CHAPTER XCIV.

By the clause in the charter authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to remove the deposits, that officer was required to communicate the fact immediately to Congress, if in session, if not, at the first meeting; together with his reasons for so doing. The act which had been done was not a "removal," in the sense of that word; for not a dollar was taken from the Bank of the United States to be deposited elsewhere; and the order given was not for a "removal," but for a cessation of deposits in that institution, leaving the public moneys which were in it to be drawn out in the regular course of expenditure. An immediate and total removal might have been well justified by the misconduct of the bank; a cessation to deposit might have been equally well justified on the ground of the approaching expiration of the charter, and the propriety of providing in time for the new places of deposit which that expiration would render necessary. The two reasons put together made a clear case, both of justification and of propriety, for the order which had been given; and the secretary, Mr. Taney, well set them forth in the report which he made, and which was laid before Congress on the day after its meeting. The following are extracts from it:

"The Treasury department being intrusted with the administration of the finances of the country, it was always the duty of the Secretary, in the absence of any legislative provision on the subject, to take care that the public money was deposited in safe keeping, in the hands of faithful agents, and in convenient places, ready to be applied according to the wants of the government. The law incorporating the bank has reserved to him, in its full extent, the power he before possessed. It does not confer on him a new power, but reserves to him his former authority, without any new limitation. The obligation to assign the reasons for his direction to deposit the money of the United States elsewhere, cannot be considered as a restriction ofthe power, because the right of the Secretary to designate the place of deposit was always necessarily subject to the control of Congress. And as the Secretary of the Treasury presides over one of the executive departments of the government, and his power over this subject forms a part of the executive duties of his office, the manner in which it is exercised must be subject to the supervision of the officer to whom the constitution has confided the whole executive power, and has required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed."The faith of the United States is, however, pledged, according to the terms of the section above stated, that the public money shall be deposited in this bank, unless 'the Secretary of the Treasury shall otherwise order and direct.' And as this agreement has been entered into by Congress, in behalf of the United States, the place of deposit could not be changed by a legislative act, without disregarding a pledge, which the legislature has given; and the money of the United States must therefore continue to be deposited in the bank, until the last hour of its existence, unless it shall be otherwise ordered by the authority mentioned in the charter. The power over the place of deposit for the public money would seem properly to belong to the legislative department of the government, and it is difficult to imagine why the authority to withdraw it from this bank was confided exclusively to the Executive. But the terms of the charter appear to be too plain to admit of question; and although Congress should be satisfied that the public money was not safe in the care of the bank, or should be convinced that the interests of the people of the United States imperiously demanded the removal, yet the passage of a law directing it to be done, would be a breach of the agreement into which they have entered."In deciding upon the course which it was my duty to pursue in relation to the deposits, I did not feel myself justified in anticipating the renewal of the charter on either of the above-mentioned grounds. It is very evident that the bank has no claim to renewal, founded on the justice of Congress. For, independently of the many serious and insurmountable objections, which its own conduct has furnished, it cannot be supposed that the grant to this corporation of exclusive privileges, at the expense of the rest of the community, for twenty years, can give it a right to demand the still further enjoyment of its profitable monopoly. Neither could I act upon the assumption that the public interest required the recharter of the bank, because I am firmly persuaded that the law which created this corporation, in many of its provisions, is not warranted by the constitution, and that the existence of such a powerful moneyed monopoly, is dangerous to the liberties of the people, and to the purity of our political institutions."The manifestations of public opinion, instead of being favorable to a renewal, have been decidedly to the contrary. And I have always regarded the result of the last election of the President of the United States, as the declaration of a majority of the people that the charter ought not to be renewed. It is not necessary to state here, what is now a matter of history. The question of the renewal of the charter was introduced into the election by the corporation itself. Its voluntary application to Congress for the renewal of its charter four years before it expired, and upon the eve of the election of President, was understood on all sides as bringing forward that question for incidental decision, at the then approaching election. It was accordingly argued on both sides, before the tribunal of the people, and their verdict pronounced against the bank, by the election of the candidate who was known to have been always inflexibly opposed to it."The monthly statement of the bank, of the 2d September last, before referred to, shows that the notes of the bank and its branches, then in circulation, amounted to $18,413,287 07, and that its discounts amounted to the sum of $62,653,359 59. The immense circulation above stated, pervading every part of the United States, and most commonly used in the business of commerce between distant places, must all be withdrawn from circulation when the charter expires. If any of the notes then remain in the hands of individuals, remote from the branches at which they are payable, their immediate depreciation will subject the holders to certain loss. Those payable in the principal commercial cities would, perhaps, retain nearly their nominal value; but this would not be the case with the notes of the interior branches, remote from the great marts of trade. And the statements of the bank will show that a great part of its circulation is composed of notes of this description. The bank would seem to have taken pains to introduce into common use such a description of paper as it could depreciate, or raise to its par value, as best suited its own views; and it is of the first importance to the interests of the public that these notes should all be taken out of circulation, before they depreciate in the hands of the individuals who hold them; and they ought to be withdrawn gradually, and their places supplied, as they retire, by the currency which will become the substitute for them. How long will it require, for the ordinary operations of commerce, and the reduction of discounts by the bank, to withdraw the amount of circulation before mentioned, without giving a shock to the currency, or producing a distressing pressure on the community? I am convinced that the time which remained for the charter to run, after the 1st of October (the day on which the first order for removal took effect), was not more than was proper to accomplish the object with safety to the community."There is, however, another view of the subject, which in my opinion, made it impossible further to postpone the removal. About the 1st of December, 1832, it had been ascertained that the present Chief Magistrate was re-elected,that his decision against the bank had thus been sanctioned by the people. At that time the discounts of the bank amounted to $61,571,625 66. Although the issue which the bank took so much pains to frame had now been tried, and the decision pronounced against it, yet no steps were taken to prepare for its approaching end. On the contrary, it proceeded to enlarge its discounts, and, on the 2d of August, 1833, they amounted to $64,160,349 14, being an increase of more than two and a half millions in the eight months immediately following the decision against them. And so far from preparing to arrange its affairs with a view to wind up its business, it seemed from this course of conduct, to be the design of the bank to put itself in such an attitude, that, at the close of its charter, the country would be compelled to submit to its renewal, or to bear all the consequences of a currency suddenly deranged, and also a severe pressure for the immense outstanding claims which would then be due to the corporation. While the bank was thus proceeding to enlarge its discounts, an agent was appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury to inquire upon what terms the State banks would undertake to perform the services to the government which have heretofore been rendered by the Bank of the United States; and also to ascertain their condition in four of the principal commercial cities, for the purpose of enabling the department to judge whether they would be safe and convenient depositories for the public money. It was deemed necessary that suitable fiscal agents should be prepared in due season, and it was proper that time should be allowed them to make arrangements with one another throughout the country, in order that they might perform their duties in concert, and in a manner that would be convenient and acceptable to the public. It was essential that a change so important in its character, and so extensive in its operation upon the financial concerns of the country, should not be introduced without timely preparation."The United States, by the charter, reserved the right of appointing five directors of the bank. It was intended by this means not only to provide guardians for the interests of the public in the general administration of its affairs, but also to have faithful officers, whose situation would enable them to become intimately acquainted with all the transactions of the institution, and whose duty it would be to apprize the proper authorities of any misconduct on the part of the corporation likely to affect the public interest. The fourth fundamental article of the constitution of the corporation declares that not less than seven directors shall constitute a board for the transaction of business. At these meetings of the board, the directors on the part of the United States had of course a right to be present; and, consequently, if the business of the corporation had been transacted in the manner which the law requires, there was abundant security that nothing could be done, injuriously affecting the interests of the people, without being immediately communicated to the public servants, who were authorized to apply the remedy. And if the corporation has so arranged its concerns as to conceal from the public directors some of its most important operations, and has thereby destroyed the safeguards which were designed to secure the interests of the United States, it would seem to be very clear that it has forfeited its claim to confidence, and is no longer worthy of trust."Instead of a board constituted of at least seven directors, according to the charter, at which those appointed by the United States have a right to be present, many of the most important money transactions of the bank have been, and still are, placed under the control of a committee, denominated the exchange committee, of which no one of the public directors has been allowed to be a member since the commencement of the present year. This committee is not even elected by the board, and the public directors have no voice in their appointment. They are chosen by thy president of the bank, and the business of the institution, which ought to be decided on by the board of directors, is, in many instances, transacted by this committee; and no one had a right to be present at their proceedings but the president, and those whom he shall please to name as members of this committee. Thus, loans are made, unknown at the time to a majority of the board, and paper discounted which might probably be rejected at a regular meeting of the directors. The most important operations of the bank are sometimes resolved on and executed by this committee; and its measures are, it appears, designedly, and by regular system, so arranged, as to conceal from the officers of the government transactions in which the public interests are deeply involved. And this fact alone furnishes evidence too strong to be resisted, that the concealment of certain important operations of the corporation from the officers of the government is one of the objects which is intended to be accomplished by means of this committee. The plain words of the charter are violated, in order to deprive the people of the United States of one of the principal securities which the law had provided to guard their interests, and to render more safe the public money intrusted to the care of the bank. Would any individual of ordinary discretion continue his money in the hands of an agent who violated his instructions for the purpose of hiding from him the manner in which he was conducting the business confided to his charge? Would he continue his property in his hands, when he had not only ascertained that concealment had been practised towards him, but when the agent avowed his determination to continue in the same course, and to withhold from him, as far as he could, all knowledge of the manner in which he was employing his funds? If an individual would not be expected to continue his confidence undersuch circumstances, upon what principle could a different line of conduct be required from the officers of the United States, charged with the care of the public interests? The public money is surely entitled to the same care and protection as that of an individual; and if the latter would be bound, in justice to himself, to withdraw his money from the hands of an agent thus regardless of his duty, the same principle requires that the money of the United States should, under the like circumstances, be withdrawn from the hands of their fiscal agent."

