and exalt us to a nearer enjoyment of himself, by any means, but such as our own poor reason can grope out of the nature and fitness of things?Now what is the reason, that all is thus mysterious and unmeasurable by human reason, in these matters so nearly concerning human nature? ’Tis because God is not anarbitrary being,but does that which theincomprehensible perfectionsof his own nature, make itfitandreasonablefor him to do. Do but grant that nothing can befitfor God to do, but what isaccordingto his owninfinite perfections: let but this be theruleof his actions, and then you have thefullestproof, that the fitness of his actions must be above our comprehension, who can only judge of afitnessaccording to ourown perfections; and then we must be surrounded with mystery for this very reason, because God acts according to acertain rule, his own nature.Again: What is the nature of a human soul, upon whatterms, and in what manner it isunitedto the body, how far it isdifferentfrom it, how far it issubjectto it, what powers and faculties itderivesfrom it; are things wherein thewisdomandgoodnessof God, and thehappinessof man are deeply concerned. Is it not necessary that these things should have their foundation in thereasonandfitnessof things? And yet what natural reason, uninspired from above, can shew that thisstateof soul and body is founded therein?*Again: The origin ofsinandevil, or how it entered into the world consistently with the infinite wisdom of God, is a mystery ofnatural religion, which reason cannot unfold. For can we shew from thereasonandnatureof things, that it wasfitandreasonable, for the providence of God to suffer sin to enter, and continue in the world? Here therefore the man of natural religion must drop his method of reasoning fromthe fitness of things, and that in an article of the highest concern to the moral world, and be as mere a believer, as he that believes the most incomprehensible mystery of revealed religion.Now as there have been in the several ages of the world, someimpatient,restlessandpresumingspirits, who, because they could not in these points explain the justice of God’s providence, have taken refuge in horridatheism, so they made just the samesober useof their reason, as ourmodern unbelievers, who because they can’t comprehend thefitnessandnecessityof certain Christian doctrines, resign themselves up to an hardenedinfidelity. For it is just as reasonable to allow of no mysteries inrevelation, as to allow of no mysteries increationandprovidence.And whenever this writer shall think it proper to attacknaturalreligion with as much freedom as he hasrevealed, he need not enter upon anynewhypothesis, ordifferentway of reasoning. For the same turn of thought, may soon find materials in the natural state of man, for as large a bill of complaints against natural religion, and the mysteries of providence, as is here brought against revealed doctrines.To proceed: If thefitness of actions is founded in the nature and relation of beings, then nothing can be fit for God to do, but so far as it is fit for theGovernor of all created beings, whether on earth, or in any other part of the universe;and he cannot act fitly towards mankind, but by acting as is fit for the Governor of all beings.* Now what is fit for theGovernor of all creatednature to do in this or that particular part of his creation, is as much above our reason totell, as it is above our power togovernall beings. And how mankind ought to be governed, with relation to the whole creation, of which they are so small a part, is a matter equally above our knowledge; because we know not how they are a part of the whole, or what relation they bear to any other part, or how their state affects the whole, or any other part, than we know what beings the whole consists of.Now there is nothing that we know with more certainty than that God is governor of thewhole, and that mankind are apartof the whole; and that the uniformity and harmony of divine providence, must arise from his infinite wise government of thewhole; and therefore we have the utmost certainty, that we arevastly incompetentjudges of the fitness or unfitness of any methods that God uses in the government of so small a part of the universe, as mankind are.Again: If thefitness of actions is founded in the relations of beings to one another, then the fitness of the actions of God’s providence over mankind, must be in many instances altogether incomprehensible to us.For the relation which God bears to mankind, as theirall-perfect Creatorand continualPreserver, is a relation that our reason conceives as imperfectly,and knows as little of, as it does of any of the divine attributes. When it compares it to that of afatherand his children, aprinceand his subjects, aproprietorand his property, it has explained it in the best manner it can, but still has left it as much asecret, as we do the divine nature when we only say, it isinfinitelysuperior to every thing that isfinite.By the natural light of our reason we may know with certainty, severaleffectsof this relation, as that it puts us under the care and protection of a wise, and just, and merciful providence, and demands from us the highest instances of humility, adoration and thanksgiving. But what it is in its own nature, what kind of state, it is to exist in and by God, what it is to see by alightthat is his, to act by a power from him, to live by alifein him; are things as incomprehensible to reason,left to itself, as what it is to be in thethird heavens, or to hear words that cannot be uttered.But if this relation consists in theseinconceivablethings, in a communication oflife,lightandpower, if these are enjoyed in God, and in ourselves, in a manner not to be explained by any thing that we ever heard, or saw; then we must necessarily be poor judges of what is fit for God to require of us, because of thisrelation. It teaches us nothing but the superficialness of our own knowledge, and the unfathomable depths of the divine perfections.How little this writer has considered the nature of thisrelationbetween God and man, may be seen by the following paragraphs.The Holy Ghost, says he,cannot deal with men as rational creatures, but by proposing arguments to convince their understandings; and influence their wills, in the same manner as if proposed by other agents. As absurd, as to say, God cannotcreateus as rational beings, unless he creates us in the samemanner, as if we were created by other agents. For to suppose that other agents can possibly act upon our understanding, and will, in thesame mannerthat God does; is as gross an absurdity, as to suppose that other agents can create us in the same manner that God creates us.And toconfinethe manner of the Holy Ghost’s acting upon us, to the manner of our acting upon one another byargumentsandsyllogisms, is as great a weakness, as toconfinethe manner of God’s creating us, to the manner of our making astatuewithtoolsandinstruments.But he proceeds and says,For to go beyond this, would be making impressions on men, as a seal does on wax; to the confounding of their reason, and their liberty in chusing; and the man would then be mearly passive, and the action would be the action of another being acting upon him, for which he could be no way accountable¹.¹Page 199.Here you see the Holy Spirit has but these two possible ways of acting upon men, it musteither only propose an argument, just as a man may propose one, or it must act like aseal upon wax.I only ask this writer, whether God communicateslife, andstrength, andunderstanding, andliberty of willto us, only as men may communicate any thing to one another? or as a seal acts upon wax? If so, it may be granted, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us any other way.But it must be affirmed, that we do, by a continual influx from God, enjoy all these powers, and receive the continuance of all these faculties from him, not as men receive things from one another, nor aswaxreceives theimpressionof theseal, but in a way as much above our conception, as creation is above our power; if we have all ourpowerof acting, by acontinual communicationfrom him, and yet as free agents, have all ourlightfrom him, and yet areaccountable intelligentbeings; then it must be great weakness to affirm, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us in the same manner: for it would be saying, God cannot act upon us as he does act upon us.The short of the matter is this. Either thiswritermust affirm, that ourrational nature, ourunderstanding faculties, ourpowerof action, ourlibertyof will, mustnecessarilysubsist without thecontinual actionof God upon them, or else hemust grant, that God canactupon ourunderstandingsandwillswithout making us asmerely passiveas the wax under the seal.This writer says,Though the relation we stand in to God, is not artificial, as most are amongst men—yet this does not hinder, but that we may know the end he had in being related to us as Creator and Governor, and what he requires of his creatures and subjects. But how are we to know this?This, says he,the divine nature, whichcontains in it all perfection and happiness, plainly points out to us¹.¹Page 29.If he had said, since God must act over us as Creator and Governor, according to his own infiniteperfection and happiness, therefore his conduct over us may bevery mysterious, he had drawn aplainconclusion. But he proves all to be plain, because God is to govern us according to something that is not plain, according to his ownincomprehensible nature.His argument therefore proceeds thus. God must govern us according to his owninfinite perfection and happiness; but wedo not knowwhat his infinite perfections and happiness are:Therefore weplainly knowhow he is to govern us.Now if this writer is capable of taking such an argument as this to be demonstrative, it is nowonder that all his principles of religion are founded upon demonstration.But if he knows no more of what arises from therelationbetween God and his creatures, than he has here demonstrated, he might be very well content with some farther knowledge from divine revelation.It is because of this incomprehensible relation between God and his creatures, that we are unavoidably ignorant of what God may justly require of us either in a state ofinnocenceorsin. For as the fitness of actions between beingsrelated, must result from their respective natures, so the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, on which the relation between God and man is founded, makes it utterly impossible for mere natural reason to say, whatkindofhomage, orworship, he mayfitlyrequire of man in a state ofinnocence; or whatdifferentworship and homage he may, or must require of men, assinners.And to appeal to the infinite perfections of God, asplainly pointing this out, is the same extravagance, as to appeal to theincomprehensibilityof God as a plain proof of our comprehending what God is.As to the obligations of moral or social duties, which have their foundation in the several relations we bear to one another, these are the same in the state ofinnocenceorsin, and we know that we truly act according to the divine will, whenwe act according to what these relations require of us.But the question is, What distinct kind ofhomage, orservice, orworship, God may require us to render to him, either in a state ofinnocenceorsin, on account of that relation he bears to us as an all-perfect Creator and Governor?But this is a question that God alone can resolve.Human reason cannot enter into it, it has no principle to proceed upon in it. For as thenecessityof divine worship, so theparticular mannerof it, must have its reason in the divine nature.Sacrifice, if considered only as anhuman invention, could not be proved to be a reasonable service. Yet considered as adivine institution, it would be the greatest folly not to receive it as a reasonable service. For as we could see no reason for it, if it was of human invention, so we should have the greatest reason to comply with it because it was of divine appointment. Not as if the divine appointment altered thenatureandfitnessof things; but because nothing has thenatureandfitnessof divine worship, but as it is of divine appointment.Man therefore, had he continued in a state of innocence, and without revelation, might have lived in an awful fear, and pious regard of God, and observed every duty both of moral and civillife, as an act of obedience to him. But he could have no foundation either to invent any particularmannerof divine worship himself, or to reject any that was appointed by God, asunnecessary. It would have been ridiculous to have pleaded his innocence, as having no need of a divine worship. For who can have greater reason, or be fitter to worship God, than innocent beings? It would have been more absurd, to have objected the sufficiency of their reason; for why should men reject arevealed mannerof divine worship, because God had given them reason of their own, sufficient for the duties of social and civil life?And as reason in a state of innocence and perfection, could not have any pretence to appoint the manner of divine worship, so when the state of innocence was changed for that of sin, it became more difficult for bare reason to know what kind of worship could be acceptable to God from sinners.For what therelationbetwixt God and sinners makes it fit for God to require or accept of them, cannot be determined by human reason.This is anew state, and the foundation of anew relation, and nothing can be fit for God to do in it, but what has itsfitness resultingfrom it. We have nothing to help our conceptions of the fore-mentionedrelative charactersof God, as ourGovernorandPreserver, but what we derive from our idea of humanfathersandgovernors:which idea only helps us to comprehend theserelations, just as our idea of human power helps us to comprehend theomnipotenceof God. For a father or governor, no more represents thestateof God as ourGovernorandPreserver, than our living in our father’sfamily, represents themannerof our living in God.These relations are both very plain, and very mysterious; they are very plain, as to therealityof their existence; and highly mysterious and inconceivable, as to themannerof their existence.That which isplain, in these relative characters of God, plainly shews our obligations to every instance ofduty,homage,love, andgratitude.And that which isinconceivablein them, is a solid foundation of thatprofound humility,awful reverence,internal pietyandtremendous senseof the divine Majesty, with which devout persons think of God, and assist at theofficesof religion. Which excites in them a higher zeal for doctrines and institutions of divine revelation, than for all things human; that fills them with reverence for allthings, places, and offices, that are either by divine or human authority, appointed to assist their desired intercourse with God.And if some people, by alongandstrictattention toreason, and thefitnessandunfitnessof things, have at last arrived at a demonstrativecertainty, that all these sentiments of piety and devotion, are merebigotry,superstition, andenthusiasm; I shall only now observe, thatyouthful extravagance,passion, anddebauchery, by their ownnatural tendency, without the assistance of any other guide, seldom fail of making the same discovery. And though it is not reckoned any reflection upongreat wits, when they hit upon the same thought, yet it may seem some disparagement of thatreasonandphilosophy, which teachesold mento think the same of religion, thatpassionandextravaganceteach the young.To return: As there is no state in human life, that can give us a true idea of any of the fore-mentioned relative characters of God, so this relative state of God towards sinners is still less capable of being comprehended by any thing observable in the relations, betwixt a judge and criminals, acreditorand his debtors, aphysicianand his patients, a father or prince, and their disobedient children and subjects.For none of these states separately, nor all of them jointly considered, give us any full idea, either of thenatureandguiltof sin or how God is to deal with sinners, on the account of the relation he bears to them.To ask, whethersinhath solely thenatureof an offence, against a prince or a father, and so is pardonable by mere goodness; whether it is like anerrorin aroadorpath, and so is entirely at an end, when the right path is taken;whether its guilt hath the nature of a debt, and so is capable of being discharged, just as a debt is; whether it affects the soul, as awoundordiseaseaffects the body, and so ought only to move God to act as a good physician? All these questions are as vain, as to ask, whether knowledge in God is reallythinking, or his nature a realsubstance. For as his knowledge and nature cannot be strictly defined, but are capable of being signified by the termsthinkingandsubstance, so the nature of sin is notstrictly representedunder any of these characters, but is capable of receivingsome representationfrom every one of them.When sin is said to be an offence against God, it is to teach us, that we have infinitely more reason to dread it onGod’s account, than to dread any offence against our parents, or governors.When it is compared to adebt, it is to signify, that our sins make us accountable to God, not in thesame manner, but with the same certainty, as a debtor is answerable to his creditor; and because it has some likeness to a debt, that of ourselves we are not able to pay.When it is compared to awound, or disease, it is not to teach us, that it may as justly and easily be healed as bodily wounds, but to help us to conceive the greatness of its evil; that, as diseases bring death to the body,so sin brings a worse kind of death upon the soul.Since therefore thenatureandguiltof sin can only so far be known, as to make it highly to bedreaded, but not so known as to befullyunderstood, by any thing we can compare to it:Since therelationwhich God bears tosinners, can only be so known, as to make it highly reasonable to prostrate ourselves before