No one is either a philologist or a doctor, who is not also anAntichrist.As a philologist, for instance, a man seesbehindthe "holy books" as a doctor he seesbehindthe physiological rottenness of the typical Christian. The Doctor says "incurable," the philologist says "forgery."197
The priest knows only one great danger, and that isscience,—the healthy concept of cause and effect. But, on the whole, science flourishes only in happy conditions,—a man must have time, he must also have superfluous mental energy in order to "pursue knowledge." ..."Consequentlyman must be made unhappy,"—this has been the argument of the priest of all ages.—You have already divined what, in accordance with such a manner of arguing, must first have come into the world:—"sin.".... The notion of guilt and punishment, the whole "moral order of the universe," was invented against science.199
The notion of guilt and punishment, including the doctrine of "grace," of "salvation" and of "forgiveness"—all lies through and through without a shred of psychological reality—were invented in order to destroy man'ssense of causality:they are an attack with the fist, with the knife, with honesty in hate and love! But one actuated by the most cowardly, most crafty, and most ignoble instincts! Apriest'sattack! Aparasite'sattack! A vampyrism of pale subterranean leeches!200
"Faith saveth;thereforeit is true."—It might be objected here that it is precisely salvation which is not probed but onlypromised;salvation is bound up with the condition "faith,"—oneshallbe saved,becauseone has faith.... But how provethatthat which the priest promises to the faithful really will take place, to wit: the "Beyond" which defies all demonstration?—The assumed "proof of power" is at bottom once again only a belief in the fact that the effect which faith promises will not fail to take place. In a formula: "I believe that faith saveth;—consequentlyit is true."—But with this we are at the end of our tether.201
Holiness in itself is simply a symptom of animpoverished, enervated and incurably deteriorated body!203-204
Christianity is built upon the rancour of the sick; its instinct is directedagainstthe sound, against health. Everything well-constituted, proud, high-spirited, and beautiful is offensive to its ears and eyes.204
"Faith" simply means the refusal to know what is true.205
The conclusion which all idiots, women and common people come to, that there must be something in a cause for which some one lays down his life (or which, as in the case of primitive Christianity, provokes an epidemic of sacrifices),—this conclusion put a tremendous check upon all investigation, upon the spirit of investigation and of caution. Martyrs haveharmedthe cause of truth.208
Convictions are prisons. They never see far enough, they do not look down from a sufficient height: but in order to have any say in questions of value and non-value, a man must see five hundred convictionsbeneathhim—behindhim.... A spirit who desires great things, and who also desires the means thereto, is necessarily a sceptic. Freedom from every kind of convictionbelongsto strength, to theabilityto open one's eyes freely.209-210
Whom do I hate most among the rabble, the Chandala apostles, who undermine the working man's instinct, his happiness and his feeling of contentedness with his insignificant existence,—who make him envious, and who teach him revenge.... The wrong never lies in unequal rights; it lies in the claim to equal rights.220
The Christian and the anarchist are both decadents; they are both incapable of acting in any other way than disintegratingly, poisonously and witheringly, likebloodsuckers;they are both actuated by an instinct ofmortal hatredof everything that stands erect, that is great, that is lasting, and that is a guarantee of the future. 221-222
Christianity destroyed the harvest we might have reaped from the culture of antiquity, later it also destroyed our harvest of the culture of Islam. The wonderful Moorish world of Spanish culture, which in its essence is more closely related tous,and which appeals more to our sense and taste than Rome and Greece, wastrampled to death(—I do not say by what kind of feet), why?—because it owed its origin to noble, to manly instincts, because it said yea to life, even that life so full of the race, and refined luxuries of the Moors!226
I condemn Christianity and confront it with the most terrible accusation that an accuser has ever had in his mouth. To my mind it is the greatest of all conceivable corruptions, it has had the will to the last imaginable corruption. The Christian Church allowed nothing to escape from its corruption; it converted every value into its opposite, every truth into a lie, and every honest impulse into an ignominy of the soul. Let any one dare to speak to me of its humanitarian blessings! Toabolishany sort of distress was opposed to its profoundest interests; its very existence depended on states of distress; it created states of distress in order to make itself immortal.... The cancer germ of sin, for instance: the Church was the first to enrich mankind with this misery!—The "equality of souls before God," this falsehood, thispretextfor therancunesof all the base-minded, this anarchist bomb of a concept, which has ultimately become the revolution, the modern idea, the principle of decay of the whole of social order,—this isChristiandynamite.... The "humanitarian" blessings of Christianity! To breed aself-contradiction, an art of self-profanation, a will to lie at any price, an aversion, a contempt of all good and honest instincts out ofhumanitas!Is this what you call the blessings of Christianity?—Parasitism as the only method of the Church; sucking all the blood, all the love, all the hope of life out of mankind with anæmic and sacred ideals. A "Beyond" as the will to deny all reality; the cross as the trade-mark of the most subterranean form of conspiracy that has ever existed,—against health, beauty, well-constitutedness, bravery, intellect, kindliness of soul,against Life itself....
This eternal accusation against Christianity I would fain write on all walls, wherever there are walls,—I have letters with which I can make even the blind see.... I call Christianity the one great curse, the one enormous and innermost perversion, the one great instinct of revenge, for which no means are too venomous, too underhand, too underground and toopetty,—I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind....230-231
All the evidences of what was to be Nietzsche's final and complete philosophical work in four volumes, are contained in two volumes of desultory and often highly condensed notes which were recently issued under the single caption of "The Will to Power"("Die Wille zur Macht").On this culminating work Nietzsche had laboured from 1883 until his final breakdown. He made two plans for "The Will to Power"—one in 1886 and the other in 1887. As the 1887 plan was the one ultimately adhered to, there seems no reason to hesitate about accepting it as the right one. The titles of the four books which comprised this final work as it stands to-day are "European Nihilism," "A Criticism of the Highest Values that Have Prevailed Hitherto," "The Principles of a New Valuation" and "Discipline and Breeding." These headings are according to the last plan made at Nice in 1887, and although, as I stated in the preceding chapter, there was some hesitation between the general title of "The Will to Power" and "The Transvaluation of All Values," "The Antichrist," which fell under the latter heading, must not be considered as forming a part of "The Will to Power." However, "The Antichrist" and also "Beyond Good and Evil," "The Genealogy of Morals" and "The Twilightof the Idols," are closely related in thought to "The Will to Power." This fact is borne out not only by internal evidence, by the manner in which the books overlap, and by the constant redistribution of titles which sometimes prove the unity of the last phase of his thought, but also by the testimony of those who had Nietzsche's confidence and could watch him at close quarters.