"The faith of the United States is, however, pledged, according to the terms of the section above stated, that the public money shall be deposited in this bank, unless 'the Secretary of the Treasury shall otherwise order and direct.' And as this agreement has been entered into by Congress, in behalf of the United States, the place of deposit could not be changed by a legislative act, without disregarding a pledge, which the legislature has given; and the money of the United States must therefore continue to be deposited in the bank, until the last hour of its existence, unless it shall be otherwise ordered by the authority mentioned in the charter. The power over the place of deposit for the public money would seem properly to belong to the legislative department of the government, and it is difficult to imagine why the authority to withdraw it from this bank was confided exclusively to the Executive. But the terms of the charter appear to be too plain to admit of question; and although Congress should be satisfied that the public money was not safe in the care of the bank, or should be convinced that the interests of the people of the United States imperiously demanded the removal, yet the passage of a law directing it to be done, would be a breach of the agreement into which they have entered.

"In deciding upon the course which it was my duty to pursue in relation to the deposits, I did not feel myself justified in anticipating the renewal of the charter on either of the above-mentioned grounds. It is very evident that the bank has no claim to renewal, founded on the justice of Congress. For, independently of the many serious and insurmountable objections, which its own conduct has furnished, it cannot be supposed that the grant to this corporation of exclusive privileges, at the expense of the rest of the community, for twenty years, can give it a right to demand the still further enjoyment of its profitable monopoly. Neither could I act upon the assumption that the public interest required the recharter of the bank, because I am firmly persuaded that the law which created this corporation, in many of its provisions, is not warranted by the constitution, and that the existence of such a powerful moneyed monopoly, is dangerous to the liberties of the people, and to the purity of our political institutions.

"The manifestations of public opinion, instead of being favorable to a renewal, have been decidedly to the contrary. And I have always regarded the result of the last election of the President of the United States, as the declaration of a majority of the people that the charter ought not to be renewed. It is not necessary to state here, what is now a matter of history. The question of the renewal of the charter was introduced into the election by the corporation itself. Its voluntary application to Congress for the renewal of its charter four years before it expired, and upon the eve of the election of President, was understood on all sides as bringing forward that question for incidental decision, at the then approaching election. It was accordingly argued on both sides, before the tribunal of the people, and their verdict pronounced against the bank, by the election of the candidate who was known to have been always inflexibly opposed to it.

"The monthly statement of the bank, of the 2d September last, before referred to, shows that the notes of the bank and its branches, then in circulation, amounted to $18,413,287 07, and that its discounts amounted to the sum of $62,653,359 59. The immense circulation above stated, pervading every part of the United States, and most commonly used in the business of commerce between distant places, must all be withdrawn from circulation when the charter expires. If any of the notes then remain in the hands of individuals, remote from the branches at which they are payable, their immediate depreciation will subject the holders to certain loss. Those payable in the principal commercial cities would, perhaps, retain nearly their nominal value; but this would not be the case with the notes of the interior branches, remote from the great marts of trade. And the statements of the bank will show that a great part of its circulation is composed of notes of this description. The bank would seem to have taken pains to introduce into common use such a description of paper as it could depreciate, or raise to its par value, as best suited its own views; and it is of the first importance to the interests of the public that these notes should all be taken out of circulation, before they depreciate in the hands of the individuals who hold them; and they ought to be withdrawn gradually, and their places supplied, as they retire, by the currency which will become the substitute for them. How long will it require, for the ordinary operations of commerce, and the reduction of discounts by the bank, to withdraw the amount of circulation before mentioned, without giving a shock to the currency, or producing a distressing pressure on the community? I am convinced that the time which remained for the charter to run, after the 1st of October (the day on which the first order for removal took effect), was not more than was proper to accomplish the object with safety to the community.

"There is, however, another view of the subject, which in my opinion, made it impossible further to postpone the removal. About the 1st of December, 1832, it had been ascertained that the present Chief Magistrate was re-elected,that his decision against the bank had thus been sanctioned by the people. At that time the discounts of the bank amounted to $61,571,625 66. Although the issue which the bank took so much pains to frame had now been tried, and the decision pronounced against it, yet no steps were taken to prepare for its approaching end. On the contrary, it proceeded to enlarge its discounts, and, on the 2d of August, 1833, they amounted to $64,160,349 14, being an increase of more than two and a half millions in the eight months immediately following the decision against them. And so far from preparing to arrange its affairs with a view to wind up its business, it seemed from this course of conduct, to be the design of the bank to put itself in such an attitude, that, at the close of its charter, the country would be compelled to submit to its renewal, or to bear all the consequences of a currency suddenly deranged, and also a severe pressure for the immense outstanding claims which would then be due to the corporation. While the bank was thus proceeding to enlarge its discounts, an agent was appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury to inquire upon what terms the State banks would undertake to perform the services to the government which have heretofore been rendered by the Bank of the United States; and also to ascertain their condition in four of the principal commercial cities, for the purpose of enabling the department to judge whether they would be safe and convenient depositories for the public money. It was deemed necessary that suitable fiscal agents should be prepared in due season, and it was proper that time should be allowed them to make arrangements with one another throughout the country, in order that they might perform their duties in concert, and in a manner that would be convenient and acceptable to the public. It was essential that a change so important in its character, and so extensive in its operation upon the financial concerns of the country, should not be introduced without timely preparation.

"The United States, by the charter, reserved the right of appointing five directors of the bank. It was intended by this means not only to provide guardians for the interests of the public in the general administration of its affairs, but also to have faithful officers, whose situation would enable them to become intimately acquainted with all the transactions of the institution, and whose duty it would be to apprize the proper authorities of any misconduct on the part of the corporation likely to affect the public interest. The fourth fundamental article of the constitution of the corporation declares that not less than seven directors shall constitute a board for the transaction of business. At these meetings of the board, the directors on the part of the United States had of course a right to be present; and, consequently, if the business of the corporation had been transacted in the manner which the law requires, there was abundant security that nothing could be done, injuriously affecting the interests of the people, without being immediately communicated to the public servants, who were authorized to apply the remedy. And if the corporation has so arranged its concerns as to conceal from the public directors some of its most important operations, and has thereby destroyed the safeguards which were designed to secure the interests of the United States, it would seem to be very clear that it has forfeited its claim to confidence, and is no longer worthy of trust.

"Instead of a board constituted of at least seven directors, according to the charter, at which those appointed by the United States have a right to be present, many of the most important money transactions of the bank have been, and still are, placed under the control of a committee, denominated the exchange committee, of which no one of the public directors has been allowed to be a member since the commencement of the present year. This committee is not even elected by the board, and the public directors have no voice in their appointment. They are chosen by thy president of the bank, and the business of the institution, which ought to be decided on by the board of directors, is, in many instances, transacted by this committee; and no one had a right to be present at their proceedings but the president, and those whom he shall please to name as members of this committee. Thus, loans are made, unknown at the time to a majority of the board, and paper discounted which might probably be rejected at a regular meeting of the directors. The most important operations of the bank are sometimes resolved on and executed by this committee; and its measures are, it appears, designedly, and by regular system, so arranged, as to conceal from the officers of the government transactions in which the public interests are deeply involved. And this fact alone furnishes evidence too strong to be resisted, that the concealment of certain important operations of the corporation from the officers of the government is one of the objects which is intended to be accomplished by means of this committee. The plain words of the charter are violated, in order to deprive the people of the United States of one of the principal securities which the law had provided to guard their interests, and to render more safe the public money intrusted to the care of the bank. Would any individual of ordinary discretion continue his money in the hands of an agent who violated his instructions for the purpose of hiding from him the manner in which he was conducting the business confided to his charge? Would he continue his property in his hands, when he had not only ascertained that concealment had been practised towards him, but when the agent avowed his determination to continue in the same course, and to withhold from him, as far as he could, all knowledge of the manner in which he was employing his funds? If an individual would not be expected to continue his confidence undersuch circumstances, upon what principle could a different line of conduct be required from the officers of the United States, charged with the care of the public interests? The public money is surely entitled to the same care and protection as that of an individual; and if the latter would be bound, in justice to himself, to withdraw his money from the hands of an agent thus regardless of his duty, the same principle requires that the money of the United States should, under the like circumstances, be withdrawn from the hands of their fiscal agent."

Having shown ample reasons for ceasing to make the public deposits in the Bank of the United States, and that it was done, the Secretary proceeds to the next division of his subject, naturally resulting from his authority to remove, though not expressed in the charter; and that was, to show where he had ordered them to be placed.