him, in every instance of humility and penitence; but not so fully known as to teach us, in what manner, God must deal with us: it plainly follows, that if God is not anarbitrarybeing, but acts according to afitness resultingfrom this relation, he must, in this respect, act by aruleknown only to himself, and such as we cannotpossiblystate from thereasonandnatureof things.For if the nature of things, and the fitness of actions resulting from their relations, is to be the rule of our reason, thenreasonmust be here at a full stop, and can have no more knowledge to proceed upon, in stating thenature, theguilt, or properatonementof sin in men, than of sin inangels.Forreasoncan no more tell us what theguiltof sin is, whathurtit does us, how far itentersinto, andaltersour very nature, whatcontrariety to, andseparationfrom God, it necessarily brings upon us, or whatsupernaturalmeans are, or are not, necessary to abolish it; ourreasoncan no more tell this, than oursensescan tell us, what is theinward, and what is theoutwardlight of angels.Ask reason whateffectsin has upon the soul, and it can tell you no more, than if you had asked, what effect theomnipresenceof God has upon the soul.Ask reason, and the nature of things, what is, or ought to be, thetrue natureof an atonement for sin, how far it is likepayingadebt, orhealingawound, or how far it is different from them? And it can tell you no more, than if you had asked, what is thetrue degreeof power thatpreservesus in existence, how far it islikethat which at first created us, and how far it isdifferentfrom it.All these enquiries are, by the nature of things, made impossible to us, so long as we have no light but from our own natural capacities, and we cannot take upon us to bephilosophersin these matters, but by deserting our reason, and giving ourselves up tovisionandimagination.And we have as much authority from the nature of things, to appeal tohungerandthirst, andsensual pleasure, to tell ushowour souls shall live in the beatific presence of God, as to appeal to ourreasonandlogic, to demonstrate how sin is to beatoned, or the soulprepared, andpurified, for future happiness.For God has no more given us our reason tosettlethe nature of an atonement for sin; or tofind out what can, or cannot, take away its guilt, than he has given ussensesandappetitesto state the nature, or discover the ingredients of future happiness.And he who rejects theatonementfor sins made by the Son of God, asneedless, because he cannot prove it to benecessary, is as extravagant, as he that should deny that God created him by hisonly Son, because he did not remember it. For our memory is as proper a faculty to tell us, whether God at first created us, by his only Son, as ourreasonis to tell us, whether we ought to be restored to God, with, or without the mediation of Jesus Christ.When therefore this writer says,Can any thing be more evident, than that if doing evil be the only cause of God’s displeasure, the ceasing to do evil, must take away that displeasure?¹¹Page 4.* Just as if he had said, if conversing with aleperhas been the only cause of a man’s getting aleprosy, must not departing from him, be the removal of theleprosy? For if any one, guessing at theguiltof sin, and itseffectson the soul, should compare it to aleprosyin the body, he can no more say, that he has reached itsreal, internalevil, than he, that comparing the happiness of heaven to a crown of glory, can be said to have described its real happiness.Thiswriterhas no occasion to appeal to the nature of things, if he can be thus certain aboutthings, whose nature is not only obscure, butimpossibleto be known. For it is as impossible for him to know theguiltandeffectsof sin, as to know the shape of an angel. It is as impossible to know by the mere light of reason, what God’sdispleasureat sin is, whatseparationfrom sinners it implies, or how itobligesGod to deal with them; as to know what the internal essence of God is. Our author therefore has here found the utmost degree of evidence, where it wasimpossiblefor him to have thesmallest degreeof knowledge.If a man, havingmurderedtwenty of his fellow-creatures, should afterward be sorry for it, and wish that he had a power to bring them to life again, or to create others in their stead, would his ceasing to kill, and wishing he had a power to create others in their stead, put him just in thesame statewith God, as if he had never murdered a man in his life? But unless this can be said, it cannot be said that repentance is sufficient to put a man in thesame state, as if he never had sinned.The writer has two more objections against the atonement for sin, made by Jesus Christ.First, as it is anhuman sacrifice, which nature itself abhors: and which was looked upon as the great abomination of idolatrousPaganworship.Thecruelty,injustice, andimpiety, of shedding human blood in the sacrifices of thePagansis fully granted; butreasoncannot thence bring the smallest objections against the sacrifice of Christ.For how can reason be more disregarded, than in such an argument as this? ThePaganswere unjust, cruel, and impious, in offering human blood to their false gods; therefore the true God cannot receive anyhumansacrifice, or allow any persons to die, as a punishment for sin.For, if no human sacrifice can be fit for God to receive, because human sacrifices, as parts ofPaganworship, were unjust and impious; then it would follow, that themortality, to which all mankind are appointed by God, must have thesame crueltyandinjusticein it. Now thatdeathis a punishment for sin, and that all mankind are by death offered as asacrificefor sin, is not only a doctrine of revealed religion, but the plain dictate of reason. But if reason must acknowledge the death of all mankind, as a sacrifice for sin, then it can have no just objection against the sacrifice of Christ,becauseit washuman.I need not take upon me to prove thereasonablenessof God’s procedure in themortalityof mankind; revelation is not under any necessity of proving this; because it is no difficulty that arises from revelation, but equally belongs to natural religion; and both of them must acknowledge it to be reasonable; not because it can be proved to be so from the nature ofthings, but is to be believed to be so, by faith and piety.But if natural religion, will not suffer us to think itinconsistentwith the justice and goodness of God, to appoint all mankind victims to death on the account of sin, thennaturalreligion, can have no objection against the sacrifice of Christ, as it is anhuman sacrifice.And all thatrevelationadds tonaturalreligion, on the point ofhumansacrifice, is only this; the knowledge ofone, that givesmerit and effect, to all the rest.Secondly, It is objected, that the atonement made by Jesus Christ, represents God as punishing theinnocentand acquitting theguilty; or, as punishing the innocentinsteadof the guilty.But this proceeds all upon mistake: for the atonement made by Jesus Christ, though it procures pardon for the guilty, yet it does not acquit them, or excuse them from any punishment, or suffering for sin, whichreason could impose upon them. Natural religion calls men to repentance for their sins: the atonement made by Jesus Christ does not acquit them from it, or pardon them without it; but calls them to asevererrepentance, than natural religion alone prescribes.God therefore does not by this proceeding, shew hisdislikeof theinnocentand hisapprobationof thewicked.For how can God be thought to punish our blessed Saviour out ofdislike, if his sufferings are represented of such infinite merit with him? Or how can he shew thereby hisapprobationof the guilty, whose repentance is notacceptableto him, till recommended by the infinite merits of Jesus Christ?As to the fitness of our Lord’s sufferings, as God and man; and thenatureanddegreeof their worth; reason can no more enter into this matter, orproveordisproveany thing about it, than it can enter into the state of the whole creation, and shew, how it could, or could not, be in the whole, better than it is.For you may as well ask any of yoursenses, as ask yourreasonthis principal question,Whether any supernatural means be necessary for the atonement of the sins of mankind?Or, supposing it necessary, whether themediation,death, andintercessionof Jesus Christ, as God and man, be that true supernatural means?For as the fitness or unfitness of anysupernaturalmeans, for the atonement of sin, must result from theincomprehensible relationGod bears to sinners, as it must have suchnecessity, anddignity, as this relationrequires, it necessarily follows, that if God acts according tothis relation, thefitnessof his actions cannot be according to our comprehension.Again: Supposing somesupernatural meansto be necessary, for destroying the guilt and powerof sin; or that thesufferings, andintercession, of the Son of God incarnate, is that true supernatural means, it necessarily follows, that a revelation of such, or any othersupernaturalmeans, cannot possibly be made obvious to our reason and senses, as the things of human life, or the transactions amongst men are; but can only be so revealed, as to become just occasions of ourfaith,humility, andpious resignation, to the divine wisdom and goodness.For, to say that such a thing issupernatural, is only saying, that it is something, which, by thenecessary stateof our own nature, we are as incapable of knowing, as we are incapable of seeingspirits.If therefore supernatural things are by the letter of scripture ever revealed to us, they cannot be revealed to us as they are in theirown nature: for if they could, such things would not besupernatural.If anangelcould appear to us, as it is in its own nature, then we should benaturallycapable of seeing angels; but, because our nature is notcapableof such a sight; therefore, whenangelsappear to men, they must appear, not as they are in themselves, but in somehumanorcorporealform.It is just thus, when anydivinematter is revealed by God; it can no more possibly be revealed to us, as it is in itsown nature, than anangelcan appear to us, as it is in its own nature;but such supernatural matter can only be revealed to us, by being represented to us, by its likeness to something, that we alreadynaturallyknow.Thus revelation teaches us thissupernaturalmatter; that Jesus Christ is makingperpetual intercession for us in heaven: for Christ’sreal state, ormannerof existence with God in heaven, in regard to his church, cannot, as it is in itsown nature, be described to us; it is in this respect ineffable, and incomprehensible. And therefore, this high and inconceivable manner of Christ’s existence with God in heaven, in regard to his church, is revealed to us under an idea, that gives us the truest representation of it, we are capable of.But if any one should thence infer, that the Son of God must therefore either be always upon his knees, orprostratein some humble form of a supplicant, he would make a very weak inference.Because this revealed idea of Christ, as a perpetual Intercessor in heaven, is only a comparative representation of something, that cannot bedirectlyandplainlyknown as it is in its own nature; and only teaches us, how to believe something, though imperfectly, yettrulyof an incomprehensible nature.Again: When it is by the letter of scripture revealed to us, that the blessed Jesus is the oneMediatorbetween God and man; that he is theAtonement, thePropitiation, andSatisfactionforour sins: these expressions only teach usas muchoutward knowledge of so great a mystery, as human language can represent. But they do not teach us the perfect nature of Christ’s state between God and sinners. For that being asupernaturalmatter, cannot by any outward words be revealed to us as it is in itsown nature, any more than theessenceof God can be madevisibleto our eyes of flesh.But these expressions teach us thus much with certainty, that there is in thestateof Christ between God and sinners, something infinitely and inconceivably beneficial to us; andtruly answerableto all that we mean bymediation,atonement,propitiation, andsatisfaction.And though thereal, internal manner, of this mediation and atonement, as it is in its own nature, isincomprehensible, yet this does not lessen our knowledge of the truth and certainty of it, any more than theincomprehensibilityof the divine nature, lessens our certainty of its real existence.And as our idea of God, though consisting of incomprehensible perfections, helps us to a real and certain knowledge of the divine nature; and though all mysterious, is yet the solid foundation of all piety; so our idea of Jesus Christ, as ourMediatorandAtonement, though it be incomprehensible as to its real nature, yet helps us to acertainknowledge of Christ, as ourMediatorandAtonement; and, though full of mystery, isyet full of motives to the highest piety, love, and gratitude unto God.All objections therefore, raised from any difficulties about the nature ofatonements,propitiations, andsatisfactions, as these words are used in common language, are vain, and entirely groundless.For all these objections proceed upon this supposition, thatatonement, orsatisfaction, when attributed to Jesus Christ, signify neither more nor less, than when they are used as terms inhuman lawsor incivillife; take away this supposition, and all objections are entirely removed with it.To return: I have granted this writer his great principle,That the relations of things and persons, and the fitness resulting from thence, is the sole rule of God’s actions: and I have granted it upon this supposition, that it thence follows, that God must act according to hisown nature; and therefore nothing could be fit for God to do, but what had the reason of its fitness in his own nature: and if so, then theruleof his actions could not fall within our comprehension. And consequently,reason alone, could not be a competent judge of God’s proceedings; or say, what God might, or might not, require of us: and therefore I have, plainly turned his main argument against himself, and made it fully confute that doctrine, which he intended to found upon it.But though I have thus far, granted thenatureandrelationsof things and beings, to be the rule of God’s actions, because that plainly supposes, that hisown naturemust be the rule of his actions; yet since ourauthor, and other modern opposers of revealed doctrines of religion, hold it in another sense, and mean by it, I know not whateternal, immutablereasons and relations of things,independentof any being, and which are acommon rule and law of God and man, I entirely declare against it, as an erroneous and groundless opinion.Thus, when this writer says,If the relations between things, and the fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must he not be an arbitrary being?As he here means someeternal, immutable relations, independentof God; so, to suppose, that God cannot be awiseandgoodbeing, unless such eternal, independent relations, be thesole ruleof his actions, is as erroneous, as to affirm, that God cannot beomniscient, unlessmathematical demonstrationsbe hissole mannerof knowing all things. And it is just as reasonable to fix God’s knowledgesolelyin mathematical demonstrations, that we may thence be assured of hisinfallible knowledge, as to make I know not what independent relations of things, thesole ruleof his actions, that we may thence be assured, he is notarbitrary, but a wise and good being.And we have as strong reasons to believe Godto be, in the highest degree,wiseandgood, without knowing on what, his wisdom and goodness isfounded; as we have to believe him to beomniscient, andeternal, without knowing onwhathisomniscienceis founded; or towhat, his eternity is owing. And we have the same reason to hold it a vain enquiry, to ask what obliges God to bewiseandgood, as to ask what obliges him to beomniscient, oreternal.And as it would be absurd to ascribe theexistenceof God toany cause, or found it upon anyindependent relationsof things, so it is the same absurdity, to ascribe the infinite wisdom and goodness of God toany cause, or found them upon any independent relations of things.Nor do we any morelosethe notion, orlessenthe certainty of the divine wisdom and goodness, because we cannot say onwhatthey are founded, than welosethe notion of God, or render his existenceuncertain, because it cannot be founded on any thing.And as in our account of the existence of things, we are obliged to have recourse to a being, whose existence must not be ascribed toany causebecause every thing cannot have a cause, no more than every thing can be created, so in our account ofwisdomandgoodness, there is the same necessity of having recourse to an infinite wisdom and goodness, that neverbeganto be, and that is as different as to itsmannerof existence, from all other wisdom and goodness, that have a beginning,as theexistenceof God isdifferentfrom the existence of the creatures.* But if it be necessary to hold, that there is an infinite wisdom and goodness thatnever beganto be, then it is as necessary to affirm, that such wisdom and goodness can no more befoundedupon therelationsof things, than theunbeginning existenceof God can befoundedupon the existence of things. And to seek for anyreasonsof a wisdom and goodness that was always in thesame infinitestate, is like seeking the cause of that which can have no cause, or askingwhatit is thatcontainsinfinity.* When therefore this writer saith,Infinite wisdom can have no commands, but what are founded on the unalterable reason of things;¹he might as justly have said, aninfinite Creatorcan have no power of creating, but what is founded on theunalterable natureof creatures.¹Page 247.