Nietzsche intended to embody in the four books of "The Will to Power" the entire sweep of his philosophical teachings. This work was to be a summary, not only in statement but also in analysis, of his ethical system. His preceding books had been replete in repetitions, and lacked both organisation and sequence. His health was such that he could work only sporadically and in short shifts, with the result that he was constantly trying to crowd an enormous amount of material into a short space. He was able to deal with but one point at a time, and, as his working period was frequently too short to develop that point as fully as he desired, we find him constantly going back over old ground, altering his syllogisms, making addenda, interpolating analogies, and in numerous other ways changing and clarifying what he had previously written. "The Will to Power" was to be, then, a colossal organisation of all his writings, with every step intact, and every conclusion in its place. And throughout the four volumes emphasis was to be put on his motivating doctrine, the will to power, an oppositional theory to Darwin's theory of struggle for mere existence. But although we have two large volumes of notes, these jottings lack in a large degree the co-ordination which would have characterised them had Nietzsche been able to carry out his plan.
The notes of these two books are the work of manyyears, and the putting together of them for publication has been done without any attempt to alter their original text. They are just as Nietzsche left them—in some cases completed and closely argued paragraphs, in others mere notations and memoranda, elliptic and unelaborated. It is possible, however, to gain a very adequate idea of what was to be the contents of this final work, due to the copiousness of the material at hand. From the time of finishing "Thus Spake Zarathustra" to 1889, Nietzsche was constantly making notes for his great work, and there is no phase of his thought which is not touched upon in these two remaining volumes. By following their pages closely, in the light of his foregoing works, one gets a very definite impression of the synthesis of his thoughts. Especially true is this of the second volume of "The Will to Power," for it is here that his cardinal doctrine is most strongly and consistently emphasised and its relationship to all human relationships most concisely drawn. Because of this fact I have chosen to consider the two volumes separately. The first volume is full of material more or less familiar to those who have followed Nietzsche in his earlier works. The notes are, in the majority of cases, elaborations and explanations of doctrines contained in those books which followed "Thus Spake Zarathustra." As such they are important.
The first volume is divided into two sections—"European Nihilism" and "A Criticism of the Highest Values that Have Prevailed Hitherto." Two subdivisions are found under section one—"Nihilism" and "Concerning the History of European Nihilism." In this first subdivision Nietzsche defines Nihilism and attempts to trace its origin. He states that it is an outcome of the valuationsand interpretations of existence which have formerly prevailed, namely: the result of the doctrines of Christianity. For our adherence to Christian morality, Nietzsche says, we must pay dearly: by this adherence we are losing our equilibrium and are on the verge of adopting opposite valuations—those consisting of Nihilistic elements. He defines the Nihilistic movement as an expression of decadence, and declares that this decadence is spreading throughout all our modern institutions. Under his second subdivision, he explains that modern gloominess is a result of the "slow advance and rise of the middle and lower classes," and asserts that this gloominess is accompanied by moral hypocrisy and the decadent virtues of sympathy and pity. In this connection he denies that the nineteenth century shows an improvement over the sixteenth. No better analysis of the effects of Christian morality on modern man is to be found in any of Nietzsche's writings than in this treatise of Nihilism; and a close study of this analysis will greatly help one in grasping the full significance of the doctrine of the will to power. Although the notes in this book are the least satisfactory of all the portions of "The Will to Power," being both tentative and incomplete, I have been able to select enough definite statements from them to give an adequate idea of both Nietzsche's theories and conclusions in regard to Nihilism.
In the second section of Volume I, "A Criticism of the Highest Values That Have Prevailed Hitherto," the notes are fuller and more closely organised. This is due to the fact that the ground covered by them is in the main the same ground covered by "The Antichrist," "The Genealogy of Morals" and "Beyond Good and Evil." In fact, there is in these notes much repetitionof passages to be found in the three previous volumes. The first subdivision of this second section is called "Criticism of Religion," and there is little material in it which does not appear in "The Antichrist." Even in the manner of expression there exists so strong a similarity that I am inclined to think Nietzsche used these notes in composing his famous philippic against Christianity. Consequently I have made but few quotations from this division, choosing in each instance only such passages as do not possess a direct parallel in his earlier work. We find here the same inquiry into the origin of religions, the same analysis of Christian ideals, the same history of Christian doctrines, and the same argument against the dissemination of Christian faiths as are contained in "The Antichrist." However, these present notes are sufficiently different from this previous book to interest the thorough student, and there are occasional speculations advanced which are not to be encountered elsewhere in Nietzsche's writings. For the casual reader, however, there is little of new interest in this subdivision.