"The propriety of removing the deposits being thus evident, and it being consequently my duty to select the places to which they were to be removed, it became necessary that arrangements should be immediately made with the new depositories of the public money, which would not only render it safe, but would at the same time secure to the government, and to the community at large, the conveniencies and facilities that were intended to be obtained by incorporating the Bank of the United States. Measures were accordingly taken for that purpose, and copies of the contracts which have been made with the selected banks, and of the letters of instructions to them from this department, are herewith submitted. The contracts with the banks in the interior are not precisely the same with those in the Atlantic cities. The difference between them arises from the nature of the business transacted by the banks in these different places. The State banks selected are all institutions of high character and undoubted strength, and are under the management and control of persons of unquestioned probity and intelligence. And, in order to insure the safety of the public money, each of them is required, and has agreed, to give security whenever the amount of the deposit shall exceed the half of the amount of the capital actually paid in; and this department has reserved to itself the right to demand security whenever it may think it advisable, although this amount on deposit may not be equal to the sum above stated. The banks selected have also severally engaged to transmit money to any point at which it may be required by the direction of this department for the public service, and to perform all the services to the government which were heretofore rendered by the Bank of the United States. And, by agreements among themselves to honor each other's notes and drafts, they are providing a general currency at least as sound as that of the Bank of the United States, and will afford facilities to commerce and in the business of domestic exchange, quite equal to any which the community heretofore enjoyed. There has not been yet sufficient time to perfect these arrangements, but enough has already been done to show that, even on the score of expediency, a Bank of the United States is not necessary, either for the fiscal operations of the government, or the public convenience; and that every object which the charter to the present bank was designed to attain, may be as effectually accomplished by the State banks. And, if this can be done, nothing that is useful will be lost or endangered by the change, while much that is desirable will be gained by it. For no one of these corporations will possess that absolute and almost unlimited dominion over the property of the citizens of the United States which the present bank holds, and which enables it at any moment, at its own pleasure, to bring distress upon any portion of the community whenever it may deem it useful to its interest to make its power felt. The influence of each of the State banks is necessarily limited to its own immediate neighborhood, and they will be kept in check by the other local banks. They will not, therefore, be tempted by the consciousness of power to aspire to political influence, nor likely to interfere in the elections of the public servants. They will, moreover, be managed by persons who reside in the midst of the people who are to be immediately affected by their measures; and they cannot be insensible or indifferent to the opinions and peculiar interests of those by whom they are daily surrounded, and with whom they are constantly associated. These circumstances always furnish strong safeguards against an oppressive exercise of power, and forcibly recommend the employment of State banks in preference to a Bank of the United States, with its numerous and distant branches."In the selection, therefore, of the State banks as the fiscal agents of the government, no disadvantages appear to have been incurred on the score of safety or convenience, or the general interests of the country, while much that is valuable will be gained by the change. I am, however, well aware of the vast power of the Bank of the United States, and of its ability to bring distress and suffering on the country. This is one of the evils of chartering a bank with such an amount of capital, with the right of shooting its branches into every part of the Union, so as to extend its influence to every neighborhood. The immense loan of more than twenty-eight millions of dollars suddenly poured out, chiefly in the Western States, in 1831, and the first four months in 1832, sufficiently attests that the bank is sensible of the power which its money gives it, and has placed itself in an attitude to make the people of the United States feel the weight of its resentment, if they presume to disappoint the wishes of the corporation. By a severe curtailment it has already made it proper to withdraw a portion of the money it heldon deposit, and transfer it to the custody of the new fiscal agents, in order to shield the community from the injustice of the Bank of the United States. But I have not supposed that the course of the government ought to be regulated by the fear of the power of the bank. If such a motive could be allowed to influence the legislation of Congress, or the action of the executive departments of the government, there is an end to the sovereignty of the people; and the liberties of the country are at once surrendered at the feet of a moneyed corporation. They may now demand the possession of the public money, or the renewal of the charter; and if these objects are yielded to them from apprehensions of their power, or from the suffering which rapid curtailments on their part are inflicting on the community, what may they not next require? Will submission render such a corporation more forbearing in its course? What law may it not hereafter demand, that it will not, if it pleases, be able to enforce by the same means?"

"In the selection, therefore, of the State banks as the fiscal agents of the government, no disadvantages appear to have been incurred on the score of safety or convenience, or the general interests of the country, while much that is valuable will be gained by the change. I am, however, well aware of the vast power of the Bank of the United States, and of its ability to bring distress and suffering on the country. This is one of the evils of chartering a bank with such an amount of capital, with the right of shooting its branches into every part of the Union, so as to extend its influence to every neighborhood. The immense loan of more than twenty-eight millions of dollars suddenly poured out, chiefly in the Western States, in 1831, and the first four months in 1832, sufficiently attests that the bank is sensible of the power which its money gives it, and has placed itself in an attitude to make the people of the United States feel the weight of its resentment, if they presume to disappoint the wishes of the corporation. By a severe curtailment it has already made it proper to withdraw a portion of the money it heldon deposit, and transfer it to the custody of the new fiscal agents, in order to shield the community from the injustice of the Bank of the United States. But I have not supposed that the course of the government ought to be regulated by the fear of the power of the bank. If such a motive could be allowed to influence the legislation of Congress, or the action of the executive departments of the government, there is an end to the sovereignty of the people; and the liberties of the country are at once surrendered at the feet of a moneyed corporation. They may now demand the possession of the public money, or the renewal of the charter; and if these objects are yielded to them from apprehensions of their power, or from the suffering which rapid curtailments on their part are inflicting on the community, what may they not next require? Will submission render such a corporation more forbearing in its course? What law may it not hereafter demand, that it will not, if it pleases, be able to enforce by the same means?"

Thus the keeping of the public moneys went to the local banks, the system of an independent treasury being not then established; and the notes of these banks necessarily required their notes to be temporarily used in the federal payments, the gold currency not being at that time revived. Upon these local banks the federal government was thrown—first, for the safe keeping of its public moneys;secondly, to supply the place of the nineteen millions of bank notes which the national had in circulation;thirdly, to relieve the community from the pressure which the Bank of the United States had already commenced upon it, and which, it was known, was to be pushed to the ultimate point of oppression. But a difficulty was experienced in obtaining these local banks, which would be incredible without understanding the cause. Instead of a competition among them to obtain the deposits, there was holding off, and an absolute refusal on the part of many. Local banks were shy of receiving them—shy of receiving the greatest possible apparent benefit to themselves—shy of receiving the aliment upon which they lived and grew! and why this so great apparent contradiction? It was the fear of the Bank of the United States! and of that capacity to destroy them to which Mr. Biddle had testified in his answers to the Senate's Finance Committee; and which capacity was now known to be joined to the will; for the bank placed in the same category all who should be concerned in the removal—both the government that ordered it, and the local banks which received what it lost. But a competent number were found; and this first attempt to prevent a removal, by preventing a reception of the deposits elsewhere, entirely failed.

By the charter of the bank, the government was entitled to five directors, to be nominated annually by the President, and confirmed by the Senate. At the commencement of the session of 1833-'34, the President nominated the five, four of them being the same who had served during the current year, and who had made the report on which the order for the removal of the deposits was chiefly founded. This drew upon them the resentment of the bank, and caused them to receive a large share of reproach and condemnation in the report which the committee of the bank drew up, and which the board of directors adopted and published. When these nominations came into the Senate it was soon perceived that there was to be opposition to these four; and for the purpose of testing the truth of the objections, Mr. Kane, of Illinois, submitted the following resolution:

"Resolved, That the nominations of H. D. Gilpin, John T. Sullivan, Peter Wager, and Hugh McEldery, be recommitted to the Committee on Finance, with instructions to inquire into their several qualifications and fitness for the stations to which they have been nominated; also into the truth of all charges preferred by them against the board of directors of the Bank of the United States, and into the conduct of each of the said nominees during the time he may have acted as director of the said bank; and that the said nominees have notice of the times and places of meetings of said committee, and have leave to attend the same."

Which was immediately rejected by the following vote:

"Yeas.—Messrs. Benton, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, Linn, McKean, Moor, Morris, Rives, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright.—20."Nays.—Messrs. Bell, Bibb, Black, Calhoun, Chambers, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen,Kent, King of Georgia, Knight, Mangum, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggaman, Webster.—27."

"Yeas.—Messrs. Benton, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, Linn, McKean, Moor, Morris, Rives, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright.—20.

"Nays.—Messrs. Bell, Bibb, Black, Calhoun, Chambers, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen,Kent, King of Georgia, Knight, Mangum, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggaman, Webster.—27."

And this resolution being rejected, requiring a two-fold examination—one into the character and qualifications of the nominees, the other into the truth of their representations against the bank, it was deemed proper to submit another, limited to an inquiry into the character and fitness of the nominees; which was rejected by the same vote. The nominations were then voted upon separately, and each of the four was rejected by the same vote which applied to the first one, to wit, Mr. Gilpin: and which was as follows:

"Yeas.—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, Linn, McKean, Moore, Morris, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright.—20."Nays.—Messrs. Bell, Bibb, Calhoun, Chambers, Clay, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Kent, Knight, Mangum, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggaman, Webster.—24."

"Yeas.—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, Linn, McKean, Moore, Morris, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright.—20.

"Nays.—Messrs. Bell, Bibb, Calhoun, Chambers, Clay, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Kent, Knight, Mangum, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggaman, Webster.—24."

These rejections being communicated to the President, he immediately felt that it presented a new case for his energy and decision of conduct. The whole of the rejected gentlemen had been confirmed the year before—had all acted as directors for the current year—and there was no complaint against them except from the Bank of the United States; and that limited to their conduct in giving information of transactions in the bank to President Jackson at his written request. Their characters and fitness were above question. That was admitted by the Senate, both by its previous confirmation for the same places, and its present refusal to inquire into those points. The information which they had given to the President had been copied from the books of the bank, and the transactions which they communicated had been objected to by them at the time as illegal and improper; and its truth, unimpeachable in itself, was unimpeached by the Senate in their refusal to inquire into their conduct while directors. It was evident then that they had been rejected for the report which they made to the President; and this brought up the question, whether it was right to punish them for that act? and whether the bank should have the virtual nomination of the government directors by causing those to be rejected which the government nominated? and permitting none to serve but those whose conduct should be subordinate to the views and policy of the bank? These were questions, first, for the Senate, and then for the country; and the President determined to bring it before both in a formal message of re-nomination. He accordingly sent back the names of the four rejected nominations in a message which contained, among others, these passages:

"I disclaim all pretension of right on the part of the President officially to inquire into, or call in question, the reasons of the Senate for rejecting any nomination whatsoever. As the President is not responsible to them for the reasons which induce him to make a nomination, so they are not responsible to him for the reasons which induce them to reject it. In these respects, each is independent of the other and both responsible to their respective constituents. Nevertheless, the attitude in which certain vital interests of the country are placed by the rejection of the gentlemen now re-nominated require of me, frankly, to communicate my views of the consequences which must necessarily follow this act of the Senate, if it be not reconsidered."The characters and standing of these gentlemen are well known to the community, and eminently qualify them for the offices to which I propose to appoint them. Their confirmation by the Senate at its last session to the same offices is proof that such was the opinion of them entertained by the Senate at that time; and unless some thing has occurred since to change it, this act may now be referred to as evidence that their talents and pursuits justified their selection."The refusal, however, to confirm their nominations to the same offices, shows that there is something in the conduct of these gentlemen during the last year which, in the opinion of the Senate, disqualifies them; and as no charge has been made against them as men or citizens, nothing which impeaches the fair private character they possessed when the Senate gave them their sanction at its last session, and as it moreover appears from the journal of the Senate recently transmitted for my inspection, that it was deemed unnecessary to inquire into their qualifications or character, it is to be inferred that the change in the opinion of the Senate has arisen from the official conduct of these gentlemen. The only circumstances in their official conduct which have been deemed of sufficient importance to attract public attention are the two reports made by them to the executive department of the government, the one bearing date the 22d day of April, and the other the 19th day of August last; both of which reports were communicated to the Senate by the Secretary of the Treasury with his reasons for removing the deposits."The truth of the facts stated in these reports, is not, I presume, questioned by any one. The high character and standing of the citizens by whom they were made prevent any doubt upon the subject. Indeed the statements have not been denied by the president of the bank, and the other directors. On the contrary, they have insisted that they were authorized to use the money of the bank in the manner stated in the two reports, and have not denied that the charges there made against the corporation are substantially true."It must be taken, therefore, as admitted that the statements of the public directors, in the reports above mentioned, are correct: and they disclose the most alarming abuses on the part of the corporation, and the most strenuous exertions on their part to put an end to them. They prove that enormous sums were secretly lavished in a manner, and for purposes that cannot be justified; and that the whole of the immense capital of the bank has been virtually placed at the disposal of a single individual, to be used, if he thinks proper, to corrupt the press, and to control the proceedings of the government by exercising an undue influence over elections."The reports were made in obedience to my official directions; and I herewith transmit copies of my letter calling for information of the proceedings of the bank. Were they bound to disregard the call? Was it their duty to remain silent while abuses of the most injurious and dangerous character were daily practised? Were they bound to conceal from the constituted authorities a course of measures destructive to the best interests of the country, and intended, gradually and secretly, to subvert the foundations of our government, and to transfer its powers from the hands of the people to a great moneyed corporation? Was it their duty to sit in silence at the board, and witness all these abuses without an attempt to correct them; or, in case of failure there, not to appeal to higher authority? The eighth fundamental rule authorizes any one of the directors, whether elected or appointed, who may have been absent when an excess of debt was created, or who may have dissented from the act, to exonerate himself from personal responsibility by giving notice of the fact to the President of the United States; thus recognizing the propriety of communicating to that officer the proceedings of the board in such cases. But, independently of any argument to be derived from the principle recognized in the rule referred to, I cannot doubt for a moment that it is the right and the duty of every director at the board to attempt to correct all illegal proceedings, and in case of failure, to disclose them; and that every one of them, whether elected by the stockholders or appointed by the government, who had knowledge of the facts, and concealed them, would be justly amenable to the severest censure."But, in the case of the public directors, it was their peculiar and official duty to make the disclosures; and the call upon them for information could not have been disregarded without a flagrant breach of their trust. The directors appointed by the United States cannot be regarded in the light of the ordinary directors of a bank appointed by the stockholders, and charged with the care of their pecuniary interests in the corporation. They have higher and more important duties. They are public officers. They are placed at the board not merely to represent the stock held by the United States, but to observe the conduct of the corporation, and to watch over the public interests. It was foreseen that this great moneyed monopoly might be so managed as to endanger the interests of the country; and it was therefore deemed necessary, as a measure of precaution, to place at the board watchful sentinels, who should observe its conduct, and stand ready to report to the proper officers of the government every act of the board which might affect injuriously the interests of the people."It was, perhaps, scarcely necessary to present to the Senate these views of the powers of the Executive, and of the duties of the five directors appointed by the United States. But the bank is believed to be now striving to obtain for itself the government of the country, and is seeking, by new and strained constructions, to wrest from the hands of the constituted authorities the salutary control reserved by the charter. And as misrepresentation is one of its most usual weapons of attack, I have deemed it my duty to put before the Senate, in a manner not to be misunderstood, the principles on which I have acted."Entertaining, as I do, a solemn conviction of the truth of these principles, I must adhere to them, and act upon them, with constancy and firmness."Aware, as I now am, of the dangerous machinations of the bank, it is more than ever my duty to be vigilant in guarding the rights of the people from the impending danger. And I should feel that I ought to forfeit the confidence with which my countrymen have honored me, if I did not require regular and full reports of every thing in the proceedings of the bank calculated to affect injuriously the public interests, from the public directors, and if the directors should fail to give the information called for, it would be my imperious duty to exercise the power conferred on me by the law of removing them from office, and of appointing others who would discharge their duties with more fidelity to the public. I can never suffer any one to hold office under me, who would connive at corruption, or who should fail to give the alarm when he saw the enemies of liberty endeavoring to sap the foundations of our free institutions, and to subject the free people of the United States to the dominion of a great moneyed corporation."Any directors of the bank, therefore, whomight be appointed by the government, would be required to report to the Executive as fully as the late directors have done, and more frequently, because the danger is more imminent; and it would be my duty to require of them a full detail of every part of the proceedings of the corporation, or any of its officers, in order that I might be enabled to decide whether I should exercise the power of ordering ascire facias, which is reserved to the President by the charter, or adopt such other lawful measures as the interests of the country might require. It is too obvious to be doubted, that the misconduct of the corporation would never have been brought to light by the aid of a public proceeding at the board of directors."The board, when called on by the government directors, refused to institute an inquiry or require an account, and the mode adopted by the latter was the only one by which the object could be attained. It would be absurd to admit the right of the government directors to give information, and at the same time deny the means of obtaining it. It would be but another mode of enabling the bank to conceal its proceedings, and practice with impunity its corruptions. In the mode of obtaining the information, therefore, and in their efforts to put an end to the abuses disclosed, as well as in reporting them, the conduct of the late directors was judicious and praiseworthy, and the honesty, firmness, and intelligence, which they have displayed, entitle them, in my opinion, to the gratitude of the country."If the views of the Senate be such as I have supposed, the difficulty of sending to the Senate any other names than those of the late directors will be at once apparent. I cannot consent to place before the Senate the name of any one who is not prepared, with firmness and honesty, to discharge the duties of a public director in the manner they were fulfilled by those whom the Senate have refused to confirm. If, for performing a duty lawfully required of them by the Executive, they are to be punished by the subsequent rejection of the Senate, it would not only be useless but cruel to place men of character and honor in that situation, if even such men could be found to accept it. If they failed to give the required information, or to take proper measures to obtain it, they would be removed by the Executive. If they gave the information, and took proper measures to obtain it, they would, upon the next nomination, be rejected by the Senate. It would be unjust in me to place any other citizens in the predicament in which this unlooked for decision of the Senate has placed the estimable and honorable men who were directors during the last year."If I am not in error in relation to the principles upon which these gentlemen have been rejected, the necessary consequence will be that the bank will hereafter be without government directors and the people of the United States must be deprived of their chief means of protection against its abuses; for, whatever conflicting opinions may exist as to the right of the directors appointed in January, 1833, to hold over until new appointments shall be made, it is very obvious that, whilst their rejection by the Senate remains in force, they cannot, with propriety, attempt to exercise such a power. In the present state of things, therefore, the corporation will be enabled effectually to accomplish the object it has been so long endeavoring to attain. Its exchange committees, and its delegated powers to its president, may hereafter be dispensed with, without incurring the danger of exposing its proceedings to the public view. The sentinels which the law had placed at its board can no longer appear there."Justice to myself, and to the faithful officers by whom the public has been so well and so honorably served, without compensation or reward, during the last year, has required of me this full and frank exposition of my motives for nominating them again after their rejection by the Senate. I repeat, that I do not question the right of the Senate to confirm or reject at their pleasure; and if there had been any reason to suppose that the rejection, in this case, had not been produced by the causes to which I have attributed it, or of my views of their duties, and the present importance of their rigid performance, were other than they are, I should have cheerfully acquiesced, and attempted to find others who would accept the unenviable trust. But I cannot consent to appoint directors of the bank to be the subservient instruments, or silent spectators, of its abuses and corruptions; nor can I ask honorable men to undertake the thankless duty, with the certain prospect of being rebuked by the Senate for its faithful performance, in pursuance of the lawful directions of the Executive."

"The characters and standing of these gentlemen are well known to the community, and eminently qualify them for the offices to which I propose to appoint them. Their confirmation by the Senate at its last session to the same offices is proof that such was the opinion of them entertained by the Senate at that time; and unless some thing has occurred since to change it, this act may now be referred to as evidence that their talents and pursuits justified their selection.

"The refusal, however, to confirm their nominations to the same offices, shows that there is something in the conduct of these gentlemen during the last year which, in the opinion of the Senate, disqualifies them; and as no charge has been made against them as men or citizens, nothing which impeaches the fair private character they possessed when the Senate gave them their sanction at its last session, and as it moreover appears from the journal of the Senate recently transmitted for my inspection, that it was deemed unnecessary to inquire into their qualifications or character, it is to be inferred that the change in the opinion of the Senate has arisen from the official conduct of these gentlemen. The only circumstances in their official conduct which have been deemed of sufficient importance to attract public attention are the two reports made by them to the executive department of the government, the one bearing date the 22d day of April, and the other the 19th day of August last; both of which reports were communicated to the Senate by the Secretary of the Treasury with his reasons for removing the deposits.

"The truth of the facts stated in these reports, is not, I presume, questioned by any one. The high character and standing of the citizens by whom they were made prevent any doubt upon the subject. Indeed the statements have not been denied by the president of the bank, and the other directors. On the contrary, they have insisted that they were authorized to use the money of the bank in the manner stated in the two reports, and have not denied that the charges there made against the corporation are substantially true.

"It must be taken, therefore, as admitted that the statements of the public directors, in the reports above mentioned, are correct: and they disclose the most alarming abuses on the part of the corporation, and the most strenuous exertions on their part to put an end to them. They prove that enormous sums were secretly lavished in a manner, and for purposes that cannot be justified; and that the whole of the immense capital of the bank has been virtually placed at the disposal of a single individual, to be used, if he thinks proper, to corrupt the press, and to control the proceedings of the government by exercising an undue influence over elections.