* For thereasonof things, is just as unalterable, as thenatureof creatures. And if the reasons and relations of things are nothing else but theirmannerof existence, or thestateof their nature, certainly the relations of things must have the samebeginning, and the samealterableor unalterable nature, as the things from whence they flow. Unless it can be said, that a thing may exist insuch a manner, though it does not exist at all.When therefore he says again,That the will of God is always determined by the nature and reason of things;¹It is the same as if he had said, theomnipotenceof God is always determined by thenatureofcausesandeffects. For as all causes and effects are what they are, andowetheirnatureto the omnipotence of God, so the relations of things are what they are, and owe their nature to the wisdom and will of God.¹Page 65.Nor does this dependance of the relations of things on the will of God, destroy the nature of relations, or make them doubtful, any more than the existence of things depending on thepowerof God, destroys the certainty of their existence, or renders it doubtful. For as God cannot make things to exist, and not to exist at the same time, though their existence depends upon his power, so neither can he make things to have such relations, and yet not to have such relations at the same time, though their relations depend upon his will.So that the ascribing the relations of things to the will of God, brings no uncertainty to those duties of life, which flow from such relations, but leaves the state of nature with all its relations, and the duties which flow from them, in the greatest certainty, so long as nature itself is continued; and when that eitherceases entirely, or is onlyaltered, it is not to be wondered at, if all its relations cease, or are altered with it.Our author says,Dare any one say, that God’s laws are not founded on the eternal reason of things?¹¹Page 425.* I dare say it with the same assurance, as that hisexistenceis not founded on theeternal existenceof things. And that it is the same extravagance to say, that God’s laws are founded on theeternal reasonsof things, as to say, that hispoweris founded on theeternal capacitiesof things. For thecapacitiesof things have just the samesolidityandeternity, as the relations of things have, and are just suchindependent realitiesas they are: and are just the sameproper materialsto found the omnipotence of God upon, as the relations of things are, to found his infinite wisdom upon.And as we can say, that theomnipotenceof God in preserving and supporting the creation, will certainly actsuitablyto itself, andconsistentwith that omnipotence which first made things be what they are, and put nature into such a state as it is in; so we can say, that theinfinite wisdomof God in giving laws to the world, will actsuitablyto itself, andconsistentwith that wisdom which at first made the nature and relations of the rational world be what they are.But then as theomnipotenceof God, though it acts suitably to the state of the creation, and the nature of causes and effects, which it first ordained, yet cannot be said to be founded upon the nature of causes and effects, because neither causes nor effects haveany nature, but what theyowetoomnipotence; so the infinite wisdom of God, though in giving laws to the world, it actssuitablyto the natures and relations of rational beings, yet cannot be said to befoundedupon such relations, because such relations are theeffectsof the divine wisdom, and owe their existence to it.And thereasonorrelationsof things shew God’santecedentwisdom, and are effects of it, just as the nature ofcausesandeffectsshew hisantecedentpower, and are the effects of it. And as he is infinitely powerful, but not from the nature of causes and effects; so he is infinitely wise, but not from thereasonandnatureof things.Again; if God isinfinitewisdom, then his wisdom cannot be founded on the relations of things, unless thingsfinite, and relations that began to be, can be the foundation of that wisdom which is infinite, and could not begin to be.Therefore to ask,whatit is founded upon, when it can have no foundation uponany thing, is asking, what anindependentbeing is dependent upon, orhowthat began, which could have no beginning?And to ask the reason or foundation ofany oneof the divine attributes, is the same as asking the reason or foundation of them all. And to seek for the reason or foundation of all the divine attributes, is seeking for the cause of God’s existence.And as we do not come to God’s existence, till we come to theendofcauses, so nothing that is divine, can be attributed to any cause.Nor is it any more a contradiction to say, there is something whose nature is without any cause or foundation of its existence, than to say, something exists without everbeginningto exist. For as nothing can have a beginning, but as it proceeds from some cause; so that which can have no beginning, can have no cause. If therefore the divine wisdom everbeganto beinfinite, and we could know when that beginning was, we should have some pretence to search for that, upon which its infinity wasfounded; but if it never could begin to be, then to seek for its reason, or foundation, is seeking for its beginning.This writer affirms, that God’s wisdom and goodness must be founded on the nature and reason of things, otherwise it could not be proved, that God was not anarbitrary being.* Now to seek for reasons to prove that God is not an arbitrary being, that is, a being of thehighest freedomandindependency, that does every thing according to hisown willandpleasure, is as vain, as to seek for reasons to prove, thatall thingsare not the effect of hiswill. For if every thing besides God, received its existence from him; if every thing that exists, is the effect of his will, and he can do nothing, but because he wills the doing it, must he not be free and arbitrary in ashigh a manner, as he is powerful?Thiswritersays,It is not in our power to love the deity, whilst we consider him to be an arbitrary being, acting out of humour and caprice.¹¹Page 31.But if God’swillis asessentiallyopposite tohumourandcaprice, as hisomnipotenceis toweakness and inability; then it is as absurd to suppose, that God must act according to humour and caprice, because he acts according to his own will, as to suppose that he must act with inability, because he acts by his omnipotence.And if the will of God,as such, is in the highest state of perfection, then we have thehighest reasonto love and adore God, because he is arbitrary, and acts according to hisown all-perfect will. And if it be asked, what it is that makes the will of Godall-perfect, it may as well be asked, what it is that makes him omnipotent, or makes him to exist. For, as we have not found out a God, till we have found a being that has nocause; so we have not found thewillof God, till we have found awill, that has nomover, ordirector, orcauseof its perfection. For thatwillwhich never began to be, can no more be any thing, but what it is in itself, than it can begin to be.That which makes people imagine, thatwill aloneis not so adorable, is because they consider it as a blind imperfect faculty that wants to be directed. But what has such a will as this to do with thewillof God?For if the will of God is asperfectawill, as his omniscience is aperfect knowledge, then we are as sure, that the will of God cannot want any direction, orwillany thing amiss, as we are, thathis omniscience cannot need any information, or fall into any mistake. And if thewillof God wanted any direction or government, it is impossible it should have it; for having no superior, it could only be so governed, because itwilledit, and therefore must be always under its own government.All the perfection therefore that can be ascribed to God, must be ascribed to hiswill, not as if it was the production of his will, (for nothing in God is produced) but as eternally inherent in it.And as God’s will has thus all the perfection of the divine nature, and has no rule, or reason, or motive to any goodness, that comes from it, but its ownnatureandstatein God: so this great will is the only law of all creatures, and they are all to obey and conform to it, for this reason, because it is the will of God.* Nothing has amoralreason, or fitness to be done, but because it is the will of God that it should be done.* It may be asked, Is there then noreasonornatureof things? Yes; as certainly as there are things. But the nature and reason of things, consideredindependentlyof the divine will, have no moreobligationin them, than adivine worshipconsidered independently of, and without any regard to theexistenceof God. For thewillof God is as absolutely necessary to found allmoral obligationupon, as the existence of God is necessary to be the foundation of religious worship. Andthe fitness of moral obligations, without thewillof God, is only like the fitness ofreligiousworship without theexistenceof God.And it is as just to say, that he destroys thereasonof religion, who founds it upon the nature and existence of God, as to say, he saps the foundation of moral obligations, who founds them upon the will of God. And as religion cannot be solidly defended, but by shewing its connexion with, and dependence upon God’s existence; so neither can moral obligations be asserted with reason, but by shewing them to be the will of God.It may again be asked, Can God make that fit in itself, which is initself absolutelyunfit to be done?This question consists of improper terms. For God’s will no more makes actions to be fitin themselves, than it makesthingsto existin, or of themselves. No things, nor any actions have anyabsolutefitness, of and inthemselves.Agift, ablow, the making awound, orsheddingofblood, considered in themselves, have noabsolutefitness, but are fit or unfit according to a variety of accidental circumstances.When therefore God by his will makes any thing fit to be done, he does not make the thing fit initself, which is just in thesame stateconsidered initself, that it was before, but it becomes fit for the person to do it, because he can only be happy, or do that which is fit for him to do, by doing the will of God.For instance, thebare eatinga fruit, considered initself, is neither fit nor unfit. If a fruit is appointed by God for our food, then it is as fit to eat it, as to preserve our lives. If a fruit is poisonous, then it is as unfit to eat it, as to commit self-murder. If eating of a fruit is prohibited by God, then it is as unfit as to eat our own damnation.But in none of these instances is the eating or not eating, considered initself fitorunfit: but has all its fitness, or unfitness, from such circumstances, as are entirely owing to the will of God.Supposing therefore God to require a person to do something, which according to his present circumstances,withoutthat command, he ought not to do, God does not make that which isabsolutelyunfit initself, fit to be done: but only addsnew circumstancesto an action, that is neither fit, nor unfit, moral, nor immoral initself, but because of its circumstances.Again, it is objected,If there is nothing right or wrong, good or bad, antecedently and independently of the will of God, there can then be no reason, why God should will, or command one thing, rather than another.It is answered,first, That all goodness, and all possible perfection, is aseternalas God, and as essential to him as his existence. And to say, that they are eitherantecedentorconsequent,dependentorindependentof his will, would be equally absurd. To ask therefore, whether there isnot something right and wrong, antecedent to the will of God, is as absurd, as to ask for some antecedent cause of his existence. And to ask, how God can be good if there is not something good independently of him, is asking how he can be infinite, if there be not something infinite independently of him. And to seek for any othersourceorreasonof the divine goodness, besides the divine nature, is like seeking for some external cause and help of the divine omnipotence.The goodness and wisdom, therefore, by which God is wise and good, and to which all his works of wisdom and goodness are owing, are neitherantecedent, norconsequentto his will.Secondly, Nothing is more certain, than that allmoral obligationsanddutiesof creatures towards one another,beganwith the existence of moral creatures. This is as certain, as that all corporeal qualities and effects,beganwith the existence of bodies.As therefore nothing has the nature of a cause or effect, nothing has any quality of any kind in bodies, but what is entirely owing to matter so created and constituted by thewillof God; so no actions have anymoral qualities, but what are wholly owing to that state and nature in which they are created by the will of God.* Moral obligations therefore of creatures have the sameorigin, and thesame reason, that natural qualities and effects have in the corporeal world,viz.the sole will of God. And as in adifferent state of matter, bodies would have had different qualities and effects; so in a different state of rational beings, there would be different moral obligations, and nothing could be right or good in their behaviour, but what began then to be right and good, because they then began to exist in such a state and condition of life. And as their state and condition could have no other cause or reason of its existence, but the sole will of God, so the cause and reason of right and wrong in such a state, must be equally owing to the will of God.The pretendedabsolute independent fitnesses, orunfitnessesof actions thereforein themselves, are vainabstractions, and philosophicaljargon, serving no ends of morality, but only helping people to wrangle and dispute away that sincere obedience to God, which is their only happiness. But to make these imaginaryabsolute fitnessesthecommon lawboth of God and man, is still more extravagant. For if thecircumstancesof actions give them theirmoral nature, surely God must first be in our circumstances, before that which is a law to us, can be the same law to him.And if a father may require that of a son, which his son, because of hisdifferent state, cannot require of his brother; surely that which God may require of us, may be as different from that which a father may require of a son, as God is different from a father.Again, if God is as much under a law as we are, then he is as much under authority;for law can no more be without authority, than without a law-giver. And if God and we are under thesame law, we must be under thesame authority.* But as God cannot be under any law in common with us his creatures, any more than he can be of the same rank or order with any♦of us; so neither can he be under any law at all, any more than he can be under any authority at all.♦word omitted in text “of”And though God is not to be looked upon as anarbitrary being, in the sense of this author, who will not distinguish arbitrary fromhumourandcaprice; yet in a true sense of the word, when applied to God, he must be affirmed to be an arbitrary being, that acts only from himself, from hisown will, and according to hisown pleasure.And we have no more reason to be afraid to be left to a God without a law, or to be left to his will and pleasure, than to be left under the protection and care of a being, that is all love, and mercy, and goodness. For as the existence of God, as such, necessarily implies the existence of all perfection; so the will of God, as such, necessarily implies thewillingevery thing, thatall perfectioncan will.And as the existence of God, because it contains all perfection, cannot for that reason have any external cause; so the will of God, because it isall perfection, cannot, for that reason, have any externalruleordirection. But his own will is wisdom, and his wisdom is his will. Hisgoodness is arbitrary, and his arbitrariness is goodness.But this writer does not only thus bring God into this state of law and obligation with us, but makes farther advances in the same kind of errors.Hence, says he,we may contemplate the great dignity of our rational nature, since our reason forkind, tho’ not for degree, is of thesame naturewiththat ofGod’s.¹¹Page 24.Here you seeour reason, that is, ourfacultyof reasoning, (for reason cannot be calledoursin any other respect,) has no other difference from reason as it is in God, but that of degree. But what greater absurdity can a man fall into, than to suppose, that a being whose existence had a beginning but a few years ago, differs only in a degree from that which could not possibly have a beginning; or that adependentandindependentbeing, should not be different inkind, butonlyin degree?For to say, that the faculties of a dependent and independent being, may be of the same kind, is as flat a contradiction, as to say, the same kind of thing may be dependent, and independent.Reason belongs to God and man, just aspower,existence,life, andhappiness, belong to God and man; and he that can, from happiness being common to God and man, prove our happinessto be of thesame kindand nature with God’s, may also prove reason in God and man to be of the same kind.This writer indeed says,Our happiness is limited,becauseour reason is so;and that God hasunlimited happiness,becausehe alone has unlimited reason.¹¹Page 24.But if that which isnecessarily limited, is different from that which isnecessarily unlimited, then we have proof enough from this very argument, that a reasonnecessarilylimited cannot be of thesame kindwith that reason, which isnecessarilyunlimited. Unless it can be said, that limited and unlimited, finite and infinite, beginning and unbeginning, have no contrariety inkind, but only differ, as ashortline differs from alongone.* The truth of the matter is this; reason is in God and man, as power is in God and man. And as the divine power has some degree of likeness to human power, yet with aninfinitedifference from it: so that perfection which we callreasonin God, has some degree of likeness to reason as it is in man, yet isinfinitelyand beyond all conception different from it.* And as our enjoyment of power is so limited, so imperfect, so superficial, as to be scarce sufficient to tell us, what power is, much less what omnipotence is; so our share of reason is so small, and we enjoy it in so imperfect a manner,that we can scarce think or talk intelligibly of it, or so much as define our own faculties of reasoning.