The same criticism holds true to a large extent when we come to the second subdivision of the second section "A Criticism of Morality." In "The Genealogy of Morals" we have a discussion of practically all the subjects considered in the present notes, such as the origin of moral valuations, the basis of conscience, the influence of the herd, the dominance of virtue, the slander of the so-called evil man, and the significance of such words as "improving" and "elevating." However, there is sufficient new material in these notes to warrant a reading, for although, despite a few exceptions, there are no new issues posed, certain points which were put forthonly in a speculative and abridged manner in earlier books, are here enlarged upon. This is especially true in regard to the doctrine of rank. Nietzsche has been accused of advocating only an individualistic morality. But the truth is that he advanced two codes. He preached a morality for the herd, a definite system which suited the needs of the serving classes. For the superior individuals, on the other hand, he taught another code, one which fitted and met the needs of the rulers. The herd morality has always sought to create and maintain a single type of mediocre man. Nietzsche preached the necessity of the superior, as well as the inferior, type of man; and in his present notes he goes into this doctrine more fully than heretofore. Furthermore, he makes clear his stand in regard to the weak. On page 291 he states, "I have declared war against the anæmic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not because I want to annihilate it, but only to put an end to itstyrannyand clear the way for otherideals,formore robustideals." It has been stated, even in quarters where we have a right to look for more intelligent criticism, that Nietzsche favoured the complete elimination of the weak and incompetent. No such advocacy is to be found in his teachings. To the contrary, as will be seen from the above quotation, he preached only against thedominanceof the weak. He resented their supremacy over the intelligent man. Their existence, he maintained, was a most necessary thing. This belief is insisted upon in many places, and one should bear the point in mind when reading the criticisms of socialism to be found throughout the present volume.
Another new point to be found in these notes relates to the immoral methods used by the disseminators ofmorals. From the passages in which these new points are raised I have taken the quotations which follow at the end of this chapter.
In the third and last subdivision of this second section, "Criticism of Philosophy," we have an extension of Chapter I in "Beyond Good and Evil," "Prejudices of Philosophers," and of the two chapters in "The Twilight of the Idols"—"The Problem of Socrates" and "Reason' in Philosophy." The notes (excepting a few pages of general remarks) occupy themselves with a criticism of Greek philosophy and with an analysis of philosophical truths and errors. These notes touch only indirectly on Nietzsche's doctrines, and may be looked upon as explanations of his intellectual methods.
Despite their fragmentariness, the notes in this volume, as I have said, permit one to gain an adequate idea of Nietzsche's purpose. In making my excerpts from this book, I have chosen those passages which will throw new light upon his philosophy rather than those statements of conclusions which have been previously encountered.
EXCERPTS FROM "THE WILL TO POWER" volume I
What does Nihilism mean?—That the highest values are losing their value.8
Thorough Nihilism is the conviction that life is absurd, in the light of the highest values already discovered; it also includes the view that we have not the smallest right to assume the existence of transcendental objects or things in themselves, which would be either divine or morality incarnate.
This view is the result of fully developed "truthfulness": therefore a consequence of the belief in morality.8
Moral valuations are condemnations, negations; morality is the abdication of the will to live.12
All values with which we have tried, hitherto, to lend the world some worth, from our point of view, and with which we have thereforedeprived it of all worth(once these values have been shown to be inapplicable)—all these values, are, psychologically, the results of certain views of utility, established for the purpose of maintaining and increasing the dominion of certain communities: but falsely projected into the nature of things. It is always man'sexaggerated ingenuousnessto regard himself as the sense and measure of all things.15
Every purelymoralvaluation (as, for instance, the Buddhistic)terminates in Nihilism:Europe must expect the same thing! It is supposed that one can get along with a morality bereft of a religious background; but in this direction the road to Nihilism is opened.19
Nihilism is not only a meditating over the "in vain"—not only the belief that everything deserves to perish; but one actually puts one's shoulder to the plough;one destroys.22
The time is coming when we shall have to pay for having beenChristiansfor two thousand years: we are losing the equilibrium which enables us to live—for a long while we shall not know in what direction we are travelling. We are hurling ourselves headlong into theoppositevaluations, with that degree of energy which could only have been engendered in man by anovervaluationof himself.
Now, everything is false from the root, words and nothing but words, confused, feeble, or overstrained.25
Modern Pessimism is an expression of the uselessnessonly of themodernworld, not of the world and existence as such.29
The "preponderance ofpain over pleasure" or the reverse (Hedonism); both of these doctrines are already signposts to Nihilism....
For here, in both cases, no other final purpose is sought than the phenomenon pleasure or pain.29
"Life is not worth living"; "Resignation"; "what is the good of tears?"—this is a feeble and sentimental attitude of mind.29-30
People have not yet seen what is so terribly obvious—namely, that Pessimism is not a problem but asymptom,—that the term ought to be replaced by "Nihilism,"—that the question, "to be or not to be," is itself an illness, a sign of degeneracy, an idiosyncrasy.
The Nihilistic movement is only an expression of physiological decadence.32
Decay, decline,andwaste,are,per se,in no way open to objection; they are the natural consequences of life and vital growth. The phenomenon of decadence is just as necessary to life as advance or progress is: we are not in a position which enables us tosuppressit. On the contrary, reasonwould have it retain its rights.