"The reports were made in obedience to my official directions; and I herewith transmit copies of my letter calling for information of the proceedings of the bank. Were they bound to disregard the call? Was it their duty to remain silent while abuses of the most injurious and dangerous character were daily practised? Were they bound to conceal from the constituted authorities a course of measures destructive to the best interests of the country, and intended, gradually and secretly, to subvert the foundations of our government, and to transfer its powers from the hands of the people to a great moneyed corporation? Was it their duty to sit in silence at the board, and witness all these abuses without an attempt to correct them; or, in case of failure there, not to appeal to higher authority? The eighth fundamental rule authorizes any one of the directors, whether elected or appointed, who may have been absent when an excess of debt was created, or who may have dissented from the act, to exonerate himself from personal responsibility by giving notice of the fact to the President of the United States; thus recognizing the propriety of communicating to that officer the proceedings of the board in such cases. But, independently of any argument to be derived from the principle recognized in the rule referred to, I cannot doubt for a moment that it is the right and the duty of every director at the board to attempt to correct all illegal proceedings, and in case of failure, to disclose them; and that every one of them, whether elected by the stockholders or appointed by the government, who had knowledge of the facts, and concealed them, would be justly amenable to the severest censure.

"But, in the case of the public directors, it was their peculiar and official duty to make the disclosures; and the call upon them for information could not have been disregarded without a flagrant breach of their trust. The directors appointed by the United States cannot be regarded in the light of the ordinary directors of a bank appointed by the stockholders, and charged with the care of their pecuniary interests in the corporation. They have higher and more important duties. They are public officers. They are placed at the board not merely to represent the stock held by the United States, but to observe the conduct of the corporation, and to watch over the public interests. It was foreseen that this great moneyed monopoly might be so managed as to endanger the interests of the country; and it was therefore deemed necessary, as a measure of precaution, to place at the board watchful sentinels, who should observe its conduct, and stand ready to report to the proper officers of the government every act of the board which might affect injuriously the interests of the people.

"It was, perhaps, scarcely necessary to present to the Senate these views of the powers of the Executive, and of the duties of the five directors appointed by the United States. But the bank is believed to be now striving to obtain for itself the government of the country, and is seeking, by new and strained constructions, to wrest from the hands of the constituted authorities the salutary control reserved by the charter. And as misrepresentation is one of its most usual weapons of attack, I have deemed it my duty to put before the Senate, in a manner not to be misunderstood, the principles on which I have acted.

"Entertaining, as I do, a solemn conviction of the truth of these principles, I must adhere to them, and act upon them, with constancy and firmness.

"Aware, as I now am, of the dangerous machinations of the bank, it is more than ever my duty to be vigilant in guarding the rights of the people from the impending danger. And I should feel that I ought to forfeit the confidence with which my countrymen have honored me, if I did not require regular and full reports of every thing in the proceedings of the bank calculated to affect injuriously the public interests, from the public directors, and if the directors should fail to give the information called for, it would be my imperious duty to exercise the power conferred on me by the law of removing them from office, and of appointing others who would discharge their duties with more fidelity to the public. I can never suffer any one to hold office under me, who would connive at corruption, or who should fail to give the alarm when he saw the enemies of liberty endeavoring to sap the foundations of our free institutions, and to subject the free people of the United States to the dominion of a great moneyed corporation.

"Any directors of the bank, therefore, whomight be appointed by the government, would be required to report to the Executive as fully as the late directors have done, and more frequently, because the danger is more imminent; and it would be my duty to require of them a full detail of every part of the proceedings of the corporation, or any of its officers, in order that I might be enabled to decide whether I should exercise the power of ordering ascire facias, which is reserved to the President by the charter, or adopt such other lawful measures as the interests of the country might require. It is too obvious to be doubted, that the misconduct of the corporation would never have been brought to light by the aid of a public proceeding at the board of directors.

"The board, when called on by the government directors, refused to institute an inquiry or require an account, and the mode adopted by the latter was the only one by which the object could be attained. It would be absurd to admit the right of the government directors to give information, and at the same time deny the means of obtaining it. It would be but another mode of enabling the bank to conceal its proceedings, and practice with impunity its corruptions. In the mode of obtaining the information, therefore, and in their efforts to put an end to the abuses disclosed, as well as in reporting them, the conduct of the late directors was judicious and praiseworthy, and the honesty, firmness, and intelligence, which they have displayed, entitle them, in my opinion, to the gratitude of the country.

"If the views of the Senate be such as I have supposed, the difficulty of sending to the Senate any other names than those of the late directors will be at once apparent. I cannot consent to place before the Senate the name of any one who is not prepared, with firmness and honesty, to discharge the duties of a public director in the manner they were fulfilled by those whom the Senate have refused to confirm. If, for performing a duty lawfully required of them by the Executive, they are to be punished by the subsequent rejection of the Senate, it would not only be useless but cruel to place men of character and honor in that situation, if even such men could be found to accept it. If they failed to give the required information, or to take proper measures to obtain it, they would be removed by the Executive. If they gave the information, and took proper measures to obtain it, they would, upon the next nomination, be rejected by the Senate. It would be unjust in me to place any other citizens in the predicament in which this unlooked for decision of the Senate has placed the estimable and honorable men who were directors during the last year.

"If I am not in error in relation to the principles upon which these gentlemen have been rejected, the necessary consequence will be that the bank will hereafter be without government directors and the people of the United States must be deprived of their chief means of protection against its abuses; for, whatever conflicting opinions may exist as to the right of the directors appointed in January, 1833, to hold over until new appointments shall be made, it is very obvious that, whilst their rejection by the Senate remains in force, they cannot, with propriety, attempt to exercise such a power. In the present state of things, therefore, the corporation will be enabled effectually to accomplish the object it has been so long endeavoring to attain. Its exchange committees, and its delegated powers to its president, may hereafter be dispensed with, without incurring the danger of exposing its proceedings to the public view. The sentinels which the law had placed at its board can no longer appear there.

"Justice to myself, and to the faithful officers by whom the public has been so well and so honorably served, without compensation or reward, during the last year, has required of me this full and frank exposition of my motives for nominating them again after their rejection by the Senate. I repeat, that I do not question the right of the Senate to confirm or reject at their pleasure; and if there had been any reason to suppose that the rejection, in this case, had not been produced by the causes to which I have attributed it, or of my views of their duties, and the present importance of their rigid performance, were other than they are, I should have cheerfully acquiesced, and attempted to find others who would accept the unenviable trust. But I cannot consent to appoint directors of the bank to be the subservient instruments, or silent spectators, of its abuses and corruptions; nor can I ask honorable men to undertake the thankless duty, with the certain prospect of being rebuked by the Senate for its faithful performance, in pursuance of the lawful directions of the Executive."

This message brought up the question, virtually, Which was the nominating power, in the case of the government directors of the bank? was it the President and Senate? or the bank and the Senate? for it was evident that the four now nominated were rejected to gratify the bank, and for reasons that would apply to every director that would discharge his duties in the way these four had done—namely, as government directors, representing its stock, guarding its interest, and acting for the government in all cases which concerned the welfare of an institution whose notes were a national currency, whose coffers were the depository of the public moneys, and in which it had a direct interest of seven millions of dollars in its stock. It brought up this question: and if negatived, virtually decided that the nominating powershould be in the bank; and that the government directors should no more give such information to the President as these four had given. And this question it was determined to try, and that definitively, in the persons of these four nominated directors, with the declared determination to nominate no others if they were rejected; and so leave the government without representation in the bank. This message of re-nomination was referred to the Senate's Committee of Finance, of which Mr. Tyler was chairman, and who made a report adverse to the re-nominations, and in favor of again rejecting the nominees. The points made in the report were,first, the absolute right of the Senate to reject nominations;secondly, their privilege to give no reasons for their rejections (which the President had not asked); and,thirdly, against the general impolicy of making re-nominations, while admitting both the right and the practice in extraordinary occasions. Some extracts will show its character: thus:

"The President disclaims, indeed, in terms, all right to inquire into the reasons of the Senate for rejecting any nomination; and yet the message immediately undertakes to infer, from facts and circumstances, what those reasons, which influenced the Senate in this case, must have been; and goes on to argue, much at large, against the validity of such supposed reasons. The committee are of opinion that, if, as the President admits, he cannot inquire into the reasons of the Senate for refusing its assent to nominations, it is still more clear that these reasons cannot, with propriety, be assumed, and made subjects of comment."In cases in which nominations are rejected for reasons affecting the character of the persons nominated, the committee think that no inference is to be drawn except what the vote shows; that is to say, that the Senate withholds its advice and consent from the nominations. And the Senate, not being bound to give reasons for its votes in these cases, it is not bound, nor would it be proper for it, as the committee think, to give any answer to remarks founded on the presumption of what such reasons must have been in the present case. They feel themselves, therefore, compelled to forego any response whatever to the message of the President, in this particular, as well by the reasons before assigned, as out of respect to that high officer."The President acts upon his own views of public policy, in making nominations to the Senate; and the Senate does no more, when it confirms or rejects such nominations."For either of these co-ordinate departments to enter into the consideration of the motives of the other, would not, and could not, fail, in the end, to break up all harmonious intercourse between them. This your committee would deplore as highly injurious to the best interests of the country. The President, doubtless, asks himself, in the case of every nomination for office, whether the person be fit for the office; whether he be actuated by correct views and motives; and whether he be likely to be influenced by those considerations which should alone govern him in the discharge of his duties—is he honest, capable, and faithful? Being satisfied in these particulars, the President submits his name to the Senate, where the same inquiries arise, and its decision should be presumed to be dictated by the same high considerations as those which govern the President in originating the nomination."For these reasons, the committee have altogether refrained from entering into any discussion of the legal duties and obligations of directors of the bank, appointed by the President and Senate, which forms the main topic of the message."The committee would not feel that it had fully acquitted itself of its obligations, if it did not avail itself of this occasion to call the attention of the Senate to the general subject of renomination."The committee do not deny that a right of renomination exists; but they are of opinion that, in very clear and strong cases only should the Senate reverse decisions which it has deliberately formed, and officially communicated to the President."The committee perceive, with regret, an intimation in the message that the President may not see fit to send to the Senate the names of any other persons to be directors of the bank, except those whose nominations have been already rejected. While the Senate will exercise its own rights according to its own views of its duty, it will leave to other officers of the government to decide for themselves on the manner they will perform their duties. The committee know no reasons why these offices should not be filled; or why, in this case, no further nomination should be made, after the Senate has exercised its unquestionable right of rejecting particular persons who have been nominated, any more than in other cases. The Senate will be ready at all times to receive and consider any such nominations as the President may present to it."The committee recommend that the Senate do not advise and consent to the appointment of the persons thus renominated."