Enquiring, whether there be any thing in thenatureandconditionof man, toobligehim to think, that he is not to admit of any doctrines or institutions, as revealed from God, but such as his own reason can prove to be necessary from the nature of things.

IBEGIN with enquiring what there is toobligea man to hold this opinion, because if there is not some strong and plain proof arising from thenatureandconditionof man, toobligehim thus to abide by the sole light of his own reason; it may be so far from being a duty, which he owes to God, that it may be reckoned amongst his most criminal presumptions. And the pleading for this authority of his own reason; may have the guilt of pleading for his greatest vanity. And if, as this writer observes,spiritual pride be the worst sort of pride,¹a confident reliance upon our own reason, as having a right to determine all matters between God and man, if itshould prove to be agroundless pretension, bids fair to be reckoned the highest instance of theworstkind of the worst of sins.

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Every other instance of vanity, every degree of personal pride, and self-esteem, may be a pardonable weakness in comparison of this. For how small is that pride which only makes us prefer our own personal beauty or merit to that of our fellow-creatures, when compared with a self-confiding reason, which is too haughty to adore any thing in the divine counsels, which it cannot fully comprehend; or to submit to any directions from God, but such as its own wisdom could prescribe? Thus much is certain, that there can be nomediumin this matter. The claiming this authority to our own reason, must either be a very great duty, or among the greatest of sins.

If it be asinto admit of anysecretsin divine providence, if it be acrimeto ascribe wisdom and goodness to God in things we cannot comprehend: if it be abasenessandmeannessof spirit to believe that God can teach usbetterormorethan we can teach ourselves: if it be ashameful apostacyfrom the dignity of our nature, to submit to anymysterious providenceover us, to comply with any other methods ofhomageandadoration, than such as we could of ourselves contrive and justify; then it is certainly a great duty to assert and maintain this authority of our own reason.

On the other hand; if the profoundest humility towards God, be the highest instance of piety: if every thing within us and without us, if every thing we know of God, every thing we know of ourselves preaches up humility to us, as the foundation of every virtue, as the life and soul of all holiness: ifsinhad its beginning frompride, andhellbe the effect of it, ifdevilsare what they are through spiritual pride and self-conceit, then we have great reason to believe, that the claiming this authority to our reason, in opposition to the revealed wisdom of God, is not a frailty offleshandblood, but that same spiritual pride which turnedangelsintoapostatespirits.

Since therefore this appealing to our own reason, as the absolutelyperfect ruleof all that ought to pass between God and man, has anappearanceof a pride of theworstkind, and such as unites us both in temper and conduct with the fallen spirits of darkness, it highly concerns every pleader on that side, to consider what grounds he proceeds upon, and to ask himself, what there is in thestateandconditionof human nature, to oblige him to think, that nothing can bedivineorholy, ornecessary, in religion, but whathumanreason dictates?

I hope the reader will think this a fair state of the case, and that all the light we can have in this matter, must arise from a thorough consideration of thestateandconditionof man in this world. Ifwithout revelation he is free from mysteries as amoralandreligiousagent, then he has some plea from his state and condition to rejectrevealedmysteries.

But if in a state of natural religion, he can’t acknowledge a divine providence or worship God, withoutas muchimplicit faith, and submission of his reason, as any revealed mysteries require; then hisstateandconditionin the world, condemns his refusal of any revelation sufficiently attested to come from God. This enquiry therefore into the state and condition of man, being so plainly the true point of the controversy, I hope to obtain the reader’s impartial attention to it.

Had mankind continued in a state ofperfect innocence, without ever failing in their duty either to God or man, yet even in such a state, they could never have known what God would or would not reveal to them, but by some express revelation from him. And as God might intend to raise them to some higher, and unknown state of perfection; so he might raise them to it by the revelation of such things as their own reason, though uncorrupt, yet could not have discovered.

But if man, in a state ofinnocence, could have no pretence to set himself against divine revelation, and make his own reason thefinal judgeof what God could, or could not reveal to him; much less has he any pretence for so doing in his present state ofsin,ignorance, andmisery. Hisnatureandconditionis so far from furnishing him with reasons against revelation, against anysupernaturalhelp from God; that it seems to be inconsolable without it; and every circumstance of his life prepares him to hope for terms ofmercyand deliverance from his present guilt and misery, not according toschemesof hisowncontrivance, not from hisown knowledgeof thenature, andreason, andfitnessof things, but from someincomprehensible depthof divine goodness.

For if sin, and misery, and ignorance, cannot convince us of our own weakness, cannot prepare us to accept of anymethodsofatoningfor our guilt, but such as our own disordered reason can suggest, we are not far from the hardened state of those miserable spirits, that make war against God.

For to insist upon theprerogativeof our own nature, as qualifying us to make our own peace with God, and to reject theatonementwhich he has provided for us, because we esteem it more fit and reasonable, that ourown repentanceshould be sufficient without it, is the same height ofprideandimpiety, as to affirm, that we have no need of any repentance at all.

For as mankind, if they had continued in a state ofinnocence, could not have known how their innocence was to be rewarded, or what changes of state God intended them for, but as revelation had discovered these things unto them: so after they werefalleninto a state of guilt and sin, theycould never know whatmiseryit would expose them to, orwhen, orhow, or whether they were ever to be delivered from it, and made as happy as if they hadneversinned; these are things that nothing but a revelation from God could teach them.

