CHAPTERII.

CHAPTERII.Shewing from therelationbetween God and man, that human reason cannot be a competent judge of thefitnessandreasonablenessof God’s proceedings with mankind, either as to thetime, ormatter, ormannerof an external revelation.AS our author has laid it down for an undeniable rule of God’s actions, that he must, if he be a wise and good being, act according to the relation he stands in towards his creatures; I proceed upon this principle to prove the incapacity ofhuman reason, to judgetrulyof God’s proceedings in regard to divine revelation.For if the fitness of actionsresults from the nature and relationsof beings, then thefitnessof God’s actions, as he is anomniscient CreatorandGovernor, to whom every thing iseternally foreknown, over beings endued withour freedom of will, must be to us incomprehensible.* We are not so much as capable of comprehending by our reason, thepossibilityof this relation, or how the fore-knowledge of God can consist with the free agency of creatures. Weknow that God fore-knows all things, with the same certainty as we know there is a God. And ifself-consciousnessis an infallible proof of our own existence, it proves with the same certainty the freedom of our will. And hence it is, that we have a full assurance of the consistency of God’s fore-knowledge with freedom of will.* Now thisincomprehensiblerelation between aneternally fore-knowing Creator and Governor, and his free creatures, is therelationfrom whence arises the fitness of God’s providence over us. But if therelationitself is incomprehensible, then those actions that have their fitness from it, must surely be incomprehensible. Nothing can be fit for God to do, either increationorprovidence, but what has its fitness founded in hisfore-knowledgeof every thing that would follow, fromevery kindof creation, andevery mannerof providence: but if nothing can be fit, but because it is according tothis fore-knowledgeofevery thingthat would follow fromevery kindof creation, andevery mannerof providence; then we have the utmost certainty, that the fitness of God’s actions as afore-knowing Creator, andGovernorof free agents, must be founded uponreasonsthat we cannot possibly know any thing of.* And a child that has but just learned to speak, is as well qualified to state the fitness of the laws of matter and motion by which thewhole vegetable world is preserved, as the wisest of men is qualified to comprehend, or state the fitness of the methods, which afore-knowing Providenceobserves over free agents. For every reason on which the fitness of such a providence is founded, is not onlyunknownto us, but by a necessity of natureimpossibleto be known by us.For if thefitnessof God’s acting in this, or that manner, is founded in his fore-knowledge of every thing that wouldhappen, from everypossible wayof acting, then it is impossible for us to know the reasons, on which the fitness of his actions is founded, as it is impossible for us to be omniscient.Who can tell whatdifferent kindsof rational creatures, distinguished by variety of natures, and faculties, it is fit and reasonable for God to create, because he eternally foresaw what would be theeffectof such different creations? Who can explain thefitnessof that vastvarietythere is amongst rational creatures of thesame species, or shew that all their different faculties ought to be as they are? And yet thefitnessof this providence has itscertain reasonin the divine fore-knowledge, and it could not be fit, but because of it.Who can tell whatdegreeof reason rational creatures ought to enjoy, or what degrees ofnewandrevealedknowledge it is fit and reasonable for God to give, or not give them, becausethey seem, or seem not to themselves to want it, are disposed, or not disposed to receive it? For as mankind cannot tell why it was fit and reasonable for God to create them of such akind, anddegree, as they are of; so neither can they tell how God ought, or ought not to add to their natural knowledge, and make them asdifferently accountablefor the use of revealed rules of life, as for the use of their natural faculties.And as the reason why God created them ofsuchakind, and withsuch faculties, was because of his own fore-knowledge of theeffectsof such a creation; so if ever he does reveal to them anysupernaturalknowledge, both the doing it, thetime, thematter, andmannerof it, must have their fitness in his owneternal fore-knowledgeof the effects of such a revelation.The reasons therefore on which the fitness of this or that revelation depends,whyorwhen, ofwhat matter, inwhat manner, and to whom it is to be made, must, from the nature and reason of things, be as unsearchable by us, as the reasons ofthisorthatcreation of rational beings, at such atime, of such akind, in such amanner, in such astate.This may help us to an easy solution of the unreasonable questions, which this writer puts in this manner.“If the design of God in communicating any thing of himself to men was their happiness, would not that design have obliged him, who at all times alike desires their happiness, to have at all times alike communicated it to them? If God always acts for the good of his creatures, what reason can be assigned, why he should not from the beginning have discovered such things as make for their good, but defer the doing it till the time ofTiberius; since the sooner this was done, the greater would his goodness appear?”¹¹Page 393.And again “How is it consistent with the notion of God’s being universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children, when all had equal need of it? Was it not as easy for him to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, as in one?”¹¹Page 196.Now all this is fully answered, by our author’s own great and fundamental principle.“For if the relations between things and persons, and the things resulting from thence, be the sole rule of God’s actions,”¹as he expressly affirms; then thesole ruleor reason of God’s revealing any thing to any men, at any time, must have itsfitness resultingfrom the divine fore-knowledge of the effects ofsucha revelation, atsucha time, and tosuchpersons. IfGod does not act thus, he does not act according to the relation betwixt afore-knowing Creator, and his free creatures. But if he does act according to afitness resultingfrom thisrelation, and makes, or does not make revelations, according to his own fore-knowledge of the fitness of times and persons for them; then to ask how a God, always equally good, can make a revelation at any time, and not make thesameatalltimes, is as absurd as to ask, how a God, always equally good, can reveal that at one time, because it is apropertime for it, and not reveal it at every other time, tho’ improper for it.¹Page 28.* God’s goodness, directed by his own fore-knowledge of thefitnessof times, and of thestateandactionsof free agents, deferred a certain revelation to the time ofTiberius, because hefore-sawit would then be an act of thegreatestgoodness, and have itsbest effectsupon the world: to ask therefore,what reason can be assigned, why so good a revelation was notsooner, or even from thebeginningmade to the world, is asking, why God should act, according to hisown fore-knowledgeof thestateandactionsoffree agents, and order all things, according to a fitness resulting from such a fore-knowledge?These questions suppose, that if God shewed hisgoodnessto mankind by a revelation at such time, he must bewantingin goodness before that time, because he did not make itsooner;whereas if his deferring it tillsucha time, was owing to hisfore-knowledgeof the actions and state of free agents, and because it would then have itsbest effects, then God is proved to be equally good before he made it, for this very reason, because he did not make it before itspropertime: and he had been wanting in goodness, if he had notdeferredit till that time.Now this appealing to God’s fore-knowledge of the state and actions offree agents, as the cause of all that is particular in thetimeandmannerof any revelation, and deducing its fitness from thence, cannot be said to bebegging the question, but is resolving it directly according to therule, which this writer lays down for God to act by: that “the relations between things and persons,andthe fitness resulting from thence, must be the sole rule of God’s actions.”But if this is thesole rule, then God in giving any revelation, must act as therelationbetwixt afore-knowingCreator and hisfreecreatures requires; and his actions must have theirfitness resultingfrom his fore-knowledge of thestateandactionsof free agents. And if this is God’s sole rule, then to ask whythisorthatrevelationonlyatsucha time, is to ask why Godonlydoes that which isfitfor him to do? And to ask, why not the same revelation at any other time, is asking why God does not do that, which it isnot fitfor him to do?This writer asks, “How it is consistent withthe notion of God’s being universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children, who had equal need of it?” But if they hadequal needof it, yet if they were notequally fitfor it, but prepared only to have theirguiltincreased by it, and so be exposed to a greater damnation; then God’s goodness to them is manifest, by withholding such information from them, and reserving it for those that would be made happier by it.Judas,Pontius Pilate, and theJewsthat called for our Saviour’s crucifixion, hadequal needof a Saviour with those that believed in him.ChorazinandBethsaidawanted the light of the gospel as much as those that received it. And if the rest of the world had been, at that time, as much indisposed for the light of the gospel, as they were, God’s goodness had been, greater to that age, if he had reserved the light of the gospel till a better age had succeeded.So that this argument, founded on theequal needof all, or former ages, has no force, unless it could be shewn, that the same revelation made to any of these former ages, would have produced all those good effects, which God foresaw would follow, from its being reserved for such aparticular timeandstateof things and persons.He asks again, “Was it not as easy for God to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, asin any one?” This argument is built upon this supposition, that God does things because they areeasy, or forbears things because they aredifficultto be performed. For it can be no argument, that God ought to have revealed such things toallnations or persons, because it was aseasyto him, as to do it toany onenation or person; unless it be supposed, that theeasinessof a thing is a reason why God does it, and the difficulty of a thing a reason why he does not do it. But if this supposition be very absurd, then the argument founded upon it must be liable to the same charge.But if God does things, not because they are easy, but because they are infinitely good and fit to be done, then the reason why God has afforded different revelations, to different ages and persons, is this, that hismannerof revealing every thing, might be worthy of his ownfore-knowledgeof the effects of it, and that every thing that is particular in thetimeormannerof any revelation, might have itsfitness resultingfrom therelationbetwixt a good God and his creatures, whosechangingstate,differentconduct, tempers and actions, are all eternally fore-known by him.Again, it is objected, that a divine revelation must either be the effect ofjustice, or else ofmercyandfree goodness; but in either of these cases it ought to beuniversal; for justice must be done to all. But if it is the effect ofmercyandfree goodness,this writer asks, “How a being can be denominated merciful and good, who is so only to a few, but cruel and unmerciful to the rest?”¹¹Page 401.It is answered, That there is neitherjusticein God without mercy, normercywithout justice; and to ascribe arevelationto either of them separately, incontradistinctionto the other, has no more reason in it, than to ascribe thecreationseparately either to thewisdomorpowerof God, in contradistinction to the other.Secondly, A divine revelation is not owing barely to thejusticeorfree goodnessof God, but to the goodness, mercy, and justice of God,governedanddirectedby his eternal fore-knowledge of all the effects of every revelation, at any, or all times.* God ordains a revelation in this, or that manner, time, and place; not because it is ajusticethat he cannot refuse, not because it is a matter offavourorfree goodness, and therefore may be given in any manner at pleasure; but because he has the wholedurationof human things, the wholeraceof mankind, the wholeorderof human changes and events, the wholecombinationof all causes and effects of human tempers, all the actions of free agents, and all the consequences of every revelation, plainly in his sight; and according to this eternal fore-knowledge, every revelation receives every thing that isparticularin it, either as totime,matter,manner, orplace.* All complaints therefore about that which isparticular, orseeminglypartial in the time and manner of any revelation, are very unjustifiable; and shew, that we are discontent at God’s proceedings, because he acts like himself, does what is best and fittest to be done, and governs the world, not according to our weak imaginations, but according to his own infinite perfections.* We will not allow a providence to beright, unless we can comprehend the reasonableness of all its steps; and yet it could not possibly be right, unless its proceedings were as muchaboveour comprehension, as our wisdom isbelowthat which is infinite.For if therelationsofthings, andpersons, and the fitness resulting from thence, be theruleof God’s actions; then all the revelations that come from God, must have their fitness resulting from the relation his fore-knowledge bears to thevarious states,conditions,tempers, andactionsof free agents, and the various effects of every manner of revelation.But if God cannot act worthy of himself in any revelation, unless he acts according to a fitness resulting from this relation; then he must act by arulethat lies out of our sight, and his providence in this particular must be incomprehensible to us; for this very reason, because it has that very fitness, wisdom and goodness in it, that it ought to have.