It is disgraceful on the part of socialist-theorists to argue that circumstances and social combinations could be devised which would put an end to all vice, illness, crime, prostitution, and poverty.... But that is tantamount to condemningLife.33
Decadence itself is not a thingthat can be withstood:it is absolutely necessary and is proper to all ages and all peoples. That which must be withstood, and by all means in our power, is the spreading of the contagion among the sound parts of the organism.33-34
All those things which heretofore have been regarded as thecauses of degeneration,are really its effects.34
If Nature have no pity on the degenerate, it is not therefore immoral: the growth of physiological and moral evils in the human race, is rather theresult of morbid and unnatural morality.44
The whole of our sociology knows no other instinct than that of the herd,i.e.,of amultitude of mere ciphers—of which every cipher has "equal rights," and where it is a virtue to be—naught.45
Nihilism is a sign that the botched and bungled have no longer any consolation, that they destroy in order to be destroyed, that, having been deprived of morality, they no longer have any reason to "resign themselves," that they take up their stand on the territory of the opposite principle, andwill also exercise powerthemselves, by compelling the powerful to become their hangmen.52
Our age, with its indiscriminate endeavours to mitigate distress, to honour it, and to wage war in advance with unpleasant possibilities, is an age of thepoor.57
Overwork, curiosity and sympathy—ourmodern vices.64
Christianity, revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights, philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words are only valuable in a struggle, as banners: not as realities, but asshowwords,for something quite different (yea, even quite opposed to what they mean!).68
The nineteenth century shows no advance whatever on the sixteenth: and the German spirit of 1888 is an example of a backward movement when compared with that of 1788.... Mankind does not advance, it does not even exist. The aspect of the whole is much morelike that of a huge experimenting workshop where some things in all ages succeed, while an incalculable number of things fail; where all order, logic, co-ordination, and responsibility is lacking. How dare we blink the fact that the rise of Christianity is a decadent movement?—that the German Reformation was a recrudescence of Christian barbarism?—that the Revolution destroyed the instinct for an organisation of society on a large scale?... Man is not an example of progress as compared with animals: the tender son of culture is an abortion compared with the Arab or the Corsican; the Chinaman is a more successful type—that is to say, richer in sustaining power than the European. 72-73
I know best why man is the only animal that laughs: he alone suffers so excruciatingly that he wascompelledto invent laughter. The unhappiest and most melancholy animal is, as might have been expected, the most cheerful.74
Socialism—or thetyrannyof the meanest and the most brainless,—that is to say, the superficial, the envious, and the mummers, brought to its zenith,—is, as a matter of fact, the logical conclusion of "modern ideas" and their latent anarchy: but in the genial atmosphere of democratic well-being the capacity for forming resolutions or even for comingto an endat all, is paralysed. Men will follow—but no longer their reason. That is why socialism is on the whole a hopelessly bitter affair: and there is nothing more amusing than to observe the discord between the poisonous and desperate faces of present-day socialists—and what wretched and nonsensical feelings does not their style reveal to us!—and the childish lamblike happiness of their hopes and desires.102
This is the teaching which life itself preaches to allliving things: the morality of Development. To have and to wish to have more, in a word, Growth—that is life itself. In the teaching of socialism "a will to the denial of life" is but poorly concealed: botched men and races they must be who have devised a teaching of this sort.102
Spiritual enlightenmentis an unfailing means of making men uncertain, weak of will, and needful of succour and support; in short, of developing the herding instincts in them.105
When thefeeling of powersuddenly seizes and overwhelms a man,—and this takes place in the case of all the great passions,—a doubt arises in him concerning his own person: he dare not think himself the cause of this astonishing sensation—and thus he posits a stronger person, a Godhead as its cause,114-115
Religion has lowered the concept "man"; its ultimate conclusion is that all goodness, greatness, and truth are superhuman, and are only obtainable by the grace of God.116
In short:what is the price paid for theimprovementsupposed to be due to morality?—The unhinging ofreason,the reduction of all motives to fear and hope (punishment and reward);dependenceupon the tutelage of priests, and upon a formulary exactitude which is supposed to express a divine will; the implantation of a "conscience" which establishes a false science in the place of experience and experiment: as though all one had to do or had not to do were predetermined—a kind of contraction of the seeking and striving spirit;—in short:the worstmutilationof man that can be imagined, and it is pretended that "the good man" is the result.122-123
Paganism is that which says yea to all that is natural,it is innocence in being natural, "naturalness."Christianityis that which says no to all that is natural, it is a certain lack of dignity in being natural; hostility to Nature.127
Christianityis a degenerative movement, consisting of all kinds of decaying and excremental elements: it isnotthe expression of the downfall of a race, it is, from the root, an agglomeration of all the morbid elements which are mutually attractive and which gravitate to one another.
It is thereforenota national religion,notdetermined by race: it appeals to the disinherited everywhere; it consists of a foundation of resentment against all that is successful and dominant: it is in need of a symbol which represents the damnation of everything successful and dominant. It is opposed to every form ofintellectualmovement, to all philosophy: it takes up the cudgels for idiots, and utters a curse upon all intellect. Resentment against those who are gifted, learned, intellectually independent: in all these it suspects the element of success and domination.130
All Christian "truth," is idle falsehood and deception, and is precisely the reverse of that which was at the bottom of the first Christian movement.133
To be really Christian would mean to be absolutely indifferent to dogmas, cults, priests, church, and theology.133
A God who died for our sins, salvation through faith, resurrection after death—all these things are the counterfeit coins of real-Christianity, for which that pernicious blockhead Paul must be held responsible.138
Christianity has, from the first, always transformed the symbolical into crude realities:
(1) The antitheses "true life" and "false life" were misunderstood and changed into "life here" and "life beyond."
(2) The notion "eternal life," as opposed to the personal life which is ephemeral, is translated into "personal immortality";
(3) The process of fraternising by means of sharing the same food and drink, after the Hebrew-Arabian manner, is interpreted as the "miracle of transubstantiation."
(4) "Resurrection" which was intended to mean the entrance to the "true life," in the sense of being intellectually "born again," becomes an historical contingency, supposed to take place at some moment after death;
(5) The teaching of the Son of man as the "Son of God,"—that is to say, the life-relationship between man and God,—becomes the "second person of the Trinity," and thus the filial relationship of every man—even the lowest—to God, isdone away with;
(6) Salvation through faith (that is to say, that there is no other way to this filial relationship to God save through thepractice of lifetaught by Christ) becomes transformed into the belief that there is a miraculous way ofatoningfor allsin;though not through our own endeavours, but by means of Christ:
For all these purposes, "Christ on the Cross" had to be interpreted afresh. Thedeathitself would certainly not be the principal feature of the event ... it was only another sign pointing to the way in which one should behave towards the authorities and the laws of the world—that one was not to defend oneself—this was the exemplary life.139-140
The Gospel is the announcement that the road to happiness lies open for the lowly and the poor—that all onehas to do is to emancipate one's self from all institutions, traditions, and the tutelage of the higher classes. Thus Christianity is no more than thetypical teaching of Socialists.