So that for a sinner to pretend to appoint theatonementfor his own sins, or to think himself able to tell what itoughtto be, is as foolish and vain a presumption, as if man ininnocenceshould have pretended to appoint his own method of being changed into acherub.

The writers against revelation appeal to thereasonandnatureof things, asinfalliblydiscovering every thing that a revelation from God can teach us.

Thus our author;If the relations between things, and the fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must not God be an arbitrary being? But if God only commands what the nature of things shew to be fit, it is scarce possible that men should mistake their duty; since a mind that is attentive can as easily distinguish fit from unfit, as the eye can beauty from deformity¹.

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It is granted, that there is a fitness and unfitness of actions founded in the nature of things, and resulting from the relations that persons and things bear to one another. It is also granted, that the reasonableness of most of the duties of children to their parents, of parents to their children,and of men to men, is very apparent, from the relations they bear to one another; and that several of the duties which we owe to God, plainly appear to us, as soon as we acknowledge the relation that is between God and us.

But then, thiswhole argumentproves directly the contrary to that which this author intended to prove by it.

I here therefore join with this author; I readily grant, that the nature, reason and relations of things and persons, and the fitness of actions resulting from thence, is thesole ruleof God’s actions. And I appeal to this one common principle, as a sufficient proof that a man cannot thus abide by thesole lightof his own reason, without contradicting the nature and reason of things, and denying this to be thesole ruleof God’s actions.

* For if thefitnessof actions is founded in thenatureof things and persons, and this fitness be thesole ruleof God’s actions, it is certain that the rule by which he acts, must in many instances beentirelyinconceivable by us, so as not to be knownat all, and in no instancesfullyknown, orperfectlycomprehended.

* For if God is to act according to afitness foundedin thenatureof things, and nothing can be fit for him to do, but what has its fitness founded in his ownincomprehensiblenature, must he not necessarily act by a ruleaboveall humancomprehension? If he must govern his actions by his own nature, he must act by arulethat is just asincomprehensibleto us as his own nature.

* And we can be no farthercompetent judgesof thefitnessof the conduct of God, than we are competent judges of the divine nature; and can no more tell what is, or is notinfinitely wisein God, than we can raise ourselves to astateof infinite wisdom.

So that if thefitnessof actions is founded in theparticular natureof things and persons, and the fitness of God’s actions must arise from that which isparticularto his nature, then we have from this argument, theutmost certaintythat theruleorreasonsof God’s actions must in many cases be entirely inconceivable by us, and in no cases perfectly apprehended; and for this very reason, because he is not anarbitrary being, that acts bymere will, but is governed in every thing he does, by the reason and nature of things.

How mistaken therefore is this author, when he argues after this manner.If God requires things of us, whose fitness our reason can’t prove from the nature of things, must he not be an arbitrary being?For how can that prove God to be an arbitrary agent, which is the necessary consequence of his not being arbitrary?

Supposing God not to be anarbitrary being, but to act constantly, as the perfections of his own nature make itfitandreasonablefor him to act, then there is an utter impossibility of our comprehendingthe reasonableness and fitness of many of his actions.

* For instance; look at thereasonof things, and thefitnessof actions, and tell me how they moved God to create mankind in the state and condition they are in. Nothing is more above the reason of men, than to explain the reasonableness of God’s providence in creating man of such aformandcondition, to go throughsucha state of things as human life is. No revealed mysteries can more exceed the comprehension of man, than the state of human life itself.

Shew me according to whatfitness, founded in thenatureof things, God’s infinite wisdom was determined to form you in such a manner, bring you into such a world, and suffer and preservesuch a stateof things, as human life is, and then you may have some pretence to believe no revealed doctrines, but such as your own reason can deduce from the nature of things.

But whilst your ownform, whilstcreationandprovidenceare depths which you cannot thus look into, ’tis strangely absurd to pretend, that God cannot reveal any thing to you as a matter of religion, except your own reason can shew its foundation in the nature and reason of things.

Revelation, you say, is on your account, and therefore you ought to see thereasonablenessandfitnessof it. And don’t you also say, that God has made you for yourown sake; ought you not therefore to know the reasonableness and fitnessof God’s forming you as you are? Don’t you say, that providence is for thesakeof man? Is it not therefore fit and reasonable, in the nature of things, that there should be nomysteries, orsecrets, in providence, but that man should so see its methods, as to be able to prove all its steps to be constantly fit and reasonable?

Don’t you say, that theworldis for thesakeof man; is it not therefore fit and reasonable that man should see, that thepastandpresentstate of the world has been such as the reason and fitness of things required it should be?

* Now if theimperfectstate of human nature, thecalamitiesof this life, thediseasesand mortality of human bodies, themethodsof God’s continual providence in governing human affairs, are things that as much concern us, as any methods of revealed religion; and if these are things that we cannot explain, according to anyfitnessorunfitnessfounded in thenatureof things, but must believe a great deal more of the infinite wisdom of God, than we can so explain; have we any reason to think, that God cannot, or ought not to raise us out of this unhappy state of things, help us to an higher order of life, and exalt us to a nearer enjoyment of himself, by any means, but such as our own poor reason can grope out of the nature and fitness of things?

Now what is the reason, that all is thus mysterious and unmeasurable by human reason, in these matters so nearly concerning human nature? ’Tis because God is not anarbitrary being,but does that which theincomprehensible perfectionsof his own nature, make itfitandreasonablefor him to do. Do but grant that nothing can befitfor God to do, but what isaccordingto his owninfinite perfections: let but this be theruleof his actions, and then you have thefullestproof, that the fitness of his actions must be above our comprehension, who can only judge of afitnessaccording to ourown perfections; and then we must be surrounded with mystery for this very reason, because God acts according to acertain rule, his own nature.

Again: What is the nature of a human soul, upon whatterms, and in what manner it isunitedto the body, how far it isdifferentfrom it, how far it issubjectto it, what powers and faculties itderivesfrom it; are things wherein thewisdomandgoodnessof God, and thehappinessof man are deeply concerned. Is it not necessary that these things should have their foundation in thereasonandfitnessof things? And yet what natural reason, uninspired from above, can shew that thisstateof soul and body is founded therein?

*Again: The origin ofsinandevil, or how it entered into the world consistently with the infinite wisdom of God, is a mystery ofnatural religion, which reason cannot unfold. For can we shew from thereasonandnatureof things, that it wasfitandreasonable, for the providence of God to suffer sin to enter, and continue in the world? Here therefore the man of natural religion must drop his method of reasoning fromthe fitness of things, and that in an article of the highest concern to the moral world, and be as mere a believer, as he that believes the most incomprehensible mystery of revealed religion.

Now as there have been in the several ages of the world, someimpatient,restlessandpresumingspirits, who, because they could not in these points explain the justice of God’s providence, have taken refuge in horridatheism, so they made just the samesober useof their reason, as ourmodern unbelievers, who because they can’t comprehend thefitnessandnecessityof certain Christian doctrines, resign themselves up to an hardenedinfidelity. For it is just as reasonable to allow of no mysteries inrevelation, as to allow of no mysteries increationandprovidence.

And whenever this writer shall think it proper to attacknaturalreligion with as much freedom as he hasrevealed, he need not enter upon anynewhypothesis, ordifferentway of reasoning. For the same turn of thought, may soon find materials in the natural state of man, for as large a bill of complaints against natural religion, and the mysteries of providence, as is here brought against revealed doctrines.

To proceed: If thefitness of actions is founded in the nature and relation of beings, then nothing can be fit for God to do, but so far as it is fit for theGovernor of all created beings, whether on earth, or in any other part of the universe;and he cannot act fitly towards mankind, but by acting as is fit for the Governor of all beings.

* Now what is fit for theGovernor of all creatednature to do in this or that particular part of his creation, is as much above our reason totell, as it is above our power togovernall beings. And how mankind ought to be governed, with relation to the whole creation, of which they are so small a part, is a matter equally above our knowledge; because we know not how they are a part of the whole, or what relation they bear to any other part, or how their state affects the whole, or any other part, than we know what beings the whole consists of.

Now there is nothing that we know with more certainty than that God is governor of thewhole, and that mankind are apartof the whole; and that the uniformity and harmony of divine providence, must arise from his infinite wise government of thewhole; and therefore we have the utmost certainty, that we arevastly incompetentjudges of the fitness or unfitness of any methods that God uses in the government of so small a part of the universe, as mankind are.

Again: If thefitness of actions is founded in the relations of beings to one another, then the fitness of the actions of God’s providence over mankind, must be in many instances altogether incomprehensible to us.

For the relation which God bears to mankind, as theirall-perfect Creatorand continualPreserver, is a relation that our reason conceives as imperfectly,and knows as little of, as it does of any of the divine attributes. When it compares it to that of afatherand his children, aprinceand his subjects, aproprietorand his property, it has explained it in the best manner it can, but still has left it as much asecret, as we do the divine nature when we only say, it isinfinitelysuperior to every thing that isfinite.

By the natural light of our reason we may know with certainty, severaleffectsof this relation, as that it puts us under the care and protection of a wise, and just, and merciful providence, and demands from us the highest instances of humility, adoration and thanksgiving. But what it is in its own nature, what kind of state, it is to exist in and by God, what it is to see by alightthat is his, to act by a power from him, to live by alifein him; are things as incomprehensible to reason,left to itself, as what it is to be in thethird heavens, or to hear words that cannot be uttered.

But if this relation consists in theseinconceivablethings, in a communication oflife,lightandpower, if these are enjoyed in God, and in ourselves, in a manner not to be explained by any thing that we ever heard, or saw; then we must necessarily be poor judges of what is fit for God to require of us, because of thisrelation. It teaches us nothing but the superficialness of our own knowledge, and the unfathomable depths of the divine perfections.

How little this writer has considered the nature of thisrelationbetween God and man, may be seen by the following paragraphs.The Holy Ghost, says he,cannot deal with men as rational creatures, but by proposing arguments to convince their understandings; and influence their wills, in the same manner as if proposed by other agents. As absurd, as to say, God cannotcreateus as rational beings, unless he creates us in the samemanner, as if we were created by other agents. For to suppose that other agents can possibly act upon our understanding, and will, in thesame mannerthat God does; is as gross an absurdity, as to suppose that other agents can create us in the same manner that God creates us.

And toconfinethe manner of the Holy Ghost’s acting upon us, to the manner of our acting upon one another byargumentsandsyllogisms, is as great a weakness, as toconfinethe manner of God’s creating us, to the manner of our making astatuewithtoolsandinstruments.

But he proceeds and says,For to go beyond this, would be making impressions on men, as a seal does on wax; to the confounding of their reason, and their liberty in chusing; and the man would then be mearly passive, and the action would be the action of another being acting upon him, for which he could be no way accountable¹.

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Here you see the Holy Spirit has but these two possible ways of acting upon men, it musteither only propose an argument, just as a man may propose one, or it must act like aseal upon wax.

I only ask this writer, whether God communicateslife, andstrength, andunderstanding, andliberty of willto us, only as men may communicate any thing to one another? or as a seal acts upon wax? If so, it may be granted, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us any other way.

But it must be affirmed, that we do, by a continual influx from God, enjoy all these powers, and receive the continuance of all these faculties from him, not as men receive things from one another, nor aswaxreceives theimpressionof theseal, but in a way as much above our conception, as creation is above our power; if we have all ourpowerof acting, by acontinual communicationfrom him, and yet as free agents, have all ourlightfrom him, and yet areaccountable intelligentbeings; then it must be great weakness to affirm, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us in the same manner: for it would be saying, God cannot act upon us as he does act upon us.

The short of the matter is this. Either thiswritermust affirm, that ourrational nature, ourunderstanding faculties, ourpowerof action, ourlibertyof will, mustnecessarilysubsist without thecontinual actionof God upon them, or else hemust grant, that God canactupon ourunderstandingsandwillswithout making us asmerely passiveas the wax under the seal.

This writer says,Though the relation we stand in to God, is not artificial, as most are amongst men—yet this does not hinder, but that we may know the end he had in being related to us as Creator and Governor, and what he requires of his creatures and subjects. But how are we to know this?This, says he,the divine nature, whichcontains in it all perfection and happiness, plainly points out to us¹.