Shewing from therelationbetween God and man, that human reason cannot be a competent judge of thefitnessandreasonablenessof God’s proceedings with mankind, either as to thetime, ormatter, ormannerof an external revelation.

AS our author has laid it down for an undeniable rule of God’s actions, that he must, if he be a wise and good being, act according to the relation he stands in towards his creatures; I proceed upon this principle to prove the incapacity ofhuman reason, to judgetrulyof God’s proceedings in regard to divine revelation.

For if the fitness of actionsresults from the nature and relationsof beings, then thefitnessof God’s actions, as he is anomniscient CreatorandGovernor, to whom every thing iseternally foreknown, over beings endued withour freedom of will, must be to us incomprehensible.

* We are not so much as capable of comprehending by our reason, thepossibilityof this relation, or how the fore-knowledge of God can consist with the free agency of creatures. Weknow that God fore-knows all things, with the same certainty as we know there is a God. And ifself-consciousnessis an infallible proof of our own existence, it proves with the same certainty the freedom of our will. And hence it is, that we have a full assurance of the consistency of God’s fore-knowledge with freedom of will.

* Now thisincomprehensiblerelation between aneternally fore-knowing Creator and Governor, and his free creatures, is therelationfrom whence arises the fitness of God’s providence over us. But if therelationitself is incomprehensible, then those actions that have their fitness from it, must surely be incomprehensible. Nothing can be fit for God to do, either increationorprovidence, but what has its fitness founded in hisfore-knowledgeof every thing that would follow, fromevery kindof creation, andevery mannerof providence: but if nothing can be fit, but because it is according tothis fore-knowledgeofevery thingthat would follow fromevery kindof creation, andevery mannerof providence; then we have the utmost certainty, that the fitness of God’s actions as afore-knowing Creator, andGovernorof free agents, must be founded uponreasonsthat we cannot possibly know any thing of.

* And a child that has but just learned to speak, is as well qualified to state the fitness of the laws of matter and motion by which thewhole vegetable world is preserved, as the wisest of men is qualified to comprehend, or state the fitness of the methods, which afore-knowing Providenceobserves over free agents. For every reason on which the fitness of such a providence is founded, is not onlyunknownto us, but by a necessity of natureimpossibleto be known by us.