"In cases in which nominations are rejected for reasons affecting the character of the persons nominated, the committee think that no inference is to be drawn except what the vote shows; that is to say, that the Senate withholds its advice and consent from the nominations. And the Senate, not being bound to give reasons for its votes in these cases, it is not bound, nor would it be proper for it, as the committee think, to give any answer to remarks founded on the presumption of what such reasons must have been in the present case. They feel themselves, therefore, compelled to forego any response whatever to the message of the President, in this particular, as well by the reasons before assigned, as out of respect to that high officer.

"The President acts upon his own views of public policy, in making nominations to the Senate; and the Senate does no more, when it confirms or rejects such nominations.

"For either of these co-ordinate departments to enter into the consideration of the motives of the other, would not, and could not, fail, in the end, to break up all harmonious intercourse between them. This your committee would deplore as highly injurious to the best interests of the country. The President, doubtless, asks himself, in the case of every nomination for office, whether the person be fit for the office; whether he be actuated by correct views and motives; and whether he be likely to be influenced by those considerations which should alone govern him in the discharge of his duties—is he honest, capable, and faithful? Being satisfied in these particulars, the President submits his name to the Senate, where the same inquiries arise, and its decision should be presumed to be dictated by the same high considerations as those which govern the President in originating the nomination.

"For these reasons, the committee have altogether refrained from entering into any discussion of the legal duties and obligations of directors of the bank, appointed by the President and Senate, which forms the main topic of the message.

"The committee would not feel that it had fully acquitted itself of its obligations, if it did not avail itself of this occasion to call the attention of the Senate to the general subject of renomination.

"The committee do not deny that a right of renomination exists; but they are of opinion that, in very clear and strong cases only should the Senate reverse decisions which it has deliberately formed, and officially communicated to the President.

"The committee perceive, with regret, an intimation in the message that the President may not see fit to send to the Senate the names of any other persons to be directors of the bank, except those whose nominations have been already rejected. While the Senate will exercise its own rights according to its own views of its duty, it will leave to other officers of the government to decide for themselves on the manner they will perform their duties. The committee know no reasons why these offices should not be filled; or why, in this case, no further nomination should be made, after the Senate has exercised its unquestionable right of rejecting particular persons who have been nominated, any more than in other cases. The Senate will be ready at all times to receive and consider any such nominations as the President may present to it.

"The committee recommend that the Senate do not advise and consent to the appointment of the persons thus renominated."

While these proceedings were going on in the Senate, the four rejected gentlemen were paying some attention to their own case; and, in a "memorial" addressed to the Senate and to the House of Representatives, answered the charges against them in the Directors' Report,and vindicated their own conduct in giving the information which the President requested—reasserted the truth of that information; and gave further details upon the manner in which they had been systematically excluded from a participation in conducting the main business of the bank, and even from a knowledge of what was done. They said:

"Selected by the President and Senate as government directors of the Bank of the United States, we have endeavored, during the present year, faithfully to discharge the duties of that responsible trust. Appointed without solicitation, deriving from the office no emolument, we have been guided in our conduct by no views but a determination to uphold, so far as was in our power, those principles which we believe actuated the people of the United States in establishing a national bank, and in providing by its charter that they should be represented at the board of directors. We have regarded that institution, not merely as a source of profit to individuals, but as an organ of the government, established by the nation for its own benefit. We have regarded ourselves, not as mere agents of those whose funds have been subscribed towards the capital of the bank, but as officers appointed on behalf of the American people. We have endeavored to govern all our conduct as faithful representatives of them. We have been deterred from this by no preconcerted system to deprive us of our rights, by no impeachment of our motives, by no false views of policy, by no course of management which might be supposed to promote the interests of those concerned in the institution, at the danger or sacrifice of the general good. We have left the other directors to govern themselves as they may think best for the interests of those by whom they were chosen. For ourselves, we have been determined, that where any differences have arisen, involving on the one hand that open and correct course which is beneficial to the whole community, and, on the other, what are supposed to be the interests of the bank, our efforts should be steadily directed to uphold the former, our remonstrances against the latter should be resolute and constant; and, when they proved unavailing, our appeal should be made to those who were more immediately intrusted with the protection of the public welfare."In pursuing this course we have been met by an organized system of opposition, on the part of the majority. Our efforts have been thwarted, our motives and actions have been misrepresented, our rights have been denied, and the limits of our duties have been gratuitously pointed out to us, by those who have sought to curtail them to meet their own policy, not that which we believe led to the creation of the offices we hold. Asserting that injury has been done to them by the late measure of the Secretary of the Treasury, in removing the public deposits, an elaborate statement has been prepared and widely circulated; and taking that as their basis, it has been resolved by the majority to present a memorial to the Senate and House of Representatives. We have not, and do not interfere in the controversy which exists between the majority of the board and the executive department of the government; but unjustly assailed as we have been in the statement to which we have referred, we respectfully claim the same right of submitting our conduct to the same tribunal, and asking of the assembled representatives of the American people that impartial hearing, and that fair protection, which all their officers and all citizens have a right to demand. We shall endeavor to present the view we have taken of the relation in which we are placed, as well towards the institution in question as towards the government and people of the United States, to prove that from the moment we took our seats among the directors of the bank, we have been the objects of a systematic opposition; our rights trampled upon, our just interference prevented, and our offices rendered utterly useless, for all the purposes required by the charter; and to show that the statements by the majority of the board, in the document to which we refer, convey an account of their proceedings and conduct altogether illusory and incorrect."

"In pursuing this course we have been met by an organized system of opposition, on the part of the majority. Our efforts have been thwarted, our motives and actions have been misrepresented, our rights have been denied, and the limits of our duties have been gratuitously pointed out to us, by those who have sought to curtail them to meet their own policy, not that which we believe led to the creation of the offices we hold. Asserting that injury has been done to them by the late measure of the Secretary of the Treasury, in removing the public deposits, an elaborate statement has been prepared and widely circulated; and taking that as their basis, it has been resolved by the majority to present a memorial to the Senate and House of Representatives. We have not, and do not interfere in the controversy which exists between the majority of the board and the executive department of the government; but unjustly assailed as we have been in the statement to which we have referred, we respectfully claim the same right of submitting our conduct to the same tribunal, and asking of the assembled representatives of the American people that impartial hearing, and that fair protection, which all their officers and all citizens have a right to demand. We shall endeavor to present the view we have taken of the relation in which we are placed, as well towards the institution in question as towards the government and people of the United States, to prove that from the moment we took our seats among the directors of the bank, we have been the objects of a systematic opposition; our rights trampled upon, our just interference prevented, and our offices rendered utterly useless, for all the purposes required by the charter; and to show that the statements by the majority of the board, in the document to which we refer, convey an account of their proceedings and conduct altogether illusory and incorrect."

The four gentlemen then state their opinions of their rights, and their duties, as government directors—that they were devised as instruments for the attainment of public objects—that they were public directors, not elected by stockholders, but appointed by the President and Senate—that their duties were not merely to represent a moneyed interest and promote the largest dividend for stockholders, but also to guard all the public and political interest of the government in an institution so largely sharing its support and so deeply interested in its safe and honorable management. And in support of this opinion of their duties they quoted the authority of Gen. Hamilton, founder of the first bank of the United States; and that of Mr. Alexander Dallas, founder of the second and present bank; showing that each of them, and at the time of establishing the two banks respectively, considered the government directors as public officers, bound to watch over the operations of the bank, to oppose all malpractices, and to report them to the government whenever they occurred. And they thus quoted the opinions of those two gentlemen:

"In the celebrated report of Alexander Hamilton, in 1790, that eminent statesman and financier, although then impressed with a persuasion that the government of the country might well leave the management of a national bank to 'the keen, steady, and, as it were, magnetic sense of their own interest,' existing among the private stockholders, yet holds the following remarkable and pregnant language: 'If the paper of a bank is permitted to insinuate itself into all the revenues and receipts of a country; if it is even to be tolerated as the substitute for gold and silver, in all the transactions of business; it becomes, in either view, a national concern of the first magnitude. As such, the ordinary rules of prudence require that the government should possess the means of ascertaining, whenever it thinks fit, that so delicate a trust is executed with fidelity and care. A right of this nature is not only desirable, as it respects the government, but it ought to be equally so to all those concerned in the institution, as an additional title to public and private confidence, and as a thing which can only be formidable to practices that imply mismanagement.'"In the letter addressed by Alexander James Dallas, the author of the existing bank, to the chairman of the committee on a national currency, in 1815, the sentiments of that truly distinguished and patriotic statesman are explicitly conveyed upon this very point. 'Nor can it be doubted,' he remarks, 'that the department of the government which is invested with the power of appointment to all the important offices of the State, is a proper department to exercise the power of appointment in relation to a national trust of incalculable magnitude. The national bank ought not to be regarded simply as a commercial bank. It will not operate on the funds of the stockholders alone, but much more on the funds of the nation. Its conduct, good or bad, will not affect the corporate credit and resources alone, but much more the credit and resources of the government. In fine, it is not an institution created for the purposes of commerce and profit alone, but much more for the purposes of national policy, as an auxiliary in the exercise of some of the highest powers of the government. Under such circumstances, the public interests cannot be too cautiously guarded, and the guards proposed can never be injurious to the commercial interests of the institution. The right to inspect the general accounts of the bank, may be employed to detect the evils of a mal-administration, but an interior agency in the direction of its affairs will best serve to prevent them.' This last sentence, extracted from the able document of Secretary Dallas, developes at a glance what had been the experience of the American government and people, in the period which elapsed between the time of Alexander Hamilton and that immediately preceding the formation of the present bank. Hamilton conceived that 'a right to inspect the general accounts of the bank,' would enable government 'to detect the evils of a mal-administration,' and their detection he thought sufficient. He was mistaken: at least so thought Congress and their constituents, in 1815. Hence the inflexible spirit which prevailed at the organization of a new bank, in establishing 'an interior agency in the direction of its affairs,' by the appointment of public officers, through whom the evils of a mal-administration might be carefully watched and prevented."