Property, acquisitions, mother-country, status and rank, tribunals, the police, the State, the Church, Education, Art, militarism: all these are so many obstacles in the way of happiness, so many mistakes, snares, and devil's artifices, on which the Gospel passes sentence—all this is typical of socialistic doctrines.
Behind all this there is the outburst, the explosion of a concentrated loathing of the "masters"—the instinct which discerns the happiness of freedom after such long oppression.173-174
Christianity is a denaturalisation of gregarious morality: under the power of the most complete misapprehensions and self-deceptions. Democracy is a more natural form of it, and less sown with falsehood. It is a fact that the oppressed, the low, and whole mob of slaves and half-castes,will prevail.
First step: they make themselves free—they detach themselves, at first in fancy only; they recognise each other; they make themselves paramount.
Second step: they enter the lists, they demand acknowledgment, equal rights, "Justice."
Third step: they demand privileges (they draw the representatives of power over to their side).
Fourth step: theyalonewant all power, and theyhaveit.177
When and where has any man,of any note at all,resembled the Christian ideal?—at least in the eyes of those who are psychologists and triers of the heart and reins. Look at all Plutarch's heroes!180
Thehigherman distinguishes himself from thelowerby his fearlessness and his readiness to challenge misfortune: it is a sign ofdegenerationwhen eudemonistic values begin to prevail (physiological fatigue and enfeeblement of will-power). Christianity, with its prospect of "blessedness," is the typical attitude of mind of a suffering and impoverished species of man. Abundant strength will be active, will suffer, and will go under.182
All ideals are dangerous; because they lower and brand realities; they are all poisons.183
These "conditions of salvation" of which the Christian is conscious are merely variations of the same diseased state—the interpretation of an attack of epilepsy by means of a particular formula which is provided,notby science, but by religious mania.190
A pang of consciencein a man is a sign that his character is not yet equal to hisdeed.There is such a thing as a pang of conscience aftergood deeds:in this case it is their unfamiliarity, their incompatibility with an old environment.192
We immoralists prefer to disbelieve in "faults." We believe that all deeds, of what kind soever, are identically the same at root; just as deeds which turnagainstus may be useful from an economical point of view, and evengenerally desirable.In certain individual cases, we admit that we might well have beenspareda given action; the circumstances alone predisposed us in its favour. Which of us, iffavouredby circumstances, would not already have committed every possible crime?... That is why, one should never say: "Thou shouldst never have done such and such a thing," but only: "How strange it is that I have not done such and sucha thing hundreds of times already!"—As a matter of fact, only a very small number of acts aretypicalacts and real epitomes of a personality, and seeing what a small number of people really are personalities, a single act very rarely characterises a man. Acts are mostly dictated by circumstances; they are superficial or merely reflex movements performed in response to a stimulus, long before the depths of our beings are affected or consulted in the matter.192-193.
Experience teaches us that, in every case in which a man has elevated himself to any great extent above the average of his fellows, every high degree ofpoweralways involves a corresponding degree offreedomfrom Good and Evil as also from "true" and "false," and cannot take into account what goodness dictates.200
What is Christian "virtue" and "love of men," if not precisely this mutual assistance with a view to survival, this solidarity of the weak, this thwarting of selection? What is Christian altruism, if it is not the mob-egotism of the weak which divines that, if everybody looks after everybody else, every individual will be preserved for a longer period of time?... He who does not consider this attitude of mind asimmoral,as a crime against life, himself belongs to the sickly crowd, and also shares their instincts.... Genuine love of mankind exacts sacrifice for the good of the species—it is hard, full of self-control, because it needs human sacrifices.203
What deserves the most rigorous condemnation, is the ambiguous and cowardly infirmity of purpose of a religion likeChristianity,—or rather like theChurch,—which, instead of recommending death and self-destruction, actually protects all the botched and bungled, and encourages them to propagate their kind.204
Let us see what the "genuine Christian" does of all the things which his instincts forbid him to do:—he covers beauty, pride, riches, self-reliance, brilliancy, knowledge, and power with suspicion andmud—in short,all culture:his object is to deprive the latter of itsclean conscience.200
What is it we combat in Christianity? That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting their proud assurance into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it knows how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect them with disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards, against themselves—until the strong perish through their excessive self-contempt and self-immolation.209
All virtues should be looked upon as physiologicalconditions.213
Formerly it was said of every form of morality, "Ye shall know them by their fruits." I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and from it I learn theSoilout of which it grew."214
My leading doctrine is this:there are no moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. The origin of this interpretation itself lies beyond the pale of morality.214
The whole of morality of Europe is based upon the valueswhich are useful to the herd.228
The herd regards theexception,whether it be above or beneath its general level, as something which is antagonistic and dangerous to itself. Their trick in dealing with the exceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to become guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen—in fact, to becometheirhead-servants:thus they convert a danger into a thing which is useful.231
My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides—that is to say, against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and against those who rise superior to its dead level.236
My philosophy aims at a neworder of rank: notat an individualistic morality. The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd—but not beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their actions.237
Conscience condemns an action because that action has been condemned for a long period of time: all conscience does is to imitate: it does not create values. That which first led to the condemnation of certain actions, wasnotconscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice against) its consequences.... The approbation of conscience, the feeling of well-being, of "inner peace," is of the same order of emotions as the artist's joy over his work—it proves nothing.242
By what means does a virtue attain to power?—With precisely the same means as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining of opposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing of their names, systematic persecution and scorn; in short,by means of acts of general "immorality."252
Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, so that we no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to the love of the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of mind appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the disease of thenervus sympathicus,forinstance, is eulogised as Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc.253
The qualities which constitute the strength of anopposing raceor class are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has: for by means of them it may be harmful to us.255
I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it doesnot sufferfrom the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim itself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as judge because it is always a personal virtue; (6) it does precisely what is generallyforbidden:virtue as I understand it is the actualvetitumwithin all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise virtue in that it is in the Renaissance style—virtu—free from all moralic acid.258
Lust of property, lust of power, laziness, simplicity, fear; all these things are interested in virtue; that is why it stands so securely.261
Vice is a somewhat arbitrary epitome of certain effects resulting from physiological degeneracy. A general proposition such as that which Christianity teaches, namely, "Man is evil," would be justified provided one were justified in regarding a given type of degenerate man as normal. But this may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever Christianity prospers and prevails, the proposition holds good: for then the existence of an unhealthy soil—of a degenerate territory—is demonstrated.269