For if thefitnessof God’s acting in this, or that manner, is founded in his fore-knowledge of every thing that wouldhappen, from everypossible wayof acting, then it is impossible for us to know the reasons, on which the fitness of his actions is founded, as it is impossible for us to be omniscient.

Who can tell whatdifferent kindsof rational creatures, distinguished by variety of natures, and faculties, it is fit and reasonable for God to create, because he eternally foresaw what would be theeffectof such different creations? Who can explain thefitnessof that vastvarietythere is amongst rational creatures of thesame species, or shew that all their different faculties ought to be as they are? And yet thefitnessof this providence has itscertain reasonin the divine fore-knowledge, and it could not be fit, but because of it.

Who can tell whatdegreeof reason rational creatures ought to enjoy, or what degrees ofnewandrevealedknowledge it is fit and reasonable for God to give, or not give them, becausethey seem, or seem not to themselves to want it, are disposed, or not disposed to receive it? For as mankind cannot tell why it was fit and reasonable for God to create them of such akind, anddegree, as they are of; so neither can they tell how God ought, or ought not to add to their natural knowledge, and make them asdifferently accountablefor the use of revealed rules of life, as for the use of their natural faculties.

And as the reason why God created them ofsuchakind, and withsuch faculties, was because of his own fore-knowledge of theeffectsof such a creation; so if ever he does reveal to them anysupernaturalknowledge, both the doing it, thetime, thematter, andmannerof it, must have their fitness in his owneternal fore-knowledgeof the effects of such a revelation.

The reasons therefore on which the fitness of this or that revelation depends,whyorwhen, ofwhat matter, inwhat manner, and to whom it is to be made, must, from the nature and reason of things, be as unsearchable by us, as the reasons ofthisorthatcreation of rational beings, at such atime, of such akind, in such amanner, in such astate.

This may help us to an easy solution of the unreasonable questions, which this writer puts in this manner.

“If the design of God in communicating any thing of himself to men was their happiness, would not that design have obliged him, who at all times alike desires their happiness, to have at all times alike communicated it to them? If God always acts for the good of his creatures, what reason can be assigned, why he should not from the beginning have discovered such things as make for their good, but defer the doing it till the time ofTiberius; since the sooner this was done, the greater would his goodness appear?”¹

¹Page 393.

And again “How is it consistent with the notion of God’s being universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children, when all had equal need of it? Was it not as easy for him to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, as in one?”¹

¹Page 196.

Now all this is fully answered, by our author’s own great and fundamental principle.

“For if the relations between things and persons, and the things resulting from thence, be the sole rule of God’s actions,”¹as he expressly affirms; then thesole ruleor reason of God’s revealing any thing to any men, at any time, must have itsfitness resultingfrom the divine fore-knowledge of the effects ofsucha revelation, atsucha time, and tosuchpersons. IfGod does not act thus, he does not act according to the relation betwixt afore-knowing Creator, and his free creatures. But if he does act according to afitness resultingfrom thisrelation, and makes, or does not make revelations, according to his own fore-knowledge of the fitness of times and persons for them; then to ask how a God, always equally good, can make a revelation at any time, and not make thesameatalltimes, is as absurd as to ask, how a God, always equally good, can reveal that at one time, because it is apropertime for it, and not reveal it at every other time, tho’ improper for it.

¹Page 28.

* God’s goodness, directed by his own fore-knowledge of thefitnessof times, and of thestateandactionsof free agents, deferred a certain revelation to the time ofTiberius, because hefore-sawit would then be an act of thegreatestgoodness, and have itsbest effectsupon the world: to ask therefore,what reason can be assigned, why so good a revelation was notsooner, or even from thebeginningmade to the world, is asking, why God should act, according to hisown fore-knowledgeof thestateandactionsoffree agents, and order all things, according to a fitness resulting from such a fore-knowledge?

These questions suppose, that if God shewed hisgoodnessto mankind by a revelation at such time, he must bewantingin goodness before that time, because he did not make itsooner;whereas if his deferring it tillsucha time, was owing to hisfore-knowledgeof the actions and state of free agents, and because it would then have itsbest effects, then God is proved to be equally good before he made it, for this very reason, because he did not make it before itspropertime: and he had been wanting in goodness, if he had notdeferredit till that time.

Now this appealing to God’s fore-knowledge of the state and actions offree agents, as the cause of all that is particular in thetimeandmannerof any revelation, and deducing its fitness from thence, cannot be said to bebegging the question, but is resolving it directly according to therule, which this writer lays down for God to act by: that “the relations between things and persons,andthe fitness resulting from thence, must be the sole rule of God’s actions.”

But if this is thesole rule, then God in giving any revelation, must act as therelationbetwixt afore-knowingCreator and hisfreecreatures requires; and his actions must have theirfitness resultingfrom his fore-knowledge of thestateandactionsof free agents. And if this is God’s sole rule, then to ask whythisorthatrevelationonlyatsucha time, is to ask why Godonlydoes that which isfitfor him to do? And to ask, why not the same revelation at any other time, is asking why God does not do that, which it isnot fitfor him to do?

This writer asks, “How it is consistent withthe notion of God’s being universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children, who had equal need of it?” But if they hadequal needof it, yet if they were notequally fitfor it, but prepared only to have theirguiltincreased by it, and so be exposed to a greater damnation; then God’s goodness to them is manifest, by withholding such information from them, and reserving it for those that would be made happier by it.

Judas,Pontius Pilate, and theJewsthat called for our Saviour’s crucifixion, hadequal needof a Saviour with those that believed in him.ChorazinandBethsaidawanted the light of the gospel as much as those that received it. And if the rest of the world had been, at that time, as much indisposed for the light of the gospel, as they were, God’s goodness had been, greater to that age, if he had reserved the light of the gospel till a better age had succeeded.

So that this argument, founded on theequal needof all, or former ages, has no force, unless it could be shewn, that the same revelation made to any of these former ages, would have produced all those good effects, which God foresaw would follow, from its being reserved for such aparticular timeandstateof things and persons.

He asks again, “Was it not as easy for God to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, asin any one?” This argument is built upon this supposition, that God does things because they areeasy, or forbears things because they aredifficultto be performed. For it can be no argument, that God ought to have revealed such things toallnations or persons, because it was aseasyto him, as to do it toany onenation or person; unless it be supposed, that theeasinessof a thing is a reason why God does it, and the difficulty of a thing a reason why he does not do it. But if this supposition be very absurd, then the argument founded upon it must be liable to the same charge.