"In the letter addressed by Alexander James Dallas, the author of the existing bank, to the chairman of the committee on a national currency, in 1815, the sentiments of that truly distinguished and patriotic statesman are explicitly conveyed upon this very point. 'Nor can it be doubted,' he remarks, 'that the department of the government which is invested with the power of appointment to all the important offices of the State, is a proper department to exercise the power of appointment in relation to a national trust of incalculable magnitude. The national bank ought not to be regarded simply as a commercial bank. It will not operate on the funds of the stockholders alone, but much more on the funds of the nation. Its conduct, good or bad, will not affect the corporate credit and resources alone, but much more the credit and resources of the government. In fine, it is not an institution created for the purposes of commerce and profit alone, but much more for the purposes of national policy, as an auxiliary in the exercise of some of the highest powers of the government. Under such circumstances, the public interests cannot be too cautiously guarded, and the guards proposed can never be injurious to the commercial interests of the institution. The right to inspect the general accounts of the bank, may be employed to detect the evils of a mal-administration, but an interior agency in the direction of its affairs will best serve to prevent them.' This last sentence, extracted from the able document of Secretary Dallas, developes at a glance what had been the experience of the American government and people, in the period which elapsed between the time of Alexander Hamilton and that immediately preceding the formation of the present bank. Hamilton conceived that 'a right to inspect the general accounts of the bank,' would enable government 'to detect the evils of a mal-administration,' and their detection he thought sufficient. He was mistaken: at least so thought Congress and their constituents, in 1815. Hence the inflexible spirit which prevailed at the organization of a new bank, in establishing 'an interior agency in the direction of its affairs,' by the appointment of public officers, through whom the evils of a mal-administration might be carefully watched and prevented."

The four gentlemen also showed, in their memorial, that when the bill for the charter of the present bank was under consideration in the Senate, a motion was made to strike out the clause authorizing the appointment of the government directors; and that that motion was resisted, and successfully, upon the ground that they were to be the guardians of the public interests, and to secure a just and honorable administration of the affairs of the bank; that they were not mere bank directors, but government officers, bound to watch over the rights and interests of the government, and to secure a safe and honest management of an institution which bore the name of the United States—was created by it—and in which the United States had so much at stake in its stock, in its deposits, in its circulation, and in the safety of the community which put their faith in it. Having vindicated the official quality of their characters, and shown their duty as well as their right to inform the government of all mal-practices, they entered upon an examination of the information actually given, showing the truth of all that was communicated, and declaring it to be susceptible of proof, by the inspection of the books of the institution, and by an examination of its directors and clerks.

"We confidently assert that there is in it no statement or charge that can be invalidated; that every one is substantiated by the books and records of the bank; that no real error has been pointed out in this elaborate attack upon us by the majority. It is by suppressing facts well known to them, by misrepresenting what we say, by drawing unjust and unfair inferences from particular sentences, by selecting insulated phrases, and by exhibiting partial statements; by making unfounded insinuations, and by unworthily impeaching our motives, that they endeavor to controvert that which they are unable to refute. When the expense account shall be truly and fully exhibited to any tribunal, if it shall be found that the charges we have stated do not exist; when the minutes of theboard shall be laid open, if it shall be found the resolutions we have quoted are not recorded; we shall acknowledge that we have been guilty of injustice and of error, but not till then."We have thus endeavored to present to the assembled representatives of the American people, a view of the course which, for nearly a year, the majority in a large moneyed institution, established by them for their benefit, have thought proper to pursue towards those who have been placed there, to guard their interests and to watch and control their conduct. We have briefly stated the systematic series of actions by which they have endeavored to deprive them of every right that was conferred on them by the charter, and to assume to themselves a secret, irresponsible, and unlimited power. We have shown that, in endeavoring to vindicate or to save themselves, they have resorted to accusations against us, which they are unable to sustain, and left unanswered charges which, were they not true, it would be easy to repel. We have been urged to this from no desire to enter into the lists with an adversary sustained by all the resources which boundless wealth affords. We have been driven to it by the nature and manner of the attack made upon us, in the document on which the intended memorial to Congress is founded."

"We have thus endeavored to present to the assembled representatives of the American people, a view of the course which, for nearly a year, the majority in a large moneyed institution, established by them for their benefit, have thought proper to pursue towards those who have been placed there, to guard their interests and to watch and control their conduct. We have briefly stated the systematic series of actions by which they have endeavored to deprive them of every right that was conferred on them by the charter, and to assume to themselves a secret, irresponsible, and unlimited power. We have shown that, in endeavoring to vindicate or to save themselves, they have resorted to accusations against us, which they are unable to sustain, and left unanswered charges which, were they not true, it would be easy to repel. We have been urged to this from no desire to enter into the lists with an adversary sustained by all the resources which boundless wealth affords. We have been driven to it by the nature and manner of the attack made upon us, in the document on which the intended memorial to Congress is founded."

But all their representations were in vain. Their nominations were immediately rejected, a second time, and the seal of secrecy preserved inviolate upon the reasons of the rejection. The "proceedings" of the Senate were allowed to be published; that is to say, the acts of the Senate, as a body, such as its motions, votes, reports, &c., but nothing of what was said pending the nominations. A motion was made by Mr. Wright to authorize the publication of the debates, which was voted down; and so differently from what was done in the case of Mr. Van Buren. In that case, the debates on the nomination were published; the reasons for the rejection were shown; and the public were enabled to judge of their validity. In this case no publication of debates was allowed; the report presented by Mr. Tyler gave no hint of the reasons for the rejection; and the act remained where that report put it—on the absolute right to reject, without the exhibition of any reason.

And thus the nomination of the government directors was rejected by the United States Senate, not for the declared, but for the known reason of reporting the misconduct of the bank to the President, and especially as it related to the appointment and the conduct of the exchange committee. A few years afterwards a committee of the stockholders, called the "Committee of Investigation," made a report upon the conduct and condition of the bank, in which this exchange committee is thus spoken of: "The mode in which the committee of exchange transacted their business, shows that there really existed no check whatever upon the officers, and that the funds of the bank were almost entirely at their disposition. That committee met daily, and were attended by the cashier, and at times, by the president. They exercised the power of making the loans and settlements, to full as great an extent as the board itself. They kept no minutes of their proceedings—no book in which the loans made, and business done, were entered; but their decisions and directions were given verbally to the officers, to be by them carried into execution. The established course of business seems to have been, for the first teller to pay on presentation at the counter, all checks, notes, or due bills having indorsed the order, or the initials, of one of the cashiers, and to place these as vouchers in his drawer, for so much cash, where they remained, until just before the regular periodical counting of the cash by the standing committee of the board on the state of the bank. These vouchers were then taken out, and entered as 'bills receivable,' in a small memorandum-book, under the charge of one of the clerks. These bills were not discounted, but bore interest semi-annually, and were secured by a pledge of stock, or some other kind of property. It is evidently impossible under such circumstances, to ascertain or be assured, in regard to any particular loan or settlement, that it was authorized by a majority of the exchange committee. It can be said, however, with entire certainty, that the very large business transacted in this way does not appear upon the face of the discount books—was never submitted to the examination of the members of the board at its regular meetings, nor is any where entered on the minutes as having been reported to that body for their information or approbation."

In the first days of the session Mr. Clay called the attention of the Senate to the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, communicating the fact that he had ordered the public deposits to cease to be made in the Bank of the United States, and giving his reasons for that act, and said:

"When Congress, at the time of the passage of the charter of the bank, made it necessary that these reasons should be submitted, they must have had some purpose in their mind. It must have been intended that Congress should look into these reasons, determine as to their validity; and approve or disapprove them, as might be thought proper. The reasons had now been submitted, and it was the duty of Congress to decide whether or not they were sufficient to justify the act. If there was a subject which, more than any other, seemed to require the prompt action of Congress, it certainly was that which had reference to the custody and care of the public treasury. The Senate, therefore, could not, at too early a period, enter on the question—what was the actual condition of the treasury?"It was not his purpose to go into a discussion, but he had risen to state that it appeared to him to be his duty as a senator, and he hoped that other senators took similar views of their duty, to look into this subject, and to see what was to be done. As the report of the Secretary of the Treasury had declared the reasons which had led to the removal of the public deposits, and as the Senate had to judge whether, on investigation of these reasons, the act was a wise one or not, he considered that it would not be right to refer the subject to any committee, but that the Senate should at once act on it, not taking it up in the form of a report of a committee, but going into an examination of the reasons as they had been submitted."

"It was not his purpose to go into a discussion, but he had risen to state that it appeared to him to be his duty as a senator, and he hoped that other senators took similar views of their duty, to look into this subject, and to see what was to be done. As the report of the Secretary of the Treasury had declared the reasons which had led to the removal of the public deposits, and as the Senate had to judge whether, on investigation of these reasons, the act was a wise one or not, he considered that it would not be right to refer the subject to any committee, but that the Senate should at once act on it, not taking it up in the form of a report of a committee, but going into an examination of the reasons as they had been submitted."