It is difficult to have sufficient respect for man, when one sees how he understands the art of fighting his way,of enduring, of turning circumstances to his own advantage, and of overthrowing opponents; but when he is seen in the light of hisdesires,he is the most absurd of all animals.269
As to the whole socialistic ideal: it is nothing but a blockheaded misunderstanding of the Christian moral ideal.275
An ideal which is striving to prevail or to assert itself endeavours to further its purpose (a) by laying claim to aspuriousorigin; (b) by assuming a relationship between itself and the powerful ideals already existing; (c) by means of the thrill produced by mystery, as though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself; (d) by the slander of its opponents' ideals; (e) by a lying teaching of the advantages which follow in its wake, for instance: happiness, spiritual peace, general peace, or even the assistance of a mighty God.278
My view: all the forces and instincts which are the source of life are lying beneath theban of morality:morality is the life-denying instinct. Morality must be annihilated if life is to be emancipated.278
Every one's desire is that there should be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means of which he himself succeeds. Thus thefundamental tendencyof theweakandmediocreof all times, has been toenfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the level of the weak: their chief weapon in this processwas themoral principle.The attitude of the strong towards the weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become bad bywords.279
Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in a struggle, strives to convince itself of this: "Good taste, good judgment, and virtue areours." War urges people to this exaggerated self-esteem.281
Whatever kind of eccentric ideal one may have (whether as a "Christian," a "free-spirit," an "immoralist," or a German Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its beingtheideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged nature. One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it, and thus level one's self down to the rest of mankind.281
Real heroism consists,notin fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission and disinterestedness, but innot fighting at all.... "I am thus: I will be thus—and you can go to the devil!"282
Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate: thus you would that men were?—thatgood menwere? But such men I can only conceive as slaves, the slaves of the future.289
Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance, are just so manyobstaclesin the way ofsovereign sentiments,of greatingenuity,of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self.290
I have declared war against the anæmic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not because I want to annihilate it, but only to put an end to itstyrannyand clear the way for otherideals,formore robustideals.291
If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and not one's neighbour that one is succouring.294
"One is continually promoting the interests of one's'ego'at the cost of other people"; "Living consists in living at the cost of others"—he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step towards truth to himself.294
A morality and a religion of "love," thecurbingof the self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, resignation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of envy,—feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the botched,—and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being-ruled, of poverty, of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness, the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross."296
Thehatred of egoism,whether it be one's own (as in the case of the Socialists) appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenge; and also as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative instinct of the suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and unity.... At bottom, the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism (one's own or that of others) is still a self-preservative measure on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological circumstances.
When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it only shows that he is oppressed by his inadequate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he also finds pleasure in crying;—if he were more at ease he would take jolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he wouldseek his pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses, condemns, and slanders the "world"—and does not even except himself. But that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find relief in slander.298
I value a man according to thequantum of power and fulness of his will;not according to the enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I consider that a philosophy whichteachesthe denial of will is both defamatory and slanderous.... I test thepowerof awillaccording to the amount of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its own advantage; I do not point to the evil and pain of existence with the finger of reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been.304
My ultimate conclusion is, that the real man represents a much higher value than the "desirable" man of any ideal that has ever existed hitherto; that all "desiderata" in regard to mankind have been absurd and dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular kind of man has sought to establish his measures of preservation and of growth as a law for all; that every "desideratum" of this kind which has been made to dominate hasreducedman's worth, his strength, and his trust in the future; that the indigence and mediocre intellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he reveals adesire;that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been developed too inadequately to do justice to the actual, not merely to the "desirable,"worth of man;that, up to the present, ideals have really been the power which has most slandered man and power, thepoisonous fumes which have hung over reality, and which haveseduced men to yearn for nonentity....311
One must be very immoral in order tomake people moral by deeds.The moralist's means are the most terrible that have ever been used; he who has not the courage to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for anything else, but not for the duties of a moralist.314
The priests of all ages have always pretended that they wished to "improve.. ... But we, of another persuasion, would laugh if a lion-tamer ever wished to speak to us of his "improved" animals. As a rule, the taming of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating it: even the moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker member of his species.319
Up to the present, morality has developed at thecostof: the ruling classes and their specific instincts, the well-constituted andbeautifulnatures, the independent and privileged classes in all respects.
Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature's endeavours to arrive at ahigher type.Its effects are: mistrust of life in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be immoral),—hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values are felt to be opposed to the higher instincts).—Degeneration and self-destruction of "higher natures," because it is precisely in them that the conflict becomesconscious.321
Suppose thestrongwere masters in all respects, even in valuing: let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering, and sacrifice. Self-contempt on the part of the weak would be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their kind. And would this be desirable?—should we really like a world in which the subtlety, the consideration, theintellectuality, theplasticity—in fact, the whole influence of the weak—was lacking? ...323
Under "Spiritual freedom" I understand something very definite: it is a state in which one is a hundred times superior to philosophers and other disciples of "truth" in one's severity towards one's self, in one's uprightness, in one's courage, and in one's absolute will to say nay even when it is dangerous to say nay. I regard the philosophers that have appeared heretofore ascontemptible libertineshiding behind the petticoats of the female "Truth."384
The second volume of "The Will to Power," even in its present fragmentary form, is the most important of Nietzsche's works. It draws together under one cover many of the leading doctrines voiced in his principal constructive books, and in addition states them in terms of his fundamental postulate—the will to power. In Volume I of this work we had the application of this doctrine to morality, religion and philosophy. In the present book it is applied to science, nature, society, breeding and art. The notes are more analytical than in the former volume; and the subject-matter is in itself of greater importance, being more directly concerned with the exposition of Nietzsche's main theory. Volume II is also fuller and more homogeneous, and contains much new material. So compact is its organisation that one is able to gain a very adequate idea of the purpose which animated Nietzsche at the time of making these notes.