But if God does things, not because they are easy, but because they are infinitely good and fit to be done, then the reason why God has afforded different revelations, to different ages and persons, is this, that hismannerof revealing every thing, might be worthy of his ownfore-knowledgeof the effects of it, and that every thing that is particular in thetimeormannerof any revelation, might have itsfitness resultingfrom therelationbetwixt a good God and his creatures, whosechangingstate,differentconduct, tempers and actions, are all eternally fore-known by him.

Again, it is objected, that a divine revelation must either be the effect ofjustice, or else ofmercyandfree goodness; but in either of these cases it ought to beuniversal; for justice must be done to all. But if it is the effect ofmercyandfree goodness,this writer asks, “How a being can be denominated merciful and good, who is so only to a few, but cruel and unmerciful to the rest?”¹

¹Page 401.

It is answered, That there is neitherjusticein God without mercy, normercywithout justice; and to ascribe arevelationto either of them separately, incontradistinctionto the other, has no more reason in it, than to ascribe thecreationseparately either to thewisdomorpowerof God, in contradistinction to the other.

Secondly, A divine revelation is not owing barely to thejusticeorfree goodnessof God, but to the goodness, mercy, and justice of God,governedanddirectedby his eternal fore-knowledge of all the effects of every revelation, at any, or all times.

* God ordains a revelation in this, or that manner, time, and place; not because it is ajusticethat he cannot refuse, not because it is a matter offavourorfree goodness, and therefore may be given in any manner at pleasure; but because he has the wholedurationof human things, the wholeraceof mankind, the wholeorderof human changes and events, the wholecombinationof all causes and effects of human tempers, all the actions of free agents, and all the consequences of every revelation, plainly in his sight; and according to this eternal fore-knowledge, every revelation receives every thing that isparticularin it, either as totime,matter,manner, orplace.

* All complaints therefore about that which isparticular, orseeminglypartial in the time and manner of any revelation, are very unjustifiable; and shew, that we are discontent at God’s proceedings, because he acts like himself, does what is best and fittest to be done, and governs the world, not according to our weak imaginations, but according to his own infinite perfections.

* We will not allow a providence to beright, unless we can comprehend the reasonableness of all its steps; and yet it could not possibly be right, unless its proceedings were as muchaboveour comprehension, as our wisdom isbelowthat which is infinite.

For if therelationsofthings, andpersons, and the fitness resulting from thence, be theruleof God’s actions; then all the revelations that come from God, must have their fitness resulting from the relation his fore-knowledge bears to thevarious states,conditions,tempers, andactionsof free agents, and the various effects of every manner of revelation.

But if God cannot act worthy of himself in any revelation, unless he acts according to a fitness resulting from this relation; then he must act by arulethat lies out of our sight, and his providence in this particular must be incomprehensible to us; for this very reason, because it has that very fitness, wisdom and goodness in it, that it ought to have.