Mr. Benton saw two objections to proceeding as Mr. Clay proposed—one, as to the form of his proposition—the other, as to the place in which it was made. The report of the Secretary, charging acts of misconduct as a cause of removal, would require an investigation into their truth. The House of Representatives being the grand inquest of the nation, and properly chargeable with all inquiries into abuses, would be the proper place for the consideration of the Secretary's report—though he admitted that the Senate could also make the inquiry if it pleased; but should do it in the proper way, namely, by inquiring into the truth of the allegations against the bank. He said:

"He requested the Senate to bear in mind that the Secretary had announced, among other reasons which he had assigned for the removal of the deposits, that it had been caused by the misconduct of the bank, and he had gone into a variety of specifications, charging the bank with interfering with the liberties of the people in their most vital elements—the liberty of the press, and the purity of elections. The Secretary had also charged the bank with dishonoring its own paper on several occasions, and that it became necessary to compel it to receive paper of its own branches. Here, then, were grave charges of misconduct, and he wished to know whether, in the face of such charges, this Congress was to go at once, without the previous examination of a committee, into action upon the subject?"He desired to know whether the Senate were now about to proceed to the consideration of this report as it stood, and, without receiving any evidence of the charges, or taking any course to establish their truth, to give back the money to this institution? He thought it would be only becoming in the bank itself to ask for a committee of scrutiny into its conduct, and that the subject ought to be taken up by the House of Representatives, which, on account of its numbers, its character as the popular branch, and the fact that all money bills originated there, was the most proper tribunal for the hearing of this case. He did not mean to deny that the Senate had the power to go into the examination. But to fix a day now for the decision of so important a case, he considered as premature. Were the whole of the charges to be blown out of the paper by the breath of the Senate? Were they to decide on the question, each senator sitting there as witness and juror in the case? He did not wish to stand there in the character of a witness, unless he was to be examined on oath either at the bar of the Senate, or before a committee of that body, where the evidence would be taken down. He wished to know the manner in which the examination was to be conducted; for he regarded this motion as an admission of the truth of every charge which had been made in the report, and as a flight from investigation."

"He desired to know whether the Senate were now about to proceed to the consideration of this report as it stood, and, without receiving any evidence of the charges, or taking any course to establish their truth, to give back the money to this institution? He thought it would be only becoming in the bank itself to ask for a committee of scrutiny into its conduct, and that the subject ought to be taken up by the House of Representatives, which, on account of its numbers, its character as the popular branch, and the fact that all money bills originated there, was the most proper tribunal for the hearing of this case. He did not mean to deny that the Senate had the power to go into the examination. But to fix a day now for the decision of so important a case, he considered as premature. Were the whole of the charges to be blown out of the paper by the breath of the Senate? Were they to decide on the question, each senator sitting there as witness and juror in the case? He did not wish to stand there in the character of a witness, unless he was to be examined on oath either at the bar of the Senate, or before a committee of that body, where the evidence would be taken down. He wished to know the manner in which the examination was to be conducted; for he regarded this motion as an admission of the truth of every charge which had been made in the report, and as a flight from investigation."

Mr. Clay then submitted two resolutions in relation to the subject, the second of which after debate, was referred to the committee on finance. They were in these words:

"1st. That, by dismissing the late Secretary of the Treasury, because he would not, contrary to his sense of his own duty, remove the money of the United States in deposit with the Bank of the United States and its branches, in conformity with the President's opinion, and by appointing his successor to effect such removal, which has been done, the President has assumed the exercise of a power over the Treasury of the United States, not granted to him by the constitution and laws, and dangerous to the liberties of the people."2d. That the reasons assigned by the Secretary of the Treasury for the removal of the money of the United States deposited in the Bank of the United States and its branches, communicated to Congress on the 3d day of December, 1833, are unsatisfactory and insufficient."

"2d. That the reasons assigned by the Secretary of the Treasury for the removal of the money of the United States deposited in the Bank of the United States and its branches, communicated to Congress on the 3d day of December, 1833, are unsatisfactory and insufficient."

The order for the reference to the finance committee was made in the Senate at four o'clock in the afternoon of one day; and the report upon it was made at noon the next day; a very elaborate argumentative paper, the reading of which by its reporter (Mr. Webster) consumed one hour and a quarter of time. It recommended the adoption of the resolution; and 6000 copies of the report were ordered to be printed. Mr. Forsyth, of Georgia, complimented the committee on their activity in getting out a report of such length and labor, in so short a time, and in the time usually given to the refreshment of dinner and sleep. He said:

"Certainly great credit was due to the committee on finance for the zeal, ability, and industry with which the report had been brought out. He thought the reference was made yesterday at four o'clock; and the committee could hardly have had time to agree on and write out so long a report in the short space of time intervening since then. It was possible that the subject might have been discussed and well understood in the committee before, and that the chairman had time to embody the sentiments of the various members of the committee previous to the reference. If such was the case, it reminded him of what had once happened in one of the courts of justice of the State of Georgia. A grave question of constitutional law was presented before that court, was argued for days with great ability, and when the argument was concluded, the judge drew from his coat pocket a written opinion, which he read, and ordered to be recorded as the opinion of the court. It appeared, therefore, that unless the senator from Massachusetts carried the opinion of the committee in his coat pocket, he could not have presented his report with the unexampled dispatch that had been witnessed."

Mr. Webster, evidently nettled at the sarcastic compliment of Mr. Forsyth, replied to him in a way to show his irritated feelings, but without showing how he came to do so much work in so short a time. He said:

"Had the gentleman come to the Senate this morning in his usual good humor, he would have been easily satisfied on that point. He will recollect that the subject now under discussion was deemed, by every body, to be peculiarly fitted for the consideration of the committee on finance; and that, three weeks ago, I had intimated my intention of moving for such a reference. I had, however, delayed the motion, from considerations of courtesy to other gentlemen, on all sides. But the general subject of the removal of the deposits, had been referred to the committee on finance, by reference of that part of the President's message; and various memorials, in relation to it, had also been referred. The subject has undergone an ample discussion in committee. I had been more than once instructed by the committee to move for the reference of the Secretary's letter, but the motion was postponed, from time to time, for the reasons I have before given. Had the gentleman from Georgia been in the Senate yesterday, he would have known that this particular mode of proceeding was adopted, as was then well understood, for the sole purpose of facilitating the business of the Senate, and of giving the committee an opportunity to express an opinion, the result of their consideration. If the gentleman had heard what had passed yesterday, when the reference was made, he would not have expressed surprise."

The fact was the report had been drawn by the counsel for the bank, and differed in no way in substance, and but little in form, from the report which the bank committee had made on the paper, "purporting to have been signed by Andrew Jackson, and read to what was called a cabinet." But the substance of the resolution (No. 2, of Mr. Clay's), gave rise to more serious objections than the marvellous activity of the committee in reporting upon it with the elaboration and rapidity with which they had done. It was an empty and inoperative expression of opinion, that the Secretary's reasons were "unsatisfactory and insufficient;" without any proposition to do any thing in consequence of that dissatisfaction and insufficiency; and, consequently, of no legislative avail, and of no import except to bring the opinion of senators, thus imposingly pronounced, against the act of the Secretary. The resolve was not practical—was not legislative—was not in conformityto any mode of doing business—and led to no action;—neither to a restoration of the deposits nor to a condemnation of their keeping by the State banks. Certainly the charter, in ordering the Secretary to report, and to report at the first practicable moment, both the fact of a removal, and the reasons for it, was to enable Congress to act—to do something—to legislate upon the subject—to judge the validity of the reasons—and to order a restoration if they were found to be untrue or insufficient; or to condemn the new place of deposit, if it was deemed insecure or improper. All this was too obvious to escape the attention of the democratic members who inveighed against the futility and irrelevance of the resolve, unfit for a legislative body, and only suitable for a town meeting; and answering no purpose as a senatorial resolve but that of political effect against public men. On this point Mr. Forsyth said:

"The subject had then been taken out of the hands of the Senate, and sent to the committee on finance; and for what purpose was it sent thither? Did any one doubt what would be the opinion of the committee on finance? Would such a movement have been made, had it not been intended thereby to give strength to the course of the opposition? He was not in the Senate when the reference was yesterday made, but he had supposed that it was made for the purpose of some report in a legislative form, but it has come back with an argument, and a recommendation of the adoption of the resolution of the senator from Kentucky; and when the resolutions were adopted, would they not still be sent back to that committee for examination? Why had not the committee, who seemed to know so well what would be the opinion of the Senate, imbodied that opinion in a legislative form?"

To the same effect spoke many members, and among others, Mr. Silas Wright, of New-York, who said:

"He took occasion to say, that with regard to the reference made yesterday, he was not so unfortunate as his friend from Georgia, to be absent at the time, and he then, while the motion was pending, expressed his opinion that a reference at four o'clock in the afternoon, to be returned with a report at twelve the next day, would materially change the aspect of the case before the Senate. He was also of opinion, that the natural effect of sending this proposition to the committee on finance would be, to have it returned with a recommendation for some legislative action. In this, however, he had been disappointed, the proposition had been brought back to the Senate in the same form as sent to the committee, with the exception of the very able argument read that morning."

Mr. Webster felt himself called upon to answer these objections, and did so in a way to intimate that the committee were not "green" enough,—that is to say, were too wise—to propose any legislative action on the part of Congress in relation to this removal. He said:

"There is another thing, sir, to which the gentleman has objected. He would have preferred that some legislative recommendation should have accompanied the report—that some law, or joint resolution, should have been recommended. Sir, do we not see what the gentleman probably desires? If not, we must be green politicians. It was not my intention, at this stage of the business, to propose any law, or joint resolution. I do not, at present, know the opinions of the committee on this subject. On this question, at least, to use the gentleman's expression, I do not carry their opinions in my coat pocket. The question, when it arrives, will be a very grave one—one of deep and solemn import—and when the proper time for its discussion arrives, the gentleman from Georgia will have an opportunity to examine it. The first thing is, to ascertain the judgment of the Senate, on the Secretary's reasons for his act."

The meaning of Mr. Webster in this reply—this intimation that the finance committee had got out of the sap, and were no longer "green"—was a declaration that any legislative measure they might have recommended, would have been rejected in the House of Representatives, and so lost its efficacy as a senatorial opinion; and to avoid that rejection, and save the effect of the Senate's opinion, it must be a single and not a joint resolution; and so confined to the Senate alone. The reply of Mr. Webster was certainly candid, but unparliamentary, and at war with all ideas of legislation, thus to refuse to propose a legislative enactment because it would be negatived in the other branch of the national legislature. Finally, the resolution was adopted, and by a vote of 28 to 18; thus:

"Yeas.—Messrs. Bibb, Black, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Hendricks, Kent, King of Georgia, Knight, Leigh, Mangum, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggaman, Webster."Nays.—Messrs. Benton, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, Linn,McKean, Moore, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright."

"Nays.—Messrs. Benton, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, Linn,McKean, Moore, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright."

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