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If he had said, since God must act over us as Creator and Governor, according to his own infiniteperfection and happiness, therefore his conduct over us may bevery mysterious, he had drawn aplainconclusion. But he proves all to be plain, because God is to govern us according to something that is not plain, according to his ownincomprehensible nature.

His argument therefore proceeds thus. God must govern us according to his owninfinite perfection and happiness; but wedo not knowwhat his infinite perfections and happiness are:

Therefore weplainly knowhow he is to govern us.

Now if this writer is capable of taking such an argument as this to be demonstrative, it is nowonder that all his principles of religion are founded upon demonstration.

But if he knows no more of what arises from therelationbetween God and his creatures, than he has here demonstrated, he might be very well content with some farther knowledge from divine revelation.

It is because of this incomprehensible relation between God and his creatures, that we are unavoidably ignorant of what God may justly require of us either in a state ofinnocenceorsin. For as the fitness of actions between beingsrelated, must result from their respective natures, so the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, on which the relation between God and man is founded, makes it utterly impossible for mere natural reason to say, whatkindofhomage, orworship, he mayfitlyrequire of man in a state ofinnocence; or whatdifferentworship and homage he may, or must require of men, assinners.

And to appeal to the infinite perfections of God, asplainly pointing this out, is the same extravagance, as to appeal to theincomprehensibilityof God as a plain proof of our comprehending what God is.

As to the obligations of moral or social duties, which have their foundation in the several relations we bear to one another, these are the same in the state ofinnocenceorsin, and we know that we truly act according to the divine will, whenwe act according to what these relations require of us.

But the question is, What distinct kind ofhomage, orservice, orworship, God may require us to render to him, either in a state ofinnocenceorsin, on account of that relation he bears to us as an all-perfect Creator and Governor?

But this is a question that God alone can resolve.

Human reason cannot enter into it, it has no principle to proceed upon in it. For as thenecessityof divine worship, so theparticular mannerof it, must have its reason in the divine nature.

Sacrifice, if considered only as anhuman invention, could not be proved to be a reasonable service. Yet considered as adivine institution, it would be the greatest folly not to receive it as a reasonable service. For as we could see no reason for it, if it was of human invention, so we should have the greatest reason to comply with it because it was of divine appointment. Not as if the divine appointment altered thenatureandfitnessof things; but because nothing has thenatureandfitnessof divine worship, but as it is of divine appointment.

Man therefore, had he continued in a state of innocence, and without revelation, might have lived in an awful fear, and pious regard of God, and observed every duty both of moral and civillife, as an act of obedience to him. But he could have no foundation either to invent any particularmannerof divine worship himself, or to reject any that was appointed by God, asunnecessary. It would have been ridiculous to have pleaded his innocence, as having no need of a divine worship. For who can have greater reason, or be fitter to worship God, than innocent beings? It would have been more absurd, to have objected the sufficiency of their reason; for why should men reject arevealed mannerof divine worship, because God had given them reason of their own, sufficient for the duties of social and civil life?

And as reason in a state of innocence and perfection, could not have any pretence to appoint the manner of divine worship, so when the state of innocence was changed for that of sin, it became more difficult for bare reason to know what kind of worship could be acceptable to God from sinners.

For what therelationbetwixt God and sinners makes it fit for God to require or accept of them, cannot be determined by human reason.

This is anew state, and the foundation of anew relation, and nothing can be fit for God to do in it, but what has itsfitness resultingfrom it. We have nothing to help our conceptions of the fore-mentionedrelative charactersof God, as ourGovernorandPreserver, but what we derive from our idea of humanfathersandgovernors:which idea only helps us to comprehend theserelations, just as our idea of human power helps us to comprehend theomnipotenceof God. For a father or governor, no more represents thestateof God as ourGovernorandPreserver, than our living in our father’sfamily, represents themannerof our living in God.

These relations are both very plain, and very mysterious; they are very plain, as to therealityof their existence; and highly mysterious and inconceivable, as to themannerof their existence.

That which isplain, in these relative characters of God, plainly shews our obligations to every instance ofduty,homage,love, andgratitude.

And that which isinconceivablein them, is a solid foundation of thatprofound humility,awful reverence,internal pietyandtremendous senseof the divine Majesty, with which devout persons think of God, and assist at theofficesof religion. Which excites in them a higher zeal for doctrines and institutions of divine revelation, than for all things human; that fills them with reverence for allthings, places, and offices, that are either by divine or human authority, appointed to assist their desired intercourse with God.

And if some people, by alongandstrictattention toreason, and thefitnessandunfitnessof things, have at last arrived at a demonstrativecertainty, that all these sentiments of piety and devotion, are merebigotry,superstition, andenthusiasm; I shall only now observe, thatyouthful extravagance,passion, anddebauchery, by their ownnatural tendency, without the assistance of any other guide, seldom fail of making the same discovery. And though it is not reckoned any reflection upongreat wits, when they hit upon the same thought, yet it may seem some disparagement of thatreasonandphilosophy, which teachesold mento think the same of religion, thatpassionandextravaganceteach the young.

To return: As there is no state in human life, that can give us a true idea of any of the fore-mentioned relative characters of God, so this relative state of God towards sinners is still less capable of being comprehended by any thing observable in the relations, betwixt a judge and criminals, acreditorand his debtors, aphysicianand his patients, a father or prince, and their disobedient children and subjects.

For none of these states separately, nor all of them jointly considered, give us any full idea, either of thenatureandguiltof sin or how God is to deal with sinners, on the account of the relation he bears to them.

To ask, whethersinhath solely thenatureof an offence, against a prince or a father, and so is pardonable by mere goodness; whether it is like anerrorin aroadorpath, and so is entirely at an end, when the right path is taken;whether its guilt hath the nature of a debt, and so is capable of being discharged, just as a debt is; whether it affects the soul, as awoundordiseaseaffects the body, and so ought only to move God to act as a good physician? All these questions are as vain, as to ask, whether knowledge in God is reallythinking, or his nature a realsubstance. For as his knowledge and nature cannot be strictly defined, but are capable of being signified by the termsthinkingandsubstance, so the nature of sin is notstrictly representedunder any of these characters, but is capable of receivingsome representationfrom every one of them.

When sin is said to be an offence against God, it is to teach us, that we have infinitely more reason to dread it onGod’s account, than to dread any offence against our parents, or governors.

When it is compared to adebt, it is to signify, that our sins make us accountable to God, not in thesame manner, but with the same certainty, as a debtor is answerable to his creditor; and because it has some likeness to a debt, that of ourselves we are not able to pay.

When it is compared to awound, or disease, it is not to teach us, that it may as justly and easily be healed as bodily wounds, but to help us to conceive the greatness of its evil; that, as diseases bring death to the body,so sin brings a worse kind of death upon the soul.

Since therefore thenatureandguiltof sin can only so far be known, as to make it highly to bedreaded, but not so known as to befullyunderstood, by any thing we can compare to it:

Since therelationwhich God bears tosinners, can only be so known, as to make it highly reasonable to prostrate ourselves before him, in every instance of humility and penitence; but not so fully known as to teach us, in what manner, God must deal with us: it plainly follows, that if God is not anarbitrarybeing, but acts according to afitness resultingfrom this relation, he must, in this respect, act by aruleknown only to himself, and such as we cannotpossiblystate from thereasonandnatureof things.

For if the nature of things, and the fitness of actions resulting from their relations, is to be the rule of our reason, thenreasonmust be here at a full stop, and can have no more knowledge to proceed upon, in stating thenature, theguilt, or properatonementof sin in men, than of sin inangels.

Forreasoncan no more tell us what theguiltof sin is, whathurtit does us, how far itentersinto, andaltersour very nature, whatcontrariety to, andseparationfrom God, it necessarily brings upon us, or whatsupernaturalmeans are, or are not, necessary to abolish it; ourreasoncan no more tell this, than oursensescan tell us, what is theinward, and what is theoutwardlight of angels.

Ask reason whateffectsin has upon the soul, and it can tell you no more, than if you had asked, what effect theomnipresenceof God has upon the soul.

Ask reason, and the nature of things, what is, or ought to be, thetrue natureof an atonement for sin, how far it is likepayingadebt, orhealingawound, or how far it is different from them? And it can tell you no more, than if you had asked, what is thetrue degreeof power thatpreservesus in existence, how far it islikethat which at first created us, and how far it isdifferentfrom it.

All these enquiries are, by the nature of things, made impossible to us, so long as we have no light but from our own natural capacities, and we cannot take upon us to bephilosophersin these matters, but by deserting our reason, and giving ourselves up tovisionandimagination.

And we have as much authority from the nature of things, to appeal tohungerandthirst, andsensual pleasure, to tell ushowour souls shall live in the beatific presence of God, as to appeal to ourreasonandlogic, to demonstrate how sin is to beatoned, or the soulprepared, andpurified, for future happiness.

For God has no more given us our reason tosettlethe nature of an atonement for sin; or tofind out what can, or cannot, take away its guilt, than he has given ussensesandappetitesto state the nature, or discover the ingredients of future happiness.

And he who rejects theatonementfor sins made by the Son of God, asneedless, because he cannot prove it to benecessary, is as extravagant, as he that should deny that God created him by hisonly Son, because he did not remember it. For our memory is as proper a faculty to tell us, whether God at first created us, by his only Son, as ourreasonis to tell us, whether we ought to be restored to God, with, or without the mediation of Jesus Christ.

When therefore this writer says,Can any thing be more evident, than that if doing evil be the only cause of God’s displeasure, the ceasing to do evil, must take away that displeasure?¹

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* Just as if he had said, if conversing with aleperhas been the only cause of a man’s getting aleprosy, must not departing from him, be the removal of theleprosy? For if any one, guessing at theguiltof sin, and itseffectson the soul, should compare it to aleprosyin the body, he can no more say, that he has reached itsreal, internalevil, than he, that comparing the happiness of heaven to a crown of glory, can be said to have described its real happiness.

Thiswriterhas no occasion to appeal to the nature of things, if he can be thus certain aboutthings, whose nature is not only obscure, butimpossibleto be known. For it is as impossible for him to know theguiltandeffectsof sin, as to know the shape of an angel. It is as impossible to know by the mere light of reason, what God’sdispleasureat sin is, whatseparationfrom sinners it implies, or how itobligesGod to deal with them; as to know what the internal essence of God is. Our author therefore has here found the utmost degree of evidence, where it wasimpossiblefor him to have thesmallest degreeof knowledge.

If a man, havingmurderedtwenty of his fellow-creatures, should afterward be sorry for it, and wish that he had a power to bring them to life again, or to create others in their stead, would his ceasing to kill, and wishing he had a power to create others in their stead, put him just in thesame statewith God, as if he had never murdered a man in his life? But unless this can be said, it cannot be said that repentance is sufficient to put a man in thesame state, as if he never had sinned.

The writer has two more objections against the atonement for sin, made by Jesus Christ.First, as it is anhuman sacrifice, which nature itself abhors: and which was looked upon as the great abomination of idolatrousPaganworship.

Thecruelty,injustice, andimpiety, of shedding human blood in the sacrifices of thePagansis fully granted; butreasoncannot thence bring the smallest objections against the sacrifice of Christ.

For how can reason be more disregarded, than in such an argument as this? ThePaganswere unjust, cruel, and impious, in offering human blood to their false gods; therefore the true God cannot receive anyhumansacrifice, or allow any persons to die, as a punishment for sin.

For, if no human sacrifice can be fit for God to receive, because human sacrifices, as parts ofPaganworship, were unjust and impious; then it would follow, that themortality, to which all mankind are appointed by God, must have thesame crueltyandinjusticein it. Now thatdeathis a punishment for sin, and that all mankind are by death offered as asacrificefor sin, is not only a doctrine of revealed religion, but the plain dictate of reason. But if reason must acknowledge the death of all mankind, as a sacrifice for sin, then it can have no just objection against the sacrifice of Christ,becauseit washuman.