CHAPTERIII.Shewing how far human reason is able to judge of the reasonableness, truth, and certainty of divine revelation.THE former chapter has plainly shewn, from the state and relation between God and man, that we must be strangers to the true reasons on which a divine revelation is founded, both as to itstime,matter, andmanner.But it is here objected, “If God by reason of his own perfections must be thus mysterious and incomprehensible, both in the matter and manner of divine revelation; how can we know what revelations we are to receive as divine? How can we be blamed for rejecting this, or receiving that, if we cannot comprehend the reasons on which every revelation is founded, both as to its matter and manner?”If a man may be blameable, or commendable, for his right or wrong belief of a God; then a man may be accountable for a right or wrong belief of such matters, as are in their own nature too mysterious for his comprehension. And tho’ a man knows the reasons of a divine revelation, either as to itsmatterormanner, as imperfectly as he knows the divine nature; yet he may be as liable to account for believingfalse revelations, as foridolatry; and as full of guiltfor rejecting atrue revelation, as for denying the onlytrue God.Secondly, Tho’ we are insufficient for comprehending thereasons, on which the particularmatterormannerof any divine revelation is founded; yet we may be so far sufficient judges, of the reasons forreceivingor notreceivinga revelation as divine, as to make our conduct therein justly accountable to God.For if God can shew a revelation to proceed from him, by thesame undeniableevidence, as he shews thecreationto be his work; if he can make himself as visible in aparticular extraordinarymanner, as he is by hisgeneralandordinaryprovidence; then, tho’ we are as unqualified to judge of the mysteries of arevelation, as we are to judge of the mysteries increationandprovidence; yet we may be as fully obliged to receive a revelation, as to acknowledge the creation to be the work of God; and as highly criminal for disbelieving it, as for denying a general providence.Adam,Noah,Abraham, andMoses, were very incompetent judges, of the reasons on which the particular revelations made to them were founded; but this did not hinder their sufficient assurance, that such revelations came from God, because they were proved to come from God in the same manner, as the creation is proved to be the work of God.And asAdamandNoahmust see every thing wonderful, mysterious, and above their comprehensions,in those new worlds into which they were introduced by God; so they could no more expect, that he should require nothing of them, but what they would enjoin themselves, than that their ownframe, thenatureof the creation, theprovidenceof God, or thestateof human life, should be exactly as they would have it.And if their posterity will let nomessagesfrom heaven, noprophesiesandmiraclespersuade them, that God can call them to any duties, but such as they must enjoin themselves; or to the belief of any doctrines, but such as their own minds can suggest; nor to any methods of changing their present state of weakness and disorder for a happy immortality, but such as suit their owntaste,temper, and way of reasoning; it is because they are grown senseless of the mysteries of creation and providence with which they are surrounded, and forget the awful prerogative of infinite wisdom, over the weakest, lowest rank of intelligent beings.* And as we can only know what is worthy of God in creation, by knowing what he has created; so we can no other way know what is worthy of God to be revealed, but by a revelation. And he that pretends independently of any relation, to shewhow, and in what manner God ought to make a revelation worthy of himself, is as great avisionary, as he that should pretend independently of the creation, or without learningany thing from it, to shew how God ought to have proceeded in it, to make it worthy of himself. For as God alone, knows how to create worthy of himself, and nothing can possibly be proved to be worthy to be created by him, but because he has already created it; so God alone knows what is worthy of himself in a revelation, and nothing can possibly be proved worthy to be revealed by him, but because he has already revealed it.Hence we may see how little thiswriteris governed by thereasonandnatureof things, who proceeds upon this as an undeniable principle, that we could not know a revelation to be divine, unless we knew, antecedently to revelation, what God could teach or require of us by it. Thus, says he, “Were we not capable by our own reason of knowing what the divine goodness could command, or forbid his creatures, antecedently to any external revelation, we could not distinguish the true instituted religion, from themanyfalse ones.”¹¹Page 66.Just as wild and visionary, as if it was said, Were we not capable by our reason of knowing what kind or orders of beings Godoughtto createindependentlyof any thing we learn from the creation, we could never prove this or that creation to proceed from him. Did we not, antecedently to facts and experience, know by our own reason what ought to be the method and mannerof divine providence, we could never prove that the providence which governs nations and persons is a divine providence.Again, He proceeds to shew, that a revelation from God cannot contain any thing, but what human reason can prove from the nature of things; because if God could require any thing more of us, than what our own reason could thus prove, he must requirewithoutreason, and then there is an end of all religion.Now this argument proceeds thus; If God does not act according to themeasureofhumanreason, he cannot act according toreason itself. If he requires any more of us, than what wethinkthe nature of things requires of us, then he cannot act according to the nature of things. If his wisdom is in any matters of revelationgreaterthan ours; if it is not in every thing he revealsmeasurableby ours, it cannot be wisdom at all, much less can it be infinite wisdom.That is, if he ismore powerfulthan we are, he cannot beomnipotent; if he ismore perfectthan we are, he cannot beall perfection; if he acts upongreater, orhigher, ormorereasonable motives than we do, he cannot be areasonablebeing.Now if these absurdities are not plain and manifest to every common understanding, it is in vain to dispute about any thing; but if they are, then it is as plain, this writer’s great argument against Christianity, and first principle of hisrational religion,is in the same state of undeniable absurdity.Thus says he, “Natural religion takes in all those duties which flow from the reason and the nature of things.”¹That is, natural religion takes in all those things that bare human reason can discover from the nature of things. This is granted; but what follows? Why, says he, “Consequently, was there an instituted religion which differs from that of nature, its precepts must be arbitrary, as not founded on the nature and reason of things, but depending on mere will and pleasure, otherwise it would be the same with natural religion.”²¹Page 114.²Page 16.Here you see all the absurdities just mentioned, are♦expressly contained in this argument, God is allhumourandcaprice, if his revelation is not strictly, in every respect, the same with human reason. That is, he iswithoutwisdom,withoutreason, if his wisdom and reason exceed ours. He hasno reason, norwisdom, if his reason and wisdom areinfinite.♦“expresly” replaced with “expressly” for consistencySecondly, This argument, if it were allowed, leads directly toatheism. For if a revelation cannot be divine, if it contains any thing mysterious, whose fitness and necessity cannot be explained by human reason, then neithercreationnorprovidencecan be proved to be divine, for they are both of them more mysterious than the Christian revelation.And if every thing isarbitrary, whosefitness and experiencehuman reason cannotproveandexplain, then surely aninvisible over-ruling providencethat orders all things in a manner, and for reasons, known only to itself; that subjects human life, and human affairs, to what changes it pleases; that confounds the best-laid designs, and makes great effects arise from folly and imprudence; that gives not the race to the swift, nor the battle to the strong; that brings good men into affliction, and makes the wicked prosperous; surely such a providence must be highly arbitrary.And therefore if this argument is to be admitted, it leads directly toatheism, and brings us under a greater necessity of rejecting divine providence, on the account of its mysteries, than of rejecting a revelation that is mysterious in any of its doctrines. And if, God cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he requires any thing of us, that our reason cannot prove to be necessary; surely he cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he over-rules our persons and affairs, and disappoints our counsels, makes weakness prosperous, and wisdom unsuccessful, in asecretandinvisiblemanner, and for reasons and ends that we have no means of knowing.* There is nothing therefore half so mysterious in the Christian revelation, as there is in thatinvisibleprovidence, which all must hold that believea God. And tho’ there is enough plain in providence, to excite the adoration of humble and pious minds, yet it has often been a rock ofatheismto those, who make their own reason the measure of wisdom.Again, Tho’ thecreationplainly declares the glory, and wisdom, and goodness of God; yet it has more mysteries in it, more things whose fitness, expedience, and reasonableness, human reason cannot comprehend, than are to be found in scripture.If therefore he reasons right, who says, “If there may be some things in a true religion, whose fitness and expedience we cannot see, why not others: nay, why not the whole; since that would make God’s laws all of a piece? And if the having of these things is no proof of its falshood, how can any things fit and expedient (which no religion is without) be a proof of the truth of any one religion?”¹If, I say, this is the right reasoning, then it may be said, “If there are things in the creation whose fitness we cannot see, why not others: nay, why not the whole; since that would make God’s works of a piece? And if the being of such things as these in the creation, is not a proof of its not being divine, how can the fitness and expedience of any creation prove that it is the work of God?”¹First address to the inhabitants of London, Page 57.Thus does this argument tend wholly toatheism, and concludes with the same forceagainstcreationandprovidence, as it does against revelation.Either therefore there is nothing in the work of the creation, whose fitness and expedience cannot be proved; nothing in God’s providence over whole nations, and particular persons, whose fitness and expedience cannot be explained and justified by human reason, or else neither creation nor providence can be ascribed to God.The credibility of an external divine revelation with regard to human reason, rests wholly uponsuch externalevidence, as is a sufficient proof of the divine interposition. If there be no such external evidence possible; if God has no ways of acting sopeculiarto himself, as to be asufficientproof to human reason of his action; then no revelation can be sufficiently proved to be a divine, external revelation from God.I appeal therefore to the miracles and prophecies on which Christianity is founded, as a sufficient proof, that it is a divine revelation. And shall here consider, what is objected against the sufficiency of this kind of proof.1. It is objected, That miracles cannot prove afalse, orbaddoctrine, to betrueandgood; therefore miracles,as such, cannot prove the truth of any revelation.But though miracles cannot prove false to be true, or bad to be good; yet they may prove, that we ought to receive such doctrines, both as true and good, which we could not know to be true and good without such miracles. Not because the miracles have any influence upon the things revealed, but because they are God’s testimony to the truth of that which he reveals.But our author brings a farther objection against this use of miracles.“If,says he, evil beings can impress notions in mens minds as strongly as good beings, and cause miracles to be done in confirmation of them; is there any way to know to which of the two, notions thus impressed are owing, but from their internal marks of wisdom and goodness?”This objection supposes, that no miracles, can be a sufficient proof of the divinity of a revelation; because we do not know the extent of that power, which evil spirits have, of doing miracles. But this objection is groundless. For, granting that we do not know the extent of that power which evil spirits may have; yet if we knowenoughof it to affirm, that thecreationis not the work of evil spirits; if we can securely appeal to the creation, asa sufficient proofof God’s action and♦operation; then we are secure in appealing to miracles, as a sufficient proof of a divine revelation.♦“opperation” replaced with “operation”For, if the creation must be allowed to be thework of God, notwithstanding anyunknown degreeof power in evil spirits; if we can as certainly ascribe it to God, as if there were nosuchspirits; then miracles may be as full a proof of the interposition of God, as if there were no such spirits in being.I do not ask, Whether thesame divineperfection is necessary to foretel such things as are foretold in scripture, and work such miracles as are there related, as is necessary tocreate? I do not ask, Whether any power less than divine can do such things? I only ask, Whether there is any certainty, that the creation is the work of God? Whether we can be sure of the divine operation, from the existence of that creation? Or, Whether we are indoubtoruncertaintyabout it, because we do not know thedegreeof power, that may belong to evil spirits.For if it can be affirmed, that the creation is the work of God, notwithstanding our uncertainty about the degree of power that may belong to evil spirits; then we have the same certainty, that thepropheciesandmiraclesrecorded in scripture, are to be ascribed to God, notwithstanding our uncertainty of the power of evil spirits.For every reason for ascribing the creation to God, is the same reason for ascribing such miracles and prophecies to God; and every argument against the certainty of those miracles and prophecies coming from God, is the same argument against the certainty of the creation’s being thework of God; for there cannot be more or less certainty in one case than in the other.For, if evil spirits have so the creation in their hands, that by reason of their power over it, nomiraclescan prove the operation of God, then the operation of God cannot be proved from the creation itself.For the creation cannot be proved to be the operation of God, unless it can be proved that Godstill presidesover it.And ifall thatwhich is extraordinary and miraculous may be accounted for, without the interposition of God; then nothing that is ordinary and common according to the course of nature, can be a proof of the action of God. For there can be no reason assigned, why that which isordinaryshall be ascribed to God, if all that is, or has been, or can be miraculous, may be ascribed to evil spirits.Either therefore it must be said, that there are, or may be miracles, which cannot be the effects of evil spirits; or else nothing that is ordinary and common can be a proof of the operation of God. For if nothing miraculous can be an undeniable proof of God’s action, nothing created can be a proof of it.The matter therefore stands thus: There are, and may be miracles, that cannot be ascribed to evil spirits, without ascribing the creation to them; and which can no more be doubted to come from God, than we can doubt of his beingthe Creator of the world. There may be miracles therefore, which, are as full a proof of thetruthof that which they attest, as the creation is of thefitnessof that which is created.And though thematterof a revelation is to be attended to, that we may fully understand it, and be rightly affected with it; yet the reason of our receiving it, must rest upon thatexternal authority, which shews it to be of God.And the authority of miracles, sufficiently plain and apparent, are of themselves a full reason for receiving a revelation, which both as to itsmatterandmanner, would not be approved by us without them.The history of magical wonders, and extraordinary things done by evil spirits, is no objection against the sufficiency of that proof, that arises from miracles. For the question is not, whether nothing that is extraordinary can be done by evil spirits, but whether nothing that is miraculous can, be a proof of its being done by God. For these two cases are very consistent. It may be very possible for evil spirits, to do things extraordinary insome circumstances, as♦where people enter into contracts with them, and resign themselves up to their power, and yet that miracle may inother circumstances, be a sufficient proof of their being done by God.♦“were” replaced with “where”And as miracles are the highest and most undeniable evidence of the truth and divinity of any external revelation; so Christianity standsfully distinguished from all other religions, by the highest and most undeniable evidences; since it has all the proof that thehighest stateof miracles can give, and every other religion is without any support from them.And though this writer, with a boldness worthy of himself, often puts alltraditional religionupon a level; yet he might have shewn himself as much a friend to truth as sobriety, by asserting, that allargumentsare equally conclusive, alltempersequally virtuous, alldesignsequally honest, and allhistoriesandfablesequally supported by evidences of fact.To give you one instance more of this writer’s extravagant and inconsistent notions.He makesreason, ornatural religion, to be God’sinternal revelation, differingonlyfromexternal revelation in the manner of its being communicated. He rejectsexternal revelationas unworthy of God, because it has not been sufficiently made known atall times, and inall places; yet he sets up an internal revelation, as worthy of God, which has never been made known to anyone manof anytimeorplacein the world. For what one man ever knew thatreasonwas God’sinternal revelation, to which nothing could be added by any external revelation?It is a mighty complaint with our author against Christianity, that so much happiness should be deferred till the time ofTiberius, and that it should be communicated to no greater a part of the world, than Christianity hath been. Butis not this ajudiciouscomplaint in the mouth of a person, that is setting up a religion, that has been communicated to no body but himself.I know nothing that can be said for our author, in excuse of so much confusion and self-contradiction, unless it be the particular hardships of hissect. Thefree-thinking few, he says,are forced into an outward compliance; and that whichforcesa man into a state of hypocrisy, may force him into a great deal of confusion and self-contradiction.To return: I have from a consideration of the state of man, and the several relations which God stands in towards his creatures, shewn that it is utterly impossible for human reason to be a competent judge of the fitness, or unfitness, of all that God may, or may not require of us. The two following chapters shall state the nature and perfection of reason, as it is a faculty, or principle of action in human nature.