The will to power, the principle which Nietzsche held to be the elementary expression of life, must be understood in order for one to comprehend the Nietzschean system of ethics. Throughout all the books which followed "The Joyful Wisdom" we have indirect references to it and conclusions based on its assumption as ahypothesis. And, although it was never definitely and finally defined until the publication of the notes comprising "The Will to Power," it nevertheless was the actuating motive in all Nietzsche's constructive writings. Simply stated, the will to power is the biological instinct to maintenance, persistence and development. Nietzsche holds that Darwin's universal law of the instinct to mere survival is a misinterpretation of the forces at work in life. He points out that existence is a condition—a medium of action—and by no means an end. It is true that only the fittest survive in nature as a result of the tendency to exist; but this theory does not account for the activities which take place after existence has been assured. In order to explain these activities Nietzsche advances the theory of the will to power and tests all actions by it. It will be seen that by this theory the universal law of Darwin is by no means abrogated, but rather is it explained and developed.
In the operation of Darwin's biological law there are many forces at work. That is to say, once the fact of existence is established, numerous forces can be found at work within the limits of existence. We know that the forces of nature—acting within the medium of existence which is ana prioricondition—are rarely unified and directed toward the same result. In short, they are not reciprocal. To the contrary, they work more often against each other—they are antagonistic. Immediately a war of forces takes place; and it is this war that constitutes all action in nature. A force in nature directed at another force calls forth a resistance and counter-force; and this instinct to act and to resist is in itself a will to act. Otherwise, inertia would be the condition of life, once mere existence was assured by the fittest.But life is not inert. Even when certain organisms have accomplished the victory for existence, and are no longer moved by a necessity to struggle for mere being, the will to action persists; and this will to action, according to Nietzsche, is the will for power, for in every clash of forces, there is an attempt on the part of each force to overcome and resist the antagonistic one. The greater the action, the greater the antagonism. Hence, this tendency in all forces topersistis at bottom a tendency of self-assertion, of overcoming counter-forces, of augmenting individual power. Wherever this will to persist is found, Nietzsche argues that the will to act is present; and there can be no will to act without a will to power, because the very desire for existence and development is a desire for power.
This, in brief, is Nietzsche's doctrine applied to the organic and inorganic world. In its application to the ideological world, the reasoning is not changed. In ideas Nietzsche finds this same will to power. But in them it is the reflection of the principle inherent in the material world. There is no will inherent in ideas. This assumption of a reflected will to power in the ideological world is one of Nietzsche's most important concepts, for it makes all ideas the outgrowth of ourselves, and therefore dependent on natural laws. It does away with the conception of supernatural power and with the old philosophical belief that ideas are superior forces to those of the organic and inorganic world. Nietzsche once and for all disposes of the theory that there is anything more powerful than force, and by thus doing away with this belief, he rationalises all ideas and puts thought on a tangible and stable basis. In the opening section of the present book where he applies the will to power toscientific research, the whole of this new theory is made clear, and I advise the student to read well this section, for I have been unable to present as clear and complete an expositional statement of it in Nietzsche's own words as I would have liked to do, owing to the close and interrelated manner in which these notes were written.
Volume II of "The Will to Power" is in two books. The first is called "The Principles of a New Valuation"; the second, "Discipline and Breeding." The first book is divided into four sections—"The Will to Power in Science," "The Will to Power in Nature," "The Will to Power as Exemplified in Society and in the Individual" and "The Will to Power in Art." The second book has three divisions—"The Order of Rank," "Dionysus" and "Eternal Recurrence." Of the first section of Book One, "The Will to Power in Science," I have already spoken. In this section Nietzsche shows how arbitrary a thing science is, and how closely related are its conclusions to the instinct of the scientists, namely: the instinct of the will to power. Scientists, he holds, are confronted by the necessity of translating all phenomena into terms compatible with the struggle for persistence and maintenance. A fact in nature unaccounted for is a danger, an obstacle to the complete mastery of natural conditions. Consequently the scientist, directed and influenced by his will to power, invents explanations which will bring all facts under his jurisdiction and control, and will thereby increase his feeling of power. As a result, the great facts of life are looked upon as of secondary importance to their explanations, and science becomes, not an intelligent search for knowledge, but a system of interpretations tending to increase the feeling of mastery in the men directly connected with it. Thus the law of the will topower, as manifest in the organic and inorganic world, becomes the dominating instinct in the ideological world as well.
It is well to speak here of truth as Nietzsche conceived it. We have seen how he denied its absolutism and declared it to be relative. But in his present work he goes further and contends that the feeling of the increase of power is the determining factor in truth. If, as we have seen, the "truths" of science are merely those interpretations which grow out of the scientists' will to power, then truth itself must be the outgrowth of this instinct. That which makes for the growth and development of the individual—or in other words, that which increases the feeling of strength—is necessarily the truth. From this it is easy to deduce the conclusion that in many instances truth is a reversal of facts, for preservation very often consists in an adherence to actual falsity. Thus, the false causality of certain phenomena—the outcome of logic engendered by a will to power—has not infrequently masqueraded as truth. Nietzsche holds that this doctrine contains the only possible definition of truth; and in this doctrine we find an explanation for many of the apparent paradoxes in his teachings when the matter of truth and falsity are under discussion.