I need not take upon me to prove thereasonablenessof God’s procedure in themortalityof mankind; revelation is not under any necessity of proving this; because it is no difficulty that arises from revelation, but equally belongs to natural religion; and both of them must acknowledge it to be reasonable; not because it can be proved to be so from the nature ofthings, but is to be believed to be so, by faith and piety.

But if natural religion, will not suffer us to think itinconsistentwith the justice and goodness of God, to appoint all mankind victims to death on the account of sin, thennaturalreligion, can have no objection against the sacrifice of Christ, as it is anhuman sacrifice.

And all thatrevelationadds tonaturalreligion, on the point ofhumansacrifice, is only this; the knowledge ofone, that givesmerit and effect, to all the rest.

Secondly, It is objected, that the atonement made by Jesus Christ, represents God as punishing theinnocentand acquitting theguilty; or, as punishing the innocentinsteadof the guilty.

But this proceeds all upon mistake: for the atonement made by Jesus Christ, though it procures pardon for the guilty, yet it does not acquit them, or excuse them from any punishment, or suffering for sin, whichreason could impose upon them. Natural religion calls men to repentance for their sins: the atonement made by Jesus Christ does not acquit them from it, or pardon them without it; but calls them to asevererrepentance, than natural religion alone prescribes.

God therefore does not by this proceeding, shew hisdislikeof theinnocentand hisapprobationof thewicked.

For how can God be thought to punish our blessed Saviour out ofdislike, if his sufferings are represented of such infinite merit with him? Or how can he shew thereby hisapprobationof the guilty, whose repentance is notacceptableto him, till recommended by the infinite merits of Jesus Christ?

As to the fitness of our Lord’s sufferings, as God and man; and thenatureanddegreeof their worth; reason can no more enter into this matter, orproveordisproveany thing about it, than it can enter into the state of the whole creation, and shew, how it could, or could not, be in the whole, better than it is.

For you may as well ask any of yoursenses, as ask yourreasonthis principal question,Whether any supernatural means be necessary for the atonement of the sins of mankind?Or, supposing it necessary, whether themediation,death, andintercessionof Jesus Christ, as God and man, be that true supernatural means?

For as the fitness or unfitness of anysupernaturalmeans, for the atonement of sin, must result from theincomprehensible relationGod bears to sinners, as it must have suchnecessity, anddignity, as this relationrequires, it necessarily follows, that if God acts according tothis relation, thefitnessof his actions cannot be according to our comprehension.

Again: Supposing somesupernatural meansto be necessary, for destroying the guilt and powerof sin; or that thesufferings, andintercession, of the Son of God incarnate, is that true supernatural means, it necessarily follows, that a revelation of such, or any othersupernaturalmeans, cannot possibly be made obvious to our reason and senses, as the things of human life, or the transactions amongst men are; but can only be so revealed, as to become just occasions of ourfaith,humility, andpious resignation, to the divine wisdom and goodness.

For, to say that such a thing issupernatural, is only saying, that it is something, which, by thenecessary stateof our own nature, we are as incapable of knowing, as we are incapable of seeingspirits.

If therefore supernatural things are by the letter of scripture ever revealed to us, they cannot be revealed to us as they are in theirown nature: for if they could, such things would not besupernatural.

If anangelcould appear to us, as it is in its own nature, then we should benaturallycapable of seeing angels; but, because our nature is notcapableof such a sight; therefore, whenangelsappear to men, they must appear, not as they are in themselves, but in somehumanorcorporealform.

It is just thus, when anydivinematter is revealed by God; it can no more possibly be revealed to us, as it is in itsown nature, than anangelcan appear to us, as it is in its own nature;but such supernatural matter can only be revealed to us, by being represented to us, by its likeness to something, that we alreadynaturallyknow.

Thus revelation teaches us thissupernaturalmatter; that Jesus Christ is makingperpetual intercession for us in heaven: for Christ’sreal state, ormannerof existence with God in heaven, in regard to his church, cannot, as it is in itsown nature, be described to us; it is in this respect ineffable, and incomprehensible. And therefore, this high and inconceivable manner of Christ’s existence with God in heaven, in regard to his church, is revealed to us under an idea, that gives us the truest representation of it, we are capable of.

But if any one should thence infer, that the Son of God must therefore either be always upon his knees, orprostratein some humble form of a supplicant, he would make a very weak inference.

Because this revealed idea of Christ, as a perpetual Intercessor in heaven, is only a comparative representation of something, that cannot bedirectlyandplainlyknown as it is in its own nature; and only teaches us, how to believe something, though imperfectly, yettrulyof an incomprehensible nature.

Again: When it is by the letter of scripture revealed to us, that the blessed Jesus is the oneMediatorbetween God and man; that he is theAtonement, thePropitiation, andSatisfactionforour sins: these expressions only teach usas muchoutward knowledge of so great a mystery, as human language can represent. But they do not teach us the perfect nature of Christ’s state between God and sinners. For that being asupernaturalmatter, cannot by any outward words be revealed to us as it is in itsown nature, any more than theessenceof God can be madevisibleto our eyes of flesh.

But these expressions teach us thus much with certainty, that there is in thestateof Christ between God and sinners, something infinitely and inconceivably beneficial to us; andtruly answerableto all that we mean bymediation,atonement,propitiation, andsatisfaction.

And though thereal, internal manner, of this mediation and atonement, as it is in its own nature, isincomprehensible, yet this does not lessen our knowledge of the truth and certainty of it, any more than theincomprehensibilityof the divine nature, lessens our certainty of its real existence.

And as our idea of God, though consisting of incomprehensible perfections, helps us to a real and certain knowledge of the divine nature; and though all mysterious, is yet the solid foundation of all piety; so our idea of Jesus Christ, as ourMediatorandAtonement, though it be incomprehensible as to its real nature, yet helps us to acertainknowledge of Christ, as ourMediatorandAtonement; and, though full of mystery, isyet full of motives to the highest piety, love, and gratitude unto God.

All objections therefore, raised from any difficulties about the nature ofatonements,propitiations, andsatisfactions, as these words are used in common language, are vain, and entirely groundless.

For all these objections proceed upon this supposition, thatatonement, orsatisfaction, when attributed to Jesus Christ, signify neither more nor less, than when they are used as terms inhuman lawsor incivillife; take away this supposition, and all objections are entirely removed with it.

To return: I have granted this writer his great principle,That the relations of things and persons, and the fitness resulting from thence, is the sole rule of God’s actions: and I have granted it upon this supposition, that it thence follows, that God must act according to hisown nature; and therefore nothing could be fit for God to do, but what had the reason of its fitness in his own nature: and if so, then theruleof his actions could not fall within our comprehension. And consequently,reason alone, could not be a competent judge of God’s proceedings; or say, what God might, or might not, require of us: and therefore I have, plainly turned his main argument against himself, and made it fully confute that doctrine, which he intended to found upon it.

But though I have thus far, granted thenatureandrelationsof things and beings, to be the rule of God’s actions, because that plainly supposes, that hisown naturemust be the rule of his actions; yet since ourauthor, and other modern opposers of revealed doctrines of religion, hold it in another sense, and mean by it, I know not whateternal, immutablereasons and relations of things,independentof any being, and which are acommon rule and law of God and man, I entirely declare against it, as an erroneous and groundless opinion.

Thus, when this writer says,If the relations between things, and the fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must he not be an arbitrary being?As he here means someeternal, immutable relations, independentof God; so, to suppose, that God cannot be awiseandgoodbeing, unless such eternal, independent relations, be thesole ruleof his actions, is as erroneous, as to affirm, that God cannot beomniscient, unlessmathematical demonstrationsbe hissole mannerof knowing all things. And it is just as reasonable to fix God’s knowledgesolelyin mathematical demonstrations, that we may thence be assured of hisinfallible knowledge, as to make I know not what independent relations of things, thesole ruleof his actions, that we may thence be assured, he is notarbitrary, but a wise and good being.

And we have as strong reasons to believe Godto be, in the highest degree,wiseandgood, without knowing on what, his wisdom and goodness isfounded; as we have to believe him to beomniscient, andeternal, without knowing onwhathisomniscienceis founded; or towhat, his eternity is owing. And we have the same reason to hold it a vain enquiry, to ask what obliges God to bewiseandgood, as to ask what obliges him to beomniscient, oreternal.

And as it would be absurd to ascribe theexistenceof God toany cause, or found it upon anyindependent relationsof things, so it is the same absurdity, to ascribe the infinite wisdom and goodness of God toany cause, or found them upon any independent relations of things.

Nor do we any morelosethe notion, orlessenthe certainty of the divine wisdom and goodness, because we cannot say onwhatthey are founded, than welosethe notion of God, or render his existenceuncertain, because it cannot be founded on any thing.

And as in our account of the existence of things, we are obliged to have recourse to a being, whose existence must not be ascribed toany causebecause every thing cannot have a cause, no more than every thing can be created, so in our account ofwisdomandgoodness, there is the same necessity of having recourse to an infinite wisdom and goodness, that neverbeganto be, and that is as different as to itsmannerof existence, from all other wisdom and goodness, that have a beginning,as theexistenceof God isdifferentfrom the existence of the creatures.

* But if it be necessary to hold, that there is an infinite wisdom and goodness thatnever beganto be, then it is as necessary to affirm, that such wisdom and goodness can no more befoundedupon therelationsof things, than theunbeginning existenceof God can befoundedupon the existence of things. And to seek for anyreasonsof a wisdom and goodness that was always in thesame infinitestate, is like seeking the cause of that which can have no cause, or askingwhatit is thatcontainsinfinity.

* When therefore this writer saith,Infinite wisdom can have no commands, but what are founded on the unalterable reason of things;¹he might as justly have said, aninfinite Creatorcan have no power of creating, but what is founded on theunalterable natureof creatures.

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* For thereasonof things, is just as unalterable, as thenatureof creatures. And if the reasons and relations of things are nothing else but theirmannerof existence, or thestateof their nature, certainly the relations of things must have the samebeginning, and the samealterableor unalterable nature, as the things from whence they flow. Unless it can be said, that a thing may exist insuch a manner, though it does not exist at all.

When therefore he says again,That the will of God is always determined by the nature and reason of things;¹It is the same as if he had said, theomnipotenceof God is always determined by thenatureofcausesandeffects. For as all causes and effects are what they are, andowetheirnatureto the omnipotence of God, so the relations of things are what they are, and owe their nature to the wisdom and will of God.

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Nor does this dependance of the relations of things on the will of God, destroy the nature of relations, or make them doubtful, any more than the existence of things depending on thepowerof God, destroys the certainty of their existence, or renders it doubtful. For as God cannot make things to exist, and not to exist at the same time, though their existence depends upon his power, so neither can he make things to have such relations, and yet not to have such relations at the same time, though their relations depend upon his will.

So that the ascribing the relations of things to the will of God, brings no uncertainty to those duties of life, which flow from such relations, but leaves the state of nature with all its relations, and the duties which flow from them, in the greatest certainty, so long as nature itself is continued; and when that eitherceases entirely, or is onlyaltered, it is not to be wondered at, if all its relations cease, or are altered with it.

Our author says,Dare any one say, that God’s laws are not founded on the eternal reason of things?¹

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* I dare say it with the same assurance, as that hisexistenceis not founded on theeternal existenceof things. And that it is the same extravagance to say, that God’s laws are founded on theeternal reasonsof things, as to say, that hispoweris founded on theeternal capacitiesof things. For thecapacitiesof things have just the samesolidityandeternity, as the relations of things have, and are just suchindependent realitiesas they are: and are just the sameproper materialsto found the omnipotence of God upon, as the relations of things are, to found his infinite wisdom upon.

And as we can say, that theomnipotenceof God in preserving and supporting the creation, will certainly actsuitablyto itself, andconsistentwith that omnipotence which first made things be what they are, and put nature into such a state as it is in; so we can say, that theinfinite wisdomof God in giving laws to the world, will actsuitablyto itself, andconsistentwith that wisdom which at first made the nature and relations of the rational world be what they are.

But then as theomnipotenceof God, though it acts suitably to the state of the creation, and the nature of causes and effects, which it first ordained, yet cannot be said to be founded upon the nature of causes and effects, because neither causes nor effects haveany nature, but what theyowetoomnipotence; so the infinite wisdom of God, though in giving laws to the world, it actssuitablyto the natures and relations of rational beings, yet cannot be said to befoundedupon such relations, because such relations are theeffectsof the divine wisdom, and owe their existence to it.