Shewing how far human reason is able to judge of the reasonableness, truth, and certainty of divine revelation.

THE former chapter has plainly shewn, from the state and relation between God and man, that we must be strangers to the true reasons on which a divine revelation is founded, both as to itstime,matter, andmanner.

But it is here objected, “If God by reason of his own perfections must be thus mysterious and incomprehensible, both in the matter and manner of divine revelation; how can we know what revelations we are to receive as divine? How can we be blamed for rejecting this, or receiving that, if we cannot comprehend the reasons on which every revelation is founded, both as to its matter and manner?”

If a man may be blameable, or commendable, for his right or wrong belief of a God; then a man may be accountable for a right or wrong belief of such matters, as are in their own nature too mysterious for his comprehension. And tho’ a man knows the reasons of a divine revelation, either as to itsmatterormanner, as imperfectly as he knows the divine nature; yet he may be as liable to account for believingfalse revelations, as foridolatry; and as full of guiltfor rejecting atrue revelation, as for denying the onlytrue God.

Secondly, Tho’ we are insufficient for comprehending thereasons, on which the particularmatterormannerof any divine revelation is founded; yet we may be so far sufficient judges, of the reasons forreceivingor notreceivinga revelation as divine, as to make our conduct therein justly accountable to God.

For if God can shew a revelation to proceed from him, by thesame undeniableevidence, as he shews thecreationto be his work; if he can make himself as visible in aparticular extraordinarymanner, as he is by hisgeneralandordinaryprovidence; then, tho’ we are as unqualified to judge of the mysteries of arevelation, as we are to judge of the mysteries increationandprovidence; yet we may be as fully obliged to receive a revelation, as to acknowledge the creation to be the work of God; and as highly criminal for disbelieving it, as for denying a general providence.

Adam,Noah,Abraham, andMoses, were very incompetent judges, of the reasons on which the particular revelations made to them were founded; but this did not hinder their sufficient assurance, that such revelations came from God, because they were proved to come from God in the same manner, as the creation is proved to be the work of God.