The second part of the first book relates to the will to power in nature, and contains the most complete and lucid explanation of Nietzsche's basic theory to be found anywhere in his writings. This section opens with an argument against a purely mechanical interpretation of the world, and a refutation of the physicists' concept of "energy." The chemical and physical laws, the atomic theory and the mechanical concept of movement, he characterises as "inventions" on the part of scientists andresearchers for the purpose of understanding natural phenomena and therefore of increasing their feeling of power. The apparent sequence of phenomena which constitutes "law" is, according to Nietzsche, only a "relation of power between two or more forces"—a matter of interdependence, a process wherein the "procession of moments donotdetermine each other after the manner of cause and effect." In these observations we see the process of reasoning with which Nietzsche refutes the current methods of ascertaining facts and the manner in which he introduces the principle of will to power into the phenomena of nature.
It is in this section that Nietzsche discusses at length the points of divergence between his life principle and that of Darwin. And it is here also that he treats of the psychology of pleasure and pain in their relation to the will to power. This latter statement is of great importance in an understanding of the instincts of life as he taught them, for it denies both pleasure and pain a place in the determining of acts. They are both, according to him, but accompanying factors, never causes, and are but second-rate valuations derived from a dominating value. He denies that man struggles for happiness. To the contrary, he holds that all expansion and growth and resistance—in short, all movement—is related to states of pain, and that, although the modern man is master of the forces of nature and of himself, he is no happier than the primeval man. Why, then, does man struggle for knowledge and growth, knowing that it does not bring happiness? Not for existence, because existence is already assured him. But for power, for the feeling of increased mastery. Thus Nietzsche answers the two common explanations of man's will to action—theneed for being and the desire for happiness—by his doctrine of the will to power.
The entire teaching of Nietzsche in regard to classes and to the necessity of divergent moral codes to meet the needs of higher and lower castes, is contained in the third part of the first book. Here again he emphasises the need of two codes and makes clear his stand in relation to the superior individual. As I have pointed out in preceding chapters, Nietzsche did not attempt to do away with the morality of the inferior classes. He saw that some such religious belief as Christianity was imperative for them. His fight was against its application to all classes, against its dominance. I mention this point again because it is the basis of the greatest misunderstanding of Nietzsche's philosophy. Part III is written for the higher man, and if this viewpoint is assumed on the part of the reader, there will be no confusion as to doctrines encountered. The statements in this section are in effect similar to those to be found in Nietzsche's previous works, but in every instance in the present case they are directly related to the will to power. Because of this they possess a significance which does not attach to them in antecedent volumes.
The whole of Nietzsche's art theories are to be found in Part IV, "The Will to Power in Art." It is not merely a system of æsthetics that occupies the pages under this section, for Nietzsche never divorces art from life itself; and the artist, according to him, is the superior type, the creator of values. The concepts of beauty and ugliness are the outgrowths of an overflow of Dionysian power; and it is to the great artists of the past, the instinctive higher men, that we owe our current concepts. The principle here is the dominant one in Nietzsche'sphilosophy in relation to valuing:—to the few individuals of the race are we indebted for the world of values.To the student who wishes to go deeply into Nietzsche's ideas of art and his conception of the artist, and to know in just what manner the Dionysian and Apollonian figure in his theories, I unhesitatingly recommend Anthony M. Ludovici's book, "Nietzsche and Art."
The first section of the second book in this volume contains some of Nietzsche's finest writing. Its title, "The Order of Rank," explains in a large measure what material comprises it. It is a description of the various degrees of man, and a statement of the attributes which belong to each. No better definition of the different classes of men is to be found anywhere in this philosopher's writings. One part is devoted to a consideration of the strong and the weak, and the way in which they react on one another; another part deals with "the noble man" and contains (in Aphorism 943) a list of the characteristics of the noble man, unfortunately too long a list to be quoted in the present chapter; another part defines "the lords of the earth"; another part delineates "the great man," and enumerates his specific qualities; and still another part treats of "the highest man as law-giver of the future." This section, however, is not a mere series of detached and isolated definitions, but an important summary of the ethical code which Nietzsche advanced as a result of his application of the doctrine of the will to power to the order of individual rank.
The two remaining sections—"Dionysus" and "Eternal Recurrence"—are short, and fail to touch on new ground. There are a few robust and heroic passages in the former section which summarise Nietzsche's definitions of Apollonian and Dionysian; but in the lattersection there is nothing not found in the pamphlet called "The Eternal Recurrence" and in "Thus Spake Zarathustra." I do not doubt that Nietzsche had every intention of elaborating this last section, for he considered the principle of recurrence a most important one in his philosophy. But, as it stands, it is but a few pages in length and in no way touches upon his other philosophical doctrines. If importance it had in the philosophy of the superman, that importance was never shown either by Nietzsche or by his critics.
However, let us not overlook the importance of the doctrine of the will to power either in its relation to Nietzsche's writings or in its application to ourselves. By this doctrine the philosopher wished to make mankind realise its great dormant power. The insistence on the human basis of all things was no more than a call to arms—an attempt to instil courage in men who had attributed all great phenomena to supernatural forces and had therefore acquiesced before them instead of having endeavoured to conquer them. Nietzsche's object was to make man surer of himself, to infuse him with pride, to imbue him with more daring, to awaken him to a full realisation of his possibilities. This, in brief, is the teaching of the will to power reduced to its immediate influences. In this doctrine is preached a new virility. Not the sedentary virility of compromise, but the virility which is born of struggle and suffering, which is a sign of one's great love of living. Nietzsche offered a new set of vital ideals to supplant the decadent ones which now govern us. Resolute faith, the power of affirmation, initiative, pride, courage and fearlessness—these are the rewards in the exercise of the will to power. The strength of great love and the vitality of great deeds, aswell as the possibility of rare and vigorous growth, lie within this doctrine of will. Its object is to give back to us the life we have lost—the life of beauty and plenitude, of strength and exuberance.