And thereasonorrelationsof things shew God’santecedentwisdom, and are effects of it, just as the nature ofcausesandeffectsshew hisantecedentpower, and are the effects of it. And as he is infinitely powerful, but not from the nature of causes and effects; so he is infinitely wise, but not from thereasonandnatureof things.

Again; if God isinfinitewisdom, then his wisdom cannot be founded on the relations of things, unless thingsfinite, and relations that began to be, can be the foundation of that wisdom which is infinite, and could not begin to be.

Therefore to ask,whatit is founded upon, when it can have no foundation uponany thing, is asking, what anindependentbeing is dependent upon, orhowthat began, which could have no beginning?

And to ask the reason or foundation ofany oneof the divine attributes, is the same as asking the reason or foundation of them all. And to seek for the reason or foundation of all the divine attributes, is seeking for the cause of God’s existence.

And as we do not come to God’s existence, till we come to theendofcauses, so nothing that is divine, can be attributed to any cause.

Nor is it any more a contradiction to say, there is something whose nature is without any cause or foundation of its existence, than to say, something exists without everbeginningto exist. For as nothing can have a beginning, but as it proceeds from some cause; so that which can have no beginning, can have no cause. If therefore the divine wisdom everbeganto beinfinite, and we could know when that beginning was, we should have some pretence to search for that, upon which its infinity wasfounded; but if it never could begin to be, then to seek for its reason, or foundation, is seeking for its beginning.

This writer affirms, that God’s wisdom and goodness must be founded on the nature and reason of things, otherwise it could not be proved, that God was not anarbitrary being.

* Now to seek for reasons to prove that God is not an arbitrary being, that is, a being of thehighest freedomandindependency, that does every thing according to hisown willandpleasure, is as vain, as to seek for reasons to prove, thatall thingsare not the effect of hiswill. For if every thing besides God, received its existence from him; if every thing that exists, is the effect of his will, and he can do nothing, but because he wills the doing it, must he not be free and arbitrary in ashigh a manner, as he is powerful?

Thiswritersays,It is not in our power to love the deity, whilst we consider him to be an arbitrary being, acting out of humour and caprice.¹

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But if God’swillis asessentiallyopposite tohumourandcaprice, as hisomnipotenceis toweakness and inability; then it is as absurd to suppose, that God must act according to humour and caprice, because he acts according to his own will, as to suppose that he must act with inability, because he acts by his omnipotence.

And if the will of God,as such, is in the highest state of perfection, then we have thehighest reasonto love and adore God, because he is arbitrary, and acts according to hisown all-perfect will. And if it be asked, what it is that makes the will of Godall-perfect, it may as well be asked, what it is that makes him omnipotent, or makes him to exist. For, as we have not found out a God, till we have found a being that has nocause; so we have not found thewillof God, till we have found awill, that has nomover, ordirector, orcauseof its perfection. For thatwillwhich never began to be, can no more be any thing, but what it is in itself, than it can begin to be.

That which makes people imagine, thatwill aloneis not so adorable, is because they consider it as a blind imperfect faculty that wants to be directed. But what has such a will as this to do with thewillof God?

For if the will of God is asperfectawill, as his omniscience is aperfect knowledge, then we are as sure, that the will of God cannot want any direction, orwillany thing amiss, as we are, thathis omniscience cannot need any information, or fall into any mistake. And if thewillof God wanted any direction or government, it is impossible it should have it; for having no superior, it could only be so governed, because itwilledit, and therefore must be always under its own government.

All the perfection therefore that can be ascribed to God, must be ascribed to hiswill, not as if it was the production of his will, (for nothing in God is produced) but as eternally inherent in it.

And as God’s will has thus all the perfection of the divine nature, and has no rule, or reason, or motive to any goodness, that comes from it, but its ownnatureandstatein God: so this great will is the only law of all creatures, and they are all to obey and conform to it, for this reason, because it is the will of God.

* Nothing has amoralreason, or fitness to be done, but because it is the will of God that it should be done.

* It may be asked, Is there then noreasonornatureof things? Yes; as certainly as there are things. But the nature and reason of things, consideredindependentlyof the divine will, have no moreobligationin them, than adivine worshipconsidered independently of, and without any regard to theexistenceof God. For thewillof God is as absolutely necessary to found allmoral obligationupon, as the existence of God is necessary to be the foundation of religious worship. Andthe fitness of moral obligations, without thewillof God, is only like the fitness ofreligiousworship without theexistenceof God.

And it is as just to say, that he destroys thereasonof religion, who founds it upon the nature and existence of God, as to say, he saps the foundation of moral obligations, who founds them upon the will of God. And as religion cannot be solidly defended, but by shewing its connexion with, and dependence upon God’s existence; so neither can moral obligations be asserted with reason, but by shewing them to be the will of God.

It may again be asked, Can God make that fit in itself, which is initself absolutelyunfit to be done?

This question consists of improper terms. For God’s will no more makes actions to be fitin themselves, than it makesthingsto existin, or of themselves. No things, nor any actions have anyabsolutefitness, of and inthemselves.

Agift, ablow, the making awound, orsheddingofblood, considered in themselves, have noabsolutefitness, but are fit or unfit according to a variety of accidental circumstances.

When therefore God by his will makes any thing fit to be done, he does not make the thing fit initself, which is just in thesame stateconsidered initself, that it was before, but it becomes fit for the person to do it, because he can only be happy, or do that which is fit for him to do, by doing the will of God.

For instance, thebare eatinga fruit, considered initself, is neither fit nor unfit. If a fruit is appointed by God for our food, then it is as fit to eat it, as to preserve our lives. If a fruit is poisonous, then it is as unfit to eat it, as to commit self-murder. If eating of a fruit is prohibited by God, then it is as unfit as to eat our own damnation.

But in none of these instances is the eating or not eating, considered initself fitorunfit: but has all its fitness, or unfitness, from such circumstances, as are entirely owing to the will of God.

Supposing therefore God to require a person to do something, which according to his present circumstances,withoutthat command, he ought not to do, God does not make that which isabsolutelyunfit initself, fit to be done: but only addsnew circumstancesto an action, that is neither fit, nor unfit, moral, nor immoral initself, but because of its circumstances.

Again, it is objected,If there is nothing right or wrong, good or bad, antecedently and independently of the will of God, there can then be no reason, why God should will, or command one thing, rather than another.

It is answered,first, That all goodness, and all possible perfection, is aseternalas God, and as essential to him as his existence. And to say, that they are eitherantecedentorconsequent,dependentorindependentof his will, would be equally absurd. To ask therefore, whether there isnot something right and wrong, antecedent to the will of God, is as absurd, as to ask for some antecedent cause of his existence. And to ask, how God can be good if there is not something good independently of him, is asking how he can be infinite, if there be not something infinite independently of him. And to seek for any othersourceorreasonof the divine goodness, besides the divine nature, is like seeking for some external cause and help of the divine omnipotence.

The goodness and wisdom, therefore, by which God is wise and good, and to which all his works of wisdom and goodness are owing, are neitherantecedent, norconsequentto his will.

Secondly, Nothing is more certain, than that allmoral obligationsanddutiesof creatures towards one another,beganwith the existence of moral creatures. This is as certain, as that all corporeal qualities and effects,beganwith the existence of bodies.

As therefore nothing has the nature of a cause or effect, nothing has any quality of any kind in bodies, but what is entirely owing to matter so created and constituted by thewillof God; so no actions have anymoral qualities, but what are wholly owing to that state and nature in which they are created by the will of God.

* Moral obligations therefore of creatures have the sameorigin, and thesame reason, that natural qualities and effects have in the corporeal world,viz.the sole will of God. And as in adifferent state of matter, bodies would have had different qualities and effects; so in a different state of rational beings, there would be different moral obligations, and nothing could be right or good in their behaviour, but what began then to be right and good, because they then began to exist in such a state and condition of life. And as their state and condition could have no other cause or reason of its existence, but the sole will of God, so the cause and reason of right and wrong in such a state, must be equally owing to the will of God.

The pretendedabsolute independent fitnesses, orunfitnessesof actions thereforein themselves, are vainabstractions, and philosophicaljargon, serving no ends of morality, but only helping people to wrangle and dispute away that sincere obedience to God, which is their only happiness. But to make these imaginaryabsolute fitnessesthecommon lawboth of God and man, is still more extravagant. For if thecircumstancesof actions give them theirmoral nature, surely God must first be in our circumstances, before that which is a law to us, can be the same law to him.

And if a father may require that of a son, which his son, because of hisdifferent state, cannot require of his brother; surely that which God may require of us, may be as different from that which a father may require of a son, as God is different from a father.

Again, if God is as much under a law as we are, then he is as much under authority;for law can no more be without authority, than without a law-giver. And if God and we are under thesame law, we must be under thesame authority.

* But as God cannot be under any law in common with us his creatures, any more than he can be of the same rank or order with any♦of us; so neither can he be under any law at all, any more than he can be under any authority at all.

♦word omitted in text “of”

♦word omitted in text “of”

♦word omitted in text “of”

And though God is not to be looked upon as anarbitrary being, in the sense of this author, who will not distinguish arbitrary fromhumourandcaprice; yet in a true sense of the word, when applied to God, he must be affirmed to be an arbitrary being, that acts only from himself, from hisown will, and according to hisown pleasure.

And we have no more reason to be afraid to be left to a God without a law, or to be left to his will and pleasure, than to be left under the protection and care of a being, that is all love, and mercy, and goodness. For as the existence of God, as such, necessarily implies the existence of all perfection; so the will of God, as such, necessarily implies thewillingevery thing, thatall perfectioncan will.

And as the existence of God, because it contains all perfection, cannot for that reason have any external cause; so the will of God, because it isall perfection, cannot, for that reason, have any externalruleordirection. But his own will is wisdom, and his wisdom is his will. Hisgoodness is arbitrary, and his arbitrariness is goodness.

But this writer does not only thus bring God into this state of law and obligation with us, but makes farther advances in the same kind of errors.

Hence, says he,we may contemplate the great dignity of our rational nature, since our reason forkind, tho’ not for degree, is of thesame naturewiththat ofGod’s.¹

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Here you seeour reason, that is, ourfacultyof reasoning, (for reason cannot be calledoursin any other respect,) has no other difference from reason as it is in God, but that of degree. But what greater absurdity can a man fall into, than to suppose, that a being whose existence had a beginning but a few years ago, differs only in a degree from that which could not possibly have a beginning; or that adependentandindependentbeing, should not be different inkind, butonlyin degree?

For to say, that the faculties of a dependent and independent being, may be of the same kind, is as flat a contradiction, as to say, the same kind of thing may be dependent, and independent.

Reason belongs to God and man, just aspower,existence,life, andhappiness, belong to God and man; and he that can, from happiness being common to God and man, prove our happinessto be of thesame kindand nature with God’s, may also prove reason in God and man to be of the same kind.

This writer indeed says,Our happiness is limited,becauseour reason is so;and that God hasunlimited happiness,becausehe alone has unlimited reason.¹

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But if that which isnecessarily limited, is different from that which isnecessarily unlimited, then we have proof enough from this very argument, that a reasonnecessarilylimited cannot be of thesame kindwith that reason, which isnecessarilyunlimited. Unless it can be said, that limited and unlimited, finite and infinite, beginning and unbeginning, have no contrariety inkind, but only differ, as ashortline differs from alongone.

* The truth of the matter is this; reason is in God and man, as power is in God and man. And as the divine power has some degree of likeness to human power, yet with aninfinitedifference from it: so that perfection which we callreasonin God, has some degree of likeness to reason as it is in man, yet isinfinitelyand beyond all conception different from it.

* And as our enjoyment of power is so limited, so imperfect, so superficial, as to be scarce sufficient to tell us, what power is, much less what omnipotence is; so our share of reason is so small, and we enjoy it in so imperfect a manner,that we can scarce think or talk intelligibly of it, or so much as define our own faculties of reasoning.

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