And asAdamandNoahmust see every thing wonderful, mysterious, and above their comprehensions,in those new worlds into which they were introduced by God; so they could no more expect, that he should require nothing of them, but what they would enjoin themselves, than that their ownframe, thenatureof the creation, theprovidenceof God, or thestateof human life, should be exactly as they would have it.

And if their posterity will let nomessagesfrom heaven, noprophesiesandmiraclespersuade them, that God can call them to any duties, but such as they must enjoin themselves; or to the belief of any doctrines, but such as their own minds can suggest; nor to any methods of changing their present state of weakness and disorder for a happy immortality, but such as suit their owntaste,temper, and way of reasoning; it is because they are grown senseless of the mysteries of creation and providence with which they are surrounded, and forget the awful prerogative of infinite wisdom, over the weakest, lowest rank of intelligent beings.

* And as we can only know what is worthy of God in creation, by knowing what he has created; so we can no other way know what is worthy of God to be revealed, but by a revelation. And he that pretends independently of any relation, to shewhow, and in what manner God ought to make a revelation worthy of himself, is as great avisionary, as he that should pretend independently of the creation, or without learningany thing from it, to shew how God ought to have proceeded in it, to make it worthy of himself. For as God alone, knows how to create worthy of himself, and nothing can possibly be proved to be worthy to be created by him, but because he has already created it; so God alone knows what is worthy of himself in a revelation, and nothing can possibly be proved worthy to be revealed by him, but because he has already revealed it.

Hence we may see how little thiswriteris governed by thereasonandnatureof things, who proceeds upon this as an undeniable principle, that we could not know a revelation to be divine, unless we knew, antecedently to revelation, what God could teach or require of us by it. Thus, says he, “Were we not capable by our own reason of knowing what the divine goodness could command, or forbid his creatures, antecedently to any external revelation, we could not distinguish the true instituted religion, from themanyfalse ones.”¹

¹Page 66.

Just as wild and visionary, as if it was said, Were we not capable by our reason of knowing what kind or orders of beings Godoughtto createindependentlyof any thing we learn from the creation, we could never prove this or that creation to proceed from him. Did we not, antecedently to facts and experience, know by our own reason what ought to be the method and mannerof divine providence, we could never prove that the providence which governs nations and persons is a divine providence.

Again, He proceeds to shew, that a revelation from God cannot contain any thing, but what human reason can prove from the nature of things; because if God could require any thing more of us, than what our own reason could thus prove, he must requirewithoutreason, and then there is an end of all religion.

Now this argument proceeds thus; If God does not act according to themeasureofhumanreason, he cannot act according toreason itself. If he requires any more of us, than what wethinkthe nature of things requires of us, then he cannot act according to the nature of things. If his wisdom is in any matters of revelationgreaterthan ours; if it is not in every thing he revealsmeasurableby ours, it cannot be wisdom at all, much less can it be infinite wisdom.

That is, if he ismore powerfulthan we are, he cannot beomnipotent; if he ismore perfectthan we are, he cannot beall perfection; if he acts upongreater, orhigher, ormorereasonable motives than we do, he cannot be areasonablebeing.

Now if these absurdities are not plain and manifest to every common understanding, it is in vain to dispute about any thing; but if they are, then it is as plain, this writer’s great argument against Christianity, and first principle of hisrational religion,is in the same state of undeniable absurdity.

Thus says he, “Natural religion takes in all those duties which flow from the reason and the nature of things.”¹That is, natural religion takes in all those things that bare human reason can discover from the nature of things. This is granted; but what follows? Why, says he, “Consequently, was there an instituted religion which differs from that of nature, its precepts must be arbitrary, as not founded on the nature and reason of things, but depending on mere will and pleasure, otherwise it would be the same with natural religion.”²

¹Page 114.²Page 16.

¹Page 114.

²Page 16.

Here you see all the absurdities just mentioned, are♦expressly contained in this argument, God is allhumourandcaprice, if his revelation is not strictly, in every respect, the same with human reason. That is, he iswithoutwisdom,withoutreason, if his wisdom and reason exceed ours. He hasno reason, norwisdom, if his reason and wisdom areinfinite.

♦“expresly” replaced with “expressly” for consistency

Secondly, This argument, if it were allowed, leads directly toatheism. For if a revelation cannot be divine, if it contains any thing mysterious, whose fitness and necessity cannot be explained by human reason, then neithercreationnorprovidencecan be proved to be divine, for they are both of them more mysterious than the Christian revelation.

And if every thing isarbitrary, whosefitness and experiencehuman reason cannotproveandexplain, then surely aninvisible over-ruling providencethat orders all things in a manner, and for reasons, known only to itself; that subjects human life, and human affairs, to what changes it pleases; that confounds the best-laid designs, and makes great effects arise from folly and imprudence; that gives not the race to the swift, nor the battle to the strong; that brings good men into affliction, and makes the wicked prosperous; surely such a providence must be highly arbitrary.

And therefore if this argument is to be admitted, it leads directly toatheism, and brings us under a greater necessity of rejecting divine providence, on the account of its mysteries, than of rejecting a revelation that is mysterious in any of its doctrines. And if, God cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he requires any thing of us, that our reason cannot prove to be necessary; surely he cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he over-rules our persons and affairs, and disappoints our counsels, makes weakness prosperous, and wisdom unsuccessful, in asecretandinvisiblemanner, and for reasons and ends that we have no means of knowing.

* There is nothing therefore half so mysterious in the Christian revelation, as there is in thatinvisibleprovidence, which all must hold that believea God. And tho’ there is enough plain in providence, to excite the adoration of humble and pious minds, yet it has often been a rock ofatheismto those, who make their own reason the measure of wisdom.

Again, Tho’ thecreationplainly declares the glory, and wisdom, and goodness of God; yet it has more mysteries in it, more things whose fitness, expedience, and reasonableness, human reason cannot comprehend, than are to be found in scripture.

If therefore he reasons right, who says, “If there may be some things in a true religion, whose fitness and expedience we cannot see, why not others: nay, why not the whole; since that would make God’s laws all of a piece? And if the having of these things is no proof of its falshood, how can any things fit and expedient (which no religion is without) be a proof of the truth of any one religion?”¹If, I say, this is the right reasoning, then it may be said, “If there are things in the creation whose fitness we cannot see, why not others: nay, why not the whole; since that would make God’s works of a piece? And if the being of such things as these in the creation, is not a proof of its not being divine, how can the fitness and expedience of any creation prove that it is the work of God?”

¹First address to the inhabitants of London, Page 57.

Thus does this argument tend wholly toatheism, and concludes with the same forceagainstcreationandprovidence, as it does against revelation.

Either therefore there is nothing in the work of the creation, whose fitness and expedience cannot be proved; nothing in God’s providence over whole nations, and particular persons, whose fitness and expedience cannot be explained and justified by human reason, or else neither creation nor providence can be ascribed to God.

The credibility of an external divine revelation with regard to human reason, rests wholly uponsuch externalevidence, as is a sufficient proof of the divine interposition. If there be no such external evidence possible; if God has no ways of acting sopeculiarto himself, as to be asufficientproof to human reason of his action; then no revelation can be sufficiently proved to be a divine, external revelation from God.

I appeal therefore to the miracles and prophecies on which Christianity is founded, as a sufficient proof, that it is a divine revelation. And shall here consider, what is objected against the sufficiency of this kind of proof.

1. It is objected, That miracles cannot prove afalse, orbaddoctrine, to betrueandgood; therefore miracles,as such, cannot prove the truth of any revelation.

But though miracles cannot prove false to be true, or bad to be good; yet they may prove, that we ought to receive such doctrines, both as true and good, which we could not know to be true and good without such miracles. Not because the miracles have any influence upon the things revealed, but because they are God’s testimony to the truth of that which he reveals.

But our author brings a farther objection against this use of miracles.

“If,says he, evil beings can impress notions in mens minds as strongly as good beings, and cause miracles to be done in confirmation of them; is there any way to know to which of the two, notions thus impressed are owing, but from their internal marks of wisdom and goodness?”

This objection supposes, that no miracles, can be a sufficient proof of the divinity of a revelation; because we do not know the extent of that power, which evil spirits have, of doing miracles. But this objection is groundless. For, granting that we do not know the extent of that power which evil spirits may have; yet if we knowenoughof it to affirm, that thecreationis not the work of evil spirits; if we can securely appeal to the creation, asa sufficient proofof God’s action and♦operation; then we are secure in appealing to miracles, as a sufficient proof of a divine revelation.

♦“opperation” replaced with “operation”

For, if the creation must be allowed to be thework of God, notwithstanding anyunknown degreeof power in evil spirits; if we can as certainly ascribe it to God, as if there were nosuchspirits; then miracles may be as full a proof of the interposition of God, as if there were no such spirits in being.

I do not ask, Whether thesame divineperfection is necessary to foretel such things as are foretold in scripture, and work such miracles as are there related, as is necessary tocreate? I do not ask, Whether any power less than divine can do such things? I only ask, Whether there is any certainty, that the creation is the work of God? Whether we can be sure of the divine operation, from the existence of that creation? Or, Whether we are indoubtoruncertaintyabout it, because we do not know thedegreeof power, that may belong to evil spirits.

For if it can be affirmed, that the creation is the work of God, notwithstanding our uncertainty about the degree of power that may belong to evil spirits; then we have the same certainty, that thepropheciesandmiraclesrecorded in scripture, are to be ascribed to God, notwithstanding our uncertainty of the power of evil spirits.

For every reason for ascribing the creation to God, is the same reason for ascribing such miracles and prophecies to God; and every argument against the certainty of those miracles and prophecies coming from God, is the same argument against the certainty of the creation’s being thework of God; for there cannot be more or less certainty in one case than in the other.

For, if evil spirits have so the creation in their hands, that by reason of their power over it, nomiraclescan prove the operation of God, then the operation of God cannot be proved from the creation itself.

For the creation cannot be proved to be the operation of God, unless it can be proved that Godstill presidesover it.

And ifall thatwhich is extraordinary and miraculous may be accounted for, without the interposition of God; then nothing that is ordinary and common according to the course of nature, can be a proof of the action of God. For there can be no reason assigned, why that which isordinaryshall be ascribed to God, if all that is, or has been, or can be miraculous, may be ascribed to evil spirits.

Either therefore it must be said, that there are, or may be miracles, which cannot be the effects of evil spirits; or else nothing that is ordinary and common can be a proof of the operation of God. For if nothing miraculous can be an undeniable proof of God’s action, nothing created can be a proof of it.

The matter therefore stands thus: There are, and may be miracles, that cannot be ascribed to evil spirits, without ascribing the creation to them; and which can no more be doubted to come from God, than we can doubt of his beingthe Creator of the world. There may be miracles therefore, which, are as full a proof of thetruthof that which they attest, as the creation is of thefitnessof that which is created.

And though thematterof a revelation is to be attended to, that we may fully understand it, and be rightly affected with it; yet the reason of our receiving it, must rest upon thatexternal authority, which shews it to be of God.

And the authority of miracles, sufficiently plain and apparent, are of themselves a full reason for receiving a revelation, which both as to itsmatterandmanner, would not be approved by us without them.

The history of magical wonders, and extraordinary things done by evil spirits, is no objection against the sufficiency of that proof, that arises from miracles. For the question is not, whether nothing that is extraordinary can be done by evil spirits, but whether nothing that is miraculous can, be a proof of its being done by God. For these two cases are very consistent. It may be very possible for evil spirits, to do things extraordinary insome circumstances, as♦where people enter into contracts with them, and resign themselves up to their power, and yet that miracle may inother circumstances, be a sufficient proof of their being done by God.

♦“were” replaced with “where”

And as miracles are the highest and most undeniable evidence of the truth and divinity of any external revelation; so Christianity standsfully distinguished from all other religions, by the highest and most undeniable evidences; since it has all the proof that thehighest stateof miracles can give, and every other religion is without any support from them.

And though this writer, with a boldness worthy of himself, often puts alltraditional religionupon a level; yet he might have shewn himself as much a friend to truth as sobriety, by asserting, that allargumentsare equally conclusive, alltempersequally virtuous, alldesignsequally honest, and allhistoriesandfablesequally supported by evidences of fact.

To give you one instance more of this writer’s extravagant and inconsistent notions.

He makesreason, ornatural religion, to be God’sinternal revelation, differingonlyfromexternal revelation in the manner of its being communicated. He rejectsexternal revelationas unworthy of God, because it has not been sufficiently made known atall times, and inall places; yet he sets up an internal revelation, as worthy of God, which has never been made known to anyone manof anytimeorplacein the world. For what one man ever knew thatreasonwas God’sinternal revelation, to which nothing could be added by any external revelation?

It is a mighty complaint with our author against Christianity, that so much happiness should be deferred till the time ofTiberius, and that it should be communicated to no greater a part of the world, than Christianity hath been. Butis not this ajudiciouscomplaint in the mouth of a person, that is setting up a religion, that has been communicated to no body but himself.

I know nothing that can be said for our author, in excuse of so much confusion and self-contradiction, unless it be the particular hardships of hissect. Thefree-thinking few, he says,are forced into an outward compliance; and that whichforcesa man into a state of hypocrisy, may force him into a great deal of confusion and self-contradiction.

To return: I have from a consideration of the state of man, and the several relations which God stands in towards his creatures, shewn that it is utterly impossible for human reason to be a competent judge of the fitness, or unfitness, of all that God may, or may not require of us. The two following chapters shall state the nature and perfection of reason, as it is a faculty, or principle of action in human nature.

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